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An urban theory of the ‘global south’ rejects the northern experience of urbanisation 
as the primary articulation of global urbanism and promotes the development of new 
paradigms and methodologies for the study of southern urbanism. Emerging 
theories on southern urbanism destabilise and decentre geographies of knowledge 
by ‘provincializing’ hegemonic urban theory. Cities across the ‘global south’ are 
developing in ways that challenge predominant theories and models of urban policy 
and planning. Therefore, the task we face is to develop a methodological repertoire 
to better understand the emergence of new place-making politics. To this end, the 
aims of this study are i) to challenge urban theory by identifying lacunas in analyses 
of southern urbanism; ii) to elaborate, trial and evaluate a research agenda built 
around ‘cityness’ to inform an urban theory of the ‘global south.’ The methodology 
is structured around an examination of the masterplans of the case study city (Dakar, 
Senegal) and a field-based analysis of (two) spaces in the city. By working with scale, 
the analysis arrives at a better understanding of ‘cityness’ and the various forces 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
The issue, the problem, the controversy   
The aim of this project is to harness theory as a ‘liberatory practice’ to challenge the 
metanarratives and hegemonic conventions of global urbanism (hooks, 1991, pg. 2). 
As it stands, cities of the ‘global south’ are evolving in ways that elude conventional 
theoretical frameworks and we have not yet developed the methodological repertoire 
to tap into their experiences. The corpus of urban theory is overwhelmingly focused 
on an exclusive group of northern cities framed as ‘successful locales of high 
finance and corporate city life’ while ‘poor’ cities are purveyors of a failed 
modernisation - 'economically stagnant yet (perversely?) expanding in 
size' (Robinson, 2002, pg. 540). This is not a new debate, but it is one that has 
‘struggled to gain traction’ (Pieterse, 2010), as southern cities are continually 
measured against a ‘global/world cities’ model based on ‘northern’ urbanisation 
(Shatkin, 2007, pg. 1). This teleology relegates southern cities to the ‘waiting room of 
history’ (Chakrabarty, 2000, pg. 8) as the metropolitan ‘other’ - systematically vilified 
or ignored by urban theory (Said, 1978; Miraftab, 2009, pg. 45). The urbanisation 
narrative of southern cities is steeped in what Hart (2001, pg. 650) terms ‘Big D 
Development’ or the post-World War II invention of the ‘Third World’ and 
‘underdevelopment’ in the aftermath of decolonisation. This rhetoric emphasises 
economic growth indicators and northern models of development as the benchmark 
of efficient urbanisation and overlooks the agency of local actors in the historically 
determinate urbanisation in other parts of the world (Malaquais, 2011; Pieterse, 
2010). Consequently, theories of global urbanism based on northern research cannot 
account for the urbanisation of cities beyond the confines of a world ‘narrated by 
Lewis Mumford1 and his followers’ (Malaquais, 2011, pg. 7). Our epistemic vision 
remains myopic as only the narrowest ‘parameters of change are possible and 
allowable’ (Lorde, 1984). 
 
The ‘parochial nature’ of urban theory and planning has been well documented 
by Yiftachel (2006), Watson (2002, 2009, 2013), and Roy (2009, 2011), as ‘travelling 
ideas’ from the north have often resulted in catastrophic results in the south. Policies 
directed at southern cities continue to rely on ‘unimaginative modernist templates’ 
 
1 Lewis Mumford was a prominent urban theorist of the 20th century whose work remains 
influential to modern urban planning.  
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repackaged as postcolonial, postmodern and, ‘post-racial (alternatively post-ethnic)’ 
(Malaquais, 2011, pg. 7-8). The restrictive boundaries of theory and planning create 
a dichotomy between the dynamic, informal cities of the ‘global south’ and the more 
static, formal cities of the ‘global north.’ Urbanity, however, is not a self-evident 
reality as cities are constantly evolving as complex systems (Brenner & Schmid, 2014, 
pg. 20). For example, city-building in much of the south is often an organic and ‘non-
state affair,’ driven by elaborate systems of organisation, exchange, regulation, 
‘reciprocity and continuous recalibration' (Pieterse, 2017, pg. 220).  Urban planning, 
however, is largely based on a singular notion of ‘proper’ communities and therefore 
remains poorly equipped to handle matters pertaining to southern urbanisation 
(Watson, 2013, pg. 102). 
 
Within this paradigm, African cities, in particular, have been ignored or ‘banished’ 
to a category of ‘not-quite cities’ (Myers, 2011, pg. 4). This has resulted in the 
dissemination of narrow and simplistic ideas on conditions of African urbanism. 
Across the continent2, cities are researched not in terms of ‘what they are, but in 
terms of what they might become’ given the appropriate policy reform and 
institutional infrastructure (Buckley & Kallergis, 2014, pg. 173). Mbembe and Nuttall 
(2004, pg. 348-9) argue that the African continent is ‘perpetually caught and 
imagined within a web of difference and absolute otherness’ (Said, 1978). Analyses 
of African urbanisation are often fraught with what Ferguson (2006, pg. 2-5) calls 
‘Africa talk’ – the generalising and predominant way of thinking about ‘Africa and 
its cities’ whereby Africa is a category based on which ‘a world is constructed…and 
a category within which and according to which people must live.’  The monolith of 
the 'African city,' exemplified in mega-cities such as Lagos, Kinshasa or Accra, is 
analysed as the antithesis of western urbanisation and acts as an all-
encompassing reference for failed modernisation or 'all that can go wrong with 
urbanism' (Myers, 2011, pg. 4).  
 
To theorise and write 'across the whole continent,' focusing mainly on the 'less 
palatable particularities' of African urbanisation (Myers, 2011, pg. 3; Chabal, 2009) 
 
2 The distinction between north and sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is irrelevant within the scope 
of a research project on the ‘global south’ given the intermingled histories of cities across 
the continent. However, the dichotomy reflects the UN division of world regions and is 
utilised for statistical and demographic data on the subregions of Northern Africa and SSA. 
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suggests an implicit understanding of African urbanisation as a 'distinct lesser kind 
of urban geography' (Myers, 2011, pg. 4). The ‘value’ of published work on African 
urbanisation is diminished by the perceived limitations and usefulness of this 
research to the field of urban geography (Parnell & Pieterse, 2016, pg. 242). ‘Things 
African’ are considered ‘residual entities, the study of which does not contribute 
anything to the knowledge of the world’ (Mbembe in Goldstone & Obarrio, 2017, pg. 
211). This betrays a normative understanding of urbanisation that frames the 
‘cityness’ of African cities as ‘alternative modernities’ (McFarlane & Rutherford, 
2008, pg. 341), evaluated in terms of the ‘authenticity of the copy’ (Ferguson, 2006, 
pg. 16). Consequently, research on African cities is limited by a ‘relevance reflex’ 
according to which the subject of urban inquiry is relevant only insofar as it 
addresses practical policy questions that ‘solve’ real-world problems (Pieterse & 
Parnell, 2014). The imperative of ‘useful knowledge’ leads to an overemphasis on 
institutional reform and capacity-building programmes. Thus, the challenge we face 
is to develop a research agenda that holds in tension a critical reading of power 
dynamics at both the macro and micro levels alongside a thorough engagement with 
‘relevant’ research (Pieterse, 2009, pg. 8). 
 
‘Cityness’ 
 To take on the challenge of studying southern urbanisation, this thesis proposes 
‘cityness’ as a lens to impose ‘conceptual order on a messy reality’ and illuminate 
the blind spots in our theoretical vision (Creswell, 2014, pg. 5). Traditional 
understandings and ‘essentialized visions’ of ‘cityness’ are rooted in the moral 
values attached to urban life (e.g. the etymology of ’civility’ is close to that of ‘city’) 
(Choplin & Ciavolella, 2017, pg. 325). Based on this approach, southern cities are 
described as 'lacking in the qualities of cityness' because of their divergent 
development (Robinson, 2002, pg. 531). ‘Cityness,’ however, refutes the universalist 
grammar of global urbanism and expands the scope of urban studies to examine the 
place-making politics that transcend mimicry of the west. Sassen (2005) argues that 
‘cityness’ captures ‘something that might otherwise easily get lost: types of urbanity 
that are non-Western.’ An urban theory of the ‘global south’ disrupts the universal 
narrative of urbanisation steeped in Eurocentric accounts of modernity and engages 
with layered, complex and emerging forms of southern urbanisation. This framework 
examines cities across the ‘global south’ as ‘distinct but intertwined repositories of 
modernity’ and ‘harbingers of the capacity for extraordinariness and novelty’ 
(Robinson, 2002, pg. 5). Cities of the south are at the heart of historical global 
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processes and ‘generators of urban stories worth telling and worth learning 
from’ (Myers, 2011, pg. 6).  By framing the discussion in terms of ‘cityness,’ southern 
cities are recast as ‘works in progress, at the same time exceedingly creative and 
extremely stalled’ (Simone, 2004, pg. 1).  
 
According to Mbembe (2010), there is no ‘better laboratory than Africa’ to gauge our 
‘epistemological imagination’ or pose questions about ‘how we know what we know’ 
(in Shipley et al., 2010, pg. 654). Researchers and theorists, including Myers (2011), 
Simone (2004), Robinson (2011), De Boeck & Plissart (2004), Parnell (2014), and 
Pieterse (2010) seek to counter simplistic ideas about southern urbanisation and 
challenge conventional metanarratives through the analysis of African cities 
(Choplin, 2012, pg. 2).  Their aim is to identify and document the ‘inventive responses 
to the contingencies of our times’ through a more nuanced examination of African 
cities (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012, pg. 125). To this end, this analysis uses ‘cityness’ 
to account for the ‘multiplicity of the pathways and trajectories of change’ in the case 
study city (Shipley et al., 2010, pg. 654).  
 
In the field of urban theory, African cities are often one step ahead of the ‘knowledge 
produced about them’ (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004, pg. 349), as their spatial 
organisation has often escaped ‘conventional methods of analysing cities’ (Isichei, 
2002, pg. 14). The challenge is therefore to hold in tension political and theoretical 
insights that make sense of the ‘elusive African city' in the analysis of ‘cityness’ 
(Pieterse, 2017, pg. 218). This framework casts urban Africans as ‘active agents’ in 
the construction of meaningful lives, rather than the ‘passive victims of inexorable 
structural processes’ (Murray & Meyers, 2011, pg.3). For example, in times of 
sickness, the urban African ‘will consult, one after another,’ the doctor in an Abidjan 
hospital, the faith healer in the suburbs and the ‘witch doctor in his village’ because 
s/he ‘simultaneously inhabits these different worlds’ (Bayart, 1993, pg. 12). This 
example demonstrates how ‘cityness’ transcends fixed and opposing coordinates 
demarking places of modernity and tradition (Brooks & Herrick, 2019, pg. 12). African 
cities are places 'to be modern' and to 'keep tradition alive,' to be ‘a kinsman’ and to 
be cosmopolitan (Simone & Abouhani, 2005, pg. 12).  Hanchard (1999, pg. 247) 
defines this social reality as ‘Afro-modernity’ or the ‘selective incorporation of 
technologies, discourses, and institutions of the modern West within cultural and 
political practices of African-derived people.’ Similarly, Ndi (2007) discusses the 
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ways in which urban dwellers find ways to integrate themselves into narrative of 
liberal capitalism while retaining ‘humanism and warmth that reflects pre-colonial 
standards’3 (Aoyaji et al., 1998; Ndi, 2007, pg. 178-9). African societies have never 
been the ‘passive objects’ of processes of exploitation and dependency as neither 
colonisation nor economic decline has lessened their ability to ‘pursue their own 
strategies to produce their own modernity’ (Bayart, 1993, pg. 20).  ‘Cityness’ is a tool 
to capture these coeval adaptations of the modern and generate a nuanced 
understanding of urban phenomena in Africa and across the ‘global south.’ The 
study of African cities does not necessitate ‘unique methodological requirements’ 
as the findings of this thesis do not have exclusive relevance to the African continent 
and lay out a methodology that captures urban processes unfolding across the 
‘global south.’ (Duminy et al., 2014, pg. 2). 
 
Research aims and questions   
This thesis is predicated on ‘cityness,’ not cities. The title is deliberately kept open-
ended to signal that the contributions of this research project extend beyond the 
case study city. While the thesis contributes to existing scholarship on the case city, 
the key contribution of this work is rooted in the task of arriving at a coherent 
understanding of ‘cityness’ by extending our knowledge of urbanisation in the 
‘global south.’4 To do so, the analysis posits the need for a deeper discussion on the 
emblematic characteristics of southern urbanisation that redress the oversights of 
mainstream urban theory. This is achieved via a retroductive analysis that ‘speaks 
back’ to mainstream urban theory and a methodology that is deployed and evaluated 
in the case study city (Dakar, Senegal). The retroductive study is neither wholly 
inductive (i.e. assuming the researcher enters ‘unknown’ territory to develop theory) 
or deductive (in the practice of relying on established scholarship to cast a gaze on 
the ‘south’). Rather, the thesis speaks directly to existing scholarship and evaluates 
its relevance to southern cities while also engaging with emerging theories on 
urbanisation in the ‘global south.’  
The research questions of this analysis are outlined as follows:  
 
3 See Mourides example on pg. 258-259 
4 The ‘global south’ is presented in lowercase and quotations to signal the problematic nature 
of the theoretical divisions and dichotomies within the field of urban planning and theory. 
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RQ1. How does an urban theory of the ‘global south’ address 
the gaps in urban theory and planning (in Africa)?  
RQ2. How can we operationalise a research agenda 
structured around ‘cityness’ to inform an urban theory of the 
‘global south’?  
RQ3. How does the selected methodology contribute to our 
understanding of ‘cityness’ (in Africa)? 
   
This research project is focused on the ‘global south’ rather than a regional theory 
of sub-Saharan African cities in order to challenge the common assumption within 
urban planning and policy that these cities are marginal examples that contribute 
little to the ‘knowledge of the world’ (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004, pg. 350). By harnessing 
the ‘ex-centricity’ of southern cities outside the traditional scope of urban theory and 
doing away with regional divisions through a relational approach, the thesis posits 
that African cities are valid empirical bases for the development of ‘mainstream’ 
urban theory (Bhaba, 1994, pg. 6).  Furthermore, by speaking to the ‘global south’ 
(rather than ‘Africa’), the analysis avoids the trap of African exceptionalism and 
worsening the trend of ‘mosaic epistemologies’ (Connell, 2015). Southern theory 
based on the analysis of an African case study does not require a ‘distinct set of 
propositions’ or an ‘alternative paradigm’ to challenge hegemonic concepts 
(Connell, 2014, pg. 217). Rather, the thesis argues that there are ‘important 
propositions’ that can be advanced from southern perspectives and African cities 
are valid empirical bases from which to develop urban theory (ibid). 
 
The research questions of this analysis are applicable across the ‘global south’ but 
have been structured around the African continent and applied specifically to the 
city of Dakar, Senegal. The premise of this thesis, however, is the elaboration of a 
methodology based on ‘cityness’ that is replicable across all southern cities. The 
analysis avoids gross generalisations that construct a metanarrative for southern 
urbanism and instead proposes ‘cityness’ as a way of understanding urban 
phenomena in the ‘global south.’ To this end, the methodology is designed to 
identify what Healey (2012) refers to as ‘contingent universals’ or the understanding 
of what is specific to a place and ‘what can be shared learning across different 
localities and contexts.’ The empirical work of this research project is conducted in 
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the same vein as Chimurenga5 and Cityscapes6. These journals have expanded the 
methodological repertoire of urban studies by challenging traditional theorisations 
of African and southern cities within the disciplines of urban studies and planning.  
 
Structure of the thesis   
The thesis is structured as a retroductive analysis that speaks directly to existing 
urban scholarship and engages with emerging theories to develop and evaluate the 
methodology (Figure 1).  
Identification: 
The theoretical work of this thesis is based on the premise that something is amiss 
in urban theory with regards to the study of southern cities (African cities, in 
 
5 Chimurenga (‘Struggle for Freedom’) is a ‘Pan-African publication of culture, art, and 
politics based in Cape Town. It provides an innovative platform for free ideas and political 
reflection by Africans about Africa’ (chimurengachronic.co.za) 
6 Cityscapes magazine is a ‘hybrid of forms, simultaneously invested in scholarly discourse 
around contemporary urbanism in Africa and the ‘global south,’ as much as individual 
everyday experiences and activities of the multitude of actors that are actively involved in 
shaping cities across the continent and the rest of the developing world’ 
(https://www.cityscapesdigital.net/about/). 
Identification
•The analysis begins by identifying the issues,
problems or existing 'pain points' within urban
theory. The gaps in our knowledge concerning
southern urbanisation have limited our
understanding of urban phenomena unfolding in
southern cities (such as Dakar, Senegal).
Elaboration
•The research project proposes a methodology
structured around 'cityness' as a means of testing
the relevance of northern theory in southern contexts
and evaluating emerging frameworks within the
scope of an urban theory of the 'global south.'
Implementation
•The methodology is based on i) planning analysis
based on archival research and ii) field-based
analysis of designated spaces in the case study city.
Evaluation
•The contributions and effectiveness of the selected
methodology are evaluated and assessed.
Where/when the methodology has failed to produce
relevant insights, the analysis proposes
amendments and improvements for future study.
Figure 1: Elements of the retroductive study (Author's own figure) 
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particular). Chapter Two engages with literature on African cities to expose the 
oversights of urban theory and identify instances in which theory based in/on the 
‘global north’ is inappropriate or poorly suited to the study of African urbanism. 
Specifically, the study of African cities has been dominated by global political 
economy and policy fix approaches that examine urbanisation through the scope of 
development discourse and modernisation theory. This chapter discusses an 
emerging and evolving research tract, labelled ‘socio-spatial infrastructures,’ that 
examines new types of resistance, exchanges, networks, development and 
subsistence in African cities (Enwezor et al., 2003, pg. 19). These studies are often 
concerned with the ‘nexus of multiple crossings that constitute urban 
spatiality' (Pieterse, 2010, pg. 3) and inform the methodology of this analysis in the 
examination of ‘largely makeshift complexion of many cities in Africa and Asia’ 
(Simone & Pieterse, 2017).  
Elaboration:  
Chapter Three addresses previous and ongoing work that, in its totality, constitutes 
an urban theory of the ‘global south.’ This section lays out the theoretical backbone 
of this thesis. By addressing definitions and categorisations, the false dichotomies 
underpinning urban theory are taken apart in order to situate northern theory within 
the geographical and intellectual prisms from which it originates. In so doing, the 
analysis identifies instances in which existing theory does not apply to southern 
contexts and examines new methods for studying urbanisation that dislodge the 
locus of knowledge production. Based on this discussion, the analysis proposes 
three ‘corrective mainstreams’ (Pieterse, 2017) which are the core tenets of this 
retroductive study. These are broadly defined as ‘southern urbanism’ (Corrective 
mainstream 1) rooted in postcolonial critique, ‘vitalist ontologies’ (Corrective 
mainstream 2) based on a deconstructive approach to the study of urban 
infrastructure, and ‘everyday urbanism’ (Corrective mainstream 3) focused on 
survival strategies and routine practices that define and shape urbanity. 
 
Chapter Four is dedicated to methodology and addresses both the traditional 
methods for studying African cities and new avenues that expand the scope of urban 
theory. This chapter outlines the research design of the project, the various 
elements involved in the data collection process, and the details of the case study 
city. The case city, Dakar, is the largest city in Senegal, the former colonial capital of 
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the AOF7 (Afrique Occidentale Française), the commercial centre and main port, 
and accounts for over half of the urban population of the country. The city is a site 
for increasing real estate speculation and a ‘laboratory’ for international urban 
planning and governance, making it a strategic choice for the study of African 
urbanisation (Choplin & Ciavolella, 2017, pg. 324). This research project works with 
scale to address the ‘heterogeneous forces, surfaces, and spaces’ that make up the 
urban fabric of a city (Simone in Enwezor Ed., 2003, pg. 25). The methodology 
involves i) planning analysis based on archival research and ii) a field-based analysis 
based on designated spaces in the city. The archival research is based on the study 
of masterplans as a means of identifying the narratives of urban development. The 
field-based analysis consists of first-hand observations supplemented by secondary 
resources to trace the evolution and transformation of the urban landscape. The 
methodology takes a step towards unravelling urban complexity through the 
analysis of built form, public services, transportation, housing and architecture in 
the ‘staging of infrastructural modernity’ (Fredericks, 2014, pg. 535). The chapter also 
discusses the limitations of the methodology and the strengths and weaknesses of a 
research agenda built around ‘cityness.’  
Implementation:  
Chapters Five, Six, Seven and Eight document the empirical findings and 
contributions of this thesis. Specifically, Chapters Five, Six and Seven report the 
findings from the archival and planning research by recreating a timeline of Dakar, 
plan by plan, from 1857 to 2035. Chapter Five begins with the precolonial origins of 
Dakar prior to annexation by the French and examines the implementation of the first 
masterplan in the newly established city, covering the period between 1857-1920s. 
Chapter Six analyses masterplans of the 20th century and considers elements of 
continuity and change in the planning narratives of the city from the 1930s to 2000. 
Chapter Seven looks at the 21st century plans of Dakar, developed in tandem with 
JICA (Japanese International Cooperation Agency), and disentangles the 
technocratic and bureaucratic jargon of policy frameworks guiding the development 
of the city. Chapter Eight covers the field-based analysis of this research project and 
engages with on-the-ground configurations of the urban landscape. The research 
findings of this chapter are framed by the parameters of the paradigmatic and 
 
7 French West Africa (Mauritania, French Sudan (now Mali), Senegal, French Guinea, Ivory 
Coast, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso), Dahomey (Benin) and Niger 
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The conclusion takes a critical look at the pitfalls and advantages of the proposed 
methodology and considers the benefits of building a research project based on 
‘cityness.’ Additionally, interspersed throughout the monograph are entries that 
document the reflexive work of this analysis and can be read in or out of sequence. 
Throughout the research process, the researcher must consider an object ‘in 
relation to itself, bending that object back upon itself in a process which includes 
the self being able to consider itself as its own object’ (Archer, 2007, pg. 72). These 
nine ‘Voices’ reflect the theoretical evolution of this thesis and the evaluation of 
‘cityness’ as a way of understanding urbanisation which inherently requires 
reflexive work and an implicit understanding of the researcher’s positionality in the 
research process. 
 
The ‘Voices’ also speak to the fact that the city, as an object of study, constantly 
‘remains out of focus’ and cannot be captured in one ‘master narrative’ (De Boeck & 
Plissart, 2004, pg. 8). Therefore, the research diaries also include works from 
novelists, musicians, photographers, artists, and poets to showcase different 
representations of the case study city beyond the confines of policy and planning. 
These resources contribute to a ‘bottom-up re-sensitization’ of top-down policy 
(Lawhon et al., 2014, pg. 507). They are situated within the retroductive approach by 
pluralising our perspective on southern and African cities beyond conventional 








Voices: Decolonising the curriculum 
 
This research project situates itself within a broader academic framework that calls 
for ‘decolonising the curriculum.’ Academic institutions both in the UK and abroad, 
have been called on to integrate subaltern voices – feminist, southern, postcolonial, 
‘other’ (Said, 1978). The ‘so-called European intellectual tradition’ lies at the heart of 
most social science departments where ‘fundamental thinkers who are long dead 
and gone’ are referenced and discussed as though they were our ‘own 
contemporaries’8 (Chakrabarty, 2000, pg. 5). Decolonising the curriculum does not 
advocate the complete rejection of masculinist, Eurocentric and hegemonic 
narratives but insists on situating these as a vernacular emanating from northern 
academia and embedded within certain disciplines.  The retroductive analysis of 
this research project challenges the universality of northern urban theory in order to 
theoretically dismantle the master’s house with the master’s tools and engage with 
southern knowledge to ‘beat him at his own game’ (Lorde, 1984).  
 
Throughout this research project, the discipline of urban geography is called into 
question, for how might anti-racist, anti-Eurocentric and grounded scholarship be 
developed by a ‘white discipline’? (Pulido, 2002). By acknowledging and addressing 
the ‘unbearable whiteness of geography’ (Derickson, 2017), this project embraces 
the possibility of the undercommons.  The ‘undercommons’ – black, indigenous, 
queer, poor, feminist, subaltern voices – are not content with ‘being acknowledged 
by a system that denies a) that anything was ever broken and b) that we deserved to 
be the broken part’ (Harney & Moten, 2013, pg. 6). The challenge of the 
undercommons is therefore not to ‘displace the academy’ but rather to figure out 
how to ‘transform it’ and change the shape of the knowledge ‘produced within it’ 
(Jazeel, 2018, pg. 11).  
 
By decolonising the curriculum, we broaden the theoretical standpoints of academic 
disciplines and address the oversights of hegemonic narratives. This provokes 
important questions regarding issues of representation and ‘voice.’ Specifically, this 
project asks ‘who gets to represent Africa’ within a discipline that has historically 
denied the continent representation as ‘a form of power’ due to legacies of 
 
8 Ebenzer Howard, Le Corbusier, Louis Wirth, Lewis Mumford 
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colonialism, racism, and economic decline (Briggs & Weathers, 2016, pg. 470). By 
tackling the issue of ‘voice,’ we must first question our role as researchers. The work 
of the ‘subversive intellectual’ in this project is to disappear into the ‘undercommons 
of enlightenment, where the work gets done, where the work gets subverted’ 
(Harney & Moten, 2013, pg. 26). In so doing, we may find that ‘other’ voices do not 
exist solely in response to the centre but in spite of it as we continue to decolonise 









Chapter Two: Studying African urbanism  
 
Academic literature on urban Africa has traditionally veered in two directions i) 
global political economy perspectives that paint a picture of ‘utter devastation’ and 
situate African cities within a dialectical totality of uneven development; ii) policy-
focused literature that elaborates a ‘comprehensive package’ of governance, 
infrastructural, and institutional reforms to address development failures (Pieterse, 
2010, pg. 2). Both approaches, however, fail to capture the paradoxical 
characteristics of modern African cities as carriers of a ‘dysfunctional yet dynamic 
urban form’ (Gandy, 2005, pg. 374). African cities represent an encounter 
with ‘indeterminacy, provisionality, and the contingent’ which, in the context of 
urban scholarship, assumes the magnitude of an ‘epistemological abyss’ 
(Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004, pg. 349). Seekings (2013, pg. 169) argues that the 
knowledge at our disposition is ill-suited for theorising the urban ‘south’ due to the 
‘irreconcilably different lived experiences’ of southern cities, rendering them 
analytically ‘incommensurate’ with their northern counterparts. An emerging 
research agenda, referred to here as ‘socio-spatial infrastructures,’ represents a 
more hopeful and nuanced approach to the study of African cities. Through 
interdisciplinary and grounded approaches, the study of socio-spatial 
infrastructures rebalances the ‘intellectual work examining the nature of African 
urban life’ and reframes the ‘imperatives of developmentalism’ (Pieterse, 2010, pg. 
1). 
 
The goal of this review is twofold: i) firstly, the chapter outlines critical approaches 
to the study of African urbanisation and identifies lacunas in urban theory 
concerning research on African cities; ii) secondly, the chapter examines an 
emerging research agenda based on a more nuanced conceptualisation of African 
urbanism. The literature review draws from both academic and policy-oriented 
literature including case studies, policy reports, newspaper articles, and 
comparative analyses, to document and analyse research on African cities. The 
chapter concludes with the examination of two key urban phenomena of African 
urbanism, informality and youth, to demonstrate how the research approaches 
outlined in this chapter (global political economy, policy fix, and socio-spatial 
infrastructures) frame the same phenomenon as the ‘saving grace’ or ‘Achilles heel’ 
of the continent. The review builds a case for rethinking the role of African cities as 
‘valid empirical bases’ based on which to develop an urban theory of the ‘global 
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south’ (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004; Robinson, 2006; Nuttall and Mbembe, 2008; Pieterse, 
2008; Watson, 2009; Duminy et al., 2014, pg. 3). 
  
The history of history  
Urban historiography has retained a ‘myopic view’ of changes in African 
metropolises and thus remains limited in scope (Salm & Falola, 2005, pg. xi). Despite 
Africa’s long urban history, historical accounts of African urbanisation often begin 
with the era of colonisation. Coquery-Vidrovitch (2005) attempts to rectify this 
timeline by describing the longue-durée processes of African urbanism dating back 
to long before the ‘Scramble for Africa9’ (1881-1914);  
‘Islamization began in desert ports from the very beginning 
of the Middle Ages; Bantu capital cities of Central Africa 
were fitted with military and kinship social structures of local 
kingdoms and chiefdoms. Most of these elements 
progressively mingled and combined, giving birth to a 
complex and contrasted cumulative history’ (Coquery-
Vidrovitch, 2005, pg. xv-xvi).  
The continent was not ‘devoid of urban development’ before colonialism and was 
home to several cities, such as Zanzibar and Ibadan, as well as major hubs along 
trade routes, including Timbuktu and Djenne which had similar characteristics to 
pre-industrial cities elsewhere in the world (Stewart, 1996, pg. 251-3). Gao 
(Mali), Thaba Bosiu (Lesotho), Umgungundlovu (South Africa), Kumasi (Ghana), Ife 
(Nigeria) and Kilwa (Tanzania) are other notable examples of pre-colonial African 
cities. According to Hopkins (1973), towns throughout West Africa performed 
important market and defence functions such as pre-industrial manufacturing in the 
form of metal-work and food processing. The populations of Gao, Timbuktu 
and Djenne, in Mali, amounted to 15,000-80,000 inhabitants, while Ibadan, in Nigeria, 
was home to about 70,000 people prior to colonialism (Hopkins, 1973; Stewart, 1996, 
pg. 253). These cities saw the birth of communities with distinct cultures and ways 
of life based, for the most part, on barter and commerce along old trade routes 
(Freund, 2007, pg. 65). Describing settlements dating back to 350 A.D. in South 
Africa, Muller (1993, pg. 9), for example, noted that villages were comprised of a 
‘complex of houses, each circular in form’ which were a distinctive aspect of 
‘vernacular South African architecture.’ In the central plazas of other precolonial 
 
9 The Scramble for Africa is also known as the ‘Conquest of Africa’ or the ‘Partition of Africa’ 
and refers to the Berlin conference (1884/5) when colonial European power agreed on the 
division and occupation of the continent.  
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formations, such as Kumasi (Ghana), capital of the Ashanti confederacy, people 
traded, celebrated public holidays, staged plays, carried out state affairs and 
proclaimed laws (Amankwah-Ayeh, 1996, pg. 68).  
 
Formal colonial rule is considered a 'turning point' in the development of African 
cities by reorienting urbanisation, urban form, and urban functions to suit its needs 
(Myers, 2011, pg. 69). Following the Berlin Conference of 1884/85, European empires 
officialised their 'spheres of influence' and bolstered their position on the continent, 
marking an important shift in the social and spatial structures of African cities 
throughout the late 19th and into the 20th century. Colonialism was responsible for 
the dissolution of precolonial towns and cities as the latter ‘withered away’ when 
their commercial life was stifled by new colonial borders rendering traditional 
caravan trade routes useless and ‘old patterns’ of trade and commerce obsolete 
(Freund, 2007, pg. 67). Inter-African trade was discouraged, and the ‘skeletal 
infrastructure’ that was put in place by colonial regimes served primarily to facilitate 
trade with Europe (Khapoya, 2016, pg. 131). European colonial powers were unwilling 
to recognise or preserve the property rights of established African populations and, 
in some instances, even made plans to destroy local communities. In 1908, for 
example, the British colonial administration ‘toyed’ with the idea of wiping out old 
sections of Accra following a plague epidemic while the French in North and West 
Africa destroyed the native quarters of Dakar and Rabat under the pretext of 
‘hygiene’ and ‘sanitation’ (Freund, 2007, pg. 75; Bigon, 2016; Betts, 1971). The key 
impact of colonialism was the radical alteration of the urban hierarchy of African 
cities from one aligned along historical trade patterns to one designed for the 
siphoning of resources towards European colonial powers (Stewart, 1996, pg. 251). 
As a result, the study of African urbanism has been defined by a perception of the 
‘colonial terrain’ as a ‘passive receptor’ of imported ideas without precolonial forms 
of urbanisation10 (Bigon, 2016, pg. 1).  
 
Despite its rich pre-colonial past, the earliest academic work on African urban 
history has been attributed to sociologist Georges Balandier who 
published Sociologie des Brazzavilles Noires in 1965. It was only 20 years after the 
publication of Balandier’s book that an Ivoirian historian, Pierre Kipré, published 
 
10 See Faidherbe, 1853 on pg. 129 
25 
 
the first comprehensive historical study of African urbanisation, with a dissertation, 
in 1985, on Cote d’Ivoire’s urban history. Similarly, Assane Seck’s (1970) Dakar, 
Metropole Ouest Africaine is one of few monographs dedicated entirely to the 
urbanisation of a postcolonial African city.  The study of African cities is an even 
more ‘recent trend in English’ with the ‘pioneering role’ of Akin Mabogunje’s 1968 
study on Nigerian urbanisation (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2005, pg. xvi). In anglophone 
scholarly literature, Anthony D. King was one of the first scholars to conduct a 
systematic study of the colonial urban enterprise of the British empire in India, 
focusing on the city of Delhi. Beginning with the study of urban planning (Colonial 
Urban Development, 1976), and the examination of urban forms and their diffusion 
throughout the world (The Bungalow, 1995), King revealed the urban dimensions of 
colonial practices, specifically with regards to the housing sector (Sinou, 1993, pg. 
6). In Francophone literature, the work of François Beguin (Arabisances, 1983) on 
colonial cities in North Africa, including Algiers, documented the ways in which the 
colonisers ‘borrowed’ from local architecture to produce hybridised colonial styles. 
Some American researchers have carried out significant work on French colonial 
planning including anthropologist Paul Rabinow, who studied urban planning in 
Morocco and chronicled its decisive role in defining French modernité (French 
Modern, 1989). Similarly, architectural historian Gwendolyn Wright outlined French 
colonial urban planning practices in 19th and 20th century Indochina, Morocco, and 
Madagascar, and their role in the production of an urban modernity (The Politics of 
Design in French Colonial Urbanism, 1991). Janet Abu-Lughod also conducted a 
study on colonial planning practice in North Africa and cast a glaring look at the 
segregationist practices of French colonialism in the 20th century, focusing her 
enquiry on Rabat, Morocco (Rabat: Urban Apartheid in Morocco, 1980).  Recently, 
the work of Bigon (2015, 2016) and Beeckmans (2013) on Dakar has documented the 
effects of colonial planning on African urbanism. 
 
Aside from these seminal pieces, French urban planning practices in sub-Saharan 
Africa have ‘remained almost unstudied' (Abu-Lughod, 1965; Bigon, 2009, pg. 
247). Njoh (2015, pg. 106) maintains that there is still a ‘dearth of knowledge on the 
raison d’être’ of French colonial urbanism in Africa in relevant Anglophone 
literature. France controlled the lion’s share of the continent during the era of 
European colonial rule, and colonialism was an important conduit for the diffusion 
and dissemination of Eurocentric urban planning principles. Yet, there is a dearth 
of research, particularly in Anglophone literature, that examines the extent to which 
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French colonialism influenced socio-spatial structures in colonial and postcolonial 
Africa (Njoh, 2015, pg. 95).  For example, surprisingly few scholars have focused on 
the language of colonial urbanism, and there has seldom been any attempt to 
compile a ‘lexical dictionary of generic terms, commensurate imageries, and their 
meaning’ in (post)colonial urban settings in Africa (Bigon & Njoh, 2015, pg. 26). 
While several studies have examined the colonial practices of place-naming, they 
stop short of developing a semiotic roadmap that reveals embedded power relations. 
Similarly, many studies focused on African architecture have been based primarily 
on ‘pre-colonial’ and ‘traditional’ forms, often devoted to mud or mud brick 
buildings. While these investigations may provide a much-needed level of inquiry 
on numerous topics including building technique and style, symbolism and history, 
they do not investigate the ways in which traditional built form was (re)fabricated 
and appropriated to adhere to the colonial mindset (Shaw, 2006, pg. 3).  
  
Key paradigms in the study of African Urbanism  
The literature on African urbanism has revealed the emergence of key themes and 
approaches within the broader study of southern urbanism. Academic and policy 
literature on African cities may be divided into two broad categories while the third 
category focuses on the emerging research agenda on southern (African) urbanism 
(Figure 2). There is considerable overlap between these categories as researchers 
develop interdisciplinary means of studying cities. The analysis will discuss the 
central themes of each approach, notable examples, and the criticisms levied 






•The global political economy approach consists of
perspectives based on the spatial workings of
capitalism and state regulation. The bulk of this
literature is focused on ‘big structural factors’ that
drive Africa’s economic marginalisation in the world
order and considers how these processes are
‘captured’ by political elites (Pieterse, 2017, pg. 224).
This literature characterises cities across the
continent as ‘incomplete or deteriorated examples of
modernity’ in the global economy (Harrison, 2006, pg.
323).





Figure 2: Key approaches to the study of African urbanism 
 
Global political economy   
The global political economy approach focuses on the range and magnitude of 
urban problems on the African continent. It emphasizes the ubiquity of unsafe urban 
environments where disease, inadequate water and poor sanitation are rife, access 
to essential services including health and education is limited, policy frameworks 
are ad hoc, and employment is often insecure, informal, and poorly 
remunerated. Based on this approach, African cities are;    
‘…threatened by chaos: parasitic on the economy and 
thus antidevelopmental; characterised by excessively rapid 
demographic growth, sucking the most active and qualified 
people from the rural areas; unplanned and sprawling; 
unhealthy because of the inability of infrastructure providers 
to keep pace with growth and the exacerbating effects of 
density on the transmission of infectious disease; and 
characterised by incompetent and corrupt government 
structures’ (Rakodi in Enwezor Ed., 2003, pg. 46).  
Policy fix
•The ‘policy fix’ approach looks at development
‘deficits’ and identifies sites and sectors for policy
intervention. This type of literature evolves as
development paradigms emerge in the international
development sector. The primary focus of this
approach is the institutional efficiency of the state and
the requisite policy for managing complex urbanisation
processes.
•AfDB, 2010; World Bank, 2014; UN HABITAT, 2008; 
ILO, 2002; Beall et al., 2010
Socio-spatial 
infrastructures
•The socio-spatial approach aims at a ‘fine-grained'
understanding of urban life by looking at the influence
of colonialism, ethnicity, culture, planning, economic
development, etc. to generate deeper insight into how
the urban poor negotiate livelihoods in the city despite
considerable impediments. This approach is based on
ethnographic research and in-depth case studies that
‘illuminate the nature of social life’ and give voice to the
subaltern (Pieterse, 2009, pg. 1).
•Bigon, 2010; Beeckmans, 2014; Myers, 2011; Robinson, 
2006; Mcfarlane & Rutherford, 2008; Ralph, 2008; Gandy, 




The global political economy approach challenges previously held assumptions 
about the link between economic growth and demographic change. Contrary to the 
experience of Europe and North America in the 19th century, African cities exhibit a 
form of urban ‘involution’ that is marked by sprawl combined with economic decline 
(Gandy, 2005, pg. 372). The development of African cities is a paradox of urbanisation 
without growth (Fay & Opal, 1999). While urbanisation has generally led to sector 
transformation from agriculture to manufacturing, evidence suggests that much of 
Africa is urbanising without industrialisation (and, in some cases, has even 
experienced deindustrialisation) (Grabowski, 2015). Across the African continent, 
urbanisation has been ‘radically decoupled from industrialisation, even from 
development per se’ (Davis, 2008, pg. 9). As a result, countries are unable to tackle 
the challenges of rapid urbanisation, such as accommodating a large and growing 
population and coping with negative externalities. Rapid urbanisation without 
concomitant investments in physical infrastructure and human capital has meant 
that cities across the continent have not been able to reap the ‘benefits of 
agglomeration’ (Freire et al., 2014, pg. 6);   
‘Urbanisation without development (or limited development) 
occurs when overall national economic growth and 
development are inadequate to meet the needs of a growing 
population […] The key characteristics of urbanisation 
without development are: weak agricultural sector; poor 
national economic performance lack of national policy that 
integrates economic and spatial planning; relative absence 
of intermediate cities and market towns; over migration 
leading to growth of mega-cities with poor economic bases 
and poor municipal capacity to provide minimum basic 
services’ (Cheru, 2005, pg. 2).   
 
On the African continent, rapid urban population growth has surpassed economic 
development in the last 30 years, resulting in an ‘urbanisation of poverty.' When 
combined with a laissez-faire approach to urban policy and planning, this has 
resulted in the proliferation of informal housing, urban poverty, inequality, informal 
work, and the deterioration of urban infrastructure. The 
UN Millennium Development Goals report (2015) estimates that approximately 59 per 
cent of the urban population of sub-Saharan Africa lives in slums, which suggests 
that informality has become a ‘generalised mode of urbanisation’ in this region. 
Aside from the precariousness of housing and insecurity of land tenure, slum 
dwellers also lack adequate access to water, electricity, sanitation, as overcrowding 
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in urban areas has led to the spread of diseases and deterioration of the 
environment. In light of these seemingly dystopian conditions, global political 
economy narratives highlight Africa’s ‘progressive marginalisation’ from the world 
economy (van de Walle, 2001, pg. 5) as ‘one can almost hear the sound of sub-
Saharan Africa sliding off the world map’ (George, 1993, pg. 66). The deviant 
trajectory of African development has framed the continent as a ‘global ghetto’ a 
region of ‘wasted lives’ abandoned by capitalism (Smith, 1997; Ferguson, 2006), and 
a ‘continuing tragedy’ (Leys, 1994, New Left Review). Davis (2008, pg. 17) describes 
African cities of the 21st century sitting in ‘squalor, surrounded by pollution, 
excrement, and decay’ and problematises the nature of their development;  
How could cities in Cote d' Ivoire, Tanzania, Congo-
Kinshasa, Gabon, Angola, and elsewhere - where economies 
were contracting by 2 to 5 per cent per year - still support 
annual population growth of 4 to 8 per cent? How could Lagos 
in the 1980s grow twice as fast as the Nigerian population, 
while its urban economy was in a deep recession? Indeed, 
how has Africa as a whole, currently in a dark age of stagnant 
urban employment and stalled agricultural productivity, 
been able to sustain an annual urbanisation rate (3.5 to 4.0 
per cent) considerably higher than the average of most 
European cities (2.1 per cent) during peak Victorian growth 
years?’ (Davis, 2008, pg. 14-15).   
 
Mega-cities11 on the continent have experienced a dramatic deterioration in the 
quality of life as they have neither the infrastructure nor the environmental capacity 
to accommodate a growing population. In Lagos, for example, unchecked population 
growth exacerbates crumbling infrastructure, as violence becomes a ‘determining 
feature of everyday life’ and symbols of civic culture (i.e. libraries, cinemas) have all 
but disappeared from the urban fabric (Gandy, 2005, pg. 372). Marginal communities 
living in temporary settlements within the city are obligated to meet their own needs, 
from housing to water, and are consistently under threat from ‘Area boys12,’ 
racketeers and criminals (Ismail, 2016). Kaplan (1994) offers a similar outlook on West 
African cities, characterising them as ‘some of the unsafest places in the world’ 
where ‘streets are unlit; the police often lack gasoline for their vehicles; and armed 
 
11 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs defines mega cities as urban 
agglomerations with a population of over 10 million inhabitants 
12 Primary and secondary school drop-outs, retrenched public sector workers, orphans, and 
citizens forcibly displaced from neighbourhoods and houses involved in income-generating 
illegal and informal activities (Momoh, 2000, pg. 100) 
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burglars, carjackers, and muggers proliferate.’ Disease, crime, scarcity of resources, 
and drug trade are ‘now most tellingly demonstrated through a West African prism.’ 
Similarly, the notorious issue of The Economist from May 2000, featuring ‘The 
Hopeless Continent’ on the front cover adopts this trend of ‘journalistic 
Malthusianism' and suggests that the ‘worst off’ in a globalized world are not the 
‘least developed’ or those at the start of their journey to development, but rather 
those the ‘farthest along a very different journey; a downward slide into 
degeneration, chaos, and violence’ (Ferguson, 2006, pg. 191).    
 
An important criticism levied against the global political economy approach is its 
failure to acknowledge longue-durée processes that explain the current state of 
affairs in African cities. Specifically, this approach does not adequately address the 
historical impacts of ‘colonial plunder’ and the intentional underdevelopment of 
countries and cities kept ‘economically subservient’ in a supplier relationship with 
former empires (Simone & Pieterse, 2017, pg. 50; Arrighi, 2010). In the process, we 
engage in sort of ‘reverse orientalism’ that examines urbanisation from the 
standpoint of southern cities and asks ‘who in India or Algeria today can confidently 
separate out British or French components of the past from present actualities, and 
who in Britain or France can draw a clear circle around British London or French 
Paris that would exclude the impact of India and Algeria upon those two imperial 
cities?’ (Said, 1993). The history of empire is a history of dispossession, the effect of 
which has affected both the cities of the coloniser and the colonised and allows for 
a better understanding of the state of African and southern cities in the 21st century. 
 
In their attempt to recreate a ‘quasi-metropolitan culture in every physical 
respect,’ colonial regimes across the continent were responsible for the reordering 
of African urban spatiality both within the city and beyond (Lloyd, 2003, pg. 7). The 
colonial period influenced important dimensions of African urbanity including land 
administration, housing, and spatial organisation. The impact of colonial rule is 
evident in the predominant role of centralised governments, the 'strong orientation 
toward blueprint master planning for modernist visions’ or the ‘co-optation of 
traditional rulers into urban local government' (Myers, 2011, pg. 55). Whether 
through direct (French) or indirect (British) rule (Mamdani, 1996), the established 
power hierarchies failed to preserve African political institutions and strategically 
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barred the development of a ‘national or colony-wide political consciousness’ 
(Khapoya, 2016, pg. 119).   
 
Policies of social and economic marginalisation imposed by colonial rule, including 
restrictions on education and paid employment, led African labourers to engage in 
profit-making activities within what is now ‘imperialistically termed’ the informal 
economy (Ndi, 2007, pg. 170). Informality is grossly condemned as a key reason 
explaining the trend of ‘urbanisation without growth.’ The history of colonisation, 
however, tells a different story. During colonial times, cities offered the prospect of 
higher living wages, but actual wages paid to African labourers could not offset 
increasing colonial taxation and inflation leading to growing urban poverty 
(Demissie, 2013, pg. 4). In turn, the growth of an African population in colonial cities 
prompted colonial authorities to reorient the spatial organisation of urban areas to 
lessen the perceived threat to Europeans created by unchecked population growth. 
Racial segregation became a defining characteristic of African cities under colonial 
rule but also a key reason for the development of informal settlements. Often, 
colonial medical practice blended with racist discourse would identify the ‘African 
body’ as the site of disease threatening the ‘white settler population’ and justified 
the segregation of populations (Vaughan, 1991). The colonial municipal officials in 
cities such as Johannesburg, Cape Town, Nairobi, Rabat, and Kinshasa used public 
health concerns13 of colonial medical discourse to relocate African populations to 
‘less desirable parts of the city’ and segregate them by establishing cordons 
sanitaires (Demissie, 2013, pg. 4-5). Urban areas were considered the domain of 
Europeans and Africans were only tolerated in these areas for their labour. They 
were required to live temporarily in segregated indigenous areas or ‘townships’ built 
on the margins of the city. These zones were meant to host incoming migrants who 
were intentionally prevented from ‘urbanising permanently [emphasis added]’ and 
benefitting from the rights of urban citizenship (Simon, 2015, pg. 219).  
 
The infrastructure built during colonial regimes in the form of roads, railroads, 
telephones, electric power, and water and sanitation systems were the shaky 
 
13 Today, medical practices re-branded as ‘global health’ programmes continue to focus on 
‘African diseases’ (i.e. Ebola, HIV/AIDS), acknowledging the inequality between northern 
and southern healthcare access but nevertheless remaining reliant on the global 
unevenness of this discourse and practice (Crane, 2010).    
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foundations upon which new African states ‘built their new national institutions’ 
(Khapoya, 2016, pg. 136). The end of colonial rule brought a ‘moment of euphoria’ 
among postcolonial elites who hoped that cities would act as ‘engines of national 
development, not just for the individual countries but for the continent as a whole’ 
(Demissie, 2013, pg. 2). The lift of colonial restrictions on urban expansion and rural-
to-urban movement meant that secondary cities experienced increasing 
urbanisation as urban growth today continues to occur ‘farther down the hierarchy’ 
(Myers, 2011, pg. 53). Indigenous elites of newly independent nations often stepped 
into the roles of ‘colonial predecessors’ and into their ‘urban spatial niches’ (Simon, 
2015, pg. 220).  Thus, the colour lines and cordon sanitaires of yore became the 
wealthy enclaves and ‘pockets’ of poverty of modern African cities, further 
exacerbated by detrimental structural adjustment programmes and deepening 
inequality (Fanon, 1961, pg. 122). Under the guise of modernisation projects, 
postcolonial states engaged in the construction and expansion of hospitals, airports, 
universities, highways, new civic buildings, residential buildings, banks, insurance 
companies, the ‘markers of modernity and modernisation’ according to the northern 
model disseminated by development banks (Demissie, 2013, pg. 2). Through 
multilateral organisations, former colonial powers continued to impose ‘historically 
informed political and economic values of the North on the South which satisfies the 
North’s ends’ (Sagoe, 2012). The ‘agents of neoliberalism’ – the IMF and the World 
Bank – are responsible for engineering development policy, notably the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and more recently the Poverty Reduction 
Programs (ibid). They impose their ‘institutional might’ through loan conditionalities 
while encouraging countries to open up to free trade and ‘corporate penetration’ 
(Conway, 2014, pg. 108). In the process of ‘developing’ poorer countries, rich 
countries are ‘locking them in positions of powerlessness and structural 
dependence,’ suggesting that poverty has ‘nothing to do with internal problems: it 
is the fault of global capitalism’ (Inglehart & Baker, 2000, pg. 20). Indeed, the 
structural adjustment policies of the 1980s and 1990s seem to ‘finish once and for all 
the task of fitting the colonies to the still-modern models of Western political 
economy’ as postcolonial nations were ‘unapologetically recolonised through the 
modernising strictures of multilateral lending agencies’ (Sylvester, 2010, pg. 717). 
 
In conclusion, the narrow-sighted outlook of the global political economy approach 
has failed to adequately address underlying historical factors explaining urban 
deprivation while also overlooking the diversity and heterogeneity of African cities. 
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The snapshot approach that dehistoricises African cities and focuses solely on 
dystopian conditions of urban apocalypse ignores the possibility of African 
urbanisation beyond the restrictive framework of northern developmental concepts. 
The 'presentism' of this approach results in the ‘compression of supposedly 
relevant' events and processes into a few decades’ since the beginning of the 20th 
century and drives the scholarly output on African cities (Reid, 2011, pg. 136). As a 
result, much of the policy and academic literature on African cities is limited by a 
language ‘prone to a level of abstraction’ that fails to translate the issues of everyday 
life into plans and policies (Harrison, 2006, pg. 23). Furthermore, the dystopian 
inclinations of this approach have overlooked positive growth figures in a period of 
global economic downturn along with the improvement of a number of human 
development indicators. Rosling (2018) is joined by Deaton (2015) and Radelet (2016) 
in arguing against an ‘overdramatic worldview’ that ignores the fact that the 
majority of the world’s population lives ‘somewhere in the middle of the income-
scale - they are not what we think of as middle class, but they are not living in 
extreme poverty’ (Rosling, 2018).  The Economist captures the ‘changing narrative’ 
surrounding the African continent; while the May 2000 front cover was cynically 
titled ‘Hopeless Africa’; by February 2001, this had shifted to ‘Africa’s elusive dawn’; 
in July 2005, ‘Helping Africa to help itself’; in December 2011, ‘Africa rising’ and by 
March 2013, the headline read ‘Aspiring Africa’ (Brooks, 2017, pg. 5). These more 
positive narratives are prominent in the ‘policy fix’ approach which also looks at 
urban development problems of African cities but seeks to capitalise on their 
advantages through policy reform. 
 
Policy fix  
The ‘policy fix’ approach, reflected in the work of international policymakers, 
identifies key urban problems of African cities including increasing informality, 
social and political exclusion, economic inequality, poor urban governance, 
overstretched infrastructural capacity, and limited service provision and proposes 
policy ‘fixes’ to address these issues. Examples of this approach can be found in 
reports such as State of African Cities (Reimagining sustainable urban transitions, 
2014; The Geography of African Investment, 2018), African Development Bank Group 
Urban Strategy (2010), Cities Alliance, United Cities and Local Governments of 
Africa, World Bank: Harnessing Urbanisation to End Poverty and Boost Prosperity 
in Africa (2013). This approach is concerned with the consequences of rapid and 
uncontrolled population growth, youth bulges, dependency ratios, and GDP (gross 
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domestic product). Policy fix reports express increasing anxiety regarding the 
spread and sprawl of Africa’s mega-cities including Lagos (18.9 million), Cairo (14.7 
million) and Kinshasa (14.5 million), all of which feature the ‘herculean problems of 
underdevelopment’ (Roy, 2011, pg. 224). This fear is further exacerbated by the fact 
that Dar es Salaam, Khartoum and Abidjan will likely reach ‘mega-city status’ within 
25 years if current growth rates persist (State of African Cities, 2018, pg. 23). 
Projections indicate that between 2010 and 2050, Africa’s urban population will 
increase from 400 million to 1.26 billion, while Africa-wide urbanisation is projected 
to rise to nearly 50 per cent by 2035, and 58 per cent by 2050 (State of African Cities, 
2018). Although data trends indicate that smaller secondary cities absorb a portion 
of urban population growth, this trend is more likely to result in the spread of 
slums rather than relieve pressures from the largest urban agglomerations (State of 
African Cities, 2014, pg. 7). Conversely, informal economic activity across the 
continent is estimated at 60 per cent in SSA and 52 per cent in North Africa (ILO, 
2015). Environmental externalities engendered by rapid urbanisation are also 
increasingly an area of focus in many reports, as the discourse has shifted to a 
discussion of sustainability, and resilience – the á la mode international 
development buzzwords14. Hence, the policy fix approach utilises terms that are 
implicitly biased towards a western model of development in the emphasis on 
economic growth, normative planning policies, and the integration and 











The World Bank report (2013) on African urbanisation frames the discussion 
in terms of ‘getting Africa’s urbanisation right.' It posits that with the 
appropriate policy framework, there is an opportunity to rectify the ‘failures’ 
of African urbanisation since the continent is ‘only halfway through its 
urbanisation process’ (World Bank, 2013, pg. 3). Although the report 
discusses the heterogeneity and diversity of African cities and the need for 
tailor-made policy, there is a general statement about the ‘typical African 
city’ which is growing despite a lack of appropriate policy coordination 
(World Bank, 2013, pg. 3). The silver bullet of policy is expected to ‘solve’ the 
failures of African cities through i) secure policy and regulatory frameworks 
that allow for long-term, integrated development, ii) increased investment 
in strategic and ‘transformative’ infrastructure and improvement of basic 
service provision, and iii) sound institutional and financial systems at the 
national, regional, and local level (World Bank, 2013).   
 
 
14 The growing concern with green urbanism is evident in the new satellite cities that are 
emerging on the continent that are touted as ‘green’ cities with an emphasis on renewable 























The State of African Cities report (2014), titled ‘Reimagining Sustainable 
Urban Transitions,’ published by UN Habitat, identifies three areas of 
intervention i) improved social services, with a focus on bettering the 
working and living conditions of a growing youth population, ii) increased 
trade and investment flows within Africa, and between Africa and the 
world, including investments in rail, road, and energy networks as a way of 
boosting urban economies, and iii)  institution building that promotes 
effective democratic institutions, less corruption in the management of 
public finances and other public interests. The latest edition of State of 
African Cities (2018) titled ‘The Geography of African Investment’ is 
focused entirely on determining ‘Africa’s current position in global FDI 
flows and uncovering why Africa is receiving low investment.’ In so doing, 
the report puts forth ‘strategies to enhance Africa’s global ranking in 
attracting investment’ (2018, pg. 11). This report concludes that an 
increased flow of FDI provides a ‘credible’ solution to urban poverty and 
unemployment but can, in some cases, result in deeper inequality. The 
report offers several ‘city-level recommendations’ that are primarily 
focused on the growth and expansion of FDI to situate African cities in 























The African Development Bank Group Urban Strategy, published in 2010, 
is another example of the ‘policy fix’ approach. The strategy identifies 
‘three pillars’ of urban development – i) infrastructure delivery, ii) good 
governance, and iii) private sector development. The report states that 
improving urban infrastructure, enhancing the effectiveness of urban 
governance systems, increasing revenue generation and financing 
modalities for municipalities and local governments will rectify the 
problematic trends of African urbanisation. The fundamental premise is 
that greater private sector participation in financing urban development 
will ‘reroute urbanisation trends and allow African cities to become 
engines of growth’ (AfDB, 2010, pg. 2). The urban strategy of the AfDB has 
not been updated since its publication in 2010 despite the rate/scale of 
African urbanisation and the challenge it poses to urban planners and 
practitioners.   
 
  
As a normative approach, ‘policy fix’ is limited by its reliance on urban 
developmental concepts originating in the ‘global north.’ In many cases, policy 
frameworks and reforms have failed to deliver their intended and expected 
outcomes. The implications of policies underpinning the drive for more accountable 
modes of public administration have scarcely been addressed. African cities, in 
many cases, have developed independently of the work of city planners in a process 
36 
 
of ‘amorphous urbanism’ which complicates the task of implementing effective 
policies (Gandy, 2005, pg. 52). Many policy frameworks fail to account for the fact that 
cities across the continent are not built according to any particular design concept 
but are instead made up of the ‘ad hoc vernacular of local construction methods or 
the self-build of individual dwellings or shelters’ (ibid). This is further exacerbated 
by data deficiencies, since much of the economic activity in Africa remains 
‘unrecorded’ (Simon, 1997). To 'solve' the problems of African cities, the latter must 
first be defined, typified, and categorised, leading to an unhelpful and misleading 
'African city' archetype and an overemphasis on mega-cities.   
 
Without a thorough engagement with the particularities of African urbanism, the 
assertion that there is a rational 'policy fix' in a neatly packaged three-pillar 
approach for a range of urban development ‘failures’ can be quite misleading 
(Pieterse, 2010, pg. 1). Many of these reports fail to acknowledge the fact that the 
investment required to achieve city-wide infrastructural improvements is currently 
near-impossible in sub-Saharan African countries. Africa’s position in the global 
infrastructure finance systems and the magnitude of the continent’s infrastructure 
‘deficit’ presents a formidable challenge for the continent’s development (Brookings 
Institute, 2016). Simply put, Africans are ‘too poor to justify large-scale investments 
for rolling out infrastructure and basic services’ with countries across the continent 
considered ‘too high risk’15 for investment (Simone & Pieterse, 2017, pg. 32). This 
results in an overemphasis on profit-driven urbanisation that caters to an elite 
minority16. Mbembe and Nuttall (2004) denounce this 'developmentalist' approach as 
an 'epistemic failure of imagination' since it betrays a profound disconnect between 
policy intervention and the lived reality of African urbanism. Policy innovation is only 
possible through an engagement with 'embedded practices and sensibilities at the 
heart of routine economic, social and cultural interactions in the urban context' 
(Pieterse, 2010, pg. 4).  Furthermore, the policy fix approach, much like global 
political economy, reveals a ‘lack of interest’ in the colonial and precolonial past 
which has remained ‘oddly irrelevant’ in developmental agendas since the 1970s and 
1980s (Reid, 2011, pg. 153).  Africa’s ‘deep past’ has therefore remained detached 
 
15 This is despite worldwide approval of the United Nations SDGs in 2015 and stipulations of 
Habitat III in 2016 which require an infrastructural revolution to ensure access to basic 
services. 
16 See ‘foreign direct investors’ on pg. 222 
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from ‘challenges of the present’ as the ‘post-imperial age has given rise to solution-
driven agendas that have no place for the deep past’ (ibid). 
 
Socio-spatial infrastructures  
In recent years, there has been an attempt to pluralise the study of African cities 
through increasingly interdisciplinary and grounded approaches. The past decade 
has seen a resurgence of interest in African cities in the social sciences with 
historical surveys of urbanisation in Africa (Bigon, 2017; Beeckmans, 2013), 
multidisciplinary studies of individual cities (Simone, 2010) and comparative 
approaches (Watson, 2009, 2013). The socio-spatial infrastructures approach tries to 
understand how urbanites of the ‘global south’ cope with difficult living conditions 
and survive in circumstances of marginality. The focus on survival strategies and 
agency generates an understanding of cities as ‘centres of generative, imaginative, 
or creative energies’ in contrast to the ‘wounded urbicides’ of global political 
economy and policy fix (Myers, 2011, pg. 16). Despite adverse conditions, urban 
Africans have ‘long made lives that have worked’ and demonstrated a shrewd 
capacity to make city life liveable and viable’ (Simone in Falola & Salm, 2004, pg. 13).  
  
Many of these studies question whether African urbanism genuinely represents new 
forms of local knowledge that can be used and operationalised in urban planning 
policy. They ask, for example, how the ‘global geographies of squatting – makeshift 
and experimental, precarious and informal’ can help us to ‘see like a city’ (Amin & 
thrift, 2017). These approaches experiment with how the ‘periphery’ may be brought 
back into our considerations of urban life (Simone, 2010, pg. 14; Duminy et al., 2014, 
pg. 3). Many cities of the ‘global south’ occupy a peripheral position in the global 
hierarchy of capital flows and are ‘relegated to the fringe of conventional urban 
analyses’ (Robinson, 2006). The study of these cities, however, can disrupt the 
theoretical ‘centre’ by broadening our understanding of ‘possibility, innovation and 
adaptation’ (Duminy et al., 2014, pg. 5).  The focus moves away from the strict 
comparison of cities, towards the consolidation of themes that exist in the ‘gaps 
between clearly designated and defined urban institutions, spaces, and actions’ 
(Myers, 2011, pg. 11). African cities are framed as precursors to a ‘new kind of 
urbanism’ previously ignored by the discourses of western modernity but ‘perfectly 




Specifically, this approach looks at new forms of urban sociality that recast the 
notion of the ‘right to the city’ as the ‘right to be messy and inconsistent or to look 
disordered’ (Simone in Myers, 2011, pg. 12). Alongside the images of hopelessness 
and desperation, there is evidence of efficiency and order in what the ‘untrained eye’ 
may see as ‘random and out of control’ (Beall et al., 2010, pg. 188). For example, 
ethnographic approaches have demonstrated how survival in African cities often 
requires improvisation, ingenuity, and finding ‘new ways of being together, of 
making the most out of crisis and disarray' (Simone, 2010; Duminy et al., pg. 
7).  Bayat (2013) observes; 
‘strolling through streets of Cairo, Tehran, Dakar or 
Jakarta in the midst of a working day, one is astonished by 
the presence of so many people operating in the streets – 
working, running around, standing, sitting, negotiating, 
driving or riding on buses or trams. These individuals 
represent the relatively new subaltern of the neoliberal city.’ 
Roy (2011, pg. 223-4) frames this as an ‘articulation of subaltern urbanism’ that 
explores squatter settlements and slums as purveyors of habitation politics that 
challenge the epistemologies and methods of urban studies. An overemphasis on 
the ‘triumphal ingenuity’ of the urban poor, however, runs the risk of conflating it 
with ‘creative survival behaviour’ which may have serious consequences for the 
urban future of cities of the ‘global south’ (Buckley & Kallergis, 2014, pg. 186).  
 
Case one: youth   
Across the continent, young people under the age of 15 account for 41 per cent of 
the total population, while persons aged 15 to 24 account for a further 19 per cent 
(UN DESA, 2015, pg. 7). By 2015, Africa’s youth population amounted to 
approximately 226 million and is projected to increase by 42 per cent to 321 million in 
2030 (State of African Cities 2018, pg. 41). A large youth population is often 
considered a ‘demographic boon’ or ‘demographic dividend’ since it represents a 
potentially productive labour force and a competitive advantage in the global 
marketplace. However, the current generation of young Africans is confronted with 
the harsh reality that, despite unprecedented rates of educational attainment, their 
employment prospects and life opportunities are limited and differ little from those 
of their parents (Filmer et al., 2014, pg. 1). African youth may never attain the ‘social 
goods and status associated with adulthood’ including steady income, property and 




Young people in Africa have been characterised as a ‘lost generation’ (O’Brien, 
1996), or a generation of people unable to transition from ‘youth’ (Langevang, 2008, 
pg. 227). Vigh (2010), for example, speaks of young people in Guinea Bissau as 
‘imprisoned in a socio-spatial time of limitation and marginality’ (Langevang, 2008, 
pg. 227).  The prolongation, making and re-making of youth is set against a backdrop 
of a tiresome routine of ‘incessant improvisation required to make ends meet’ in a 
broader socioeconomic context typified by little opportunity for formal employment 
(Simone, 2005, pg. 518). As historically and socially constructed categories, age, 
identity and power are ‘refracted, recombined and reproduced’ through 
perspectives on African youth (Durham, 2000, pg. 114). Durham (2000, pg. 
116) proposes a definition that captures the role of youth in the African context and, 
perhaps, the ‘global south’ more broadly;  
‘(1) those (either by their own claims, or by the impositions of 
others) who straddle kin-based, domestic space and broader 
public spheres; (2) those who have gained some level of 
recognized autonomy and take up public roles, but are still 
also dependent and not yet able to command the labour of 
others as superiors themselves; (3) those who can be 
expected to act upon their social world and not just be the 
recipients of action, but whose actions are often 
conceptualized as straddling (or linking) the social and a-
social (biological, natural exotic domains).’  
Youth is a contested term in the African context with age-based definitions 
including anyone between the ages of 15 and 35 (Christiansen, Utas & Vigh, 2006, 
pg. 11). While the Nigerian Youth Policy (2009) targets people between the ages of 
18-35, Togo defines youth as 15-24 years, and Mali has no fixed definition for youth. 
Hence, ‘youth’ is a demographic cross-section of society shaped by the ‘economic 
trials of postcoloniality,’ ‘geographically isolated (in urban areas),’ and gendered, 
and ‘classed (as economically marginal)’ (Ralph, 2008, pg. 11). In a context of urban 
poverty, deprivation, and limited formal opportunities, youth becomes a position of 
‘social and political immaturity,’ defined by exclusion, marginality, stagnation and a 
‘truncation of social being’ (Vigh, 2010, pg. 37).   
  
The global political economy approach constructs young people, who lack an 
economic and social purpose, as a threat. The ‘reclassification’ of young people as 
a ‘threat’ is manifested in the ‘institutionalized hostility toward them’ 
which renders their ‘present difficult and their future unpredictable’ (Diouf, 1996, 
pg. 4-5). Without education, employment and prospects of meaningful futures, youth 
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becomes synonymous with radicalisation, violence, and instability (Frederiksen 
& Muniver, 2010, pg. 250). On one hand, young men have played important roles in 
conflicts throughout the region. Young women, on the other hand, are usually seen 
as victims of violence who ‘submit and have no real say in their own destiny’ 
(Frederiksen & Muniver, 2010, pg. 249). Therefore, narratives surrounding young 
men and women have been reified as an archetype of ‘objects-who-defend-
themselves’ (women) and ‘subjects-who-perpetrate-violence’ (men) (Mohanty, 2007, 
pg. 339). For example, young men have been actively involved in the Casamance 
insurgency in Senegal, Tuareg rebellions in Mali and Niger, and have joined the 
ranks of extremist groups in the Sahel (Marc et al., 2015, pg. 51). However, the link 
drawn between youth and violence needs to be re-examined within the scope of 
larger processes17. Armed conflict and violence undermine young African’s 
education and employment prospects which leaves many of them unskilled and 
poorly prepared for the job market. These factors further exacerbate their already 
precarious position and perpetuates a cycle of conflict. In Liberia, for 
example, poverty was identified by ex-combatants as the most common reason for 
‘considering a return to violence, followed by lack of jobs and benefits or training’ 
(Marc et al., 2015, pg. 55). Marginality and exclusion are identified as key triggers for 
criminality and violence, contrary to the narrative that assumes the latter are 
defining characteristics of African youth.  
  
The eruption of youth violence in African cities is best understood as a response to 
crumbling states and ‘crises of patronage politics’ in the struggle for basic services 
and physical security (Meagher, pg. 112, 2007). Our understanding of urban violence 
must be recast as the product of deprivation, marginality, inequality and poverty 
(Winton, 2004). Deprivation, a cause of violence, becomes a form of violence 
(Galtung, 1991). Thus, the violence of youth should be understood through the scope 
of alienation and repression, income equality and lack of access to basic services as 
well as the lack of state protection, severe corruption and inefficiency (Winton, 2004, 
pg. 166). The eruption of ‘everyday reactionary violence’ (Winton, 2004, pg. 166) can 
escalate to larger conflict in societies that have endured the dissolution of social 
structures including family, school, police and justice (Vanderschueren, 1996, pg. 
 
17 Pieterse (2010) proposed a research agenda that examines African ‘cityness’ through the 
scope of youth, criminality and violence. This topic was the subject of a previous dissertation 
titled ‘Youth, Criminality and Violence in the African City’ but has been expanded in this 
analysis to adopt a more holistic approach to the examination of ‘cityness.’ 
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93).  The socio-spatial infrastructures approach demonstrates how youth violence is 
a product of inequality and social exclusion resulting from a distortion of social 
structures – family, school, peer group, neighbourhood, police, justice – that can no 
longer fulfil their role. For example, the case of the vigilante group known as 
the Bakassi Boys in south-eastern Nigeria emerged as a ‘spontaneous popular 
initiative’ to enforce property rights and compensate for the lack of state security 
provision (Meagher, 2007, pg. 96). Similarly, the emergence of young, urban vigilante 
groups in Cameroon, Kenya, and South Africa suggests that the ‘apparent links that 
Nigerians draw between vigilantism and inequality and power are far more 
widespread’ (Smith, 2004, pg. 429-30). Yet, African states often regard youths as 
‘saboteurs’ whose potential for social upheaval stems from their ‘incomplete 
subjugation’ and subversive political action (Durham, 2000, pg. 113).   
 
Building off the global political economy approach, the policy fix approach broaches 
the topic of youth primarily through the scope of employment and poverty. High 
growth rates in Africa have not resulted in higher employment rates; between 2000 
and 2008 employment grew at an annual average of 2.8 per cent, half the rate of 
economic growth with only five countries — Algeria, Burundi, Botswana, Cameroon, 
and Morocco— experiencing employment growth over 4 per cent (State of African 
Cities 2018, pg. 41). Women and youth are disproportionately engaged in the informal 
sector as formal employment is rare in most countries. South Africa is the only 
country in which formal employment accounts for most jobs. Formal employment in 
Botswana and Egypt represents 40 to 50 per cent of employment while neighbouring 
countries register less than 20 per cent of the working-age population in the formal 
employment sector (State of African Cities 2018, pg. 46). Policies that address 
unemployment seek to transform ‘youth’ into an engine of growth by tailoring 
education to job market demands, formalising informal economic activities, and 
pacifying criminal elements. For example, the Agenda 2063 of the African Union and 
the Common African Position have prioritised ‘youth development, science, 
technology and innovation’ as critical factors in the socio-economic development of 
the entire continent (African Union, 2017).   
  
A ‘monodisciplinary (economic) prism’ of employment, income and labour markets 
has serious consequences for development interventions affecting African youth 
(Ismail, 2016, pg. 55). Youth employment strategies are often focused on how best to 
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make young people ‘employable’ in the formal economy, with a focus on vocational 
training. Training programs aimed at retrenched workers and new entrants to the 
job market are proposed and implemented as a means of increasing productivity. 
Youth-oriented programs are ‘designed in close collaboration with private firms’ and 
expected to yield positive results (State of African Cities 2018, pg. 54). Fox & Thomas 
(2016, pg. 33) have found that these projects do not help the majority of young people 
as paid jobs are in short supply relative to the number of working-age youth. Often, 
only educated youth from wealthier families have the educational level to gain 
access to wage jobs. This type of training in SSA, when publicly provided, does not 
produce cost-effective results (Fox & Thomas, 2016, pg. 33). Most youth employment 
policies tend to be ‘elitist’ and have ‘formal sector biases’ as they are aimed at 
educated urban youth or ‘focused on skills training to prepare beneficiaries for 
formal, wage sector jobs’ (Ismail, 2016, pg. 42). Furthermore, formalising pre-existing 
informal youth businesses may, in fact, stifle small and underfunded youth-led 
endeavours that are subjected to government scrutiny and taxation. The socio-
spatial infrastructures approach demonstrates the ways in which policy dealing with 
‘youth unemployment’ frames young people as an ‘undifferentiated mass, 
overlooking the fact that very few young people are unemployed in the sense that 
they are doing nothing’ (Fortune et al., 2014). African youth have demonstrated 
remarkable ingenuity, creativity, and resourcefulness in spite of limited 
opportunities by seeking income-generating activities in a variety of sectors. 
Artisanal mining, street trading, hairdressing and barbering can be characterised 
as ‘survivalist entrepreneurial activities’ that represent efficient coping mechanisms 
(Marc et al., 2015, pg. 57).   
 
In some examples, young people pursue profitable agendas such as the ‘marketing 
of violence,’ demonstrating their aptitude for coercion, extortion, and violence by 
turning a capacity (for violence) into a resource (Ismail, 2009, pg. 483). In Lagos, for 
example, public discourse on youth has focused on the ‘Area boys,’ primary and 
secondary school drop-outs, retrenched public sector workers, orphans, and 
citizens forcibly displaced from neighbourhoods and houses (Momoh, 2000, pg. 100) 
who make a living by extorting money from drivers, demanding bribes from vendors 
in markets and threatening violence if and when resisted. There are two categories 
of ‘Area boys’: the first is considered ‘harmless’ and make a living by doing menial 
jobs in the streets of Lagos; the second group – the ‘landlords’ – holds more power 
and influence by extorting money from traders and holding shops mainly in Lagos 
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Island (Momoh, 2000, pg. 186). The relevant literature explains the existence of ‘Area 
boys’ as the by-product of deep-set schisms in state-society relations in Nigeria 
which have resulted from political oppression under military rule and the harmful 
consequences of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). Ismail (2009) documents 
the daily lives of the ‘Area boys’ who use violence and criminality as ‘adaptive 
strategies’ to broaden their spaces of operation and ‘territories of habitation’ in ways 
that are economically practical (Ismail, 2009, pg. 465). Through the establishment of 
‘junctions’18 and ‘bases,’ ‘Area boys’ exercise their right to the city through a violent 
appropriation of public space.  These ‘junctions’ and ‘bases’ are sites where norms, 
and ‘codes of belonging’ are created, defined, and processed as a way 
distinguishing, sustaining and reproducing youth identities within the public 
sphere (Simone, 1998, pg. 8; Ismail, 2009, pg. 471). The discourse surrounding ‘bases’ 
and ‘junctions’ highlights the fact that policy-oriented research often ignores how 
young Africans may resort to unconventional money-making opportunities to 
compensate for the ‘impossibility of their everyday lives’ (Ismail, 2009, pg. 485).  In so 
doing, these ‘hoodlums,’ ‘hooligans’ and ‘miscreants’ have revealed themselves as 
a force to be reckoned with, prompting both the state and civil society to co-opt them 
and attempt to use them as a politically influential tool (Fourchard et al., 2005, pg. 
183). In 2007, after the reconstruction of major streets around the central business 
district (CBD), the Lagos State government co-opted the ‘Area boys’ to police the 
CBD as legal enforcers of street trading laws and regulations. To justify this policy, 
the state claimed it was an effective means of reducing youth unemployment and 
handling the problem of ‘Area boys’ (Ismail, 2009, pg. 481). This state policy is 
remarkable for a number of reasons. The move constitutes an implicit 
acknowledgement, even legitimation, of the ‘regime of order’ imposed by these 
urban agents in ‘junctions’ and ‘bases’ and also suggests that the state has 
acknowledged its ‘deterritorialization’ in the spheres of influence controlled by the 
‘Area boys’ (Ismail, 2009, pg. 481). Therefore, the political and power struggles of the 
‘Area boys’ shed light on an emerging politics that sees ordinary urban dwellers 
move into spaces vacated by the state19, necessitating a new way of understanding 
of the urban condition in African cities (Momoh, 2000, pg. 197).    
 
18 The term ‘base’ refers to a neighbourhood or meeting place where young people 
congregate, normally after working hours, to relax and discuss politics and sports. 
‘Junctions’ are places where social hoodlums and ‘street marauders’ gather to devise and 
exploit money-making opportunities (Ismail, 2009, pg. 464). 




The emergence of ‘youth politics’ across the continent demonstrates the political 
engagement of young people who embrace their modernity by using different 
mediums such as music, graffiti, fashion, and dancing to express agency (Herson, 
2011; Niang, 2006). Youth music geographies provide arenas for negotiating political 
identities through rebellion and contestation, to 'claim a voice, group membership, 
or a place in the city’ (Fredericks, 2014, pg. 133). Perullo (2005) looks at the ways 
young urban Tanzanians use the medium of music to deal with painful realities of 
difficult living conditions. Emerging in the 1980s, hip hop and rap evolved as a ‘kind 
of lingua franca for disenfranchised youth’ across the African continent (Saucier, 
2011). His research focuses on the pressures encountered by young men and women 
in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, a city of approximately 3.5 million people where 
unemployment ranges from 13 to 40 per cent. In this context, young people work 
'menial jobs, sit on street corners waiting to be hired, or search the city for 
employment’ (Perullo, 2005, pg. 76). Pitted against a society that ignores their 
'contributions in language, dress, and popular culture, and negates the ways they 
cope with economic and social pressures,’ young people use rap to vent their 
frustration with unemployment, corruption, social stratification, AIDS, and gender 
relations (ibid). Therefore, through the medium of rap, young people are 
the representatives for ‘those without power,’ giving voice to the subaltern20 
(Whiteley, 2004, pg. 9). 
  
In a similar context, Senegalese rappers initially emulated the style of rap emerging 
from the USA and France, but their music soon began to develop its own ‘distinct 
flavour,’ combining local musical traditions, indigenous languages, and ‘messages 
that resonated with Senegalese youth’ (Fredericks, 2014, pg. 134). The decision to 
abandon French as the language of rap was conscious and deliberate. O’Brien (2008) 
differentiates between the use of Wolof and French, stating that French is the 
language of ‘authority and instruction’ while Wolof is the language of ‘collusion and 
evasion, the language in which the orders are most effectively circumvented’ (Gellar, 
2016, pg. 13). Dakar is one of the most popular and influential hip-hop scenes on the 
continent (Charry, 2012). The trademark of the music is focus on with matters of 
social importance including political corruption, delinquency, legacies of 
 
20 See Set/Setal on pg. 267-269 
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colonialism, economic hardship and the complacency of the country’s leaders. 
Fredericks (2014, pg. 136) suggests that the political critique in rap is ‘radical’ for two 
reasons;   
‘First, it constitutes, a transgression of conventional 
delineations of who is allowed to speak for the community 
because it usurps gerontocratic traditions of public 
discourse. Second, this new discursive space constitutes a 
rupture with inherited conventions of propriety in indirect 
comment, through involving a direct and uncensored mode 
of public moral critique. In this way, rap—as a mode of 
speaking out of turn— embodies a rejection of the status quo 
that is at the core of a sort of generational revolt.’  
The accessibility of rap, which requires no formal musical training, instruments, 
equipment, ‘or even literacy,’ has meant that it continues to be widely embraced as 
a medium of self-expression for young people everywhere (Fredericks, 2014, pg. 136). 
In Cote d’Ivoire, urban youth have harnessed popular music genres of zouglou and 
reggae as a means of democratic self-expression to vent their frustration with 
politicians and the lack of opportunities available to them. Through music, they have 
found a domain for articulating ideas and information on politicians, corruption, 
history and identity. Drawing from Lefebvre, Saldanha (2002, pg. 348), describes 
youth music geographies as the ‘embodied production of space’ existing ‘in’ space 
and referring ‘to’ space – ‘the space of music is produced and produces identity and 
politics through its corporealisation.’ Rap and hip-hop become a key element for 
reconstituting the democratic public sphere by producing ‘alternative 
representations of space’ (Saldanha, 2002, pg. 348). Thus, through rap and hip hop, 
young people forge a ‘radical politics’ in a reconfiguration of spaces that helps them 
assert their right to the city21 (Fredericks, 2014, pg. 138).  
 
Through consumption, trade, violence and entrepreneurship, young people reinsert 
themselves into statist agendas and larger capitalist and global processes in the 
production of what Bhabha (1996) has termed a ‘vernacular cosmopolitan.’ These 
strategies point to the ‘hidden and subtle’ ways youth drive the economic and social 
life of the city and ‘keep it hooked into the global economy’ (Scheld, 2007, pg. 
233). The urban knowledge of African youth, defined by Mbembe (1997) as the 
‘ability to improvise, survive, and ultimately succeed in the city,’ can only be 
acquired through experimentation and improvisation. Urban knowledge enables 
 
21 See Plebeian public sphere on pg. 263 
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young Africans to ‘navigate successfully’ through the hazards of urban life, using 
improvisational skills that demand knowledge of ‘chaos, fractals, mobility 
and vectoral capacity’ to navigate the ‘complex dynamics of (social) transmission’ 
(De Boeck, 2015, pg. 5).  
  
Case two: informality  
Informality is a poorly defined concept, particularly on the African continent where 
a false dichotomy between formal and informal is misleading and fails to grasp 
the nuances of the phenomenon. Official data detailing the size and range of 
informal activities in the ‘global south’ is approximative, but commands substantial 
authority. The International Labour Organization (ILO) (2018) estimates that, 
excluding agriculture, informal employment accounts for 78.8 per cent of 
employment in Central Africa, 76.6 per cent in East Africa, and 87 per cent in West 
Africa (ILO, 2018, pg. 29).  Data suggests that only a third of 15- to 24-year-olds in Côte 
d’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, and Nigeria are employed in the formal labour force (Fortune 
et al., 2014). The rest are categorised as ‘unemployed’ according to official data 
figures, although they are likely involved in the informal economy (Marc et al., 2015). 
The International Labour Organization (1972) defines informality as a ‘way of doing 
things characterized by (a) ease of entry; (b) reliance on indigenous resources; (c) 
family ownership; (d) small-scale operations; (e) labour intensive and adaptive 
technology; (e) skills acquired outside of the formal sector; (g) unregulated and 
competitive markets.’ 
 
The global political economy and policy fix approaches address informality through 
the lens of regulation and legality. However, the approaches differ on their 
standpoint regarding the effects of informality on urban development. While global 
political economy approaches refuse to acknowledge the informal sector as anything 
other than a ‘parasitic,’ and unproductive form of ‘disguised unemployment’ 
(Bromley, 1997), policy fix approaches have cast informality as a dynamic form of 
entrepreneurship, in which the self-employed opt out of the formal economy to 
benefit from its perceived advantages (Castells, 1989).  
 
Both approaches ignore the history of informality in Africa which is arguably based 
on colonial rationale and neoliberal economic restructuring. It is important to note 
that ‘informality,’ as defined by the global political economy and policy fix 
47 
 
approaches, exist(s)ed in the pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial histories of 
Africa (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1991, pg. 171-96; Abdoul, 2005, pg. 237). Following 
independence in many African countries, the informal sector was generally 
perceived as an ‘inconvenient reality’ that would eventually disappear as economies 
were modernised (Potts, 2007, pg. 10). State policies discouraged street traders and 
the informal sector was considered problematic, as newly independent governments 
wanted their cities to ‘look like First World cities of the late 20th century’22 (Potts, 
2007, pg. 10). However, the dearth of employment opportunities in urban areas and 
the absence of social safety nets meant that many urban dwellers were driven to the 
informal sector in search of income-generating activities. The case of Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania demonstrates the tumultuous relationship between the state and the 
informal sphere. Both the colonial and postcolonial states made many attempts to 
remove the 'so-called unproductive elements' from Dar es Salaam and relocate 
them to the countryside. The targets of these policies were the self-employed, whose 
conflict with the state became one of determining ‘not just how they would obtain a 
livelihood but also who would control their very means of survival’23 (Tripp, 1997, pg. 
162). Resettlement schemes such as Nguvu Kazi (1983) removed ‘unproductive,’ and 
‘idle’ elements from the city and relocated them to the rural hinterland. Resettlement 
policies only antagonised the majority of the urban population whose work in the 
informal sector was a key means of survival but often disregarded as a legitimate 
form of employment. A similar set of policies implemented in Nigeria, called the war 
against indiscipline (1984), involved the arrest of street vendors and destruction of 
stalls along main roads in urban areas. In Zambia, similar policies arrested street 
vendors and destroyed their wares during a period of job shortages in 1982 (Hansen, 
1999, pg. 148).  
 
Structural adjustment in the late 1980s required the liberalisation of trade and cuts 
to public expenditure to attain macroeconomic stability and balance national 
budgets. The impact on urban livelihoods was felt throughout the continent; real 
income in urban areas declined as currencies were devalued and wages were 
 
22 See ‘vernacular western modernity’ on pg. 241 
23 These historical and ongoing processes of marginalisation and exclusion may be linked to 
Roy’s current research based on the criminalization of poverty in American cities in which 
processes of dispossession are met with mobilization and protest by the urban poor who 
challenge housing exclusion (Institute of Inequality and Democracy, UCLA, 2019). This line 
of research casts the right to the city in terms of the right to be informal and the 
criminalization of informality as a means of survival. 
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cut. Urban dwellers ‘bore the brunt of formal job losses’ and suffered the scaling 
back or removal of public subsidies (housing, schooling, and staple food). Real 
minimum wages fell 81 per cent in Abidjan between 1978 and 1988, and by 90 per 
cent in Nigeria between 1981 and 1990 while the population of Bissau experienced 
‘persistent impoverishment’ (Lourenço-Lindell, 2002, pg. 71). Governments remained 
either unable or unwilling to fulfil the needs and demands of urban citizens or were 
still ‘obsessed with unrealistic modernising ideals for their cities’ (ibid).  Retrenched 
public sector workers and new job seekers did not ‘passively watch their conditions 
deteriorate’ and devised alternative ways to access land, housing, and other basic 
services (Lourenço-Lindell, 2002, pg. 71, pg. 9). African urbanites created their own 
urban systems in the process of negotiating livelihoods with little concern for 
regulation and public policy, giving credence to the proverb ‘necessity is the mother 
of invention.’ By virtue of their small size, informal sector production units can evade 
taxation and regulation, which means they may benefit from public goods but do not 
contribute to public finance. In the context of Senegal, the informal sector is often 
the ‘only alternative to an acceptable life’ and ‘protection from the absolute lowest 
level of poverty’ following the devaluation of the Franc CFA (Granström, 2009, pg. 14). 
During times of economic crises, the informal sector has proven remarkably resilient 
to external shock since it does not have direct access to global financial markets. In 
recent years, the focus has shifted to an emphasis on gendered entrepreneurialism 
based on the assumption that ‘more women than men choose to become 
entrepreneurs’ across the African continent (Gaye, 2018). The informal sector 
creates opportunities for women to undertake income-generating activities and has 
improved the position of women through increased bargaining power and greater 
opportunities (Todaro & Smith, 2006). Policy discourse therefore focuses on 
solutions to support female entrepreneurs on the continent.  In his pioneering 
analysis on the informal economy in Accra, Hart (1973) asked whether the ‘army of 
urban unemployed and underemployed really constitute a passive, exploited 
majority,’ or if they possess ‘some autonomous capacity for generating growth.’ Self-
employment, redefined as micro-entrepreneurship, purportedly offers a host of 
potential benefits including flexible hours, opportunity for economic independence, 
better wages, and avoidance of taxes and inefficient government regulation. Thus, 
informality endures as a key means of employment, housing, services, and other 
functions in many under-serviced African cities. However, the neoliberal 
conceptualisation of ‘informality as self-employment’ represents a deceptively 
compelling and enticing narrative of opportunity and empowerment (Pieterse, 2010, 
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pg. 12). Although it provides income-generating activities for the poorest 
marginalised urban dwellers, employment in the informal sector remains precarious 
and poorly remunerated. 
 
In recent years, the continent has experienced the spread and sprawl of informal 
settlements. Urban planning has been inefficient in light of the demographic and 
economic realities of rapid population growth, poorly defined property rights and 
limited provision of essential public services.  Researchers explaining the increase 
of slums across the ‘global south’ have framed the process as ‘disjointed 
modernisation,’ the scale of which is ‘symptomatic’ of state failure to actively 
manage urbanisation (Fox, 2013, pg. 192).  The ‘modernist’ view assumes that, as 
urban dwellers and rural-urban migrants find employment and increase their 
incomes, they will eventually gain access to the formal housing market or invest in 
upgrading their living conditions24. It is more often the case, however, that slums 
become ‘permanent’ dwellings, entrenching the urban poor deeper into conditions 
of precariousness and informality. This makes their rise out of poverty increasingly 
unlikely in the long term. Overall, informality (in terms of forms of income generation, 
forms of settlement and housing) has become the dominant model; it is no longer 
the 'exception’ in Africa and more broadly across the ‘global south’ (Roy, 2005; Al-
Sayyad and Roy, 2003; Yiftachel and Yacobi, 2003; Watson, 2014, pg. 2263).   
  
Increasingly, informal settlements are cast as ‘islands of resistance and/or outcast 
territories,’ but also increasingly as ‘untapped markets and potential spaces for 
profit-driven development’ and speculative urbanism (Vasuvedan, 2015, pg. 346). 
Slums play a significant role in capital formation, demanding imports from the 
urban centre, and supplying unskilled and semiskilled labour (Frankenhoff, 1967, pg. 
34). The attempts to formalise economic activities following deliberate attempts to 
suppress them reveal an ‘ambition on the part of the state to tap this potential source 
of revenue’25 (Lourenço-Lindell, 2002, pg. 74). However, there is no concrete roadmap 
for what the formalisation of the informal26 would look like in the ‘global south.’ The 
desire to formalise the informal originates in the early emergence of modern 
 
24 See ‘urbanisme evolutif’ on pg. 193 
25 See Centre Felix Eboué on pg. 259 
26 Examples of how formalisation attempts have been deployed in the case study will be 
discussed in Chapter Eight. 
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statecraft in the ‘global north,’ and its subsequent development into high-modernist 
ideology aimed at the ‘rational design of social order’ (Scott, 1998, pg. 4). Informal 
dwellers are expected to accept the long-term binding financial and legal 
obligations of home ownership, including the 'adherence to various regulations 
regarding the use of the land and the conduct of the occupants (e.g. respecting 
noise and health standards), and the payment of regular rates and service charges 
to the municipal authority’ (Watson, 2003, pg. 396). This paradigm has driven 
government action in the ‘global north,’ and has dominated colonial and 
postcolonial policy in the south where development and modernisation have come 
to mean the same thing. In this context, slum evictions and the destruction of 
informal settlements is an ever-present threat for the working poor, while 
harassment and ostracism are legitimised by policies that seek to formalise the 
informal. The perceived ‘illegality’ of the informal sector makes it highly vulnerable 
to changes in government attitudes and policies, justifying ‘draconian interventions’ 
(Potts, 2007, pg. 6-7).  Planning theory and policy in much of the ‘global south’ 
continues to categorise the ‘informal’ as ‘illegal’ which means that urban planning 
and policy has often intentionally sought to undermine or, in most cases, neglect the 
urban poor even though they constitute the majority across southern cities.   
 
The socio-spatial infrastructures approach demonstrates that the formal/informal 
dichotomy is neither an accurate nor useful distinction in SSA and the ‘global south’ 
since informality is pervasive and exists throughout the city at a variety of scales. 
However, the dichotomy sheds ‘light on what this condition implies for those living 
in it’ (Marx & Kelling, 2019, pg. 10). Global political economy and policy fix 
approaches mostly ignore the fact that the informal economy is a fundamental 
component of the complex social life of cities across the sub-region, enabling the 
poor to access sources of incomes, and services that would not have been available 
to them if not through informal means. This approach reveals that informality is more 
than merely an encroachment of conventional infrastructures since it consists of a 
‘wholly alternative set of practices, indigenous in origin, which remained 
unrecognised in law for a long period during colonialism’ (State of African Cities, 
2014, pg. 132). The informal sector is arguably the ‘real’ economy in which social and 
economic linkages are formed, interrupted, reproduced and transformed through 
established cooperative practices. In recent years, the growth of informal work in 
African cities has been studied as a ‘sign of resilience, partial autonomy and 
inventiveness’ (Pieterse, 2010, pg. 5). Patterns of squatting in both the ‘global north’ 
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and ‘global south’ reflect the ‘contingencies of precarious life in an unstable urban 
world’ but also demonstrate practices of sociability and place-making relevant 
beyond conventional formulations of the ‘political’ (Vasuvedan, 2015, pg. 
353). Informality arguably demonstrates the ambiguities of ‘non-compliant economic 
resistance’ and its ‘potential transformative power’27 (Tripp, 1997, pg. 173). The 
ubiquity of informal urban processes and spaces forces us to recognize an 
‘alternative right to the city’ and consider a more complicated link between 
‘insurgency and informality’ (Roy, 2005, pg. 148).   
 
An inverted look at the development of informality in the ‘global south’ suggests 
that it is not symptomatic of ‘failure’ but is arguably a ‘triumphant sign of their 
success in resisting the western models of planning and urban development’28 
(Miraftab, 2009, pg. 45). The failure of neoliberal economic reforms, once touted as 
the ‘key’ to ‘unlocking’ a country’s development potential, has given way to 
deepening and diversifying informality. Furthermore, the continued emphasis on 
policy based on the northern model of urbanisation undermines the ‘most basic right 
of the urban poor’ – the ‘right to control their means of subsistence’ (Tripp, 1997, pg. 
173). Urbanites do not ‘sit by passively waiting for change,’ and instead seek ‘new 
niches within the informal economy’ (i.e. young women join men at traffic 
intersections to sell newspapers and in artisan mechanic shops to fix cars while 
young men join women in selling doughnuts on street corners, and tailoring 
in women-owned workshops) (Scheld, 2010, pg. 161). Yet, the informal sector 
continues to be discussed as an ‘individualistic, inchoate mass’ that expresses 
political interests only through political and economic disengagement rather than 
through organized and concerted political action (Meagher, 2007, pg. 46). Where the 
state has greatly and repeatedly failed the people, the informal sector has picked up 
the slack and become an inherently political reality of African cities. Informality as a 
mode of urbanisation is ‘insurmountable for states in poorer countries,’ as urban 
residents are the builders of the city, prompting a shift away from ‘simply 
accounting for structural drivers of urban inequality’ towards an understanding of 
how things get done amid ‘overlapping and dense social relations’ (Simone & 
Pieterse, 2017, pg. 39).   
 
27 See ‘exercise in placemaking’ on pg. 25292 




Grounded knowledge on informal processes reveal new ‘imaginaries’ and strategic 
opportunities with the ‘potential for wider applicability’ (Watson, 2014, pg. 2263).  A 
deeper and more nuanced understanding of informality allows us to understand its 
role in the ‘city yet to come’ (Simone, 2004; (Duminy et al., 2014, pg. 252). As it stands, 
planning theory is poorly equipped to handle pressing urban issues and continues 
to advocate policies that destabilise the survival of large swathes of the urban 
population of the ‘global south.’ Consequently, new research will need to find ways 
of dealing with rapid and unpredictable growth in contexts where land and basic 
services rely to a greater extent on informal providers (Watson, 2014, pg. 2263).   
 
Conclusion  
By examining the main approaches to the study of African urbanism, this review has 
sought to make the origins of theory explicit in order to ‘provincialize’ our 
understanding of urban phenomena. While the global political economy and policy 
fix approaches represent the key paradigms guiding the bulk of research on African 
cities, the emerging research agenda (socio-spatial infrastructures) suggests that 
we can no longer dismiss African cities as failures of urbanisation, or decaying sites 
for ‘export-oriented neo-colonialism’ (Oldfield & Parnell, 2014, pg. 141). As the 
dichotomy between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ cities is slowly receding, the 
relations between cities in different parts of the world are recast and challenge 
‘existing theoretical assumptions about the core and periphery’ (Hubbard, 2018).  
 
The analysis has demonstrated that global political economy approaches are limited 
by an overreliance on northern models of growth that continue to rely on an 
understanding of southern, specifically African, urbanisation as merely an 
embryonic and distorted version of its northern referent. When identifying 
impediments (e.g. infrastructure deficits) and comparative advantages (e.g. large 
youth populations) to growth, policy fix approaches are primarily concerned with 
normative reform which has, in some cases, been inappropriate or detrimental to 
African cities. Socio-spatial approaches provide a corrective balance to the study of 
African urbanism by addressing the same harsh realities highlighted by the 
previous two approaches and broadening and pluralising the scope of research. The 
case studies on youth and informality are presented as examples identifying the 
tension between these three approaches. This research project is positioned firmly 
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within the socio-spatial infrastructures approach while simultaneously 
acknowledging the pitfalls and oversights of global political economy and policy fix. 
This analysis delves into the examination of processes shaping African urbanism in 
the case study city, including the ‘patronage networks of dependency’ and the ‘new 
shared identities and social solidarities’ (Choplin & Ciavolella, 2017, pg. 329). The 
following chapter outlines the theoretical framework of this research project which 
is aligned with the aims and methodologies of the socio-spatial infrastructures 
approach. The goal of this framework is to harness the research potential of this 






Voices: Psychogeographies and ‘cityness’ 
 
Psychogeography was developed by the Situationists in the 1950s and defined by 
Debord (1955) as the study of the ‘precise laws and specific effects of the 
geographical environment, consciously organized or not, on the emotions and 
behaviour of individuals.’ Psychogeographies map the ‘unrouted route’ designed by 
the ‘spatial intentionality’ articulated in the everyday currents of the city (Jenks & 
Neves, 2000, pg. 8). The psychogeographies of the city reveal the ‘amorphous 
urbanism’ (McFarlane, 2005) of southern cities that is shaped by ‘people’s intentions 
to do other things’ (Tonkiss, 2014). Within the scope of this research project, 
psychogeographies provide an interesting metaphor for understanding ‘cityness’. 
Debord (1955) explains:  
‘The sudden change of ambiance in a street within the space 
of a few meters; the evident division of a city into zones of 
distinct psychic atmospheres; the path of least resistance 
that is automatically followed in aimless strolls (and which 
has no relation to the physical contour of the terrain); the 
appealing or repelling character of certain places – these 
phenomena all seem to be neglected…People are quite 
aware that some neighbourhoods are gloomy and others 
pleasant. But they generally simply assume that elegant 
streets cause a feeling of satisfaction and that poor streets 
are depressing, and let it go at that. In fact, the variety of 
possible combinations of ambiences, analogous to the 
blending of pure chemicals in an infinite number of mixtures, 
gives rise to feelings as differentiated and complex as any 
other form of spectacle can evoke. The slightest demystified 
investigation reveals that the qualitatively or quantitatively 
different influences of diverse urban decors cannot be 
determined solely on the basis of the historical period or 
architectural style, much less on the basis of housing 
conditions.’  
The psychogeographies of a city speak to the unspoken rules of urban life and allow 
for a better understanding of how these rules are broken, subverted or contested in 
the production of urban space. The empirical analysis reveals several instances 
when mechanisms of exclusion and marginalisation are integrated into 
urban planning as a way of manipulating the psychogeographies of the city. The 
archival analysis, for example, demonstrates how a city is planned and designed to 
impact and influence the psyche of urbanites. Specifically, the analysis documents 
the ways in which the colonial administration and postcolonial state harness 
architecture as an ‘ideological transmitter’ (Wright, 1991, pg. 1). The fieldwork 
analysis provides examples of the contest between the rationalities of urban 
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planning and the psychogeographies of urban life in the production of ‘cityness.’  
The fieldwork analysis provides examples of the contest between the rationalities of 
urban planning and the psychogeographies of urban life. Fieldwork conducted in 
the case study city involves the experience of the psychogeographies of Dakar which 
integrates researcher’s own experience of the latter in the process of unravelling the 






Chapter Three: Theory in the making 
 
Until recently, research on Asian, African and Latin American urbanisation has 
largely been ‘backward oriented,’ concerned primarily with determining and 
exposing the causes of poverty and inequality (Parnell, 2014, pg. 74). The emerging 
counter-narrative, discussed in Chapter Two as the study of ‘socio-spatial 
infrastructures,’ has cast these cities as ‘more aspirant, growth-oriented and 
ambitious’ (ibid).  New frameworks for theorising southern urbanisation include 
‘grey spacing’ (Yiftachel, 2009), multiple modernities (Eisenstadt, 1999), ordinary 
cities (Robinson, 2006), alternative modernities (Gaonkar, 2000; Bhargava, 2010), 
hybrid modernities (Bhabam, 1994) and global modernity (Dirlik, 2007).  Other 
examples include Watson’s (2009) ‘conflicting rationalities,’ Roy’s (2011) subaltern 
urbanisms and state informality, and Porto Alegre’s participatory budgeting 
(Albrechts, 2012), all of which challenge conventional urban theory. An urban theory 
of the ‘global south’ is a theory-in-the-making as researchers explore new avenues 
for urban research that embrace the plurality and complexity of southern 
urbanisation. Trial and error29 are therefore important parts of the research process 
and calls on the researcher to act as a ‘bricoleur’30 by experimenting with theories to 
determine whether they are useful tropes for expanding our understanding of 
southern cities.  
  
The review begins by discussing and defining the key components of an urban 
theory of the ‘global south.’ The analysis then moves from the general (‘global 
south’) to the specific (African cities) to outline the theoretical framework of this 
research project and the guiding theories underpinning the fieldwork. Specifically, 
the project looks at postcolonial theory to provincialize urban studies, planetary 
urbanisation (Brenner & Schmid, 2015) and ‘grey spaces’ (Avni & Yiftachel, 2014) 
to recast urban development in southern cities, and ‘people as infrastructure’ 
(Simone, 2004) to examine more closely the survival strategies of the urban 
subaltern. For the purpose of clarity, much of what is presented here is outlined as 
neatly bound schools of thought, but an urban theory of the ‘global south’ can only 
come to the fore through the cross-pollination of various disciplines and theories.  
 
29 Simone and Pieterse (2017) advocate for ‘experimentation’ as an integral part of theory-
building for southern research (see pg. 297). 




Theorising the ‘global south’  
Drawing from the work of Sheppard et al. (2013), the analysis proposes a five-point 
manifesto that outlines the theoretical scope of this research project and its 
conceptual underpinnings.  
  
i. Defining the urban   
Research on cities of the ‘global south,’ is limited by definitions that circumscribe 
and frame our understanding. Conventional definitions of cities, urbanisation, and 
urban ‘thresholds’ are simply inadequate for defining and describing cities of the 
‘global south.’ The ‘global south’ has replaced the ‘Third World’ as a term 
referencing all of Africa, Central and Latin America, the Caribbean, and most of 
Asia. The term originates in the Cold War era, denoting a ‘tripartite division’ in which 
two major ideological models for the political economy of modernity emerged, each 
with its ‘less developed others’ (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012, pg. 127). The Third 
‘nonaligned world’ appeared after the Bandung conference (1955) and embraced an 
‘empowering alternative’ to the ‘imperial plutocracy’ of the First World and the 
‘imperial bureaucracy of the Second’ (Flusty, 2003, pg. 102). The more recently 
popularised term, ‘global south,’ is arguably a misnomer due to the multiplicity of 
locations it encompasses, becoming a blanket reference for a large part of the 
world. It is therefore best described as a ‘vernacular shorthand’ stemming from the 
‘long-term parochialism’ in urban theory (Simone, 2018, pg. 23). It creates an artificial 
dichotomy between ‘north’ and ‘south’ and deepens the schism between the 
apparent ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of global capitalism. Throughout the thesis, ‘global 
south’ is intentionally written in lowercase and in quotations to problematise the 
term and signal its usage as a theoretical referent. In so doing, the analysis signals 
the need to ‘interrogate the coloniality’ of terms like ‘indigenous’ and ‘southern’ and 
question the parochialism of urban theory (Jazeel, 2018, pg. 10). In the realm of 
theory, the term references specific historical processes with their epicentre in the 
urban regions of the ‘south’ (Pieterse, 2013) and acts as a shorthand reference for 
‘non-European, postcolonial peoples’ (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012, pg. 113). The 
‘global south’ is therefore framed as an ‘epistemological location’ rather than a 
‘geographical container’ which allows for the provincialization of hegemonic theory 
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(Lawhon et al., 2014, pg. 505). The ‘monolithic West’31 is arguably no more pertinent 
a term than ‘global south’ as a way of speaking ‘convincingly of the entire ex-colonial 
world in one sweeping generalisation after another’ (Said, 1987, pg. 47). However, 
the term ‘global south’ may also provide an opening for theory-building. In its ‘ex-
centricity’ outside of Euro-America, the ‘global south’ signals an angle from which 
to ‘estrange our world’ in order to ‘make sense of its present and future’ (Bhaba, 
1994, pg. 6). In this analysis, the term is harnessed as tool and point of contention to 
push back against urban theory and explore an urban world of southern cities 
beyond the focus on developmental factors.  
 
The urban is widely understood as a ‘distinct kind of site’ (the city), distinguishable 
from the hinterland (the rural), and ‘taken to be a hallmark of modernism, progress, 
development and the metropole – the opposite of provincialism’ (Sheppard et al., 
2013, pg. 894). Our understanding and definition of urbanism is steeped in Euro-
American historicism – the opposite of which is not only ruralism, but a southern 
urbanism that deviates from the urban patterns of northern cities. As the 
‘destination of societal development,’ urbanisation relies implicitly or explicitly on 
Northern American and Western European cities as ‘the norm’ (Sheppard et al., 
2013, pg. 894). As they continue to evolve, cities of the ‘global south’ shed some of 
the elements that defined them ‘since antiquity’ including the ‘demarcation 
between urban and rural and functional and economic complementarity between 
its neighbourhoods’ (Jihad & Jacques, 2012, pg. 93). Wirth (1938, pg. 8), a key urban 
scholar of the early 20th century, defines a city as ‘a relatively large, dense, and 
permanent settlement of socially heterogeneous individuals.’ Size, density, and 
heterogeneity shape an ‘urban way of life’ and an ‘urban personality’ (ibid). 
Similarly, Mumford (1937, pg. 93-4) defines the city as; 
‘…the fixed site, the durable shelter, the permanent facilities 
for assembly, interchange, and storage; the essential social 
means and the social division of labour, which serves not 
merely the economic life but the cultural processes. The city 
in its complete sense, then, is a geographical plexus, an 
 
31 The ‘west’ is displayed in lowercase (except in direct quotations from the literature) to 
signal that it makes the same blanket statements as the term ‘other’ or ‘oriental.’ 
Nevertheless, these terms are pertinent to the subject matter of this inquiry since they 




economic organisation, an institutional process, a theatre of 
social action, and an aesthetic symbol of collective unity.’  
Wirth’s definition of cities applies largely to urban agglomerations across the ‘global 
south,’ owing to their dynamism, heterogeneity and diversity. The focus on 
‘permanence,’ however, does not necessarily apply to the large and growing 
informal and temporary settlements in many southern cities.  When cities across the 
south are weighed in the balance of Mumford’s definition, they are often found 
wanting in the characteristics of a city. The ‘fixed site,’ ‘durable shelter,’ and 
‘permanent facilities’ do not lend themselves to an understanding of the mutable, 
flexible, and transient qualities of many southern cities, often defined by 
uncontrolled urban sprawl. In fact, the ‘question of temporariness’ demonstrates the 
‘temporary quality’ of physical and spatial resources and ‘social, political, and moral 
relations and relations to the sources of power’ are produced by a continuity ‘in the 
face of the temporariness of things’ (Appadurai, 2003, pg. 47).  The ‘theatre of social 
action’ is therefore devoted to producing, ‘if not the illusion, then the sense of 
permanence in the face of the temporary’ (Appadurai, 2003, pg. 47). When we 
broaden the definition of urbanity to explain the ‘concentration – or congregation – 
of human energies and activities that bring space to life,’ then southern cities are 
prime examples of contemporary urbanism as evidenced by their dense social and 
economic networks and linkages32 (Beall & Fox, 2009, pg. 3). This analysis posits that 
southern cities fall within the scope of Gramsci’s citta, a ‘physical, densely inhabited 
and structured space (the roman urbs); [and] a social space of political engagement 
and active citizenship (the Greek polis)’ (Choplin & Ciavolella, 2017, pg. 316). The city 
is therefore a socio-historically produced arena in which the subaltern become 
‘actively involved in the making of their own society’ (ibid). Hence, there is a case for 
rethinking what constitutes a ‘city’ and the task of re-imagining the definitions of 
southern cities is only possible through new and nuanced approaches to the study 
of modern-day southern urbanism.   
  
So, we arrive at ‘cityness’ – a prism through which to gain a deeper understanding 
of urbanisation in the ‘global south’ without relying on meta-narratives and 
development models of northern theory. The 'developmentalist' outlook that guides 
most studies of southern cities focuses on dimensions of 
poverty, economic marginalisation, dysfunctionality, and failures in establishing 
 
32 See ‘people as infrastructure’ on pg. 87 
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viable systems of local governance. At times, this outlook has promoted policies that 
have been 'downright destructive' such as the Structural Adjustment Programmes 
in the 1980s and 1990s (Watson, 2002, pg. 46). While these factors are relevant to 
understanding the present-day realities of southern cities, they only tell one side of 
the story. Urban processes and practices in the ‘global south’ are not 'inadequate 
copies, or distortions’ of northern developments but instead have 'their own logics' 
and represent unique and ‘creative adaptations of the modern’ (Harrison, 2006, pg. 
324).  This shift in focus opens a ‘more hopeful’ research agenda that focuses on 
the ability of southern urbanites to construct productive and meaningful lives at the 
‘micro-scale’ and ‘economies and societies at a macro-scale' (Harrison, 2006, pg. 
323).   
  
‘Cityness’ sheds light on coeval modes of contemporary urbanism and the ‘diverse-
yet-distinctive means’ of city-making that shape the materiality of everyday life in 
cities (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012, pg. 118). To label southern urban modernity as 
‘alternative’ presupposes its existence at the margins of a hegemonic (western) 
modernity, or worse, as a critique or ‘merely an appendage of Western modernity 
and European modernism’ (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012, pg. 118). Instead, it must be 
read as a ‘vernacular—just as Euro modernity is a vernacular’ since it constitutes an 
ongoing engagement with the ‘unfolding history of the present’ (ibid). Southern 
‘cityness’ is the social and political meaning of ‘being in and belonging to the 
city and refutes the narrative of ‘urban incompleteness’ and dysfunctionality 
(Choplin & Ciavolella, 2017, pg. 325).  
  
ii. Delimiting the urban   
‘Cityness’ forces us to reconsider the spatiality of a city. Physical boundaries and 
delimitations are often rendered obsolete as soon as they are incorporated into the 
urban lexicon of many cities of the south owing to the rate of urban sprawl. 
Statistical definitions and demographic indicators are often used to establish a 
‘benchmark’ based on which an area is defined as urban (or not). However, as the 
analysis will show, there are varying benchmarks often dealing with the same sets 
of data manipulated to fit within the scope of city agendas and municipal divisions.  
  
The ‘urban threshold’ is arguably no longer a useful tool for understanding urban 
realities in the south, particularly on the African continent where growth projections 
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have been misleading and do little to explain the drivers of urbanisation. Varying 
definitions of the urban ‘threshold’ have meant that urban areas are defined as those 
encompassing anything from a ‘few thousand inhabitants’ in Cameroon to 10,000 
urban dwellers according to Africapolis (2011) (Potts, 2012, pg. 2). Patterns of 
urbanisation across the African continent, and the ‘global south’ more broadly, have 
challenged demarcations between urban, peri-urban and rural33 (Simon, 2008). 
Population estimates indicate that 70 per cent of the urban population in over 20 
African countries resides in cities of less than 500,000 inhabitants (Simkins, 2013). 
Another important trend is the rise of mega-cities as these large urban 
agglomerations, including Lagos, Cairo and Kinshasa will continue growing at a 
‘maddening pace’ (Koffi, 2012, pg. 188). By 2030, Dar es Salaam, Johannesburg, and 
Luanda will also have reached mega-city status (UN World Cities Report, 2018).  The 
size and evolution of these cities defies definitions and challenges the capacity of 
traditional measuring tools for capturing the demographic phenomenon in all its 
complexity. Databases and measures of growth in African cities are ‘weak’ 
and available data is often produced based on a ‘great deal of guessing' (Jerven, 
2013, pg. 357).  
 
Urban policymakers and practitioners rely on statistics, probability and risk 
modelling to dissect and study cities, but the toolbox developed from the northern 
model is unsuitable for an examination of cities in Africa and the ‘global 
south.’ These tools conceal the fact that ‘no one knows quite what is going on’ as 
everything that falls outside of the scope of traditional modelling techniques either 
‘does not matter or is subject to ‘grubby governance’ (Simone, 2014, pg. 323). Grubby 
practices refer to the pushback against narratives circulated by technocrats to 
preserve the ‘domination of capital over labour’ and reveal the disconnect between 
the strictly measured and defined categories of northern urbanisation and the 
flexible and mutable parameters of southern urbanisation (Harvey, 1978, pg. 231). 
‘At the design level, an incompatibility exists between 
statistical categories that were conceived for industrialised 
societies (with clearly defined property rights and formal 
employment relationships) and the developing contexts to 
which they are applied. At the implementation level, a lack of 
capacity and record keeping at official statistical offices is 
exacerbated by the challenge of inaccessibility that is 
associated with poor and remote areas. Thus, numbers and 
 
33 See example of Pikine on pg. 184 
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indicators are especially inadequate in less developed 
countries' (Jerven, 2013, pg. 356).  
Cities of the ‘global south’ have thwarted efforts for ‘certainty inherent in modernist 
urban planning’ (Chakrabarty 2002; Edensor and Jayne 2011). Yet, urban 
investigations in the ‘global south’ are often deployed with a ‘prefabricated’ set of 
theories and methodologies and urban plans are implemented despite important 
data deficiencies (McFarlane & Rutherford, 2008, pg. 343). Roy (2005, pg. 225) 
suggests we develop new ‘vocabularies and epistemologies’ for southern cities as 
we continue to ‘decolonize [our] imagination about cityness.’ Often, the only viable 
option for defining a city in the south is to ask, what isn’t a city? There is no singular 
definition of the urban that captures the magnitude of this ‘total phenomenon’ 
(Lefebvre, 1970). However, in order to build a case for an urban theory of the ‘global 
south,’ this review concludes with a discussion on the definition of the urban that 
espouses the complexity of southern urbanity.   
 
iii. Theorising the urban 
The corpus of urban theory is centred on northern cities, borne of the industrial 
revolution, which no longer constitute the urban majority in terms of contemporary 
urbanisation trends of the 21st century (Oldfield & Parnell, 2014, pg. 2).  Research on 
the ‘urban phenomenon’ in developing countries has been limited to case studies 
on large mega-cities cities such as Shanghai, Mumbai, São Paulo and 
Johannesburg (Choplin, 2012, pg. 1). This overemphasis on mega-cities is 
problematic since the latter are a hyperbolic example of southern urbanisation just 
as South African cities constitute extreme examples of racially segregated 
postcolonial urban environments. Nevertheless, these cities are often used as the 
‘African’ examples in multi-regional comparative projects. The bulk of theory on 
southern urbanism is constrained by the ‘notion of linearity’ which assumes the 
reproduction of northern trends and patterns in southern cities in the manner of 
Rostow’s (1960) stages of economic growth (Robinson, 2003; Patel, 2014, pg. 37). 
While an overreliance on statistical data in southern contexts is problematic, the 
numbers point to the sheer magnitude of the urban phenomenon unfolding in the 
south. In the 21st century, Africa and Asia account for 67% of the world’s urban 
population (UNDESA, 2018). Yet, the ‘canon of urban theory’ fails to grasp the 
importance of cities of the south as ‘worlding nodes’ that foster planetary linkages 
within global regimes (Roy, 2014, pg. 17). Urban theory struggles to explain 
phenomena unfolding in cities of the south and is thus ill-suited to inform policy 
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intervention (Edensor & Jayne, 2012; Watson, 2009).  For example, the World Bank 
(2009) maintains that ‘globalising capitalist and Western development models’ will 
enable informal settlements in Mumbai to ‘go the way of London’s Victorian slums’ 
(Sheppard et al., 2013, pg. 895). This reveals not only a ‘failure of implementation’ but 
also of theory which is based on ‘truth claims that are universal’ rather than 
‘asserting those that are contextual’ (Patel, 2014, pg. 45).  
 
Theorising from the south means adopting a ‘southern perspective’ as a starting 
point from which to alter ‘one’s gaze on cities’ (Oldfield & Parnell, 2014, pg. 1). An 
urban theory of the ‘global south’ counters the trend of ignoring the ‘other’ (Said, 
1973) and engages with concepts and arguments dislocated from 
the western experience and rhetoric (Roy, 2014, pg. 23). Southern theory begins by 
contextualising the role and importance of northern cities to move beyond the 
‘Eurocentric epistemic trap’ of urban studies (Patel, 2014, pg. 38).  The ‘unmarked 
Eurocentrism’ of urban theory is challenged through an investigation of the existing 
urbanisms of the world’s ‘subordinated populations’ (Gidwani, 2006, pg. 16). In so 
doing, urban scholars challenge the ‘colonizer’s model of the world’ (Blaut, 1993) 
and its ‘pervasive, taken-for-granted power’ (Sheppard et al., 2013, pg. 
899). However, in the analysis of southern urbanism, there is always a risk of 
reproducing the epistemological pitfalls of northern theory. The 
continued emphasis on ‘Anglophone scientific output’ as the hegemonic model of 
thought, means that theory still travels in one direction – north to south (Choplin, 
2012, pg. 3). Theory travelling in the opposite direction has often been limited to 
‘sweeping generalisations usually about recent immigration populations’ (Roy, 2014, 
pg. 29).    
  
iv. ‘Provincializing’ the urban   
By ‘provincializing’ (Chakrabarty, 2002, pg. xviii) northern theory, ideas that 
were once packaged as universal, are now tied to their specific intellectual and 
historical traditions and can no longer claim ‘universal validity’ (Robinson, 2012, pg. 
59). Dislodging urban theory from its western referents means fostering a dialogue 
between researchers from the south and north as well as between southern 
intellectual traditions. The goal is to destabilise ‘northern thinking’ and ‘those who 
do it’ (Roy, 2014, pg. 24). The central tenets of southern theory are outlined as 
follows:     
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1. ‘northern theory fails or does not apply in the south; 
the north-south axis can be inverted  
2. northern hegemonies intellectually may be 
challenged, Europe may 
be provincialized (Chakrabarty), Africa may 
be ’worlded’ (Mbembe, 2001, 2010);  
3. the future is outlined in the south, not the north  
4. events and ideas in the south are powerful for 
understanding the world as a whole, not only the 
south’ (Roy, 2014, pg. 24).  
Operationalising these ideas in the process of constructing a research agenda for 
an urban theory of the ‘global south’ is a formidable challenge. It entails dislodging 
the long-held position of northern research in academic circles despite its continued 
supremacy in policymaking arenas and its status as the main recipient of grants and 
funding. The gaps in our knowledge are exacerbated by the uneven global 
distribution of scholars and scholarship focused in/on the north and dictating the 
‘politics of knowledge’ that shape urban studies (Oldfield & Parnell, 2014, pg. 2). We 
must move beyond disciplinary ‘controversies’ to challenge the control of knowledge 
and assumptions that posit the universality of ‘locus enunciations’ (the places from 
which knowledge is produced and articulated) (Mignolo, 2009, pg. 4). Theorising 
from the south therefore proposes an ‘other thinking’ by changing the terms, not just 
the content of the discussion (Mignolo, 2000, pg. 70).   
 
Thus, emerging theories pertaining to southern urbanisation ‘speak back against 
those theories underwriting global urbanism’ to destabilise and decentre 
geographies of knowledge and theory production (Sheppard et al., 2013, pg. 897). By 
‘provincializing’ the history of Europe and universalising the experience of the urban 
south, we open new theoretical spaces for reimagining the history of southern cities 
in all their breadth and complexity. Therefore, ‘we should write our [emphasis 
added] history as the history of our society in all its fullness’; a history during which 
‘contact with Europeans should only figure in it from the view point of the African 
experience’ (Nkrumah in Bayart, 1993, pg. 6). By ‘subalternising’ the urban in the 
practice of studying cities, we reject the western experience of urbanisation as the 
‘singular articulation’ and focus on the development of knowledge that has 




v. ‘Subalternising’ the urban   
Situating the production of urban knowledge in the (primarily) northern confines 
from which it originates allows us to ‘subalternise’ the urban by looking southward 
and ‘writing the world from the African metropolis’ (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004). Often, 
knowledge produced in the ‘global south’ is considered relevant only to other 
southern contexts and treated as ‘primarily raw empirical data and information, to 
be made sense of by utilizing theories advanced by Western scholars’ (Sheppard et 
al., 2013, pg. 898). Thus, where urban theory is produced ‘has consequences for 
whether it counts as ‘theory’ or ‘empirical evidence’ of theory (Robinson, 2006)’ (Marx 
& Kelling, 2019, pg. 6). The ‘cultural colonialism’ this engenders holds power in its 
‘internalisation by the host’ (Rahnema, 1997). As countries of the ‘global south’ 
are relegated to the ‘waiting room of history,’ universally accepted narratives of ‘first 
in Europe, then elsewhere’ preclude the possibility of useful knowledge emerging 
from southern cities (Charkabarty, 2000, pg. 7).  For example, theorisations of urban 
informality in cities in the ‘global north’ are rarely featured in the ‘formulation of 
broader urban theory emerging from cities in the west’ (Marx & Kelling, 2019, pg. 20). 
Yet, processes and phenomena unfolding across the ‘global south’ reveals key 
aspects of how the ‘global’ works, and ‘how it might work in the future’ (Ferguson, 
2006, pg. 48). An urban theory of the ‘global south’ demonstrates how local problems 
at the micro-level ‘resonate with universal challenges’ such as environmental 
degradation, inequality, resilience and sustainable infrastructure34 (Oldfield & 
Parnell, 2014, pg. 3).  
 
The processes taking place in the south may even foreshadow coming events in the 
‘global north.’ Comaroff & Comaroff (2012, pg. 121) suggest that the urban south is 
first to feel the effects of world-historical processes and thus 'prefigure the future of 
the former metropole.’ As countries in the ‘global north’ are suffering fiscal 
meltdowns, shrinking labour markets, disenfranchised lumpen youth, privatisation, 
corruption, increasing xenophobia and ethnic conflict, it appears as though they 
may be ‘evolving southward’ while the south itself is demonstrating new ways of 
addressing and coping with these trends (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012, pg. 113). In 
Lagos, for example, the trends of ‘canonical, modern, Western cities can be seen in 
hyperbolic guise’ (Comaroff & Shepard, 1999). Koolhaas (2007) therefore suggests 
 
34 See Lefebvre on pg. 262 
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that Lagos is not catching up with ‘us’ but that ‘we may be catching up with Lagos’ 
since it is ‘a paradigm for [the] future of cities everywhere and is at the forefront of 
globalising modernity’ (Koolhaas & Cleijne, 2001, pg. 652–3).  This echoes the 
comments by former U.S. Treasury advisor Roubini who saw the ‘early warnings’ of 
the 2008 recession by identifying a ‘pattern of economic movement in the US that by 
2005 made it look like ‘an emerging market economy,’ with the same ‘irrational 
exuberance’ (Roubini in Brockes, 2009, 25). Similarly, the increase in foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in sub-Saharan Africa by 16 per cent in 2008 against a 20 per cent 
decrease worldwide during the global recession seems to indicate that African 
countries are not ‘immature forms of globalization’ but ‘advanced, sophisticated 
mutations of it’35 (Ferguson, 2006, pg. 41). However, we may take issue with the notion 
that developed nations are subjected to a ‘Third Worldization’ since it implies that 
these regions have been ‘colonised by an external power, their native populations 
set to work on plantations and down mines and their indigenous culture despised’ 
(Slater, 1994, pg. 237). Furthermore, when the ‘global south’ or ‘Third World’ is used 
as a metaphor for poverty, inequality, corruption and chaos, it denies the agency 
involved in the articulation of an ‘empowering alternative’ (Flusty, 2003, pg. 102). 
Overstating the relevance of southern urbanism as a metaphor explaining the 
(de)evolution of some northern cities undermines the entire premise of southern 
urbanism since it fails to consider how these cities are purveyors of ‘cityness’ we can 
learn from. To this end, developing a theoretical framework based on the ‘global 
south’ must identify the limits of existing theory and ‘where it does not apply’ 
(Connell, 2007, pg. 225), and look beyond a paradigm that frames southern urbanism 
as ‘backward or excluded vis-à-vis the newly emergent forms of global society’ 
(Ferguson, 2006, pg. 48).  
 
Urban theory is only ‘unsettled’ through a comparative approach when all cities are 
used as models and foundations for theory building (Watson, 2014, pg. 105). In so 
doing, it is possible to draw ‘inspiration from all cities’ (Robinson, 2002, pg. 2). 
Robinson (2014, pg. 58) suggests that, in order to proactively challenge hegemonic 
theory, a comparative approach requires the careful selection of ‘comparators’ 
moving away from an evaluation of cities towards the identification and exploration 
of common urban themes across regions. Themes such as the colonial legacies of 
 
35 See satellite cities on pg. 219 
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poverty, 'underdevelopment' and inequality, the existence and growth of informal 
economies and settlements, matters of good governance, the impact of economic 
restructuring, globalization, and migration trends are important across the ‘global 
south’ (Myers, 2011, pg. 15). They represent the ‘contingent universals’ (Healey, 2012) 
of southern urbanism. The goal of this analysis is to find a way of understanding how 
they shape ‘cityness’ in a southern city. 
 
Theoretical framework  
The schema drawn by Pieterse (2017, pg. 40) outlines and explains the different 
research tracts of southern urbanism (Figure 3). This map is a useful guide for the 
construction of a theoretical framework since an urban theory of the ‘global south,’ 
much like subaltern urbanism, is not yet a coherent or full-fledged theory. The 
ongoing development of this theoretical premise opens up ‘new windows’ onto ways 
of inhabiting, appropriating or reapproriating the city that ‘run counter to or disrupt 
















Depth: intimate ethnography 
Surface: quantitative trends, 
typologies & topographies 
Figure 3: Critical urban theory landscapes (Pieterse, 2017) 
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Southern urbanism provides a ‘corrective mainstream’ to 
urban theory by emphasizing the demographic importance 
of the south and the necessity for a postcolonial ‘re-reading 
of history, state craft, political identities, hybrid cultural 
systems and multiplicity of bases of power, subjugation and 
empowerment’ (Pieterse, 2017, pg. 226).  
Vitalist ontologies is focused on a post-structural 
‘deconstruction’ and neo-Marxist structuralist reading of 
the materialities of the city (Pieterse, 2017, pg. 227). This 
approach is concerned with how agency is enacted through 
particular configurations of both human and non-human 
actants (de Boeck, 2015; Larkin, 2013; Pieterse, 2017, pg. 228).  
Everyday urbanism is modelled on Simone’s (2004, 2010) work 
which meticulously documents everyday life in southern 
cities to develop a better picture of ‘cityness.' The basis of 
this work is the careful documentation of the lives of the 
urban poor to ‘give rise to a new moral universe, a sense of 
value, of potential, and of the unexpected’ (Simone, 2010, pg. 
38-9).  
Ecological urbanism is concerned with the ‘viability’ of 
contemporary modes of urban development and planning 
and looks at ‘alternative, more resilient and more liveable 
forms and modalities of inhabitation' (Pieterse, 2017, pg. 
228).   
 
The schema provides a useful guide for situating this research project within the 
broader discussion on southern urbanism but may potentially create theoretical 
limitations in the discursive work of this research project. Engaging with existing 
theory in this manner may limit the cross-pollination of theory that is necessary in 
the elaboration of a theoretical framework. For example, an investigation into 
informal means of subsistence situates itself firmly within ‘southern urbanism’ but 
also draws from methods of ‘everyday urbanism’ and ‘vitalist ontologies’ when 
discussing matters of ‘ecological urbanism’ (e.g. resilience and environmental 
degradation in slum settings and their effect on survival strategies). The 
components of the mind map will be analysed in the following sections and tailored 
to suit the research aims of this project. The analysis will discuss the theoretical 
applications of this framework in the African context, all the while acknowledging 
its pertinence to the ‘global south’ more broadly. Building on the work of Pieterse 
(2017), the theoretical framework expands the scope of the ‘corrective mainstreams’ 
outlined above to construct a retroductive approach that critiques existing theory 




Corrective Mainstream 1: Southern urbanism   
Southern urbanism is based largely on postcolonial theory which creates enormous 
potential for revisioning the history and the ‘present and potential futures’ of 
southern cities in the 21st century (Pieterse, 2017, pg. 226). Postcolonial theory is a 
key rhetoric for identifying and countering the ways in which colonialism and 
‘Occidental rationality' have subjugated ‘other’ ways of thinking to create an ‘image 
of the West in terms of modernity, progress, and rationality' (Said, 1978; Harrison, 
2006, pg. 324). Postcolonial critique remembers and recovers what Homi Bhabha 
calls the ‘painful, dismembered and traumatic’ and engages with the enduring 
sequelae of this history (Sylvester, 2010, pg. 712). The aim is not to produce 
‘authentic alternatives’ to northern phenomena but instead to theorise from the 
‘situatedness of specific places in the South’ and challenge the hegemony of 
northern rhetoric (Harrison, 2006, pg. 326).  
 
Postcolonial analyses therefore aim to insert the ‘periphery, the marginal, the non-
expert into their own destinies’ in the articulation of southern knowledge (Sylvester, 
2010, pg. 172). While the aims of postcolonial theory may be explicit, the methods for 
conducting analyses in urban settings remain ambiguous since postcolonial urban 
theory is not a ‘fully fledged urban epistemology or a new research paradigm’ 
(Brenner & Schmid, 2015, pg. 160). While this allows for a degree of improvisation 
when casting a postcolonial gaze on the topic of inquiry, it also creates a great deal 
of uncertainty in the task of developing a research agenda. In this research project, 
postcolonial theory is harnessed as a corrective measure for the metanarrative of 
‘northern’ urbanisation in the context of a retroductive analysis. The approach of this 
research project is to utilise postcolonial theory to destabilise the hegemonic 
discourse of the ‘metropolitan West’ by critiquing the discursive and material 
legacies of colonialism (Crush, 1994). Since postcolonial studies often pits itself 
against mainstream theory and is almost always antagonistic, the discussion rarely 
moves beyond oppositional terms in the dismantling of centre/periphery paradigms. 
As a result, it is necessary to draw from other corrective mainstreams to move 
beyond the epistemic trap of dichotomies and paradigmatic contest. To do so, the 
analysis considers the ways in which to analyse and interpret the built environment 
and the urban experience. By taking a step away from the traditional/fixed 
understandings of cities, the analysis of a modern southern metropolis is based on 
the analysis of the ‘heterogeneity and multiplicity of metropolitan modernities’ (Roy, 
2016, pg.821). This analysis looks at both the material legacies of colonialism through 
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an examination of the built environment and the ‘discursive’ legacies of postcolonial 
rhetoric in the field of African urbanism.  
  
Materiality 
Colonial legacies are ‘etched’ on the urban landscape of many African cities (Home, 
2014, pg. 75). The location of the continent’s major cities along the coasts or near 
sites of resource extraction is a colonial hangover resulting in the 'functional 
retardation' of African cities into roles as ‘entrepot/warehouse towns, bureaucratic 
capitals, or both at once’ (Myers, 2011, pg. 51). The primate cities of forty-six of the 
fifty-four independent nations of the continent were once the primary port or port 
capital cities established during the colonial era. The vestiges of colonial power 
remain in these cities in the form of parliamentary complexes, buildings, national 
symbols, artistic styles, language and cultural forms (King, 1995, pg. 90). Situating 
the material presence of colonial power in the physical structures of a city disrupts 
the ‘cultural hegemony of the West’ by revealing it as a destructive imposition of 
colonial logic onto the built environment rather than an unproblematic unilinear 
evolution towards modern urban forms (Ahluwalia, 2005, pg. 140). For example, the 
influence of Islamic culture and architecture in Dakar prior to annexation by the 
French colonial administration suggests continuity with existing community and 
household units. Spatial organization continued to be structured around the 
traditional penc (assembly area designated by a single tree), rather than the 
mosque, despite the centrality of Islam (Depret, 1983, pg. 62). Colonial architecture, 
however, brutally destroyed or replaced these elements – literally forcing circular 
forms of habitation into square plots – and demonstrating how the deployment of 
colonial built form in the physical landscapes of postcolonial cities was not a logical 
and rational evolution towards a western model of urban modernity but rather the 
result of domination, destruction and control.  
 
Whether it was for the purpose of resource extraction, exploitation of labour or 
expropriation of land, the role of these cities was determined by the metropole 
which necessitated the destruction or disruption of pre-existing structures, cultures 
and rationales. Colonial governments implemented the production of timber, cocoa, 
rubber, and palm oil on a widespread scale in West Africa, while the settler regimes 
of Southern and Central Africa exploited mineral resources and agriculture using 
indigenous labour and indentured workers. The built environment of African cities 
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not only reveals the socioeconomic and political links between the metropole and 
the colony but also explains the development trajectory of cities. The archival 
chapters of this research project (Chapters Five, Six and Seven) document the ways 
in which colonialism determined the development of Dakar based on the motives 
and needs of the French colonial administration. 
 
The material legacies of colonialism did not end with decolonisation. Although the 
term ‘postcolonial’ implies a break from the colonial past, newly independent 
nations only shifted from a ‘position not so much of independence as of being in-
dependence' (Young, 2003, pg. 3).  As colonialism withdrew its capital, it set up 
‘around the young state the apparatus of economic pressure’ which turned the 
‘apotheosis of independence’ into a ‘curse of independence’ (Fanon, 1961, pg. 
77). Developmental policy has arguably served to ‘keep the poor world poor,’ rather 
than contributing to its development (Potter, 2004, pg. 18). The material legacy of 
(neo)colonialism is visible in the nefarious physical effects of the 1980s SAPs 
(structural adjustment programmes) in Africa and across the ‘global south.’ The ‘roll 
out’ of neoliberalism led to stagnant economic development which resulted in 
increasing urban poverty, decaying infrastructure, massive rural to urban exodus, 
the proliferation of slums, environmental degradation, deepening inequality and 
worsening violence (UN Population Division, 2002). The mutation of colonial 
doctrine into development discourse can be read in the built/crumbling 
environment of many African cities. The physical decay of cities in the wake of ill-
fated development programmes was an urbicide36 of sorts and led to a new set of 
social relations based on the ‘proliferation of survival strategies,’ 
social immiserisation, marginalisation and exclusion in African cities (Demissie, 
2013, pg. 222). Therefore, postcolonial urban studies document the ways 
urban inhabitants survive under conditions of ‘duress and often state collapse’ and 
traces these practices back to a history of colonialism and its modern-day 
configurations (Simon, 2015, pg. 218).  
 
Despite the social failures of the SAPs, the mechanism was never completely 
abandoned and, instead, ‘repackaged in a form and manner to make it attractive to 
stakeholders in development’ by addressing the most ‘fashionable’ issues of the 
 
36 Urbicide: ‘violence against the city’ (Moorcock, 1963) 
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development agenda of multilateral agencies (Heidhues & Obare, 2011, pg. 61). The 
enduring power of this discourse is evident in the fervent pursuit of large-scale 
infrastructural projects in many African cities that uphold the same modernising 
rhetoric (discussed in Chapter Seven). The ‘lost decade of development’ (1980s) 
failed to unlock the ‘kingdom of abundance promised by theorists and politicians in 
the 1950s’ (Escobar, 1995, pg. 4). The oft-repeated question ‘why is Africa so poor?’ 
is answered by international development banks who chalk it up to bad 
government, corruption, and civil disunity that failed to attract much-needed 
investment and financing (Ferguson, 2006, pg. 195). Dependency theorists and world 
system theorists have denounced development theory as a mechanism to 
‘subordinate, contain and assimilate the Third World as other’ (Slater, 1993, pg. 
421). Colonialism as development has historically subjugated the built environment 
of African cities to its needs as the ‘historically informed political and economic 
values’ of the ‘global north’ on the south to satisfy the ‘North’s ends’ (Sagoe, 2012).  
 
Discursivity 
The ‘global north’ contributed to the ‘development of underdevelopment’ both in 
ways that can be measured and documented (i.e. growth figures, statistics) but also 
in terms of how the southern world comprehends its own evolution (Conway, 2014, 
pg. 111). For example, planning education on the African continent is steeped in the 
western city model and urban planning and policy discourse. Watson and Agbola 
(2013) have found that the history of planning in Africa is ‘firmly ensconced in the 
traditions and models of Europe – especially the UK – and the USA’ as the curricula 
of African planning schools is based largely on the colonial past and ‘promote ideas 
and policies transferred from the global North.’  
 
Colonialism has contributed to the historical ‘othering’ of African societies which 
translates into a view of Africa as a ‘residual entity, the study of which does not 
contribute anything to the knowledge of the world or of the human condition in 
general’ (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004, pg. 350-1). Colonialism was based on the 
'systematic negation of the other person’ and a ‘furious determination to deny the 
other person all attributes of humanity' (Fanon, 1961). The ‘privileged geopolitical 
identification’ between modernity and the west was circulated through the 
mechanism of colonialism and established a hegemonic western narrative of 
‘modernity’ (Harootunian, 2000, pg. 41). The birth of European ‘modernity’ in the 
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19th-century afforded Europeans a sense of difference and superiority from other 
worlds (e.g. Africa), viewing the latter as caught in the ‘immature stages’ of human 
progress (Power, 2003, pg. 98). The ‘underdeveloped’ world was therefore an 
‘incomplete’ or ‘embryonic’ form of western development based on a linear 
understanding of growth and modernisation (Rostow, 1960; Rist, 2002, pg. 74).   
 
Following decolonisation, colonial rhetoric morphed into the present-day 
configuration of development discourse. Development emerged as a new hegemony 
governing the way in which the postcolonial world and former imperial 
powers understood their position and role in the global hierarchy. The 
development framework emerged on the global scene in US President Truman’s 
post-war inaugural speech on January 20th, 1949 in which he proclaimed that it was 
the ‘responsibility of rich nations to develop poorer countries in their own image’ 
(Potter, 2014, pg. 18). On that very day, ‘two billion people became underdeveloped’ 
(Esteva in Sachs, 2001, pg. 7); 
‘In a real sense, from that time on, they ceased being what 
they were, in all their diversity, and were transmogrified into 
an inverted mirror of others’ reality: a mirror that belittles 
them and sends them off to the end of queue, a mirror that 
defines their identity, which is really that of a heterogeneous 
and diverse majority, simply in the terms of homogenizing 
and narrow minority’ (Esteva quoted in Sachs, 2001, pg. 7). 
The newly designated ‘underdeveloped’ world would unlock development by 
embracing the ‘mental models of the West (rationalisation), the institutions of the 
West (the market), the goals of the West (high mass consumption), and the culture 
of the West (worship of the commodity)’ (Peet & Hartwick, 2009, pg. 85). The 
modern/traditional binary was understood as a hierarchical relationship in which 
traditions were ‘destined to die out’ or be ‘bred out’ through policy interventions that 
would usher modernity (Schech and Haggis, 2000, pg. 18-9). The discursivity of this 
rhetoric, underpinned by an unassailable reasoning equating ‘western’ with 
‘modern,’ has enduring consequences. Southern knowledge – broadly understood 
as any theory or insight emerging from/on the south (i.e. subaltern, indigenous, etc.), 
is often dismissed in favour of theory elaborated on/in the ‘global north.’ This trend 
is evident in the postcolonial masterplans of African cities which still rely on 
northern models of urban planning despite ample evidence of their profound 
disconnect from realities on the ground. The planning analysis of Dakar in Chapters 
Five, Six, and Seven closely examine how this ‘colonisation of minds, heart and 
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imaginations’ has resulted in the continued (and inefficient) emphasis on northern 
planning models (Matthews, 2017, pg. 2654). 
 
An urban theory of the ‘global south’ argues that postcolonial cities are rife with 
possibilities for destabilising ‘imperial arrangements’ (Jacobs, 1996, pg. 4) and 
allowing for the reinvention of urban practices, languages, and the (re)discovery of 
‘multiple memories’ (Triulzi, 2006, pg. 79). A postcolonial reading of African cities 
requires a thorough engagement with the ways in which ‘subaltern counter publics’ 
reinvent and disseminate discourses that shape the ‘oppositional interpretations of 
their identities, interests and needs’37 (Fraser, 1990; Yeoh, 2001, pg. 459). Beyond 
closely attending to everyday life, subaltern urbanism ‘self-consciously avoids’ 
questions of state, capital, and collective action—all of which are ‘contaminated 
already by elitism and grand theory’ (Sheppard et al., 2013, pg. 897). The focus is, 
instead, on the ‘encroachments and subversions’ of the subaltern as a means of 
opening up new ways of inhabiting the city that disrupt global urbanism. 
Postcolonial urban studies fall squarely within Gramsci’s notion of ‘subalternity’ or 
the reimagining of the ‘margins of society’ through resistance, piracy, banditry, 
informality and ‘everyday practices of contesting or by-passing relations of 
domination and state control’38 (Choplin & Ciavolella, 2017, pg. 325).  
 
As a corrective mainstream, southern urbanism can only exist in 
‘contestatory terms’ in the examination of socio-spatial arrangements, and urban 
infrastructures (Fraser, 1990; Yeoh, 2001, pg. 459). Postcolonial 
studies have ‘borrowed heavily’ from western thought – ‘Said from Foucault, Spivak 
from Derrida and Bhabha from Lacan’ but has sought to maintain a degree of 
detachment from these intellectual traditions in order to deconstruct ‘Occidental 
reason’ (Mignolo, 2000; Harrison, 2006, pg. 320).  The theoretical framework of this 
thesis does not shy away from harnessing northern theory developed by Eurocentric 
researchers in order to demonstrate its applicability in the ‘global south’ and thereby 
challenge the ‘political economy of knowledge’ that governs urban theory. The 
traditional ‘political economy of knowledge’ is based on a division of labour in which 
the periphery supplies data and later applies ‘knowledge in the form of technology 
 
37 These can be read as an articulation of Hanchard’s (1999) concept of ‘afro modernity.’) 
38 See Plebeian public sphere on pg. 263 
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and method’ while the role of the metropole, in addition to producing data is to 
‘collate and process data’ and produce theory (including methodology) which are 
‘later exported to the periphery’ (Connell, 2014, pg. 211). The thesis therefore 
proposes a methodology for ‘writing the world from the African metropolis,’ utilising 
the African metropole as the base for theory production, using both northern and 
southern theory in the process. This method of theorising takes it cue from 
‘intellectuals of colonized societies’ who have adapted and critiqued existing work, 
‘combining this with critique of the conquest and sieving the culture of the 
colonizers’ (Connell, 2014, pg. 212). The aim is not to replace northern theory with 
southern theory or ‘set up artificial binaries between North and South’ but to 
consider how urban ideas and theories originating in one city may inspire the study 
and analysis of other contexts (Watson, 2016, pg. 38).  The task of building urban 
theory from the south is ‘still in its infancy’ and southern scholars have made several 
propositions on how best to tackle the enormity of this challenge (Watson, 2016, pg. 
38). A core argument of southern theory isn’t necessarily about ‘different 
propositions, but about different knowledge practices’ and ‘to do, more than 
anything else, is start learning in new ways, and in new relationships’ (Connell, 2014, 
pg. 219).  
 
Nevertheless, the extent to which postcolonial theory can speak from the margins is 
undermined by its very ‘fixation’ on the centre (Sylvester, 2010, pg. 714). Postcolonial 
identity simultaneously identifies with and rejects the coloniser’s culture (Yeoh, 
2001, pg. 459) which often limits investigations to questions of how to be ‘Western 
without depending on the West’ (or how to use northern theory without positioning 
the west as the benchmark) (Shils in Vale, 1992, pg. 53). McClintock (1992, pg. 86) 
argues that postcolonialism is ‘haunted by the very figure it seeks to displace’ since 
it continues to ‘privilege Europe as the central subject of history by reorienting the 
world around the single axis of the colonial/postcolonial.’  As a result, the issue of 
‘voice’ remains a weakness in postcolonial theory as the focus on refuting the claims 
of the centre often means that the periphery (subaltern) cannot speak or is 'rarely 
asked to do so’ (Sylvester, 1999, pg. 717). The field is therefore left bereft of subaltern 




B. Corrective Mainstream 2: Vitalist ontologies  
Vitalist ontologies originate in a post-structural approach to the study of 
urbanisation which requires the theoretical deconstruction of urban infrastructure. 
Urbanisation, or the production of a built environment and its concomitant social 
developments, is a ‘total phenomenon’ (Lefebvre, 1970). Urban infrastructure is 
therefore comprised of:   
‘socio-cultural’ infrastructures - social development 
investments that forge identity and urban communities and 
guarantee social reproduction (e.g. education, public 
spaces, healthcare, libraries, gardens, housings, arts and 
sports) (Simone & Pieterse, 2017, pg. 128).  
 ‘biophysical’ network infrastructures – highways, roads, 
transportation networks, ICTs, energy, sanitation, water, food 
and ecological services are linked to landscape 
infrastructure and ‘make urban life and movement materially 
possible’ (Simone & Pieterse, 2017, pg. 128).  
This disaggregation demonstrates that infrastructure is arguably always in a state 
of flux since it amounts to the ‘practice of connecting people and things in socio-
material relations that sustain urban life’ and can therefore never be static39 
(McFarlane & Silver, 2017). Silverman (2014, pg. 789) describes this as a theory of 
‘incremental infrastructures’ whereby infrastructure is constantly under adjustment 
as ‘shifting technological and material configurations’ impact the formation of socio-
cultural infrastructures. Infrastructure is ‘open ended’ (Wiig & Silver, 2019), which is 
why we must look at ‘life between buildings’ (Gehl) in order to gain a better 
understanding of the ‘contested process of ever-shifting in-the-making, socio-
technical relations’ that produce urban form (Wiig & Silver, 2019). 
 
i. Assemblage and fragmentation 
McFarlane (2011) proposes a metaphor of ‘assemblage’ to understand the 
infrastructures of a city as composed of ‘relatively unpredictable 
but agentive combinations of objects, techniques, practices and human 
actions.’ A theory of urban assemblage questions how urban things are assembled 
and ‘how they might be disassembled or reassembled’ (Brenner et al., 2011, pg. 228). 
For example, in his work on informal settlements in Mumbai, McFarlane (2011) 
 
39 This links back to Appadurai’s (2003) concept of the continuity of temporariness or the 
notion that the only constant in many cities is the temporary quality of physical and spatial 
resources (see pg. 59). 
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disassembles the ‘everyday hardships faced by the poor’ in order to pay attention to 
the ‘eclectic collection of urban materialities’ that constitute the everyday. He 
examines the tactile infrastructures of corrugated iron, sackcloth, and 
infrastructures of sanitation, drainage, water and electricity that constitute urban 
spatiality but also looks at the interactions between urban inhabitants and their 
physical environment to better understand existing infrastructures and how they 
constitute a city40 (Storper & Scott, 2016, pg. 1127).   
  
Deconstructing infrastructure allows for a ‘grounded excavation’ of how ‘the urban’ 
is hardwired into the infrastructure (Pieterse, 2017, pg. 228). By disassembling what 
constitutes the urban, we may understand how ‘actually existing urban situations’ 
are constituted and begin imagining ‘alternatives to those situations’ (Brenner et al., 
2011, pg. 228). In many cities, for example, the uneven distribution of utility services 
is best characterised as the presence of ‘incomplete archipelagos’ of access which 
become ‘material emblems’ or ‘cultural signifiers’ of social citizenship41 (Bakker, 
2003, pg. 62). Exclusion is, therefore, ‘hardwired’ into the network and inequality is 
embodied in the ‘splintered’ infrastructure that makes up urban spatiality (Bakker, 
2003, pg. 64). McFarlane (2018, pg. 1008) and Roy (2015) proposes a narrative of 
‘fragments’ to understand the infrastructural environment of the urban poor which 
is ‘deeply fragmented’ in a number of ways, from urban services, housing, to 
political, property and legal rights or employment opportunities. An investigation 
into the spatial organisation of cities is underpinned by a questioning of the 
mechanisms that produce spatial inequalities (Badcock, 1984, pg. 55). In sub-
Saharan Africa, for example cities that were once spatially divided between African 
and European zones during colonialism today exist as ‘parallel worlds (connected 
with secret passageways)’ between those with access to modern infrastructure and 
those who continually ‘hustle, pilfer and labour to re-secure a measurable access to 
energy, water and information’ (Simone & Pieterse, 2017, pg. 44). The fragmentation 
of the urban fabric occurs everywhere but is mostly visible in the ‘histories of 
capitalist and social exploitation, oppression and marginalization’ of southern cities 
where urban fragments make up the ‘texture and politics of the city’ (McFarlane, 
2018, pg. 1020). By taking apart infrastructure, right down to the building materials 
 
40 The tactile infrastructures of Dakar are examined as part of the archival analysis (see pg. 
140). 
41 See Dakar plateau on pg. 156 
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that make up the urban landscape, we are able to read power in the built 
environment and gain a better understanding of the driving forces that guide 
urbanisation. The concrete of Lagos, for example, defines the aspirations of 
modernity ‘crafted by the ruling elite’ of the postcolonial state (Omezi, 2011, pg. 112). 
Architects, engineers, and planners 'manipulate the city's material reality' to 
concretise these dominant aspirations (Minuchin, 2011, pg. 107). As these 
aspirations are rendered in material form, they are encroached upon by marginal 
figures in the city who negotiate their ‘material insertion into the modern metropolis’ 
(ibid). The planning chapters of this thesis (Chapters Five, Six and Seven) will 
demonstrate how decrees on building materials, zoning laws, and building permits 
are mechanisms that explicitly govern the infrastructural development of the city 
while implicitly fragmenting the urban landscape as an instrument of domination 
and control. 
 
The examination of infrastructures reveals urbanisation as a complicated process 
based on complex relationships between class, ethnicity, race, occupation, religion, 
and generation. Throughout the African continent, infrastructure and networks are 
consolidated through ‘people’s intentions to do other things’ - make a living; ‘find a 
space to sleep; get from A to B, and on to Z according to routes and along paths 
unanticipated by any transport planner’ (Tonkiss, 2014). Conscious and planned 
design objectives give way to ‘innumerable more-or-less conscious designs’ that are 
often improvised, incidental, temporary or permanent, which gives rise to the 
psychogeographies of cities discussed in Voices II (ibid). These studies reveal 
processes of ‘creative destruction’ (i.e. through abandonment, violence, war, etc.) 
that create both ‘wasteland’ and ‘wealthy enclaves’ as well as displacements and 
new networks (Mcfarlane & Rutherford, 2008, pg. 349). For example, traffic 
congestion itself becomes a ‘slow-moving market space’ as hawkers offer motorists 
plastic packets of water, roasted peanuts, fake designer watches and sunglasses, 
and mobile phone top-up cards (Gandy, 2005, pg. 41). Physical infrastructures – 
social and spatial – are conduits through which the urban poor exercise their 
agency. Issues of governance are located in the assemblages of both non-human 





Deconstructing urban development reveals colonially inherited or borrowed 
frameworks which emphasize the inappropriateness of northern theories and 
policies in southern contexts. A hegemonic understanding of modernity has 
resulted in structural transformations based on a ‘global city’ narrative which, in 
many cases, has resulted in the disruption of ‘networks of survival and dependence’ 
(Harrison, 2006, pg. 330). The infrastructure of many African cities reveals a contest 
between two rationalities – the western and formal rhetoric from ‘above’ vs. the 
informal survival strategies from ‘below.’ An example from Kinshasa demonstrates 
what happens when these rationalities come head to head. The creation of 
the Cité du Fleuve, a new development planned by international design companies, 
led to serious consequences for the urban poor (Watson, 2013, pg. 222). The 
‘promotional narratives’ display an ‘iconic’ landscape of skyscrapers and ‘ultra-
modern’ airports, trade centres, office blocks and commercial centres (ibid). The 
reality, however, is that Kinshasa is a post-conflict city that bears the scars of war 
and is home to about nine million people, the majority of whom live in conditions of 
poverty and informality (De Boeck & Plissart, 2012). Under the guise of ‘modernising’ 
Kinshasa, the project converted boulevards to an eight-lane highway, ousting street 
children and small informal traders and destroying the rice-producing areas 
and their economic networks (Watson, 2013, pg. 228). In so doing, they undermined 
the socio-cultural infrastructures of the ‘unaccounted for’ – the unemployed, 
impoverished and marginalised (Simone, 2018, pg. 31). In its disruption of existing 
infrastructures and ‘segregationist model,’ the Cité du Fleuve redefines ‘what is 
centre and what is edge in Kinshasa’ which has profound consequences for those 
located in the margins42 (De Boeck, 2011, pg. 277). 
 
Similarly, the masterplan of Abuja, elaborated with the help of American and 
Japanese architects and planners, is based on a ‘borrowed’ understanding of what 
a modern city should look like and a lifestyle based on the modernist Eurocentric 
ideal (Watson, 2014, pg. 100). The draconian manoeuvres of this plan resulted in the 
eviction of approximately 800,000 people by 2006 from areas that were ‘zoned’ in the 
masterplan to allow for the ‘beautification of the city, privatisation and cleaning up 
criminals’ (COHRE, 2006; Watson, pg. 100). Similarly, the ‘Chinese-built ghost towns’ 
of Luanda, comprised of tower blocks apartments selling at 150,000−200,000 USD, 
 
42 See Planetary Urbanisation on pg. 81 
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fragment the infrastructural landscape of the city since they are implanted in a 
context where most Angolans survive on less than 2 USD a day. These examples 
illustrate the ways in which ‘biophysical infrastructures’ based on hegemonic state 
narratives dictate infrastructural transformation and undermine and destroy the 
‘socio-cultural infrastructures’ of the urban fabric. The imperatives of speculation 
and capital flow unravel the ‘long-honed practices of inhabitation’ and force urban 
residents to ‘reassemble’ according to new ‘forms of obligation and control’43 
(Simone, 2018, pg. 27).  Put simply,  
‘…architects and planners often do not recognize that the 
people whose concerns they are seeking to address have very 
complicated aspirational maps44, in which spatial issues play 
a part. The issue is not to cut straight through to get the 
quickest road from the designer's head or mandate or 
professional context to delivering the house, the road, the 
shopping mall, the train station, but to figure out where those 
elements actually might fit more fruitfully into strengthening 
what I call ‘the capacity to aspire’ (Appadurai, 2003, pg. 52). 
Consequently, the analysis uses (dis)assemblage theory to correct the ‘silences of 
urban historiography’ (Roy, 2011, pg. 230) by recognizing infrastructures of survival 
and ‘spaces of poverty’ and putting them back on the map (Derickson, 2015, pg. 652). 
Assemblage theory is therefore harnessed as a tool to engage with ‘rationalities and 
practices’ that emerge as the subaltern finds ways to survive in ‘circumstances of 
marginality and domination’ (Harrison, 2006, pg. 325). Corrective mainstream 2 uses 
the metaphor of the ‘city as assemblage’ (Jacobs, 2012, pg. 416) but also adopts a 
relational mode of theorisation that moves beyond the understanding of ‘cities-as-
territory’ or the concept of cities as bounded spatial entities in order to consider the 
circulation of urban mobilities. ‘Assemblage’ proposes an ‘alternative ontology for 
the city’ which emphasizes how ‘assemblages are being made and unmade at 
particular sites of practices’ (Farias, 2009; Jacobs, 2012, pg. 416).  The jargon of 
assemblage and fragmentation emphasizes the notion that infrastructure is 
constantly in flux, not just a ‘context or a noun, but a verb’ and a ‘connective tissue, 
often unpredictable, anchoring urban life’ (McFarlane & Silver, 2017). The planning 
chapters of this analysis (Chapters Five, Six and Seven) involve the dissection of 
masterplans as a way of disassembling the built environment and analysing each 
 
43 See example of SICAP housing in Dakar on pg. 187 
44 See Voices: Psychogeographies and ‘cityness’ on pg. 49 
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successive layer in the urban development of Dakar. In so doing, we identify when 
and where the biophysical and socio-cultural infrastructures come into contest.  
 
ii. An African perspective on planetary urbanisation  
African urbanisation is often framed in terms of the ‘alarming,’ ‘relentless,’ and 
‘unprecedented’ rate of population growth. The assertion that Africa has crossed 
the urban threshold is the ‘most quoted, but therefore also among the most banal, 
formulations in contemporary urban studies’ (Brenner & Schmid, 2015, pg. 156). 
Urban growth projections and population estimates suggest that Africa and Asia are 
urbanising faster than any other region in the world, becoming 56 and 64 per cent 
urban by 2050 (World Urbanisation Prospects, 2018). Approximately 90 per cent of 
the increase anticipated in the urban population of the world (2.5 billion people by 
2050) will take place in Asia and Africa. India, Nigeria and China are projected to 
account for 35% of the anticipated growth of the world’s urban population between 
2018 and 2050 (World Urbanisation Prospects, 2018).  
 
Despite the ‘colonial inclination’ to restrict the growth of secondary cities, the most 
rapid urbanisation taking place on the African continent is driven by secondary and 
smaller cities while growth is slowing in primate cities (Myers, 2011, pg. 53). 
Urbanisation across the continent is most rapid in the urban-rural, ‘peri urban’ 
interface zones, which are a continuum of rural areas, villages, towns and cities of 
less than 500 000 inhabitants (McGregor et al., 2006). This trend has created an 
interesting dichotomy between a ‘metropolisation from above’ (i.e. urbanisation 
driven by major cities) and ‘urbanisation from below’ (Africapolis, 2011). Today’s 
African cities are ‘loose agglomerations of quasi-autonomous socio-spatial entities,’ 
each evolving ‘independently’ of the other but connected through networks of 
exchange (Jihad & Jacques, 2012, pg. 93).This means that centre and periphery, city 
or village, urban or rural are ‘states of mind’ rather than objective designations of 
space in the ‘postcolony,’ which necessitates an imaginative retheorisation 
(De Boeck in Ed. Okwui, 2011, pg. 265). Consequently, the differences between 
‘formal and informal, autoconstructed and state sponsored, government-led or 
market-led suburbanisations are often pronounced’ but are linked by a common 
denominator – they are part of ‘extended urbanisation in the age of complete 
urbanisation’ (Keil, 2018, pg. 501-2). Spivak (2003, pg. 72) suggests that a planetary 
outlook offers an alternative to ‘reductive comparisons’ by moving away from the 
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‘grip of algorithmic or computational logic’ of conventional urban theory (Jazeel, 
2018, pg. 8).  
 
Planetary urbanisation originates in the work of Lefebvre (1970) and proposes a new 
way of looking at how urbanisation occurs, arbitrates and transforms everyday life. 
Whether this happens in densely populated centres or more dispersed locations, 
urbanity is defined by the ‘struggles’ regarding the form and content of ‘the urban’ 
itself (Brenner & Schmid, 2015, pg. 171). Thus, the urban cannot be equated with 
‘any singular, bounded spatial unit (city, agglomeration, metropolitan region or 
otherwise)’ or confined to any ‘territorial contours’45 (Brenner & Schmid, 2015, pg. 
166), and mainstream urban theory must abandon the ‘fetishism of an ill-conceived 
notion of the city’ (Goonewardena, 2018, pg. 457). Planetary urbanisation proposes a 
‘new politics of the city,’ as the urban becomes an arena for an ‘epic struggle (or 
many struggles over the future of human life on earth’ – a struggle of planetary 
proportions (Keil, 2018, pg. 10).  
 
Planetary urbanisation is a trope that sees the whole ‘rather than the differently sized 
illuminated dots on the dark background of the satellite-generated image,’ as urban 
agglomerations and rural hinterlands are perceived as relational and ‘co-
constitutional’ (Shaw, 2015, pg. 589). This framework illuminates the ‘intimate, wide-
ranging and dynamically evolving connections’ of city-building processes and the 
transformations of non-urban landscapes (Brenner & Schmid, 2015, pg. 156). This is 
not to say that the ‘rural’ has disappeared, but rather to emphasize the fact that the 
use of ‘generic labels’ often presupposes patterns and pathways of development 
that limit the possibility of context specific and reflexive investigations (Brenner & 
Schmid, 2015, pg. 174-5). Geographical approaches to the study of urban life, for 
example, often limit their scope to the boundaries of neighbourhoods but 
acknowledge that activities and networks are ‘not confined to this urban space’ and 
extend to other parts of the city, rural areas, and even ‘across the nation’s borders 
and even the global world’46 (Koning, Van Dijk & Foeken, 2001, pg. 4).  Boundaries 
are often only necessary in the definition or delimitation of a case or field site when 
it is necessary to create artificial delimitations and dichotomies. However, these 
 
45 Planetary urbanisation challenges Wirth’s (1938) and Mumford’s (1937) definitions of a city 
(see discussion on pg.81). 
46 See example of Chinese supermarket on pg. 218-224, and Mourides on pg. 258-259 
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borders need not rely on a ‘simple counterposition to the outside’ and are formed by 
their link to the ‘outside’ which is consequently part of what ‘constitutes the place’ 
(Massey, 1994, pg. 8).  
 
Schindler (2017, pg. 50) argues that planetary urbanisation will likely recreate the 
same theoretical marginalisation of southern cities as ‘ordinary cities’ in the south 
will never be the ‘primary reference points upon which its epistemological 
scaffolding will rest.’ However, planetary urbanisation does not presuppose the 
existence of ‘dense agglomerations everywhere’ but instead acknowledges that to a 
degree we haven’t seen before, ‘no one is outside the scope of the urban’ (Soja & 
Kanai, 2007, pg. 62). When Lefebvre describes the ‘urban problematique’ as global, 
he is not making a ‘claim about the totalisation of any particular urban form’ but 
instead saying that ‘what becomes planetary is the urban as a question, as a 
theoretical framework, as a conceptual object of struggle’ (Madden, 2011, pg. 781). 
The problems of the ‘modern city’ are therefore envisioned as ‘worldwide problems’ 
(Lefebvre, 2009, pg. 282). Furthermore, planetary urbanisation is particularly well 
suited for understanding ‘dispersion, not agglomeration’ which has typified urban 
growth in African cities (Parnell & Pieterse, 2016, pg. 236). The ‘boundaries’ of many 
African cities are constantly being pushed further out, suggesting that neatly drawn 
delimitations and city limits represented in maps and plans never exist(ed) in the 
imaginaries of those living within or beyond the perceived city limits (e.g. urbanites 
living 30 km out of Kinshasa still consider themselves Kinois). In the context of this 
research project, the contention that future inhabitants of Diamniadio, a satellite city 
located 37 km from Dakar will call themselves ‘Dakarois’ is not very far-fetched. 
Furthermore, the growth and expansion of the urban agglomeration of Dakar, which 
contains rural and non-urbanised zones47, suggests that there is a pressing need to 
move beyond conventional dichotomies and definitions of what constitutes the 
‘urban’ in the making of ‘endless cities’ (Burdett et al., 2011). The difference between 
urban and rural spaces seems ‘less relevant’ today to the extent that ‘urban’ and 
‘rural’ are not useful distinctions for societies characterised by ‘high levels of 
geographic and social mobility’ (Hubbard, 2018, pg. 2). African urbanisation 
therefore defies boundaries and arguably falls squarely within the scope of a theory 
of planetary urbanisation. 
 




Planetary urbanisation is a polarising debate but provides an important framework 
because it reframes the urban question - ‘do we really know, today, where the ‘urban’ 
begins and ends, or what its most essential features are, socially, spatially or 
otherwise?’ (Brenner et al., 2011, pg. 226). Roy (2016) and Sheppard et al., (2013) 
argue that the urban ‘should not be taken as an absolute’ and instead defined 
through ‘central and peripheral processes of interacting urbanisms’ as a way of 
thinking beyond the city centre ‘towards the periphery, from the core to the suburbs 
of urban society’ (Keil, 2018, pg. 505). To respond to this criticism, it is perhaps 
helpful to speak of planetary urbanisation in terms of mondialisation. While the 
English word ‘globalisation’ implies that the ‘distinctiveness of the world is drowned 
by something becoming ubiquitous,’ mondialisation suggests the emergence of a 
world that is ‘open-ended and creative’ (Madden, 2011, pg. 775). Planetary 
urbanisation does not function as a teleology in which the centre takes precedence 
over the periphery in a totalising outcome, and instead sheds light on a 
‘discontinuous history rather than the growth of a stable and scalable object’ with 
an end state (Madden, 2011, pg. 780). This is further emphasised by the point that, 
according to Lefebvre, the city as a ‘historical form (and concrete object of study) 
disappears as the urban evolves’ (Brenner, 2014; Brenner and Schmid, 2014; Keil, 
2018, pg. 501).  
 
The theoretical framework uses the language of ‘planetary urbanisation’ which has 
the explicit aim of dismantling space-based dichotomies and engaging with a mode 
of theorisation that is freed from a ‘topographical conceptualization of the city’ 
(Smith & Doel, 2011; Jacobs, 2012). Amin and Thrift (2002, page) argue that ‘[w]e can 
no longer even agree on what counts as a city’ for ‘[t]he city is everywhere and in 
every thing,’ which casts urbanism as ‘something far more dissipated and emergent’ 
(Jacobs, 2012, pg. 413). For example, the common perception of Africa as a ‘rural 
continent’ has tinged development cooperation throughout the 21st century and 
been the basis of development aid and cooperation, largely ‘ignoring the urban 
realities of the continent’ (Forster and Ammann, 2018). Furthermore, this trend is 
perpetuated by postcolonial governments that previously and continue to support 
strategies to reduce rural-urban migration. This ‘clear-cut binary distinction’ 
between the rural and urban is ‘utterly impossible’ as the latter are linked in 
‘manifold ways’ (Forster and Ammann, 2018). Planetary urbanisation forces us to 
move beyond traditional definitions and dichotomies in urban theory in order to 
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engage with ‘dynamic topologies and deep relationalities: the worlding of cities, the 
production and politics of space, and exurbanity and extraterritoriality’ (Roy, 2016, 
pg.821). 
 
iii. Grey spaces  
Often, infrastructure in the ‘global south’ evolves in unforeseen ways as the city is 
reimagined by unplanned and ‘illegal’ neighbourhoods, incoming migrants and 
informal economies that are ‘forever contentious’ in the political struggle for societal 
transformation (Yiftachel, 2009, pg. 249-250). Across the African continent, urban 
spaces are characterised simultaneously by ‘regularity and provisionality’ (Simone, 
2004, pg. 408). Often, much of what takes place in African cities is ‘fairly invisible’; 
for example, the number of people residing in a compound, the provenance of 
household incomes, or how electricity is available for more households than there 
are official connections (Simone, 2004, pg. 426). An African city exists ‘beyond its 
architecture,’ characterised as much by what is hidden as what is seen48 
(De Boeck & Plissart, 2014, pg. 233).   
  
Demographic trends on the African continent have intensified the pursuit of basic 
needs for housing, sanitation, or transport and are likely to govern city agendas in 
the near future. Southern contexts are often characterised by inequality, informality, 
and ‘grubby governance,’ which make the guiding imperatives of physical growth 
and transformation difficult to manage and comprehend (Parnell, 2014, pg. 431). The 
‘informal’ does not conform to planning regulations and continues to grow, 
becoming an important part of the ‘new urban order’ (Avni & Yiftachel, 2014, pg. 
487). The spread of informality, or ‘grey spacing,’ has blurred the dichotomies 
between formal and informal, legality and illegality, permanent and temporary and 
survival and entrepreneurship. This new ‘mode of urbanism’ (Al Sayyad, 2004) is 
located somewhere between the ‘lightness’ of legality/approval, and the ‘darkness’ 
of eviction/destruction/death (Avni & Yiftachel, 2014, pg. 488). Infrastructure in 
Africa and across the south can no longer be seen through the prism of false 
dichotomies as the reigning order has given rise to ‘new forms of resistance, creative 
self-planning and democratisation ‘from below’’ (Avni & Yiftachel, 2014, pg. 
501).  The development of the continent has demonstrated how infrastructures that 
 
48 See discussion on data deficiencies on pg. 35 
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are rationalised as ‘progressive, beneficial, and humane’ are revealed as ‘powerful, 
controlling, and often (if not always) detrimental’ (Peet & Hartwick, 2009, pg. 142). 
Grey spacing refers explicitly to what happens to infrastructure when the subaltern 
disengages from the state and creates an alternative vision of civil society through 
an ‘indigenisation’ of and ‘familiarisation’ with the ‘cracks’ in the workings of power49 
(Yiftachel, 2009, pg. 249; Bayat, 2007; Perera, 2002, 2009; Yiftachel, 2009, pg. 249-250).  
  
Informality poses a new and considerable challenge to city planning, but the 
preferred state response to this phenomenon is a lack of planning or policy or a 
policy of ‘ignore and neglect’ (Avni and Yiftachel, 2014, pg. 496). The stages of urban 
policy with regards to the informal are;   
1. ‘ignore –turning a blind eye;  
2. neglect – intentional denial and under-development;   
3. limit – institutional and at times violent control and 
containment;   
4. ‘whiten’ (selectively) – gradual recognition of 
(selected) sections, accompanied by anesthetization, 
privatisation and gentrification’ (Avni & Yiftachel, 
2014, pg. 490).   
The prevalence of ‘grey spaces’ has meant that postcolonial African nations are 
viewed as the ‘shadowland of other societies,’ the late arrivals to Eurocentric 
modernity (Chakrabarty, 2000). The shadow metaphor reiterates the notion that the 
modernity and development of the ‘global north’ is only conceived in opposition to 
the ‘underdevelopment’ of the south because a ‘shadow, after all, is not a copy but 
an attached twin’ (Ferguson, 2006, pg. 17). Ferguson (2006) identifies the ‘presence 
of a variety of shadows’ in academic work pertaining to the ‘dark continent.’ 
Globalisation theorists have ‘shadowy metaphors of their own when it comes to 
Africa.’ The continent reveals the ‘dark side’ (Stiglitz, 2002) or ‘Satanic geographies’ 
(Smith, 1997) of globalisation, the ‘black hole of the informational economy’ (Castells, 
1996) (Ferguson, 2006, pg. 15; McFarlane & Rutherford, 2008, pg. 341). Its ‘shadow 
economy’ is governed by a ‘shadow state’ (Reno, 1999) that develops ‘shadow 
networks’ (Duffield, 2002) across the continent (McFarlane & Rutherford, 2008, pg. 
341). Africa is the ‘uncanny dark double’ of the west (Ferguson, 2006, pg. 16). 
As Mbembe (2006, pg. 1-3) puts it;   
 
49 See autogestion on pg. 92 
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 ‘Africa as an idea, a concept, has historically served, and 
continues to serve, as a polemical argument for the West’s 
desperate desire to assert its difference from the rest of the 
world.’ ‘Africa’ in this sense has served as a metaphor of 
absence – a ‘dark continent’ against which the lightness and 
whiteness of ‘Western civilization’ can be pictured.’  
Neither in the shadow nor in the light, African cities are thus made and remade as 
urban dwellers find their own vernaculars, not just as consumers or victims of 
modernity but as active agents in the advent of ‘real collective change’ (Simone, 
2006, pg. 325). African urbanites have reaffirmed their right to the city by operating 
outside the scope of conventionally accepted forms of urbanity in the ‘grey spaces’ 
of liminality. In this analysis, ‘cityness’ is the tool that is used to capture these 
processes of systematic change that transform the urban fabric. Specifically, the 
empirical chapters will demonstrate how the process of ‘grey spacing’ in the case 
study city is a fundamental component of urban development despite its absence 
from the masterplans. 
  
C. Corrective Mainstream 3: Everyday urbanism 
‘To be able to make something out of being a city resident, 
for many [Africans] today, means you have to find ways to 
NOT consolidate, to not defend, to not have your secure little 
niche, which you hold onto. It means taking the chances to 
move through the city, … to deal with walks of life that are 
unfamiliar to you, because, within those kinds of unexpected 
or unanticipated chances, some new opportunity and 
possibility might ensue.’   
Abdoumaliq Simone at Radio Netherlands Worldwide (2007)  
 
People as infrastructure  
Simone (2014, pg. 322) argues that urban politics and public policy neglect a key 
component of contemporary urban life in Africa and the south - the ability of the 
poorest urban residents to ‘exceed sheer survival.’ By deploying the ‘little money 
that is left over after making ends meet,' they can engage in various experiments and 
opportunities to improve their lives (ibid). Urbanites embody ‘hybridised’ identities 
to move through the city and create ‘complex combinations of objects, spaces, 
persons, and practices’ in the making of socio-cultural infrastructures (Simone, 
2004, pg. 407). The oft-cited example of children and youth who loiter at bus stations, 
traffic intersections, and markets to ‘beg, shine shoes, sell cigarettes and food items, 
wash cars or steer customers to transport’ is an example of how the intended use of 
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certain spaces is reconfigured to fit the needs of the ‘users’ (urban dwellers) 
(Falola & Salm, 2005, pg. 14).   
 
Simone (2004, pg. 407–408) has documented the ways in which urban dwellers 
‘become [emphasis added] an infrastructure, a platform providing for and 
reproducing life in the city.’ The work conducted by Simone reveals economies of 
‘piracy’ in the conversion of underground parking garages into new mega-churches, 
hotel kitchens as day-care centres, living rooms as hair salons and ‘even indoor 
swimming pools as butcheries’ (Simone, 2006, pg. 362). Borrowing from Levi-Strauss 
(1962, pg. 17), the analysis argues that urbanites of African cities are the ‘bricoleurs’ 
of a ‘new urban sociality’ (Simone, 2010, pg. 314-16);  
 ‘…adept at performing a large number of diverse tasks; but, 
unlike the engineer, he[sic] does not subordinate each of 
them to the availability of raw materials and tools conceived 
and procured for the purpose of the project. His universe of 
instruments is closed and the rules of his game are always to 
make do with ‘whatever is at hand’, that is to say with a set of 
tools and materials which is always finite and is also 
heterogeneous because what it contains bears no relation to 
the current project, or indeed to any particular project, but is 
the contingent result of all the occasions there have been to 
renew or enrich the stock or to maintain it with the remains 
of previous constructions or destructions.’  
The ‘bricoleur’ is a metaphor explaining how survival in many African cities is based 
on the ability to improvise as urbanites ‘turn themselves into logistical instruments’ 
(Simone, 2018, pg. 24). For example, a transport depot in Abidjan is full of young men 
who simultaneously ‘function as steerers, baggage loaders, ticket salespersons, 
hawkers, drivers, petrol pumpers, and mechanics’ (Simone, 2004, pg. 410). The 
ability to inhabit different roles, shift connections and collaborate to maximise 
efficiency despite the lack of ‘explicit rules or formal means of payment’ is based 
entirely on the capacity to improvise50 (Simone, 2004, pg. 410). While ‘civil 
inattention’ and the ‘blasé outlook’ dictates the politics of urban life51 in cities of the 
‘global north,’ Simone’s (2008) description of urban life suggests a state of hyper 
awareness in African cities as urban inhabitants are acutely attuned to one another 
 
50 See ‘urban knowledge’ on pg. 45 
51 The tendency for people to ‘rapidly scan each other to gain some categorical knowledge 
before turning their glance away for fear of invading their privacy’ maintains ‘civil order’ and 
helps the citizen ‘cope with the sheer number of strangers that are routinely encountered on 
the city’s streets’ (Lofland, 1998; Hubbard, 2017, pg. 20). 
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and people become infrastructure in the elaboration of networks, politics of mobility 
and the strategic positioning of bodies (Hubbard, 2017, pg. 19). This hyper 
awareness is evidenced in the fact that many urban dwellers base their livelihoods 
on the ‘tensions between the temporary and the permanent’ in the constant search 
for information regarding the ‘social forces at play in their environment’ (Appadurai, 
2003, pg. 51). Everyone’s life is ‘so implicated in the lives of others that any gesture 
takes on an incalculable number of meanings as arrangements are momentarily put 
together by diverse residents trying to figure each other out and live together’ 
(Simone, 2008, pg. 80). By stitching ‘lacks and losses together,’ urban dwellers are 
generating ‘realignments and opening up alternatives’ through new kinds of 
‘creativity with (spatial and temporal) beginnings, and therefore with new forms of 
interactivity’ (De Boeck, 2015, pg. 10).  Thus, the bricoleurs may be framed as the 
‘authentic builders of African cities, as part of a process of development from below’ 
(Freund, 2007, pg. 155). Rather than encroach upon and harm the development of the 
city and its economy, the urban poor, who often constitute the majority, are ‘actually 
building it up’ as they perform important activities and services in the city, generate 
employment opportunities, and carve out spaces for political representation 
(Freund, 2007, pg. 155). 
   
An example emerging from Kenya, Ghana and South Africa, demonstrates how self-
taught young people have independently engaged in ‘all manner of ICT-related 
services’ including hardware repair and maintenance, database management, 
mobile application development, call centres, business process outsourcing (BPO) 
(Ismail, 2016, pg. 44). These tech-savvy urban bricoleurs acquired the necessary 
skills outside of formal training and education, learning from peers and self-study 
on the Internet. Harnessing technological advancements and breakthroughs, these 
young people were able to meet their own needs for employment and income. The 
‘preference’ for self-employment fits within a larger neoliberal framework in which 
workers opt out of formal employment to gain more independence and pursue 
versatile opportunities. Nollywood, another youth-owned industry in Nigeria, has 
arguably emerged from this ‘entrepreneurial will to overcome considerable 
obstacles,’ including inept governance, corruption, crime and lack of basic 
infrastructures such as electricity and roads (Foroohar, 2014). Without formal 
training, young Nollywood creatives have learned the trade of filmmaking through 
observation, ‘pre-existing talents and sheer adventure,’ enjoying continued success 
across the continent and the African diaspora (Ismail, 2016, pg. 46). Similarly, in 
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Sierra Leone as in much of West Africa, urban bricoleurs have joined 
the okada (motorcycle taxis) business which employs nearly 300,000 people as bike 
riders and 50,000 indirectly as mechanics, bike-owners, park attendants, food 
vendors, etc. Bike riders learn the trade ‘on the streets’ through observation and peer 
learning and meet an ‘unmet demand’ for transport in cities with few roads, too many 
cars and constant traffic congestion (ibid). In these examples, urban inhabitants 
become the infrastructure that is lacking in the urban context, compensating for 
state failure and legacies of poverty through improvisation, trial and risk-taking. 
Therefore, informality is often the key means by which urbanites are able to counter 
the ‘erosion of urban public services,’ affecting primarily those citizens who already 
struggle with fragile and temporary infrastructure in their neighbourhoods 
(Fredericks, 2014, pg. 536).  Through the medium of music (e.g. Afrobeats), film 
(Nollywood), violence and gang affiliations (e.g. ‘Area boys’), and loitering in public 
spaces, urban Africans are negotiating new spaces within the city for social and 
political assertion and shaping an emerging ‘cityness.’   
 
Simone & Pieterse (2017, pg. 63) argue that the ‘inordinate skills of survival’ 
demonstrated by urban inhabitants in light of the ‘exigencies of urban remaking,’ 
have opened up the possibility of radically new cities. In pursuing their own 
strategies, urbanites are ‘responding to necessity’ but also ‘remodelling their own 
destinies’ and finding new ways of making a living and reshaping the political and 
socioeconomic structures around them (Tripp, 1997, pg. 
161). ‘Cityness’ demonstrates how ‘micro infrastructures and minimal gestures’ take 
on ‘substantial powers’ in the everyday (Simone & Pieterse, 2017, pg. 74). The 
intention is not to glorify the tenacity of the poor and ignore their struggle but to 
acknowledge the ways in which they ‘recreate hope in places that have been written 
off by civic and government authorities’ (Seabrook, 1996, pg. 10). A research agenda 
concerned with ‘people as infrastructure’ must investigate the ingenious survival 
strategies of the poor without depoliticising the debate on poverty by ‘failing to 
question its causes’ (Ferguson, 2006). In his analysis of Lagos, for example, Koolhaas 
(2007) focuses on the resourcefulness of the urban poor and slum dwellers but has 
come under fire for his overreliance on the neoliberal discourse of self-help and 
entrepreneurship that indirectly justifies the ‘abandonment of these populations by 
public authorities' (Choplin, 2012, pg. 3). Emphasising the ‘ingenuity’ and 
‘resilience’ of the poor may depoliticise the debate on poverty and inequality when 
it fails to question and understand its causes (Ferguson, 2006). There is a need for 
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studies that hold in tension micro processes of survival habits of urban dwellers with 




The theoretical framework outlined in this chapter originates in a new research 
agenda on the ‘global south’ that embraces urban geography’s spirit of ‘radical 
openness as method’ (Wolch, 2003). It relates directly to the rhetoric discussed in 
Voices I: Decolonising the curriculum, which calls for a theoretical decolonisation of 
urban theory and an emphasis on existing and emerging knowledge from the ‘global 
south.’ Often, the rhetoric of ‘urban triumphalism’ that prioritises the link between 
urbanisation and economic growth moves away from the central concern of urban 
studies - ‘social justice and the city’ (Goonewardena, 2018, pg. 458). Referring to the 
five-point manifesto outlined earlier, this chapter has engaged with definitions, 
thresholds and theories to recast ‘the urban’ in a manner relevant to the scope and 
aims of this research project. Southern cities, African in particular, are interpellated 
outside the scope of mainstream urban theory. In their perceived divergence, cities 
of the ‘south’ are recast as examples of Gramsci’s ‘future city’ and Simone’s 
(2004) ‘city yet to come’ in light of their ‘insurgent citizenships’ (Brown, 2015) and 
new forms of ‘politically being-in-the-world’ (Chatterjee, 2004; Choplin & Ciavolella, 
2018, pg. 315). This analysis ponders how the subaltern of southern cities 
become cittadini, not solely in the sense of ‘becoming urban’ or ‘belonging to 
the citizenry (cives)’ with political and judicial rights but rather in the ways that they 
become political actors in transforming their society (Choplin & Ciavolella, 2017, pg. 
317).  
 
With the goal of theory-building in mind, we move towards an understanding of ‘the 
urban’ as a shifting language of rights (Bayart, 1997). The ‘right to the city’ is invoked 
when urban inhabitants decide to ‘reclaim space in the city, when they assert use 
value over exchange value, encounter over consumption, interaction over 
segregation, free activity and play over work’ and appropriate spaces, as they 
develop the ability to ‘manage the city for themselves’ (Purcell, 2013, pg. 152). In the 
 
52 The archival analysis of this thesis investigates the longue-durée processes and their 
impact on micro/survival strategies of local inhabitants (see chapters 5, 6, & 7). 
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absence of ‘open political revolution,’ the cittadini shape their urban existence 
through everyday acts of resistance that circumvent power (Choplin & Ciavolella, 
2017, pg. 327). Each time a social group refuses to accept its conditions of ‘existence, 
of life, of survival,’ and endeavours to understand and master its own conditions, 
autogestion [self-management] is occurring (Lefebvre, 2009, pg. 135). Autogestion, 
understood here as ‘people as infrastructure,’ entails the appropriation of ‘grey 
spaces,’ abandoned by the state and reclaimed by the subaltern (Gramsci in 
Valentino Gerratana, 1975). The critical dimensions of this discussion turn the 
perceived stigma of marginality and informality into a ‘claim, a right, or a call for 
justice’ (Benit-Gbaffou, 2016, pg. 286). Therefore, being an urban citizen or 
‘citaddini’ is no longer dependent on the ‘recognition of legal status’ by the state but 
is manifested in the role of the subaltern who produce the ‘future city’ 
(Choplin & Ciavolella, 2017, pg. 317). In the process, we begin to see glimpses of the 
urban – not yet in its ‘mature form’ but in a state of ‘dispersed and alienated 
actuality’ (Lefebvre, 1996, pg. 148). The task of the urban scholar of the ‘global south’ 
is to identify the emergence of the urban as it develops and materialises around us 





Voices: Feminism and Flânerie 
 
Historically, various forms of ‘white, bourgeois heterosexual masculinity’ have 
structured the ways in which the discipline of geography ‘claims to know space, 
place and landscape’ (Rose, 1993, pg. 137). The Chicago School53 has relegated 
urban ethnography almost exclusively to the realm of men as women are ‘either 
repressed’ or viewed as ‘disobedient marginal presences’ in the street (Parsons, 
2000, pg. 2). Thus, the street has arguably ‘never belonged’ to women who shy away 
from the ‘dark, derelict urban environs’ that bear the dangers of sexual harassment 
and assault (Preston & Ustundag, 2007, pg. 221). The female flâneur – the ‘flaneuse’ 
– can therefore never exist as her preoccupation with safety means she cannot ‘drift’ 
with male insouciance.  
 
The early iterations of this research project proposed flânerie as a key research 
method for understanding the case study city. While the method was revised, the 
act of walking and observing remains a key methodological tool in this project (but 
has abandoned the ‘aimlessness’ of the traditional dérive). Walking is a research tool 
that is not just ‘parallel to thinking and writing’ but extends into ‘thinking and writing 
in terms of aesthetic engagement with its spatial, situational surroundings’ 
(Parsons, 2000, pg. 72). Therefore, in writing the story of the city, the reader becomes 
a ‘page of it himself [sic]’ (Sow, 1983, pg. 45). Walking through the city allows for the 
observation of people, interactions and contexts, as a ‘way of reading the city, its 
population, its spatial configurations whilst also a way of reading and producing 
texts’ (Jenks & Neves, 2000, pg. 1). It involves paying attention to detail, built form, 
and human interaction to reveal what lies beneath the surface and ‘beyond the 
particular’ (Frisby, 1985, pg. 221). Consequently, this analysis argues that flânerie is, 
in fact, perfectly aligned with the principles of feminist research in the reflexivity of 
walking that casts the flâneur(euse) as a ‘producer of a city’ through the ‘interplay 
of self/city identity’ (Parsons, 2000, pg. 1).  
 
While this research project is not explicitly situated within the scope of feminist 
scholarship, it draws from the latter when examining relations of power and issues 
of reflexivity and voice. At one end of the spectrum, ‘masculinist geographers’ lay 
 




claim to an ‘omniscient view, a transparent city, total knowledge’ while, at the other 
end, feminist geographers challenge this ‘omniscient vision and its exclusions’ 
(Rose, 1993). The broader framework of this analysis considers the ways in which 
scholarly practices and disciplines are inherently ‘inscribed in relations of power’ 
and questions the power relations that this monograph ‘counter[s], resist[s] or even 
perhaps implicitly support[s]’ (Mohanty, 2007, pg. 334). This gives rise to questions 
concerning who has the right to represent urban lives and how to do so without 
flattening out their complexity. Initially, the research design featured interviews as 
a key method for understanding the lived experience of cities. However, following 
preliminary fieldwork, it became apparent that there was a risk of replicating the 
shortcomings of subaltern and postcolonial urbanism on the issue of ‘voice’54. 
Feminist, subaltern and postcolonial critique advise us to tread carefully when 
representing people’s lives and experiences, particularly the lives of those who have 
historically been marginalised or maligned in academic disciplines. The decision to 
minimise the importance of interviews in this analysis was a strategic move to avoid 
the objectification of participants. Instead, the researcher is cast as a research 
subject and fieldnotes are treated as raw data as the city is (re)produced through 
her positionality as an African urbanite and a Francophone postcolonial subject. 
Through the act of walking and observing, these elements become an integral part 
of the data collection process in the task of addressing and redressing the failings 
of traditional urban theory.  
  
 
54 See discussion on ‘voice’ on pg. 74-75 
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Chapter Four: Operationalising the research 
agenda 
 
The methodology of this research project aims to i) destabilise the hegemonic 
narrative of urban theory; and ii) place ‘cityness’ at the heart of an urban 
investigation in the process of operationalising an urban theory of the ‘global south.’ 
The theoretical framework has directly influenced the development of the 
methodology to suit the aims of a retroductive analysis. The case study method 
allows for an engagement with the minutiae of data while providing a segue way into 
broader discussions on key themes pertaining to urban spatiality. In the context of 
the case study city, the methodology is divided between a planning analysis of Dakar 
based on the masterplans for urban development and a field-based analysis of 
spaces in the city.  
 
To begin, the chapter re-examines the research questions in order to explain how 
the methodology was developed using a retroductive approach. To do this, the 
chapter discusses the elaboration of methodology in the context of highly mobile, 
versatile, and dynamic urban environments. The next section addresses the specific 
components of the case study, detailing the specific parameters of the research 
interventions. The case study city– Dakar, Senegal – is introduced in this section to 
lay the groundwork for the empirical chapters (Chapters Five, Six, Seven, and Eight). 
The following segment details the methodological tools employed during each 
phase of research including qualitative techniques, field sites, and data analysis 
techniques. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the trials and tribulations 
of fieldwork and the reflexive work that is required in the analysis of ‘cityness.’ 
 
Re: Research Questions 
While this research project espouses elements of the inductive case, it is a 
retroductive case study that ‘speaks back’ to theory in the process of answering the 
research questions.  
RQ1. How does an urban theory of the ‘global south’ address 
the gaps in urban theory and planning (in Africa)?  
RQ2. How can we operationalise a research agenda 
structured around ‘cityness’ to inform an urban theory of the 
‘global south’?  
RQ3. How does the selected methodology contribute to our 
understanding of ‘cityness’ (in Africa)?   
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RQ1 is based on the premise that urban theory and planning are poorly equipped to 
study urbanism of southern cities55. The analysis therefore speaks directly to existing 
theory in order to identify the gaps that are postulated by the research question. The 
case study method is the most strategic tool in the process of theory building, 
falsifying in the development of countering theoretical propositions. The case study 
method builds in-depth knowledge of a particular ‘case,’ while retaining a real-world 
perspective on the subject matter. According to Yin (2014, pg. 17), the case study 
method:  
1. ‘copes with the technically distinctive situation in 
which there will be many more variables of interest 
than data points;  
2. relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data 
needing to converge in a triangulating fashion;  
3. benefits from the prior development of theoretical 
propositions to guide data collection and analysis.’  
The four main applications of the case study method are to i) explain links in ‘real-
world interventions that are too complex for survey or experimental methods,’ ii) 
describe the real-world context of an intervention, iii) illuminate topics through 
descriptive evaluation, and iv) ‘enlighten those situations in which the intervention 
being evaluated has no clear, single set of outcomes’ (Yin, 2014, pg. 19).   
 
The inductive case has the explicit goal of answering ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions in 
under-researched areas. Induction begins with the observation of empirical 
examples to make general statements and formulate hypotheses. The inductive case 
allows theories and generalizable statements to emerge throughout the research 
process. These cases are often ‘non-linear, with theoretical construction, data-
gathering and analysis carried out simultaneously’ (Duminy et al., 2014, pg. 51). In 
the ‘global south,’ the inductive case is often used to enhance practical knowledge 
and address issues relating to urban governance such as concerns with the impact 
of structural adjustment in the urban domain, the links between formal and informal 
economies, land reform and tenure, or spatial planning and infrastructure. The 
deductive case usually begins with an ‘established theoretical premise’ in the form 
of a hypothesis supported by empirical examples to validate the existence of the 
 




theory (Lauria and Wagner, 2006, pg. 365). Observations determine how variables 
contained within a theory ‘manifest (or not) in the case,’ and test the ‘predictive or 
explanatory power of the theory, substantiate or disprove a hypothesis, or assess 
whether the theory is or is not accurate in explaining the observed outcomes’ (e.g. 
urbanisation without growth) (Duminy et al., 2014, pg. 62). 
 
The methodology of this research project proposes to answer RQ2 through a 
retroductive case study that challenges existing theory and develops concepts for 
evaluating and adapting theory to the subject matter under scrutiny. A retroductive 
case differs from an inductive case in its effort to ‘speak back’ to theory and assess 
the initial theoretical framework of the case. To do this, the methodology proposes 
an examination of macro-trends and policies through planning analysis and an 
understanding of micro-trends through field-based analysis that describes how 
statist agendas and blueprint planning are ‘received and negotiated by urban 
inhabitants’ (Duminy, 2014, pg. 9).  Therefore, the retroductive case provides a much 
needed ‘reality check’ for urban theory by trying to understand ‘what is, rather than 
constantly striving for what should be’ (Odendaal, 2011, pg. 174). For example, 
Jenkins et al. (2002, pg. 116) conducted a retroductive case study on the impacts of 
globalisation in Luanda, as an ‘extreme case of peripheralization,’ noting how 
external forces have continually shaped the city. Their aim was to add to critical 
thinking and develop theories on alternative responses to globalisation leading to 
the conclusion that ‘what is developing on the ground in the face of global 
peripheralization can be the basis for more proactive agency rather than reactive 
acceptance of the dominant structural situation.’ Similarly, Harrison’s (2006, pg. 319) 
characterization of Johannesburg as a ‘prism through which to look at cities and at 
planning’ presents an ‘other way’ of thinking as the retroductive case takes on the 
task of critiquing and evaluating the relevance of urban theory from the north in a 
southern context. The goal of the retroductive case study then is to: i) cast a critical 
eye at ‘mainstream’ theory and ii) to use the case as a vehicle for theory building.  
 
Throughout the retroductive research process, the researcher moves between 
knowledge and ‘observable events,’ recognising that knowledge ‘cannot be reduced 
to observable events’ (Meyer & Lunnay, 2012, pg. 3). The retroductive case requires 
‘a priori knowledge’ to begin questioning and clarifying the basic prerequisites or 
‘conditions’ for a priori assumptions or theoretical frameworks (Meyer & Lunnay, 
2012, pg. 3). Where the inductive approaches are concerned with moving from 
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the particular to the general, retroduction involves moving from a ‘conception of 
some phenomenon of interest to a conception of a different kind of thing (power, 
mechanism) that could have generated the given phenomenon’ (Lawson, 1997, pg. 
236). Therefore, retroduction means ‘moving backwards’ and asking, ‘what must be 
true in order to make this event possible?’ (Easton, 2010, pg. 123).  
 
The analysis addresses RQ3 by evaluating whether the methodology has succeeded 
in fulfilling the aims of the retroductive study. These are defined as i) ‘conceptual or 
analytical modification (that is, improving how we understand an issue or approach 
its analysis)’, and ii) enhancing knowledge and methodologies for project design 
and implementation (Duminy et al., 2014, pg. 57). The evaluation process of the 
methodology considers the strengths and weaknesses of the methods and the 
challenges of conducting this type of analysis in the ‘global south.’  
 
A key strength of the case study is that it is not limited by epistemological or 
theoretical orientations. Furthermore, case studies can be adapted to the dynamic, 
informal, and often transient nature of phenomena in cities of the south. The case 
study can be focused on what Flyvberg (2011) terms ‘developmental factors’ or 
changes over time that are interlinked and related. The malleability of case studies 
makes them a useful tool for developing southern theory. The use of qualitative case 
studies in the study of urban theory and planning allows for engaged and context-
specific grounded research that is suited to ‘promoting a collaborative and activist 
agenda amongst planning educators and students’ (Peattie, 1994). Furthermore, a 
case study approach allows for the examination of the ‘asymmetry between 
verifiability and falsifiability’ in order to evaluate and assess universal statements 
(Popper, 2005, pg. 19). Case study research can be used to call into question the 
generalisability of northern theory while also generating contextualised knowledge. 
The analysis will consider whether the method operationalised in this research 
agenda succeeds in producing contextualised knowledge of power relations, daily 




Through the case study, the analysis will determine whether the methodology 
provides a vantage point for examining ‘phronetic insights’56 and context-specific 
knowledge as a means of rectifying methodological and theoretical oversights 
(Duminy et al., 2014, pg. 11). The analysis will demonstrate how this method allows 
for a degree of manoeuvre that opens the possibility for tapping into knowledge that 
may be gleaned over conventional methods (i.e. statistics, surveys, etc.). Since 
planners and policymakers often rely largely on quantitative datasets to design and 
enact policy, they continually make assumptions on the beliefs, value systems, and 
rationalities of ‘those for (or with) whom they plan’ (Watson, 2003, pg. 404). This often 
results in a disconnect between the needs of the urban majority and the policy 
framework that guides the development planning of their cities in a ‘one size fits all’ 
approach to urbanisation. In the African context, the case study approach will 
demonstrate how the ‘periphery’ can be ‘productively brought back into our 
considerations of urban life’ (Simone, 2010, pg. 14). The premise is that theory and 
‘conceptualisation’ can begin from any city but must also acknowledge the 
‘locatedness of all theoretical endeavours’57 (Robinson et al. 2006, pg. 25). 
Increasingly, African cities are offered up as valid empirical examples based on 
which to develop theory since trends unfolding on the continent help inform 
changes taking place in other regions of the world58 (Mbembe and Nuttall, 2008; 
Pieterse, 2008; Watson, 2009; Robinson, 2006). The challenge for urban studies is no 
longer simply 'paying more theoretical attention to the marginalized informal, 
invisible, spectral, necropolitan or ordinary settings’, but more so in dealing with 
issues of praxis in the articulation of how urbanisation processes might improve the 
lives of inhabitants of these cities (Myers, 2011, pg. 14).  
 
Nevertheless, case study research is often subject to ‘methodological 
misunderstandings’ that undermine its credibility as a source of knowledge 
(Flyvberg, 2006). The viability of a case study as a research tool depends on the 
proper and thorough delineation of methods (i.e. interview, participant observation, 
etc.) and the honing of research aims and questions of the project. There are also 
many logistical considerations that can impede the research process such as access 
 
56 Phronetic insights are similar to Mignolo’s (2000) ‘locus of enunciation’ which is the 
concept of theorising from where one’s theoretical/geographical situatedness (e.g. casting 
a gaze from the ‘global south’/’seeing from the south’) 
57 See discussion on selection of Dakar on pg. 102-105 
58 See tenets of an urban theory of the ‘global south’ on pg. 64 
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to research sites and respondents, language barriers, and financing of the project. 
Another common problem surrounding the case study method is centred on the 
topic of generalisability since the data collected cannot always be extended to larger 
or similar contexts. The case, however, is not always intended as a ‘sample’ for 
extrapolating statistical generalities representative of a wider population. Case 
studies may be used as a tool for testing the generalisability of theories rather than 
presupposing their relevance to the phenomena a priori (Lipset et al., 1956, pg. 419-
20). Hence, the ‘good case’ produces knowledge about the ‘causes, modalities or 
outcomes of a real-world problem’ and theorises beyond the ‘immediate boundaries 
of the case’59 (Duminy et al., 2014, pg. 27).  The methodology of this research project 
is designed to arrive at an understanding of urban spatiality in the ‘global south’ 
through the prism of ‘cityness.’ While generalisability is not intended as a research 
outcome, the methodology has been designed in order to identify what Healey (2012) 
refers to as ‘contingent universals.’ The goal of this exercise is to identify the 
contexts in which theories originate and then to critically evaluate the ‘extent to 
which these assumptions may hold elsewhere’ (Watson, 2014, pg. 105). 
 
Designing the case  
The methodology of this research project consists of a case study and three research 
interventions (Figure 4). This project uses a qualitative approach to examine 
structural change through an examination of urban planning and fieldwork and 
observations.  The methodology of this research project has been designed around 
two key aims;    
1. an analysis of the urban evolution of the case study 
city based on planning documents and narratives; 
methodology includes archival research, analysis of 
master plans, renders and policy literature (Chapters 
Five, Six, and Seven) 
2. a field-based analysis of (two) spaces and socio-
spatial infrastructures to inform an understanding of 
‘cityness’; methodology will rely primarily on 
observation, photography and unstructured 
interviews (Chapter Eight). 
The sequencing of the analysis was designed deliberately to tackle the field-based 
examination of the city with a priori knowledge obtained through archival work. The 
 
59 Chapter 8 relays the findings from fieldwork and observations and makes broader linkages 
to theorise beyond the case study. 
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groundwork conducted through the archival work was crucial for identifying the 
‘contingent universals’ of the field sites. The research design uses two units of 
analysis (in Chapter Eight) adapted from critical and paradigmatic case studies. The 
critical case is selected for its particular or even unique ‘strategic importance’ 
regarding the ‘general problem’ it seeks to investigate (Flyvbjerg, 2001, pg. 78). For 
example, a hypothesis suggesting that informal urban settlements are characterised 
by ‘social disorganisation’ can be challenged by the observation that ‘social 
organisation is indeed present in a particularly poor settlement that is generally 
recognised as a most likely site of disorganisation’ (Duminy et al., 2014, pg. 30). 
Paradigmatic cases are more representative and have ‘metaphorical and 
prototypical value’ and provide a generally accessible ‘metaphor’ for 
comprehending the complex ‘intersection of discourse, action and context in 
society’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Duminy et al., 2014, pg. 30). For example, Robert Park’s 
‘laboratory method’ metaphor for urban research views the city as a ‘social 
laboratory,’ or ‘clinic in which human nature and social processes might be 
conveniently studied’ (Bulmer, 1984, pg. 92). The critical and paradigmatic cases are 
utilised as entry points for researching the city but are not presumed to be the only 
spaces that define urban spatiality in the case study city. 
 
The methodology of this research project has been designed to allow for an 
understanding of the various components that define and explain ‘cityness’ in a city 



















Figure 4: Case study parameters 
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of the ‘global south’ without falling into the epistemic trap of definitions and binaries 
that limit the scope of urban research. The selection of methods speaks directly to 
the fact that methodological choices ‘frame what it is possible to see’ and the 
multiplicity of actors and processes involved in the production of 
urban spatialities means that ‘methodological choices matter greatly’ (Robinson 
in Campkin & Duijzings, 2016, pg. 24). The methodology of this project was 
conceived within the limits of a doctoral dissertation, which has guided and 
constrained the selection of methods, cases and field sites resulting from a 
combination of scope, practicality and logistics. To focus the project without losing 
theoretical rigour, the parameters of this case have been repeatedly reviewed and 
revised.  
 
The case study city: Dakar, Senegal  
Based on their work in Kinshasa, De Boeck and Plissart (2004, pg. 8) concluded that 
cities of the ‘global south’ resist ‘objectification, colonisation, synthesis and 
summary,’ making it near impossible to elaborate a generalising or omniscient view 
of life in the city of Dakar. The primary aim of this project is figuring out how to arrive 
at an understanding of ‘cityness’ through the examination of planning documents 
and urban spaces. Thus, this project does not have ‘exclusive relevance to Africa or 
the global South’ but can apply equally to the analysis and study of northern cities, 
given its emphasis on method and the study of processes deployed in space (rather 
than on the particularities of the spaces themselves) (Peattie, 1994; Duminy et al., 
pg. 2). 
 
The selection of Dakar as the case study city was influenced by practical and theory-
based considerations. In terms of the practicalities of undertaking fieldwork, Dakar 
was a strategic choice for a number of reasons. Visa-free travel, familiarity with the 
official local language (French)60 and the fact that city was the former capital of the 
Afrique Occidentale Francaise (French West Africa) and the locus and exemplar of 
 
60 Although French is the official language of Senegal, Wolof is the most widely spoken 
language in the city of Dakar. Referring to Senegal as a ‘French-speaking’ country is perhaps 
misrepresenting the language politics in the country since only a minority – ‘speaks French 
with any fluency’ (O’Brien, 2008, pg. 5).  The Dakarois are a mixture of the Wolof, Peul, Diora, 
Mandinka, Soninke, Lebou and Serer ethnolinguistic groups. Senegal’s urban population 




urban development in West Africa, were all factors influencing the choice of Dakar. 
Additionally, a previous visit to the city in 2012 revealed the surprising similarities 
between Dakar and Rabat in terms of both the built environment, historical and 
contemporary spatial segregation and day-to-day activities unfolding in the city. 
Having been previously unaware of, and unfamiliar with, the strong links between 
the two cities, this was an opportunity to develop a deeper understanding of the 
mechanisms responsible for the parallel trajectories of these two cities.  
Additionally, Dakar is the locus of economic development, democratisation, 
innovation, and ethnic heterogeneity in Senegal. Economic analyses of Senegal 
suggest that the city plays a vital role in gauging the entire country’s economic 
performance and the effectiveness of its poverty reduction programmes since it 
occupies a pivotal role in the country’s trade sector, nationally and internationally 
(Mboup et al., 2015, pg. 4). Recently, the city has become a site for real estate 
speculation and a ‘laboratory’ for urban planning and governance which allows for 
an understanding of a ‘new global assemblage of urban governance’ 
(Choplin & Ciavolella, 2017, pg. 324).  
 
The theoretical framework of this thesis guided the selection of Dakar by responding 
to Robinson’s (2002) proposition that African cities may be used as ‘starting points’ 
or prototypes for understanding ‘an emerging, global form or urbanity’ (Robinson, 
2002, pg. 8). Mainstream urban theory has been developed based on the example of 
a few ‘great cities’ such as New York, Paris and Los Angeles, all of which are located 
in the ‘global north’ (Roy, 2016, pg. 820). This trend is replicated in the ‘global south’ 
with a similar set of ‘great’ cities that act as key sites for theoretical production.  
Cities such as Johannesburg, New Delhi and Jakarta are often focal points for urban 
research since they are aligned with a ‘world economy of knowledge’ shaped by 
colonialism and ‘current north-south global inequalities’ which often means that 
cities like Dakar are overlooked61 Connell, 2014, pg. 210). Within the ‘world economy 
of knowledge,’ research conducted on African cities is often limited by the 
perception that it ‘does not contribute anything to the knowledge of the world’ 
(Mbembe in Goldstone & Obarrio, 2017, pg. 11). Analyses of African urbanisation 
 
61 It may also be argued that the political economy results in an emphasis on topics pertinent 
to the north that become focal points for southern research as well. For example, ecological 
urbanism constitutes an area that garners considerable attention and, from the standpoint 




often focus on deviant/extreme examples in comparative approaches that pit the 
southern examples against the model of the north. The value of published work on 
urban Africa is lessened by its perceived limitations relative to the broader field of 
urban theory and geography. Furthermore, the ‘relevance reflex’ that governs 
existing research limits the choice of field sites but also the range and scope of 
phenomena under scrutiny. The analysis therefore tests the effectiveness of African 
cities as ‘worlding nodes’ that foster planetary linkages within global regimes (Roy, 
2014, pg. 17). 
 
The choice of Dakar is a deliberate one for the purpose of producing a ‘new set of 
concepts in the crucible of a new repertoire of cities’ (Roy, 2016, pg. 820). Dakar is 
neither a mega city nor a post-apartheid city, both of which have been studied as 
glaring examples of the dysfunctional urbanisation of African cities. The choice of 
Dakar as the case study city for this research project is to demonstrate that an 
African city, which is neither a deviant nor extreme example of southern 
urbanisation, can act as a valid empirical prototype for the development of theory. 
By focusing on Dakar, the analysis investigates the ways in which a city may be 
connected to larger global networks that transcend the advanced business and 
producer services of the ‘global cities’ rhetoric. Yiftachel (2016), for example, 
engaged with a ‘different epistemology of learning about South(east) cities’ by 
focusing on Jerusalem which is not a ‘universal model’ for southern cities but acts 
as a ‘window’ to examine the relational nature of urban forces, the rise of new 
categories and concepts, and the transformations which they bring about over time’ 
(Watson, 2016, pg. 37). The selection of cities like Dakar or Jerusalem falls within the 
scope of Robinson’s ‘ordinary cities’ and ‘cosmopolitan comparativism’ that places 
‘all62 [emphasis added] cities within the same analytical field’ and interprets the 
differences between cities as ‘diversity rather than exemplars of a hierarchical 
division’ (Schuermans, 2006). The fundamental premise of this study is that the 
analysis may be undertaken in any city as the research questions and methodology 
 
62 Nevertheless, it is important to note that although Dakar and Jerusalem are not mega-
cities, they are capital and primate cities and therefore retain an important role in the global 
hierarchy of cities. A truly radical approach would be to examine small southern provincial 
cities and consider their relevance as starting points for theoretical elaboration. Within the 
context of this doctoral project, however, the selection of a smaller case study city was 




are designed to investigate the emblematic characteristics of the case city and 
ponder how these inform a broader urban theory of the ‘global south.’ 
 
The administrative region of Dakar is divided into four départements: 




The urban agglomeration of Dakar covers an area of 550 km2 with a population of 
approximately 3.3 million inhabitants. Guédiwaye and Rufisque are the most recent 
peri-urban incorporations of Dakar region and are also made up of smaller 
administrative units (Diop, 2012, pg. 32). The region of Dakar includes two rural 
communities: Sangalkam63 and Yene64. The commune of Dakar (city) is divided into 
four Arrondissement which are subdivided into nineteen commune 
d’arrondissement (Figure 5 & 6). 
 
Senegal is marked by a strong incidence of single-city dominance, or primacy, with 
the largest city (Dakar) accounting for approximately half of the total urban 
population. The rate of urbanisation in Senegal has previously been overestimated 
by UN population figures, owing perhaps to varying definitions of the urban 
threshold (Potts, 2012). According to Potts (2012, pg. 1), urbanisation rates were 
revised down from 48 to 43 per cent for the period of 2001 to 2010. Between 1960 and 
1976, the population growth rate in Dakar was 5.1%, falling to 3.9% between 1976 and 
1988. Within 20 years, the population of Dakar nearly doubled, from 1,609,820 in 1990 
to over 2.5 million in 2007 (Diop, 2012). This rapid growth rate is partly due to rural-
urban migration which continues as Dakar attract migrants from the country’s 
hinterlands and to the continued expansion of the city’s borders. Overall, the urban 
population appears to be increasing steadily year after year, with a 3.6 per cent urban 
 
63 Sangalkam is made up of: Sangalkam, Tivaouane Peulh, Niaga, Niacoulrap, Ngalap, 
Kounoune, Keur Daouda SARR, Keur Ndiaye, LO, Ndiakhirate Digue, Bambilor, 
Deni Guedj, Ndiakhirate Ndiobène, Gorom 1, Deni Biram Ndao Nord, 
Deni biram Ndao Sud, Gorom 2, Gorom 3, Wayambame, Mbeuth, Kagnack, Keur Abidou, Ni
aga Peul, Nguindof, Ndiougouye.  
64 Yene is made up of 10 villages: Yène, Yène Guedj, 




growth rate in 2012, 3.7 per cent in 2014 and 3.6 per cent in 2016 (World 
Bank Databank, 2018).  
Figure 5: Administrative division of the département of Dakar 

































Figure 6: Map of the administrative division of the département of Dakar (Author’s own figure) 
 
Methodology  
i. the archives  
Figure 7: Archival research 
Planning 
analysis
•Sources: Archives National du Senegal; Gallica; 
Archives National d’Outre 
Mer; Bibliotheque Nationale de France (Pinet-
Laprade (1862); Hoyez (1938); Lambert, Gutton & 
Lopez (1946); Ecochard (1967); PDU Horizon 2025 
(2001); PDU Horizon 2035 (2015))
•Field site(s): Dakar Plateau, Dakar Ville, Médina, 
Village de Segregation
•Conceptual framework: Watson (2014); 
Melly (2013); Project for Urban Master Plan of Dakar 
and Neighbouring Area for 2035 




Archival research involves reading archival documents in a ‘disciplined fashion’ to 
gain insights, ‘make discoveries and generate informed judgments about the 
character of historical events and processes’ (Ventresca & Mohr, 2001, pg. 16). This 
method involves rigorous note-taking and ‘coding’ using a software (Nvivo) to allow 
for the assessment of relevant variables that are ‘implicitly embedded’ within the 
source material (Ventresca & Mohr, 2001, pg. 16). Colonial archives, in particular, 
require a constant awareness of the power politics at work in historical records. The 
narratives examined through archival research are shaped primarily by the 
documentary history of the ‘powerful’ (colonisers) but also, to a lesser extent, by the 
‘powerless’ (colonised) whose actions and/or transgressions were shaped by the 
laws and systems imposed by imperial forces (Shaw, 2006, pg. 32).  
 
Archival research is subject to a number of limitations. Firstly, archives are 
fragmented, in terms of chronology and ‘coverage’ (Mills, 2013, pg. 703). The survival 
of some records in state repositories as opposed to others is a direct testament to 
their perceived ‘use value (like the records of land ownership)’65 or suggests they are 
‘too banal to threaten or incriminate’ (Stoler, 2007, pg. 317). Thus, even when 
complete, an archival account is only one version of the past as issues of power and 
representation are vital to the re-construction of archives (Mills, 2013, pg. 703). 
Secondly, in the study of African colonial archives, Hobsbawm (1983, pg. 262) claims 
that the archival researcher is entrusted with ‘a double task’ of i) liberating 
themselves from the ‘illusion’ that the African ‘custom’ recorded by colonial officials 
and anthropologists is a sort of ‘guide to the African past’66 and ii) acknowledging 
that ‘invented traditions of all kinds’ are important in the process of constructing 
‘better-founded accounts’ of the colonial history of Africa. Thus, in the process of 
engaging with colonial archives, subaltern studies suggest that historical records 
must be read ‘against the grain’ according to or even ‘along’ it while also paying 
attention to the ‘unexplored fault lines, ragged edges, and unremarked disruptions 
to the seamless and smooth surface of colonialism’s archival genres’ (Stoler, 2007, 
pg. 314). The goal is not to arrive at an ‘authentic’ understanding of African 
urbanisation, devoid of colonial intrusion, but rather to engage with the ways in 
which colonialism, and its guiding narratives, influenced the development of cities. 
 
65 See example of permis d’habiter on pg. 143 
66 See example of neo-Sudanese architecture on pg. 240 
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The archival research of this study reads 'against the grain' to account for the 
blatantly racist overtones of the documents and uses them to trace the rationale 
guiding the elaboration of urban plans. The narratives constructed through archival 
research are indicative of the power hierarchy in a colonial society which ultimately 
shapes the socio-spatiality of the city.  
 
As historical documents, archives ‘wield power over the shape and direction of 
historical scholarship, collective memory, and national identity’67 (Schwartz & Cook, 
2002, pg. 2). Archival records are neither ‘innocent or transparent’ and the very 
circumstances surrounding their production should ‘give pause for reflection’ 
(Ventresca & Mohr, 2001, 2001, pg. 4). In a very real way, archival records pertaining 
to the planning of Dakar still affect the direction of planning today. For example, the 
2001 masterplan (Plan Directeur Urbain Horizon 2025) utilises the masterplan of 1946 
(Plan Directeur de la Presqu’ile du Cap Vert) to design the current and future 
masterplans of Dakar. In turn, the 1946 masterplan is based on and updated from the 
1938 Hoyez masterplan of Dakar which is itself based on the previous colonial 
masterplans from the 19th century. Remembering (or re-creating) the past through 
historical research in archival records does not only require the ‘retrieval of stored 
information’ but also involves the ‘putting together of a claim about past states of 
affairs’ (Halbwachs, 1992, pg. 43).  
 
The archival research for this empirical case was conducted over the course of 
six months and involved the consultation of archives from different sources. 
Archives of Francophone West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Francaise), and digital 
archives were accessed through the Archives Nationales d’Outre Mer (ANOM) 
(online), Gallica (online), Bibliotheque Nationale de France (online). Fieldwork in 
Dakar involved two trips and repeated visits to the Archives National du 
Senegal (ANS) during which archival documents relevant to this research project 
were consulted (daily visits limited to 5 record consultations a day). The project has 
also benefitted from the continued help of a contact in the ANS 
(Mohamadou Djiby Diallo, archiviste à la Direction des Archives du Sénégal) who 
assisted in accessing missing documentation. Where official translations do not 
exist, the archival work included in this analysis is translated by the author. 
 




The archival work was used to trace the lineage of urban development in Dakar, 
beginning with the establishment of French rule in Dakar, the colonial construction 
of the segregated ‘African’ spaces (e.g. Médina) and culminating in ongoing 
infrastructural projects such as Diamniadio (satellite city 30 km from Dakar). Data 
collection for this case is conducted primarily through archival and document 
analysis to yield an appropriate understanding of the evolution of urban planning 
and infrastructure. Melly (2013) provides an excellent example of how the trajectory 
of an urban space can be mapped out and situated within a historical perspective in 
such a way that sheds light on the narratives underpinning urban planning;   
‘During colonialism, this section of the city was known as 
Dakar-ville or simply la ville and was home to the city’s 
European population and évolué (evolved) Africans given 
the status of French citizens. As an experiment in 
assimilationist rule, Dakar-ville was strictly segregated from 
the so-called ‘African’ quarters, called Médina, on the city’s 
periphery, which supplied labour to the European district. In 
contrast to the unpaved roads and ostensibly impermanent 
housing of Médina (see Ndione and Soumaré 1982; Betts 
1971), Dakar-ville was distinguished by its grand boulevards, 
cafés, government buildings, tidy shops and multi-storey 
residences (Whittlesey 1948). After independence, Dakar-
ville was renamed Plateau, and, as the heart of the now post-
colonial capital city, it was rapidly transformed by the 
construction of new government ministry buildings, 
monuments and museums, all of which were intended to 
make materially present President Léopold Sédar Senghor’s 
visions of Négritude and post-colonial nationalism. Plateau 
also contained some of the city’s liveliest commercial spaces, 
including Marché Sandaga, a thriving market known initially 
for its textiles and produce that grew quickly both in terms of 
the area it encompassed and the products it offered’ (Melly, 
2013, pg. 392-3).  
The archival and planning analysis is divided into three chapters that recreate a 
timeline of Dakar’s urban development (Figure 8). Chapter Five covers the period 
between 1857 through to the 1920s, during an era of colonial ‘assimilation,’ a 
cornerstone of French colonialism. Chapter Six covers the period between the 1930s 
through to the 1980s and 1990s, which includes post-independence urban planning 
following Senegal’s independence in 1960. In the build-up to decolonisation, the 
colonial administration rationalised the urban planning of the city according to the 
doctrine of ‘association’ (between native and European cultures). The analysis will 
demonstrate that planning was, in fact, more closely aligned to modernising ideals 
that reflect a hierarchical understanding of colonised and colonial societies. The 
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final planning chapter (Chapter Seven) looks at postcolonial planning and the 
emerging role of international players in the urban development of 21st century 
Dakar. It includes an in-depth analysis of the satellite city project currently underway 
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Figure 8: Timeline of masterplans (Author’s own figure) 
1960 Senegal gains 
independence 





ii. the field  
 
Figure 9: Field research 
The units of analysis for this research project are strategically selected urban spaces 
in the city that function as the loci for observation (Figure 9). The process involves 
an ‘immersion’ of the researcher into the everyday routines and rhythms of the 
spaces under observation68 in order to experience the ‘whole range of relationships 
and emotional states that such a process must inevitably involve’ (Cook & Crang, 
2007, pg. 37). Documenting observations involves ‘trying to describe things in 
breadth (e.g. to make sense of an event, and everything and everyone apparently 
involved in it, from beginning to end)’ and trying to pay attention ‘what seems most 
important’ based on the discursive work of the research project (Cook & Crang, 2007, 
pg. 55). Photographs and field notes are useful tools for documenting the 
infrastructural developments and ‘comings and goings’ in the urban spaces under 
observation.  
 
The study of public spaces requires a certain degree of self-awareness since these 
places are guided by social norms or ‘assumptions of expected behaviour’ 
(Andranovich & Riposa, pg. 78). Structured interviews have taken a backseat in this 
research project since the extended analysis of archival work and observational 
research would curtail the analysis of multiple perspectives with an adequate level 
of detail, thereby perpetuating the trend of silencing the oft-ignored urban 
subaltern. Scoping interviews revealed that any attempt to give ‘voice’ to the 
research subjects within the framework of this monograph would likely undermine 
 




•Unit of analysis: Place Kermel
•Conceptual framework: 
Bigon, Beeckmans & Sinou (2016); Wright 
(1991); Bigon & Katz (2017); Betts (1961)
Critical 
case analysis
•Unit of analysis: Marché Sandaga
•Conceptual framework: Scheld (2007); Simone 
(2004, 2010); Ralph (2008); Ismail (2009)
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the theoretical premise of the project itself (as discussed in Voices III: Feminism and 
Flânerie). Rather than perpetuate a scholarly trend of objectifying and essentialising 
the lives of people under scrutiny, interviews were given less prominence and the 
researcher’s own experience of ‘cityness’ was included in the data collection 
process. The research project, however, underlines the importance of interviews 
and life stories for understanding ‘cityness’ as a lived experience and opens up 
avenues for further research. As noted by Brenner et al. (1985, pg. 2): ‘if you want to 
know something about people’s activities, the best way of finding out is to ask them’ 
through the ‘everyday activity of talk’ which allows for ‘opinions, networks of 
relationships and ideas to be presented and qualified’ (Hoggart et al., 2002, pg. 203). 
Consequently, first-hand experiences of the city, recorded in daily field notes, were 
given more prominence as valid experiences of the city. The focus is shifted to an 
examination of the spaces in which people live but also the ways in which they live 
through the scope of Soja’s trialectic of space69 (based on Lefebvre, 1996). Observing 
everyday life as it unfolds in these spaces allows for the mapping of ‘socially 
significant patterns’ (Hoggart et al., 2002, pg. 282). Unplanned day-to-day 
interactions during fieldwork – documented in field notes - are incorporated in the 
analysis when relevant to the research topic.  Whether in the form of formal 
interviews or unstructured interactions, it is important to bear in mind that there is 
always a ‘gap between lived experience and communication’ which Giddens (1987) 
has labelled the ‘double hermeneutic’ of social science based on which research is 
‘visualised as an interpretation of interpretation of lived reality’70 (Hoggart et al., 
2002, pg. 210).   
 
Data collection in these carefully selected field sites enables the analysis 
of several interrelated themes and topics within the scope of the research project. 
This portion of the research was conducted in two stages. Each stage focuses on 
one of the urban spaces, utilising primary and secondary resources to arrive at the 
bigger picture of urbanisation on a city-wide scale. The research project looks at 
both the ‘skyline and the sidewalk’ –macro (i.e. monuments, highways, etc.) and 
micro (sidewalks, street corners, etc.) elements of the field sites are examined and 
 
69 See example of vendors in Kermel on pg. 230 




situated within local, national, and global trends to form an understanding of urban 
spatiality (Gandy in Campkin & Duijzings, pg. 32).  
 
Urban ‘spatiality’ refers to the ‘assemblage, juxtaposition, mobility, separation’ and 
the ‘pure physicality’ of the built environment that shapes urban processes and 
forms (Robinson, 2011, pg. 91). Researching spatiality therefore requires teasing out 
space/society linkages which involves: 
1. an examination of the ‘social practices of everyday 
life’;  
2. an analysis of how these spaces have been shaped by 
and shape urbanity (Castells, 1996).   
The study and observation of these spaces is guided by Lefebvre’s threefold 
conceptualisation of socio-spatial relations, as operationalised by Soja (1996) in 
a trialectic of space71:    
1. Espace percu (perceived space) – Spatial practices 
are social processes which produce spatiality 
through individual routines (e.g. shopping) which 
culminate in the systematic creation of zones and 
regions that are ‘concretised over time in the built 
environment and landscape’ (Urry, 2006, pg. 25).   
2. Espace concu (conceived space) – Representations 
of space are the spaces of imagination represented in 
the visions of designers, planners, artists and 
architects (for example, in maps, designs, paintings) 
and can become real geographies through spatial 
practices (such as commodification) (Mansvelt, 2005, 
pg. 57).   
3. Espace vecu (lived space) – Spaces of representation 
exist at the intersection between spatial practices and 
representations of space. These include ‘collective 
fantasies around space, the resistance to the 
dominant practices and resulting forms of individual 
and collective aggression’ (Urry, 2006, pg. 25). 
They open up possibilities for resistance as an 
imagined space in which oppositional socio-spatial 
relations and space ‘might be overcome and 
disrupted’ (Mansvelt, 2005, pg. 57).  
The analysis utilises larger themes drawn from the units of analysis to broaden the 
scope of urban spatiality as advocated by Robinson (2002) who views African cities 
 
71 See example of Sandaga trialectic of space on pg. 286 
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as the ‘starting points, prototype for an emerging, global form or urbanity’ 
(Robinson, 2002, pg. 8). For example, Marché Sandaga provides a segue way into a 
discussion of informality since it acts as the ‘gateway to the country’s informal 
economy, a place where urban residents of various backgrounds barter for textiles, 
vegetables, or bootlegged DVDs’ (Melly, 2013, pg. 392). It represents an interesting 
‘interaction between two logics of structuring space’: the ‘normative logic of the 
state’ that polices this popular tourist site and seeks to limit informal activity and the 
‘so-called informal logic, which is animated by the customary authorities’ (Abdoul, 
2002, pg. 357). Place Kermel, the paradigmatic case, has strong metaphorical value 
in the examination of the successive layers of urban planning narratives that shape 
urbanisation in Dakar. The field site is approached as a ‘microcosm’ depicting many 
themes including colonial rhetoric, postcolonial nationality, Chinese development 
intervention, and south-south pan Africanism. This analysis also demonstrates how 
spaces which are conceived with a specific purpose may be subverted and re-
appropriated by urban dwellers.  
 
The aim of arriving at an understanding of cityness as a ‘lived reality’ is fundamental 
to the project. The magnitude of this task means that this doctoral dissertation lays 
the groundwork for subsequent research. The thesis is presented as a standalone 
project, using archival and observational work as the bedrock of analysis. However, 
the research can also be elaborated to broaden the range of voices contributing to 
an understanding of ‘cityness.’ An extensive research project ‘à la Simone’ based 
on the longer-term ethnographic documentation of urban lives is a challenging 
endeavour given the practical considerations of a doctoral thesis and the routines of 
training, supervision and participation in a Geography Department in London. Thus, 
the project is intended as an example of a retroductive approach to the study of 
‘cityness’ in the case study city.  
 
iii. data collection 
The data collected for this research project is primarily qualitative, textual (archives, 
field notes, fieldwork diary, local newspapers, government reports) and visual data 
(photography). Where available, primary documents including policy reports, 
planning guides, interviews, and research conducted by local universities in London 




Visual data in the form of photography, maps and masterplans is an important 
element throughout this research project. Visual tools and imagery challenge the 
‘fantasies of stable places and pure cultures in a world of global flows, dis-location 
and proliferating hybridity’ (Cook & Crang, 2007, pg. 108). For example, postcards, 
brochures, city maps, shed light on how urbanity is conveyed through imagery by 
individuals or organisations who seek to project a narrative on the city and create 
the ‘conceived space’ of the city72.  Urban images, in the form of maps, plans and 
pictures, are key data elements of this research project and powerful tools in the 
representation and development of cities. Images ‘depict and interpret urban 
change’ and have important impacts on-the-ground (Campkin et al., 2016, pg. 
148).  Maps, masterplans, photographs, ‘renders,’ street art and signage, ‘drive 
physical changes and are central to perceptions of place’ (ibid).  
 
Maps and plans are not impartial records of the landscape but instead reveal power 
relations both in what they present and what they ‘subjugate/ignore/downplay’ 
(Crampton, 2008, pg. 699). Colonial masterplans are tools of ‘power, domination and 
control’ that enable the colonial administration to assert its dominance over the wild, 
exotic landscape of the colonial ‘other’ (Dovey, 1999; Njoh, 2016, pg. 4). The urban 
plans presented in this analysis are not ‘neutral or technical artefacts, but carriers 
of meaning’ (Beeckmans, 2013, pg. 2). They reveal the physical articulations of power 
and their imprint on the city. As a tool for development, the masterplan indicates 
how the growth and development of a city is envisaged and implemented. 
Masterplans reveal the technical practice of planning as a social practice, as every 
technical practice is ‘soaked in social determination’ (Baudrillard, 2006, pg. 51).  
 
Maps and plans are therefore examined as a ‘compelling form of storytelling’ that 
expose the metanarratives embedded within them (Caquard, 2011, pg. 136), 
revealing the values, beliefs, discourse, attitudes, and institutional frameworks of 
the time and place in which they are produced (Silva, 2015, pg. 1). The prevailing 
discourse of the powerful can be understood by ‘reading’ the urban space planned 
and designed by maps. The subaltern response to this discourse is observed in the 
 
72 See Soja’s trialectic of space on pg. 114 
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visible in the encroachments that are not rendered in maps but play an equally 
pivotal role in the physical structure of the city (and the designated spaces of 
observation). Today, the masterplan is designed and ‘legitimised’ by planners, 
consultants, policymakers, international architecture design firms, and ICT 
consultants using ‘standard assessment tools, glossy brochures and impressive 
presentations’ to ‘sell’ the masterplan to the social and political elites (Datta, 2017, 
pg. 18). One of the most ‘prolific’ forms of representation in shaping contemporary 
cities along with masterplans is the ‘render.’ The term describes digital 
visualisations that have the authority and apparent ‘realism’ to dictate ‘city imaging 
and branding’ by conveying what a city would ‘look and feel like in context’73 
(Campkin et al., 2016, pg. 152). The renders of Dakar are analysed in this analysis to 
understand the future imaginaries of the city that drive the agendas of urban 
planning. 
 
iv. data analysis  
Data analysis of archival research, field notes, observations and primary resources 
is an integral part of the research process. Kumar (2014) breaks down the process of 
content analysis in the following stages: 1) identifying central themes; 2) assigning 
codes to central themes; 3) classifying responses and notes under central themes; 
4) integrating themes into the report. As data is collected, transcribed, and coded, 
the elaboration of problems, hypotheses, and ‘appropriate research strategy’ 
continues to evolve, driven by the trials and tribulations of field research 
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983, pg. 151). The collection of data is therefore guided 
by the progressive analysis of data, which is in turn driven by the ‘clarification of 
topics for inquiry’ in a feedback process of ‘progressive focusing’ throughout the 
research process (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983, pg. 151).  
 
The data analysis stage requires the coding of raw data using the data analysis 
software Nvivo which allows for the extrapolation of important themes originating in 
field notes and observations. In the process of data analysis, the following factors 
allow for a coherent and navigable overview of the data: chronology aims of the 
research, research questions, and theoretical framework. The data analysis stage 
 
73 See renders of Diamniadio on pg. 219 
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requires techniques of data ‘triangulation’ by compiling and comparing data 
relating to the same phenomenon during ‘different phases of the fieldwork, different 
points in the temporal cycles occurring in the setting, or the accounts of different 
participants (including the ethnographer) differentially located in the setting’ 
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983, pg. 183). The coded data identifies central themes 
from field notes and day-to-day observations and interactions. The goal of data 
analysis is to develop a narrative that describes a place, situation, or instance and, 
in the process, to zoom in on key themes that speak to the epistemic underpinnings 
of the project (Kuman, 2014, pg. 317).   
 
Conclusion  
The research questions and methodology are framed around ‘cityness’ as a means 
of engaging more thoroughly with southern urban spatiality. ‘Cityness’ is articulated 
in both the masterplans of a city and on-the-ground where ‘indigenous modernities’ 
resist, embrace, and reshape planning policy (Robinson, 2003, pg. 1). The 
methodology of this research project is designed to be applicable to most/any city of 
the ‘global south,’ since it is a way of studying ‘cityness’ and the urban evolution of 
southern cities like Dakar. The aim is not on a ‘strict, measured comparison’ of cities, 
but rather an engagement with themes that hold ‘somewhat constant as they 
manifest themselves in different ways in this diversity of cities’ (Myers, 2011, pg. 11). 
The retroductive case posits that African cities can become the theoretical starting 
points for more general analyses of southern urbanisation. This task is complicated 
by the fact that across the continent, ‘a new urban infrastructure is being built with 
the very bodies and life stories of city residents’ and the reality of ‘what kind of city 
is being put together is not clear’ (Simone, 2004, pg. 68).  
 
When designing the methodology of a research project, one must always make 
allowances for the ‘messiness of fieldwork’ (Rabinow, 1974). This messiness stems 
from the need to critically engage with a number of competing positions on the 
nature of knowledge and its production and acquisition as well as the 
‘epistemological positions, in the research sites’ (Naveed et al., 2017, pg. 773). As 
part of this ongoing process, the researcher must reflect on her presence in the field 
but also throughout the process of knowledge production. The researcher’s 
positionality is continually examined throughout the research process, both within 
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the context of a UK educational institution and during fieldwork in Dakar, Senegal. 
The task of the researcher is therefore to tackle the messiness of fieldwork rather 
than avoid it in order to reconcile the tension between local and universal 
pragmatics and realities. To do so, it was necessary to reconcile the fact that this 
southern project was conducted in a norther institution and drew from northern 
sources. The goal, however, was never to repudiate northern theory in favour of 
southern theory but, in many instances, to demonstrate how northern theory is not 
only applicable in the south but a worthwhile trope for events unfolding across the 
world. For example, the use of Lefebvre to gain a better understanding of events 
taking place in the ‘global south’ is perhaps an odd choice given that Lefebvre did 
not develop his theories with the ‘global south’ in mind but the analysis will reveals 
the ways in which his theories are instrumental in illuminating urban phenomena in 
the ‘global south.’ 
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Voices: Ryszard Kapuscinski 
 
Documenting his experiences as a journalist stationed in Africa during the era of 
independence and decolonisation, Kapuscinski captures the changing landscapes 
of newly independent countries. The passage below, from The Shadow of the Sun: 
My African Life, conveys Kapuscinski’s description of Dakar as he travels by train 
across Senegal. At first glance, Dakar appears as a facsimile of European ideals with 
architectural and design referents that recall a European city and way of life. 
However, as the train moves towards the outskirts of the ‘European’ city, the 
landscape changes dramatically and his description becomes more relational and 
critical. Kapuscinski captures many of the narratives and imperatives that have 
guided Dakar’s urbanisation. The description of Dakar as the ‘showcase city’ and 
the ‘dream city’ speaks to the intention of making Dakar a symbol of the triumph of 
French imperialism, reserved exclusively for the Europeans. As the train passes 
through the bidonvilles, the passage conveys the fact that the ‘beautiful coastal city’ 
of Dakar is surrounded by a ‘neighbourhood of squalor,’ pushed to the outskirts of 
the city, onto the train tracks. The empirical chapters examine the mechanisms that 
have led to the development of this bifurcated urban landscape and takes apart 
these narratives to understand the constituent elements of ‘cityness.’  
‘At first, the train rolls along the edge of old, colonial Dakar. 
A beautiful coastal city, pastel-coloured, picturesque, laid 
out on a promontory amid beaches and terraces, slightly 
resembling Naples, the residential area of Marseilles, the 
posh suburbs of Barcelona. Palm trees, gardens, cypresses, 
bougainvillea. Stepped streets, hedges, lawns, fountains. 
French boutiques, Italian hotels, Greek restaurants. The 
train, gathering more and more speed, passes this showcase 
city, enclave city, dream city, then suddenly, in the space of 
a second, it grows dark in the compartment, there are loud 
thudding, crashing sounds outside, and we hear blood-
curdling scream… 
I can see that the lush, flowering gardens have disappeared, 
swallowed beneath the ground, and a desert has 
commenced, but a populated desert, full of shacks and lean-
tos, sand upon which sprawls a neighbourhood of squalor, a 
chaotic and swarming district of slums, one of the typical, 
depressing bidonvilles that surround most African cities. 
And in this cramped bidonville, the shanties crowd one 
another, press together, even climb up one another; the only 
open space for a market is the train tracks and embankment’ 
(Kapuscinski, 1998, pg. 271),
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Chapter Five: Layers I (1857-1920s)  
  
The ‘Layers’ chapters (Chapters Five, Six, and Seven) lay the groundwork for the 
field-based analysis which examines spaces within the city in further detail. These 
chapters are titled ‘layers’ because the structural transformation of Dakar is taken 
apart and examined, plan by plan, to understand the gradual transformation of the 
urban fabric. Through the examination of masterplans, the analysis looks at the 
consecutive implementation of plans (layers), ‘while accepting that each is 
irreversible’ and can ‘never obliterate those which have preceded them, nor can they 
be cancelled by those which follow them’ (de Carlo, 1983, pg. 74). 
 
The methodology of the planning chapters is based primarily on archival research 
conducted in Dakar and supplemented by secondary sources. The planning analysis 
is conducted in the same vein as the work of Dione (Dakar au fil des plans, 1992) who 
offers a brief overview of the contours of urban planning in Dakar 
and Beeckmans (Editing the African City, 2013) who utilises plans to understand the 
physical evolution of the city. The empirical work of Chapters Five, Six and Seven 
draws from both Anglophone and Francophone material to broaden the scope of the 
analysis. The structure of this chapter follows a chronological approach that traces 
the urban evolution of Dakar, beginning with its pre-colonial origins and 
culminating in the 21st century renders of the future metropolis. Bigon (2017, 
2016), Njoh (2015), and Sinou (1993) have conducted extensive research on the urban 
development of Dakar and are instrumental to this analysis of masterplans. 
Additionally, the archival records collected by Jacques Charpy, archivist for 
the Afrique Occidentale Francaise from 1951 to 1958 and Claude Faure, archivist of 
the Afrique Occidentale Francaise from 1911-1920, are also crucial to piecing 
together the planning history of the city. These resources are utilised as tools for 
understanding the history of planning as well as the modern contours of planning in 
the city.  
 
Throughout the planning chapters, the theoretical framework of this research 
project is applied to the empirical findings to identify the lacunas in urban theory 
and tease out elements of ‘cityness’ through the deconstruction (and 
reconstruction) of Dakar’s planning history. Specifically, in this chapter, southern 
urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1) addresses the silences of the past by focusing 
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on the precolonial history of Dakar and exposing the history of colonial exploitation 
and expropriation that has guided the development of the city. Vitalist ontologies 
(Corrective mainstream 2) attends to the infrastructural development of Dakar, 
factoring in the architecture and building materials that constitute the urban fabric. 
Everyday urbanism (Corrective mainstream 3) engages with the human impact of 
colonial urban policies in the progressive socio-spatial segregation of the city and 
its enduring consequences. The chapter covers the evolution of Dakar from 1857 to 
the 1920s and begins with a map of the precolonial layer. The map reveals the 
presence of existing settlements on the Cap Vert peninsula prior to annexation by 
the French colonial empire. The following layer superimposed on the precolonial 
fabric is the masterplan designed by Emile Pinet-Laprade, head of the local Corps of 
Engineers, in 1862. The analysis of this plan demonstrates how French colonial 
doctrine was articulated through urban planning and the built environment. The 
following sections examine the extension of the city limits as the colonial 
administration sought to push the indigenous inhabitants further from the 
‘European’ city designated by the masterplan. The chapter concludes with a 








The age of planned urbanisation in Dakar began with the official annexation of the 
Cap-Vert peninsula in 1857 by the French colonial empire. However, contact between 
the indigenous populations of Senegal, the Lebou and the Wolof, and the French 
colonial enterprise predates the establishment of Dakar to the mid-seventeenth 
century with the settlement of French merchants in the towns of Gorée, Saint Louis 
and Rufisque (Figure 10).   
‘The Senegalese coastal towns of Saint Louis, Gorée and 
Rufisque, provide exceptional examples for the long 
presence of European settlement in West Africa. Initiated by 
Portuguese and Dutch seamen and merchants (from the 
mid-fifteenth and the early seventeenth centuries, 
respectively), these fortified coastal settlements were not 
established as 'cities,’ but rather as trading posts and 
depots, totally dependent for their existence on the extent 
and intensity of commercial exchanges, including the slave 
trade. Monopolised by the regime of the semi-
official 'compagnies,' commerce was conducted by a tiny 
number of Europeans, a limited number of mulattos (métis), 
free Africans and domestic slaves, mostly women’ (Guèye, 
2013).  
Treaties and agreements already in place between the French and local populations 
between 1679 and 1830, detailed the ‘economic obligations’ of European merchants 
to indigenous rulers (i.e. tolls paid in return for protection and the right to operate 
chambers of commerce) (Bigon, 2016, pg. 22-23). These treaties were designed 
to legitimise future seizure by European powers and paved the way for French 
occupation74 of the peninsula.  For example, the ordinance of November 17, 1823 
extended to Dakar a law applying to all of Senegal which allowed for the 
expropriation of land for public purposes and conferred a market value to any land 
that may or may not be part of the state property75 (Faye, 2001, pg. 60).  
 
 
74 Treaties concluded with the Damel of Cayor in 1763 and 1765 by Poncet de la Riviere and 
in 1767 by Boufflers recognized France’s property rights over the entire territory of the Cap 
Vert peninsula. However, the Lebou, formerly subject to the Damel, had made themselves 
independent and were the rulers of the region (Exposition coloniale internationale de 1931, 
1933, pg. 6). 
75 See ‘accumulation by dispossession’ on pg. 186 
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On the Cap-Vert peninsula, the pre-colonial settlement of Ndakarou was composed 
of eleven Lebou villages76, the native inhabitants of the Cap-Vert peninsula. Lebou 
villages were made up of straw-hut complexes, organised by patriarchal households, 
situated around a central square with several large trees (Figure 11) (Bigon, 2016, pg. 
24). Each Lebou village was arranged around a central public square (penc in 
Wolof), a common feature observed in settlements across Senegambia (Ross, 2014, 
pg. 112). Lebou society was structured around fishing and inland farming and was 
governed by a ‘Muslim religious lineage’ known as the serignes of Ndakarou (Shoup, 
2011, pg. 163). The population of Ndakarou at the time of French occupation 
amounted to approximately 10,000 and was also composed of the Toucouleurs, 
Peuhls, Sarakholés from Bakel, Sereres and Bambaras from Baol, Kassoutrés, and 
Moroccans from the North (Moraze, 1938, pg. 626). Ndakarou was the ‘generic name’ 
given to the Lebou villages, which, according to Lengyel (1941, pg. 25), was based on 
a ‘misunderstanding’;   
According to the traditional explanation, they [white 
travellers] pointed to the village and asked the natives its 
 
76 The eleven Lebou villages were N’grave (Ngaraf), Kaye (Kaye), Kaye Toute, Sintia 
(Santiaba, Sinthiaba), M’bor (Mbor) and Tanne (Thann), Alonga, Sainba Dionni 
(Soumbedioune), Kamen, Thedem (Thieudeme), M’botte (Mbott)  
 
Figure 11: Dakar, 7 am in the morning (Loti, 1873; Gallica) 
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name. The black people, thinking the white travellers had 
asked the name of the tree, replied: ‘Tamarind, tamarind 
- N’Dakar, N’Dakar’.  
The map drawn by Louis Faidherbe in 1853 (Figure 12), the Governor General of 
Senegal from 1854-1861, indicates the location and names of the eleven Lebou 
villages on the Cap-Vert peninsula prior to the colonisation of Ndakarou. This map 
demonstrates that French occupation was not exercised over a tabula rasa, ‘as many 
colonialists would have probably wanted to believe’ since Ndakarou existed on the 
Cap-Vert peninsula as a set of villages with distinct arrangements and way of life 
(Bigon, 2016, pg. 23). Dakar – the imperial name of the indigenous Ndakarou – was 
therefore a kind of ‘sketched colonial city’ laid on top of the existing precolonial layer 
of as an ‘improvised resting place for vessels on this western point of Africa we call 
Cap-Vert’ (Loti; Letter from October 3, 1879). Urban planning under French colonial 
rule was therefore based on the ‘destruction of indigenous cities and towns’ and the 
construction of European built form (Wright, 1991, pg. 75). The physical changes to 
Dakar’s precolonial layer recall the histories of other colonial cities following the 
advent of French imperialism;   
‘When the French captured Algiers in 1830, the destruction 
of the existing city – its streets, its monuments, and its 
population – seemed the primary goal. The French seized 
control of Saigon in 1859, when Napoleon III and his prefect, 
Baron Haussmann, were at the height of their imperial glory. 
Having burned the city, the French troops proceeded as if 
they had a tabula rasa. In an effort to encourage real estate 
speculation, an engineer’s gridiron dominated the plan of the 
proposed new city, embellished with a few wide streets to 








Figure 12: Le Village de Dakar (Faidherbe, 1853; Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer) 
In the fifteen years since the end of the slave trade in Senegal in April 1848, the 
political decision to colonise Dakar led to the construction of a deep-water port to 
support the deployment of French expansion in Africa and facilitate resource 
extraction from the region (Fall, 2005, pg. 150). In April 1856, Pinet-Laprade, adjoint 
du Gouverneur du Senegal (Deputy Governor of Senegal), wrote a letter addressed 
to the colonial administration on the annexation of Dakar;   
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The occupation of the peninsula is necessary for the 
protection of our increasingly important establishments 
in Dackar [sic], all the trading houses of the colony have a 
branch on the peninsula and in the space of ten years the 
commercial movement on the point rose to more than one 
Million (Rapport de Pinet-Laprade sur la defense de 
la presqu’ile du cap vert; Gorée le 15 Avril 1856; Report from 
Pinet-Laprade on the defences of the Cap Vert peninsula; 
Charpy, 1958, pg. 96).  
The exploitation of groundnut77 constitutes the economic foundation of the colony of 
Senegal and, along with military and strategic concerns, the primary motive for the 
annexation of Dakar78. Prior to the colonisation of Dakar, trade was conducted 
primarily in Saint-Louis following its establishment as a colonial outpost in 1659. 
However, the establishment of Dakar as a port of extraction would divert economic 
activity towards the Cap-Vert peninsula (Chenal et al., 2009). Consequently, 
colonisation made the ‘groundnut industry the essential vector of urban growth’ as 
the French power structure and city plans were designed based on exporting raw 
materials from the colony via Dakar (Sow, 1983, pg. 46). 
 
On January 13, 1857, General Léopold Protet, Commandant de la Division Navale des 
Côtes Occidentales d’Afrique et Commandant supérieur de Gorée (Commander of 
the Naval Division of the Western Coasts of Africa and Commander of 
Gorée), disembarked his troops in Dakar and established a fortified post in the house 
of Jaubert, a groundnut merchant from nearby Gorée. On May 25th, as the local 
population celebrated the last day of Ramadan, Protet took possession of the Cap-
Vert peninsula, distributing the tricolore to the local chiefs who ‘proudly hoisted 
them’ during religious festivities; it was ‘thus that the French took over Dakar’ 
(Lengyel, 1941, pg. 75). On the same day, in a communiqué addressed 
 
77 Groundnut processing and export, between 1920-1970, was the driving force of 
manufacturing activities in Senegal. Between 1930 and 1938, half a dozen industries emerged 
around groundnut export including breweries, biscuiteries, soap, bags and packaging 
factories. The economy of the colony of Senegal was driven largely by the growing demand 
for peanuts (oil) from the metropole (Pélissier, 1951). 
78 The colony of Senegal was largely dependent on the export of groundnut which took place 
through Dakar; therefore, the countryside cannot be dissociated from the city as the colony 
would not exist without the port city and vice versa. The analysis argues that this presents 
an interesting iteration of planetary urbanisation whereby the artificial dichotomies between 




to the Goréens and the Minister of the Navy and the Colonies Admiral 
Hamelin, Protet wrote:  
Gentleman, I am pleased to announce that today, 25 May 
1857, I have taken possession in the name of France of the 
territory of Dakar, flying the French flag over the fortress that 
has just been built here, and I thereby release our commerce 
from the tolls that were imposed on it by our treaties with the 
previous chiefs of the land (Leopold Protet, Commander in 
Chief for Gorée and Dependencies; Charpy, 1958, pg. 130).  
In the years following its annexation, Dakar remained ‘in the shadow’ of the three 
pre-existing communes, Gorée, Saint-Louis and Rufisque (Shaw, 2006, pg. 23). 
Residents of Gorée were concerned that the establishment of a new settlement in 
such close proximity, and the increasingly disadvantageous allocation of funds by 
the colonial administration following the occupation of Dakar, would compromise 
their primacy within the colony. Dakar remained in an ‘embryonic state’ (Bérenger-
Féraud, 1883) for many years as evidenced by the reports of Colonel 
Canard, commandant de l’arrondissement de Gorée (commander of the Gorée 
district) from 1870-1880, who complained of the stifling silence of Dakar in the early 
years (Faure, 1914, pg. 158-60).  
 October 1875 - Nothing salient, perfect calm, still very few 
European inhabitants and mulatres [metis], and these few do 
not want to occupy themselves with industry; there is no 
shoemaker, tailor, or wigmaker, hardly can we find a 
laundress, but on the other hand we have a large quantity of 
merchants.  
December 1875 - Everything is calm, too calm; trade is almost 
nil.  
January 1878 - Dakar is still very calm, it is even sad, few 
houses, few inhabitants, little trade and no industry: one is 
obliged to be shaved by a disciple who was mason before his 
entry into service.  
April 1880 - Always the same calm, too calm, trade almost nil; 
Always few houses to accommodate officers and officials; 
Little food, beef, always beef, little sheep, never a calf; In 
short life is very difficult, very expensive and not very 
pleasant.  
 
Plan Directeur d’Urbanisme (E. Pinet-Laprade, 1862) 
The first official masterplan of Dakar was designed by Emile Pinet-Laprade, head of 
the local Corps of Engineers, in 1862 (Figure 13). The plan features the deployment 
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of colonial and military rationale on what was then considered terra nullius. In 
a meeting of the Board of Directors of the Administration of Senegal, Pinet-Laprade 
detailed the plans for the new city:    
Several public squares have been reserved and distributed 
in the principal districts; that of the market, the most 
important, is situated on the way to Cayor; That of the 
church, at the centre of which this edifice is to be built, is on 
the central plateau of the settlement; Finally, a third place of 
irregular form was reserved in the quarter of the East, at the 
meeting point of the streets of different directions, so as to 
destroy the disgraceful aspect which would have presented 
the houses raised in these directions.  
Several fields have been reserved to receive the public 
establishments which will be necessary to create in Dakar, if, 
as can be supposed, this point becomes the main centre of 
our establishments of the West African coast. In the choice 
of these reserves we have been guided by a double 
consideration: 1) the question of salubriousness; 2) trade 
interests. (Proces-Verbal du Conseil d’Administration du 
Senegal; 1er Juillet 1862; Meeting of Board of Directors of the 




Figure 13: Plan Directeur d’Urbanisme (Pinet-Laprade, 1862; Bigon, 2013) 
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The Pinet-Laprade masterplan, based on an orthogonal gridiron layout, was ‘brutally 
implemented’ on top of the indigenous tapestry of the Lebou villages which 
caused irreparable damage to the precolonial layer (Bigon, 2016). The land was 
conceived as a ‘terra incognita (an unknown land)’ but also as ‘terra nullius (an 
empty land)’ despite clear evidence from archival records and maps that the French 
colonial administration was familiar with the precolonial Lebou settlement of the 
Cap-Vert peninsula (Bigon, 2008, pg. 483). Imperialism was articulated as ‘an act of 
geographic violence’ whereby every place on earth was measured, mapped, 
exploited and brought under control79 (Said, 1978, pg. 180-2).   
 
The design and layout of the masterplan and accompanying notes of Pinet-Laprade 
indicate a concern with sanitation and hygiene, a return to order in the land of ‘fever 
and barbarism’ (terre des fièvres et de la barbarie), and the clear intention to ensure 
that Dakar plays a strategic role in the region. Furthermore, the implicit denial of the 
existing settlement, referred to by Pinet-Laprade as a ‘disgraceful’ element that 
necessitated removal, suggests the birth of an urban culture predicated on 
destruction, segregation and ‘othering.’ The French colonial administration 
designated overseas territories as ‘experimental terrains’ or laboratories for testing 
urban planning policies and designs that were too risky or polemical in 
the metropole (Wright, 1991). Until the start of the nineteenth century, Guyana and 
the French West Indies, linked to Africa through trade, were France’s first location 
for colonial experimentation, and the subsequent experiments carried out in Saint 
Louis were often replicas of those implemented in Fort-de-France or Cayenne (Sinou, 
1993, pg. 342). Dakar is prominent example of an ‘urban laboratory’ since low levels 
of urbanisation in 1857 meant that the French colonial administration treated the 
terrain as a tabula rasa – a blank canvas80. The first masterplan, however, was 
superimposed atop existing Lebou villages, destroying native burial sites, mosques 
and sacred lands. In the elaboration of planning decisions, African colonies – 
 
79 See example of spatial organisation of Lebou settlements on pg. 127 
80 The trend of tabula rasa urbanism is evident in the satellite cities of the African continent 
that bypass urban problems of existing metropoles in favour of the development of a wholly 





‘ahistorical in the then European mind’ – were seen as having little to offer in the way 
of inspiration or design as local knowledge was dismissed as ‘mostly irrelevant’81 
(Bigon, 2016, pg. 166).  
 
By presenting the masterplan of Ndakarou as the foundation upon which the French 
urban fabric was overlaid, the analysis is doing the work of southern urbanism 
(Corrective mainstream 1) by exposing the silences of colonial history which ignores 
or neglects the precolonial history of Dakar. Furthermore, by beginning the urban 
history of Dakar with the precolonial layer, the analysis demonstrates that the 
deployment of colonial power in Ndakarou did not entail continuity of existing 
physical forms but involved the brutal implementation of urban change. Through 
the scope of vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2), the juxtaposition of the 
maps of Dakar demonstrates how the biophysical infrastructures of the newly 
established city were laid atop the pre-existing socio-cultural infrastructures of the 
Lebou settlement (Figure 14). As the analysis proceeds along the timeline of Dakar’s 
urban development, the examination of masterplans reveals instances when the 
socio-cultural infrastructures of the city survive or are adapted to the logics of urban 
planning. This provides an apt mechanism for understanding the narratives 
underpinning social change and their effects on the socio-spatial infrastructures of 
urban networks. 
 
81 The perceived (a)historicity of African cities is perpetuated by urban theory in their image 
























Figure 14: Dakar en 1850 et 1880 (Faidherbe & Ancelle, 1889; Gallica) 
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i. Assimilation and civilising mission  
French occupation of overseas territories was rationalised and justified by a doctrine 
of assimilation or mission civilisatrice (civilising mission82). The policy of 
assimilation identified all indigenous inhabitants born in the four communes (Dakar, 
Saint Louis, Rufisque, Gorée), or having lived there over five years, as French citizens 
(originaires) with legal and political rights similar to those of 
French citoyens (citizens). Following French revolution in 1848, the government of 
the Second Republic extended the rights of citizenship to the French colonies. The 
rights were repealed in 1851 under the rule of Napoleon III but restored in 1870 under 
the Third Republic. The originaires benefited from certain rights that weren’t 
extended to the rest of the Senegalese colony and West Africa (i.e. the right to vote, 
by universal adult male suffrage, the right to justice by courts, the right to elected 
municipal government, and the right to elect a deputy to the Assemblée Nationale in 
Paris). In 1889, Dakar was proclaimed by the Colonial Congress as a distant suburb 
of Paris83, further reinforcing the tenets of assimilation (Betts, 1961, 13). The rest of 
the Senegalese colony was subjected to the colonial regime of the ‘indigénat – native 
justice’ or colonial officer’s justice which was ‘good enough for the subjects but 
definitely not good enough for the citizens of the coastal communes’ (O’Brien, 2008, 
pg. 8).   
  
Rooted in Enlightenment rationale, the colonial policy of assimilation promoted 
‘unilinear evolutionism and the unity of reason’ (Diouf, 1998, pg. 676). French 
colonialism sought to turn ‘backward’ and ‘primitive’ African societies into an 
Enlightenment project through education, sanitation, commerce and paid labour 
(Demissie, 2013, pg. 5). According to this policy, colonised African populations were 
expected to ‘love France and Africa simultaneously’ (Bigon, 2009, pg. 
443). This necessitated a complete subordination to the ‘Metropolitan culture’ and 
the abandonment of an African identity (Diouf, 1998, pg. 676). Furthermore, the 
concept of assimilation was used to justify segregationist and repressive colonial 
manoeuvres, making the situation in the communes one of ‘false fraternité, a 
denied egalité, and an absence of liberté’ (Bigon, 2008, pg. 487). Ironically, the 
 
82 The ‘civilising mission’ constitutes the ‘ideological bedrock’ of the European colonial 
enterprise and the modern development discourse (Omar, 2012, pg. 44) 
83 See discussion on planetary urbanisation on pg. 81 
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‘humanist’ idea of man originating in the Enlightenment era was only achieved 
through ‘dehumanizing the non-Western Other’ (Fanon, 1961). The imagery 
of Moraze’s (1936, pg. 627) description of Dakar reveals the emptiness of the 
assimilationist discourse in the racial classifications and power hierarchies it 
upholds;  
‘It is its population that gives Dakar the best of its 
picturesque. Under the brilliance of the sun, the variety of 
costumes with gaudy colours, the heavy jewels and golden 
threads worn by the rich, and the long floating robes of the 
poor make a curious assemblage. The costumes translate the 
manners: the fetishists wear the amulet, while a style of 
headdress distinguishes the Catholics. And when the 
Muslim prayer sounds in the evening, half of the population 
comes to a halt, then prostrate themselves in genuflexions. In 
the midst of this diverse and motley crowd, the European is 
the master. His title is managing to create a city in this 
peninsula which, less than a century ago, seemed prohibited 
to men.’  
The colonial administration sought to subjugate the landscape and its people to 
assimilationist doctrine and the principles of urban planning and organisation. 
France’s ‘civilising ideas’ in West Africa, and across its colonies, identifies 
colonialism with one key principle - mastery;  
‘Mastery not of other peoples – although ironically this would 
become one of civilisations prerogatives in the age of 
democracy; rather, mastery of nature, including the human 
body84, and mastery of what can be called ‘social behaviour’. 
To put it another way, to be civilised was to be free from 
specific forms of tyranny: the tyranny of the laments over 
man, of disease over health, of instinct over reason, of 
ignorance over knowledge and of despotism over liberty’ 
(Conklin, 1997, pg. 4-5).  
Thus, mastery over nature – including the human settlement of precolonial 
Ndakarou- spelled the ‘destruction of nature’ (Lefebvre, 1995, pg. 149) and the first 
iterance of a fragmented landscape (McFarlane, 2018; Roy, 2015). Vitalist ontologies 
(Corrective mainstream 2) reveal how this this framework becomes increasingly 
relevant to the urban development of Dakar in the ‘fragmentation and pulverisation’ 
resulting from capitalist relations of production through the ‘private ownership of 
 
84 See discussion on ‘biopolitics’ on pg. 144 
138 
 
the means of production and of the earth, that is, of space itself’ (Lefebvre, 1995, pg. 
149).  
 
Under the guise of ‘modernist’ urban planning, colonial regimes sought to bring 
order out of the ‘Dickensian urban disorder’ by improving public health and urban 
services (Simon, 2015, pg. 218-19). For the most part, however, urban policies were 
designed to serve the interests of the colonial settlers by separating them from the 
'tumult, alien cultures, poverty or real moral and health threats’ posed by the natives 
– an exercise in racialised modernisation (or the assimilation of black bodies into 
white landscapes) (Simon, 2015, pg. 219). The colonisation of the Cap-Vert was 
focused primarily on the material profit of France as the actual policies of the 
civilizing mission did not serve the needs of the native communities (Sinou, 1993; 
Conklin, 1997, 38-72). The cadastral plan of Dakar is the concrete rendering of 
assimilationist urban planning, a (literal) roadmap indicating how French colonial 
authorities inscribed assimilation and, ironically, segregation onto the built space of 
the city. Architecture and the built environment were used to design and organise 
the spaces of leisure, work, and cultural practices in order to (re?)orient an emerging 
urban identity. By imposing an ‘essentially occidental and rationalistic vision’ on the 
land and its native population, colonial urban planning fragmented existing 
relationships, political formations and family units (Bugnicourt, 1982, pg. 30).  
  
 ii. Military rationale and security  
As an officer of the Navy and the Corps of Engineers, Pinet-Laprade was greatly 
influenced by the layout designs and models of the French military and naval 
engineers in the elaboration of the grid plan based on the ‘Roman camp type, in the 
tradition of Debelle Gallico’ (Bugnicourt, 1982, pg. 30). This planning model is 
associated to the ‘medieval bastide towns and the Renaissance tradition,’ which 
were characterised by two key principles: i) facilitating the organisation of a 
settlement in a faraway territory; and ii) engineering the modernisation of the 
indigenous practices (Bigon, 2009, pg. 435). Pinet-Laprade’s plan proposed to 
establish the barracks of soldiers on the upper part of the site to secure the land, 
while traders would be based on the edge of the sea in proximity to arriving ships 
(Sinou, 1993, pg. 232). The decision to position colonial buildings on an elevated 
plain was a strategic move to ‘dignify the power of the imperial government’ (Njoh, 
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2015, pg. 103). Topography in colonial settlements played an important role, 
symbolizing the unequal distribution of wealth and power and effectively 
distinguishing the ‘ruler from the ruled’ (Winters, 1982). The salience of topography 
becomes increasingly apparent when European quarters are established on the 
‘plateau,’ a geographically elevated area, during the 1910s both in Dakar and 
throughout French West Africa.  
  
The military layout, exemplified in the 1862 masterplan, can also be found in the 
colonial settlements of Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, and England. While these 
plans take into account local environmental conditions, they feature the same basic 
characteristics, namely;  
1. an orthogonal design, featuring an ‘internal hierarchy 
of morphological and infrastructure elements’   
2. tree-lined streets, verandas in the caverns and the 
barracks (that is, the ‘bungalow compound complex’ 
or ‘maison coloniale’)  
3. the influence of sanitary considerations on the layout 
of the built sphere 
4. the segregation and isolation of the colonial 
population from the native inhabitants through land 
confiscations and forcible displacements (Bigon, 
2016, pg. 71).   
The analysis demonstrates that the 1862 plan of Dakar features these elements 
prominently and deploys them strategically to suit the needs of colonial doctrine. 
The similarities between the newly built towns of Dakar and Bathurst, founded by 
the British empire around 1820, illustrate the shared architectural design and 
practices based on military rationale that guided the early planning of colonial cities. 
The capital of the Gambia (Bathurst) is remarkable for its numerous military 
buildings, batteries, casernes, prisons, guardhouse, powder stores, and civilian 
buildings, including government hotel, hospital, church, school, prison, courthouse, 
cemetery, and coal depot (Sinou, 1993, pg. 237). Much as in Dakar, these elements 
were deemed necessary for the creation of a ‘civilised’ space suitable for European 
residents, as town planning was used specifically for ‘articulating power in built 
space’ (Njoh, 2015, pg. 101). Another key reason for the pervasiveness of this military 
style was the quest for ‘visual unification’ so that, Dakar to Hanoi, military officers in 
French colonies moving from one colonial outpost to another would encounter 
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familiar landscapes (Bigon, 2016, pg. 59). Where differences did exist, these were 
largely driven by health concerns, particularly with regards to prevailing winds and 
the orientation of streets that facilitated the circulation of air and ‘miasma’ (Sinou, 
1993, pg. 232).  
  
iii. Déguerpissements  
The implementation of the Pinet-Laprade masterplan called for the displacement of 
Lebou villages beyond the new borders of the city. Driven by Vitruvian85 principles, 
Pinet-Laprade’s plan represents an attempt to ‘discipline’ the conquered territories 
through the design and imposition of legislative boundaries (Bigon, 2008, pg. 482). 
This required the displacement of ‘undisciplined’ elements that did not fit within the 
scope of the masterplan. In instances where Lebou villages and huts 
encumbered the streets, boulevards and avenues, the settlements 
were destroyed, and their inhabitants exiled to other parts of the city-to-be in a series 
of forced removals labelled ‘déguerpissements’[displacements] (Figure 15).  
 
85 On the topic of urban planning, Vitruvius proposed a city ‘founded on salubrity, to be 
achieved through the avoidance of the prevailing winds’ (Lagopoulos, 2009, pg. 194). 
Vitruvian principles in planning and architecture are based on arrangement, proportion, 





In 1858, ninety-five huts from the Kaye village were destroyed for the construction of 
a boulevard while the rest of the village was ‘incorporated’ into the city’s urban plans 
(Le Commandant de Gorée, d’Alteyrac, au Prince chargé du Ministre Gorée, le 
21 Septembre 1858; Charpy, 1958, pg. 190). Racial segregation, while never overt in 
the French colonies, was used to enhance the power of the coloniser over the 
colonised by facilitating the ‘former’s surveillance of the latter’ (Njoh, 2015, pg. 106). 
 Surveillance was made possible through the internment of the colonized within 
delineated spaces. Everyday urbanism (Corrective mainstream 3) reveals that this 
practice set Dakar on a track of socio-spatial segregation and prompted the first 
iteration of informal settlements as the displaced communities sought to rebuild 
homes at the periphery of the newly established city. The strongest resistance to the 
‘déguerpissements’ came from the Lebou who resented being dispossessed of their 
Figure 15: Dégeurpissements (Bigon, 2016) 
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ancestral lands (Sinou, 1993, pg. 280). The Lebou, however, did not fully comprehend 
the European land contracts and ownership rights, nor the ‘full implication of acts 
such as signatures on documents’ (Bigon, 2016, pg. 68). The colonial administration 
enforced the use of building permits (permis d’habiter; Figure 16) as a means of 
dispossessing the Lebou of their ancestral lands while legally enforcing a process of 
déguerpissements and segregation. In the European neighbourhoods, any permis 
d’habiter granted stability to inhabitants afforded them a sense of security while the 
permits bestowed to natives were often revocable and worsened their precarious 
foothold in the city (Ndiaye, 2015, pg. 52). The native population of Dakar were the 
‘victims, recipients and participants’ of a colonial logic that substituted the ‘way of 
life of the villager for the civility of the city dweller’ (Faye, 2001, pg. 37). 
 
During this time period, the first versions of the ‘sanitation’ narrative emerged 
in Dakar, recycling the rhetoric used to legitimise similar displacements in the 
development of Saint-Louis. The ‘Sanitation Syndrome’ (Swanson, 1977) dictated 
colonial urban policies and encouraged the segregation of Africans and Europeans 
as urban race relations were conceived and dealt with in an ‘imagery of infection 
and epidemic disease’ (Swanson, 1977, pg. 387). As in 19th century London, the urban 
Figure 16: Permis d'Habiter (Gouvernement Générale de L’Afrique Occidentale Française, 
1913; Archives Nationale du Senegal) 
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fabric was shaped by the goal of ‘producing a civilised, clean, respectable, 
productive and healthy city’ (McFarlane & Rutherford, 2008, pg. 349). Yellow fever 
outbreaks in the early days of the French occupation of Dakar as well as the 
perceived sanitation concerns generated by the lifestyle of the African population 
were used to justify the banishment of the latter to the outskirts of the newly 
developing city. During the colonial period, contamination was often underwritten 
by a ‘close association with disgust at the colonial Other’ as the ‘uncivilised, 
racialized polluting bodies’ of colonial subjects were arguably ‘less amenable to 
self-government’ (McFarlane & Rutherford, 2008, pg. 350). Infrastructural 
developments during the early colonial period and the displacement of local 
populations aimed to produce self-governing subjects. This provides an interesting 
restatement of Foucault’s (1997) concept of ‘biopolitics’ as colonial medical practice 
underpinned by racist discourse, became the rationality based on which the ‘African 
body’ was identified as the site of disease that threatened the white settler 
population and justified the segregation of bodies (and cities) (Vaughan, 1991). 
Infrastructure was therefore not only a means of regulating and allowing the 
circulation of water, waste, air and goods but also played a crucial role in producing 
a ‘self-governing hygienic, moral subject’ (Joyce, 2003).   
  
A policy of segregation replaced the earlier arrangement of ‘coexistence’ in Senegal 
and was epitomised in the establishment of the Médina as a separate African quarter 
of Dakar in 1914. Similarly, the colonial municipal officials in cities such as 
Johannesburg, Cape Town, Nairobi, and Kinshasa used public health 
concerns derived from colonial medical discourse to relocate African populations to 
‘less desirable parts of the city’ (Demissie, 2013, pg. 4-5). Urban areas were 
considered the ‘preserve of Europeans’ and Africans were merely tolerated in these 
spaces for the work and services they provided. They were required to live in 
segregated ‘indigenous centres’ or ‘townships’ built on the margins of the city to 
host ‘temporary [emphasis added]’ urban dwellers who were intentionally prevented 
from ‘urbanising permanently [emphasis added]’ and acquiring land rights of urban 
citizenship (Simon, 2015, pg. 219).  
 
The pretext of sanitation was revealed as a political tool for subjugating the native 
population in colonized countries, as ‘medical’ rationality justified a mode of 
governance amenable to the aims of the French colonial project. This is evident in 
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the fact that the seemingly benevolent health concerns of the French for the living 
conditions of the African population all but disappeared once the latter were moved 
to the swampy interiors of the peninsula where topographic conditions and the 
incessant influx of people worsened living conditions in African settlements.   
 
iv. Toponymic segregation  
Bigon (2008) has conducted in-depth research on the toponymic practices of the 
French colonial administration in Dakar which constitute an important element for 
explaining how the civilising mission and segregation were simultaneously 
deployed through urban planning. Street-naming systems supported the 
‘alienation’ of the native population from the colonial urban sphere (Bigon, 2008, pg. 
497). The French colonial administration built a ‘linguistic superstructure which 
reduced the Senegambian dialects to unenviable rank of vernacular language’ 
(Faye, 2001, pg. 84). While racial segregation was never overt and consciously 
applied in the French colonies, the street naming system represented a ‘conceptual 
barrier’ in urban spaces that instilled an ‘informal racial segregation’ between the 
colonial and indigenous populations (Bigon, 2008, pg. 482). Faure, archivist of 
the Afrique Occidentale Francaise (1911-1920), categorized the thirty-eight street 
names of Dakar, approved by the Administrative Council in 1863;   
1. Metropolitan street names (1): the first category includes 
only one street name, the Boulevard National (originally 
named by Pinet-Laprade the Rue Imperiale).  
2. Military and Navy officer names (24): this second category 
lists street named after significant actors in the 
colonisation of Senegal and other regions, mostly military 
and navy officers, who died in battles against local powers 
(e.g. Descemet, Dagorne, Mage) or succumbed to 
malaria and other disease (e.g. Caille, 
Parent, Parchappe). Governors (Blanchot, 
Canard), military engineers (Vincens), surgeons 
(Theze) and explorers (Raffenel) are also included in this 
category.  
3. French site-related names (5): this refers specifically to 
sites created by the new colonising powers such 
as Avenue du Barachois, Rue de l’Hopital, the newly 
established hospital in the Plateau; Rue 
du Cimetière, original location of the European cemetery, 
and Rue de la Gendarmerie and Rue de l’Administration. 
4. African names (8): These names were carefully selected, 
featuring only references that supported the French 
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regional ‘master narrative’; in the three instances where a 
local settlement name was used (Rue de Kaolak, Rue 
de Dialmath and Rue de Médine) it was, in fact, ‘in praise 
of French military posts or fortresses that had heroically 
been established there’ (Bigon, 2008, pg. 486). In later 
years, streets names such as Avenue El Hadji Malik 
Sy and Avenue Blaise Diagne drew from ‘Afrocentric 
lexical dictionaries’ to incorporate native culture and ‘win 
the hearts and minds of the colonised’ (Njoh, 2016, pg. 6). 
The choice of these names was deliberate as the political 
leaders they honour ‘never threatened the French colonial 
rule in Senegal’ (one was linked to Islamic life and the 
other was the first African mayor of Dakar) (Bigon, 2009, 
pg. 443).  
Through the practice of street naming, the colonial state was both symbolically and 
materially exercising its power in the articulation of a ‘Eurocentric vernacular of 
spatiality in African built space’ (Njoh, 2016, pg. 12). The street names and ensuing 
toponymic segregation of Dakar depicts the encounter between two ‘spatial 
hierarchies, codifications and toponyms’ - that of the coloniser and that of the 
colonised (Bigon, 2008, pg. 480). Language policy was based on ‘presumptions of 
superiority’ and an ignorance and ‘denigration of indigenous languages’ (Gellar, 
2016, pg. 6). French was best suited to ‘civilize’ the native populations; ‘excluding 
those who did not speak French from participating in public life and access to elite 
status; and conducting public affairs and administering justice exclusively in 
French’ (Gellar, 2016, pg. 6). This explains the privileged position of the evolués 
within the colonial hierarchy, as these African colonial subjects embraced a 
European way of life and abandoned indigenous languages in favour of French. As 
the socioeconomic divides in Dakar deepened, language became a determining 
factor for urban identity and an important constituent of ‘cityness.’ Language 
reflects the dichotomy between ‘appropriate urban and non-urban identities’ and 
everyday urbanism (Corrective mainstream 3) reveals the ways in which urbanites 
developed the ability to slip ‘out of one identity and into another as easily as if they 
were changing clothes’ in the process of negotiating their spaces in the city86 
(McLaughlin, 2001, pg. 157). The duality of the city, as represented through 
language, is further compounded in the imperial age when the city is physically 
divided into European and native quarters, each structured differently and 
 
86 See discussion on Wolof language on pg. 44 
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subjected to explicit codes of urban infrastructure and implicit codes of social 
behaviour.  
 
Imperial Dakar  
With the establishment of the Dakar - Saint Louis (DSL) railway in 1885, ongoing work 
on the deep-water port, and the increase in visiting sea crafts, Dakar entered its 
‘imperial age’ which triggered a development momentum linked to the city’s new 
administrative status. In 1902, the capital of French West Africa was transferred from 
Saint-Louis to Dakar. Dakar was designed and destined to become a new urban 
model for French colonies throughout Africa and was meant to play a strategic 
international role. A report presented to the President de la Republique following 
the decree in 1902 announced the new circonscription of Dakar;   
The decree of October 1st, 1902 made of Dakar, city of 
Senegal whose capital remains Saint Louis, the capital of 
French West Africa. The General Government, as such, was 
gradually installed with all the departments of inspection, 
centralisation and control, the headquarters of the superior 
commander of the occupying troops, the court of appeal of 
the AOF, and treasury department. A large port has been 
built; a whole city has been built. In short, a considerable 
effort has been made to make Dakar a city worthy of the great 
role which it is called upon to fulfil, an effort made by the 
General Government, both on the ordinary resources of its 
budget and on the borrowing budgets for which it has 
repeatedly had to cover almost all costs. The results 
obtained, however, still do not meet all expectations. The 
urgent improvements in Dakar will necessitate very different 
expenditures. It is essential that the General Government 
should completely replace the Government of 
Senegal (Charpy,1958, pg. 90-91).  
Dakar was set up as an autonomous territory in an arrangement similar to the 
‘special status’ of Washington, D.C. with a Governor of Colonies at the head of this 
autonomous territory known as the Circonscription de Dakar (Lengyel, 1914, pg. 53). 
The image of Washington, D.C. as a model for Dakar is particularly interesting given 
that Marshal Hubert Lyautey, the first Resident-General of Morocco from 1912 to 
1925, labelled Rabat ‘my little Washington’ and Dakar’s urban design was modelled 
after that of Rabat (Bigon, 2016, pg. 32-33). The parallels between Dakar and Rabat 
are useful for understanding the motives behind urban policies in French colonies. 
The foundations of the ‘système Lyautey’ (Lyautey system), as it was implemented in 
Morocco, were based on a ‘peaceful penetration’ – ‘the coloniser is a civilizer, not a 
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conqueror’ with the goal of global development (Brisson, 1934, pg. 72). Thus, in the 
‘land of anarchy’ (Morocco) and the ‘land of fever and barbarism’ (Dakar/Senegal), 
‘modern civilisation’ would be introduced to the landscape through ‘construction 
and not with trenches; with picks and not with bayonets’ (Brisson, 1934, page 16). 
Architecture and planning were viewed as ‘effective ideological transmitters’ fit for 
the purpose of subjugating, taming, and civilising the indigenous lands and 
societies of North and West Africa (Wright, 1991, pg. 1).  
 
The new status of Dakar brought unprecedented growth to the city, with the 
construction of government buildings, European residences, recreation facilities 
and networked urban infrastructure. In 1877, it was necessary to expand the 1862 
Pinet-Laprade plan south of the Rue Imperiale (Avenue Sarraut) and from the 
quartier des disciplinaries to the Rue de l’Hopital (rue Berenger-Feraud) (Exposition 
Coloniale, 1931). This also meant the enforcement of new regulations that prohibited 
African housing in the ‘European’ city. As a regional project, Dakar was based on 
the exploitation of peanut, underscoring its role as a port city with concomitant 
facilities as a means of strengthening the infrastructure of the region while 
reorganising the economy of the territory (Sinou, 1993, pg. 242). The population of 
Dakar grew considerably during this era, from 1,556 in 1878, to 8,737 in 1891 and then 
to 18,447 in 1904 (Lengyel, 1941, pg. 79-80). Ribot and Lafon (1908, pg. 18) report an 
even larger population with 19,775 in 1904 and over 25,000 in 1907 of which 2,700 
Europeans. The population of Europeans in the capital, mostly French, was made up 
of civil servants and traders (35 per cent) or military men (15 per cent), sometimes 
accompanied by families (women, 17 per cent, children, 8 per cent). Alongside the 
French, there were foreigners engaged in trade (25 per cent) including 
Catholic Libano-Syrians, who, sought refuge from Muslim persecution and formed a 
colony of nearly 2,000 members in the city (Moraze, 1938, pg. 626). In 1901, Degouy, a 
captain of Engineering, designed an extension plan for Dakar to deal with the 
demographic growth of the city. As early as 1904, the first major avenues were laid 
out and intended to connect large facilities to each other (Dione, 1992; Chenal et al., 
2009, pg. 71). 
 
As the capital of French West Africa, Dakar was the ‘living testimony’ of the work 
accomplished in Dakar, ‘at the cost of a thousand difficulties’ to build the ‘empire on 
solid foundations’ (Ribot & Lafon, 1906, pg. 18). The increasing importance of Dakar 
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fostered a desire to give the city an ‘air of distinction’ as architecture and urban 
design were meant to display France’s imperial superiority (Bugnicourt, 1982, pg. 
31). Vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2) reveals the ways in which 
architecture and infrastructure were harnessed as fundamental elements of urban 
planning not only to direct the ‘flow of human traffic’ but also to structure the ‘way 
people interact,’ thereby acting as an effective mechanism of self-governance 
(Shaw, 2006, pg. 10). The city centre was composed of the market, the church and 
the administrative office - the ‘three functional units’ for the deployment of colonial 
ideology and power (Faye, 2001, pg. 94). Architectural styles of colonial buildings 
were influenced by the Beaux-Arts tradition in Parisian architecture, as well as 
rococo and baroque styles. The construction projects undertaken during this time 
period were meant to evoke the monumentality of Dakar’s development, and display 
the superiority of French colonial institutions and ideals and their mastery over the 
land. Dakar was living proof that French colonialism allowed for the metamorphosis 
of Ndakarou from a settlement of villages to a city of ‘permanent edifices’ (Bigon, 
2016, pg. 135).   
 
i. Built environment and building materials  
A map of Dakar from 1906, taken 
from Essai de Geographie Medicale et d’Ethnographie ( 
Essay of Medical Geography and Ethnography) by Jojot (1907) (Figure 17), shows the 
changing landscape of Dakar as Pinet-Laprade’s gridiron plan was implemented 
and expanded.  The Jojot map clearly betrays the notion that the urban ‘centre’ of 
the city (i.e. Dakar-Ville) was perceived as the ‘real’ city and populated by the 
European population while the periphery, referred to only as ‘quartier indigène’ 
(indigenous village), rendered in the map as blank space, was not conceptually an 
‘integral part of the city’ (Bigon & Njoh, 2015, pg. 32). The French social and cultural 
projects in Dakar designated the African population as ‘rural,’ regardless of their 
proximity to urban areas (Nelson, 2007, pg. 226). According to Celcik (1997, pg. 5), 
racial, cultural, social and historical ‘otherness’ constituted the paradigm that 
‘dominated all building activity’ and spatial segregation only ‘reinforced the 
difference.’ Hence, urbanity in Dakar comes to be defined by a process of ‘othering’ 
whereby the urban European city was only conceived in opposition to a perceived 




The Lieutenant Governor of Senegal, Ernest Roume, issued a decree on June 21, 
1902 forbidding the use of non-permanent building materials in the European 
residential quarters of Dakar. Non-permanent materials (i.e. anything designated by 
colonial authorities as contributing to an unhealthy urban environment) included 
cloth, straw, thatch, wattle, mud and tarred carton (Seck, 1970, pg. 133). This new 
legislation was unquestioningly directed towards the African population of the 
peninsula whose precolonial forms of habitation consisted mainly of the newly 
banned building materials. The Lieutenant Governor also required building 
permission for new structures in the city which were only bestowed to constructions 
using ‘permanent’ building materials (en dur). Existing habitations within the city 
limits made of perishable materials were destroyed while those made of durable 
materials were ‘thoroughly decontaminated’ (Betts, 1971, pg. 144). The owners of the 
150 
 
destroyed buildings were allowed to rebuild their homes ‘à l’europèenne’ (the 
European way). If owners of destroyed houses did not build according to the new 
standards and regulations, they were assigned a plot near the city borders and 
granted the freedom to build as they saw fit. The native inhabitants remaining within 
the city limits often resorted to subversive means in the construction of their 
residences by replacing the walls of straw with walls of wooden planks and thatched 
roofs with mechanical ties in order to abide by the decree. These adaptations were 
generally considered sufficient to remain in place. Everyday urbanism (Corrective 
mainstream 3) reveals that these subversive measures are still utilised in 
Figure 17: Plan de Dakar (Jojot, 1907) 
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contemporary Dakar as those inhabiting or working in the informal sphere are 
constantly finding ways to subvert legislation that potentially undermines their way 
of life. 
  
The style of residential buildings established during this period mirrored the 
nineteenth century ‘Haussmannisation’ of Paris with French and African 
populations sharing both adjacent buildings but segregated vertically with 
Europeans living on higher floors (to benefit from the ocean breeze) and Africans 
living on the ground floor (Nelson, 2007, pg. 229). This recalls the French concern 
with elevation and topography as a means of expressing power and domination87. 
The first settlement houses built in Dakar emulated the style of Gorée and Saint-
Louis, arranged side-by-side, barrack-like and surrounded by a garden. These 
‘colonial villas’ were built with Hispanic and Mediterranean details and provide an 
‘ease of living’ because of their ‘adaptation to the climate’ (Bugnicourt, 1982, pg. 30). 
Public space in Dakar was built by ‘uprooting’ the existing socio-spatial environment 
and replacing it with a ‘modern’ landscape. The penc was no longer the heart of 
community life as Place Protet (today’s Place de l’Independence), became the 
central square of the city and exhibited an air of European flair with theatres and 
cafés that gave Dakar the ‘impression of French city’ (Bigon, 2016, pg. 136).  
 
Public buildings, located in Place Protet, were ‘neoclassical in inspiration’ and 
signal the power of the coloniser with many Doric or Corinthian colonnades that 
evoke ancient Greek and Roman styles (Sinou, 1993, pg. 327). The Governor General's 
Palace and the Chamber of Commerce were constructed with neo-classical motifs 
to mark the power of the colonizer (ibid). Mosques were forced to follow rules of 
western architecture, ‘characterized by a total rejection of African culture’ with 
minarets disguised as bell towers as only the arches and cupola indicated the 
buildings’ Islamic function (Barblan & Hernach, 2014, pg. 26). The 
‘instrumentalization of space’ was therefore achieved through the ‘successful 
application of French heritage’ in the production of the city (Faye, 2001, pg. 65).  
 
 
87 See discussion on topography on pg. 140 
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The built environment of Dakar reveals the role of architecture as an ideological 
transmitter in the city and throughout the French colonial empire. A comparison of 
the colonial architectures of Casablanca, Rabat and Dakar reveals the ways in which 
the French colonial administration manipulated architecture and planning to 
articulate its power in the built environment. In Morocco, for example, 
Lyautey (Resident-General of Morocco from 1912 to 1925) envisioned colonial society 
according to the following principles;   
‘the French will always settle beside the Moroccan, the 
French city next to the Moroccan city, never in its place. And 
not only will the native retain integrally and always his 
character, his manners, his customs, his arts, but each of the 
two peoples that make up Morocco - Arabs and Berbers - will 
keep their institutions, their own customs and even their 
justice’ (Brisson, 1934, pg. 49).  
In Morocco, the colonial administration sought to ‘conquer the native’s hearts and 
win their sympathy’ with ‘Moroccan-inspired design’ of colonial buildings such as 
Casablanca’s courthouse (Marrast in Mazrui et al., 2012).  The policy served to pacify 
indigenous populations in order to facilitate resource extraction by securing the 
acquiescence of the exploited. In Dakar, however, the expulsion of indigenous 
populations to the periphery of the city suggest that the apparent ‘respect’ for and 
preservation of local culture in Lyautey’s doctrine was lacking in the French colony 
of Senegal. The 1862 masterplan reflects a colonial period during which the 
‘modernisation’ (read: westernisation) of the territory of Dakar was achieved through 
the deployment of French colonial urban forms that were intended to ‘impress’ the 
indigenous population who, based on patriarchal logic, would unquestioningly 
imitate the European way of life (Bigon & Katz, 2017, pg. 58). However, the following 
chapters will demonstrate that, despite the efforts of the colonial administration, the 
‘straw-hut landscape’ (the precolonial layer) never disappeared completely from 
colonial cities as the ‘organic’, ‘spontaneous’, ‘random’ and ‘improvised’ structures 
remained the ‘ultimate image of these towns’ (Bigon & Njoh, 2015, pg. 34). 
 
Dualistic Dakar - ‘Garden city’ and ‘ghetto’  
The deepening socio-spatial segregation of the European and African quarters lead 
to the establishment of an increasingly dualistic city. While the 1862 plan was 
rigorously implemented in the ‘European’ parts of the city, the margins of Dakar-
ville were left to grow and expand unchecked, resulting in urban sprawl. Despite 
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numerous ‘déguerpissements’, the continued presence of the ‘indigenous’ 
inhabitants of the Cap-Vert in the ‘European’ city meant that French urban policy 
adopted different tactics to transform or exclude the indigenous residences from the 
emerging city. In 1914-15, several plans were drawn up for the new design of the 
Plateau (garden city) and the Médina which was hastily implemented after an 
outbreak of plague in 1914.  The segregation of Dakar was progressive, but the 
establishment of the Médina marks a turning point when an entirely separate section 
of the city was officially nominated as ‘African’ and populated by native inhabitants 
forcibly removed from the city centre and separated by a cordon sanitaire (formed 
by the camps des tirailleurs Sénégalais – camp of the Senegalese sharpshooters) 
(Figure 18). At the same time, Dakar Plateau was established as the ‘European’ 
quarter with the implementation of the ‘garden city’ model in Dakar, and throughout 
much of West Africa.  The choice of Dakar Plateau is a strategic one since it is 
topographically the highest point on the peninsula. Thus, to ‘assert their sociological 
superiority,’ the colonial administration built their urban habitat in areas of higher 
altitude, thereby initiating a ‘vertical flight’ (Faye, 2001, pg. 40). The development of 
these parallel cities ‘hardened into material spatialities of political connection, 
economic dependency, architectural imposition and landscape transformation’ 




i. ‘Garden city’ and cité-jardin  
The ‘garden city’ originates in the work of Ebenezer Howard’s 1902 
publication Garden Cities of Tomorrow. This book was translated into French soon 
Figure 18: Dakar en 1920 (Exposition coloniale internationale, 1931; Gallica) 
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after its publication and was popularised by the first garden city experiments in 
England (e.g. Letchworth). The model soon entered Francophone urban planning 
circles. Howard presented the ‘garden city’ as an autonomous unit that provided an 
alternative to the growth of industrial cities which were associated with deteriorating 
sanitary and hygiene conditions, poverty, crime, and slums, and increased rural-
urban migration. He stated that the ‘universally agreed’ principle in England, 
Europe, America and the colonies was that the continued ‘stream into the already 
over-crowded cities’ would further deplete the country districts and was a path best 
avoided (Howard, 1965, pg. 42). The garden city model proposed to counter this 
worrying trend through the following measures;  
‘…the provision of a permanent belt of open land, to be used 
for agriculture as an integral part of the city; the use of this 
land to limit the physical spread of the city from within, or 
encroachments from urban development not under control at 
the perimeter; the permanent ownership and control of the 
entire urban tract by the municipality itself and its 
disposition by means of leases into private hands; the 
limitation of population to the number originally planned for 
the area’ (Mumford, 1965, pg. 34-35).   
The monograph outlines the three ‘magnets’ that explain the attraction of the Town 
or Country and suggests that the ‘Town-Country,’ in the garden city configuration, 
is the strongest magnet (Figure 19). Howard (1902, pg. 47) argues that neither Town 
or Country represent the ‘full plan and purpose of nature’ and that ‘human society 
and the beauty of nature are meant to be enjoyed together.’ Town and Country must 
therefore be ‘married’ to form the Town-Country magnet. Howard maintained that 
his vision was ‘practicable’ and based on ‘principles which are the very soundest, 





Anglophone scholarly literature has seldom addressed the role of the ‘garden city’ 
model in urban planning in colonial Africa. Zeynep Celcik, Gwendolyn Wright and 
Paul Rabinow have only treated the subject en passant in the analysis of urban 
planning in French North Africa (Bigon, 2013, pg. 478-9).  Bigon & Katz (2017, pg. 36) 
and Bigon (2012) trace the diffusion of the ‘garden city’ model and its adaptations 
and deviations in the French colonies across the African continent. Although the 
‘garden city’ was envisioned as an alternative to industrialised urban environments, 
the colonial history of French West Africa did not involve an industrial revolution per 
se. Instead, the colonies were used as pools for the siphoning and exportation of raw 
materials and then as markets for manufactured goods.  
  
The ‘garden city’ was disseminated as the cité-jardin model in West Africa and 
consisted of tree-lined streets, villas with verandas and gardens, and an abundance 
of vegetation, mainly for decoration (Bigon & Katz, 2017, pg. 59). This model, based 
on the ‘beaux quartiers’ in France, ‘haunts’ the settler who aspires to live in the 
manner of the bourgeoisie; ‘from his villa he [French expatriate in Dakar] dominates 
Figure 19: The Three Magnets (Howard, 1965) 
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his park, the garden boys, and can identify with the nobles or the bourgeois whose 
houses are enthroned in small urban parks’88 (Sinou, 1993, pg. 308).  
‘From Algeria to Madagascar, from Senegal to Congo 
Brazzaville and throughout the French dependencies and 
those of other nations, expatriate residential forms are 
often labelled ‘garden cities’ in these reports. The white 
residential area in Antananarivo (Madagascar) is described 
there as a ‘satellite garden-suburb’; in Thiès (east of Dakar) 
it is described as ‘a real garden city’; in Elisabethville 
(Belgian Congo) ‘a large garden city with greenery creates all 
the charms’ and even in Beira (Portuguese Mozambique) the 
white area is characterized as a desirable ‘garden city’. It is 
clear, however, that one should not look here for a direct 
application of the British Garden City movement but should 
understand this term as a successful inclusion of vegetation 
within the white residential quarters’ (Bigon, 2013, pg. 480).  
The cité-jardin model was implemented in Dakar plateau and intended to imbue the 
area with an image of prestige. The Plateau has no function from an economic point 
of view other than bringing together employees of the colonial administration. As in 
Saint Louis, the streets of the Plateau were the first to be paved and outfitted with 
public lighting, effectively becoming the city centre of Dakar. Dakar Plateau is 
organised around several round public places and star-shaped avenues as urban 
planners adopted the same principles in most major colonial metropolises (Prost in 
Casablanca, Hebrard in Hanoi) or by other colonizers in sub-Saharan Africa, such 
as the Germans in Lomé (Sinou, 1993, pg. 301).  The arrangement of the Plateau 
reflects the French colonial ‘pretensions’ in this part of the world. The main rond-
point, a ‘simplified six-street version’ of the Rond-Point de l’Etoile in Paris 
exemplifies the ways in which mimicry of the metropole was inscribed in the 
narrative of Dakar’s development (Bigon & Katz, 2017, pg. 58) (Figure 20). In colonies 
across the African continent, the ‘garden city’ became the main type of settlement 
for the colonial administration. Lengyel (1941, pg. 30), a visitor to Dakar during this 
period wrote that ‘Dakar looks partly very French and partly very colonial’ and ‘if the 
visitor closed his eyes and forgot about the heat - which is, of course, out of the 
question - he might imagine himself in a corner of suburban Paris.’  
 
 




The ‘garden city’ model played a key role in deepening the racial polarisation of the 
urban landscape, a phenomenon described as ‘dual cities’ (Abu-Lughod, 
1965; Bigon, 2013, pg. 477). While the plateau landscape featured buildings of 
‘international character, edged by trees and streetlamps,’ the indigenous 
settlements appeared as a ‘jumble of an African village, preserving a human texture 
despite the grid plan installed by the city administration’ (Bugnicourt, 1982, pg. 28). 
Vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2) demonstrate how the city was divided 
between the ‘modern, well-equipped, picturesque, white residential areas’ and the 
‘ad-hoc African quarters’ with limited and/or inexistent infrastructural 
developments, thereby relegating these areas to the ‘waiting room of modern 
planning’ (Bigon & Katz, 2017, pg. 69).  
 
The emphasis on ‘gardens’ or ‘jardins’ in the cité-jardin model of Dakar Plateau 
meant that vegetation played a key role in the duality of the urban landscapes. On 
the plateau, the well-maintained garden represented the taming of ‘savage’ fauna – 
greenery conquering the desert and the mastery89 and ‘domestication of a savage 
 
89 See discussion on ‘mastery’ on pg. 138 
Figure 20: Aerial view of Dakar Plateau (Agence économique de la France d'outre-mer, 
1929; Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer) 
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environment’ (Bigon & Katz, 2017, pg. 51-68). Historically, African flora ‘worried the 
White’ as humidity introduced by vegetation encouraged the presence of insects, 
snakes and disease (Sinou, 1993, pg. 307). The desert was ‘just as repulsive in the 
eyes of Westerners,’ reflecting the arduous journey of building an entire city from 
‘sand’ (ibid). While the French, much like their European counterparts, considered 
any uninhabited or uncultivated parcel of land as ‘unoccupied,’ the Lebou, like many 
other colonised populations, saw these terrains as fulfilling various roles (Bigon, 
2016, pg. 68). Vegetation played a key role in the pre-colonial settlement of Ndakarou. 
Prior to French occupation, vegetation such as the baobab or kapok were key to the 
layout of Lebou and Wolof settlements as they fulfilled an aesthetic as well as 
‘spiritual, didactic, pragmatic and recreational’ function (Bigon, 2012, pg. 39). 
Bigon (2012, pg. 42) categorises the green spaces of Dakar-ville and Plateau as 
follows:  
1. ‘Official’ gardens, designed according to French 
‘formalistic tradition, such as those found 
in l’Hôtel de Ville and the Palais du Gouverneur 
General, and supervised by the Horticultural Service;  
2. Public gardens and parks, such as those 
in Place Protet or the Jardin de Hann (Forestry Park 
of Hann, now known as Hann Botanical Gardens);  
3. Tree-lined boulevards and avenues, which included 
imported species such as acacia and mimosa and 
native mango and banana. These served both an 
aesthetic purpose in their ‘resemblance to the urban 
arteries at ‘home’, a practical purpose in the 
‘provision of shade in the tropical climate’, and a 
sanitary function through ‘swamp reclamation and 
other anti-malarial countermeasures, and the 
prevention of erosion on the sandy peninsula’;(Figure 
15) 
4. Corniche, a promenade along the eastern shore of the 
Plateau;  
5. Decorative gardens of the European households 
located mainly on the Plateau and, to a lesser extent, 
in Dakar-ville.   
The colonial administration imported trees such as the bougainvilliers and lauriers, 
and favoured vegetation such as the chestnut or platanus that calls to mind cities in 
France. Gardeners ‘trained on the French Riviera’ ‘simulated’ the mood of the ‘old 
country’ in the vegetation of Senegal (Lengyel, 1941, pg. 31) (Figure 21). 
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Nature thus became ‘an object of consumption’ on the plateau and was subjected 
to the needs and aesthetics of bourgeois culture. The appropriation of native 
vegetation, once considered a factor of insalubrity, reflects the ways in which the 
French colonial administration subjected the native flora to its needs, turning it into 
a ‘symbol of civilisation’ and dispossessing it of its precolonial signification in order 
to embed it within the imported cité-jardin model (Bigon, 2016, pg. 52; Sinou, 1993, 
pg. 237). Vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2) reveals several instances 
throughout the empirical work when the natural landscape of the city is harnessed 
as tool of ‘modernisation.’ In modern-day masterplans, this approach is translated 
into matters of environmental preservation and ‘green cities’ agendas. The link that 
is drawn between the manipulation and preservation of nature that originated in 
colonial settlements such as Dakar Plateau is therefore recast in the neoliberal city 
agenda which links environmental conservation and ‘green’ policies to modern, 
wealthy enclaves90.  
 
 
90 See discussion on ‘green cities’ on pg. 161 
 Figure 21: Dakar Plateau (Author's own photograph, 2018) 
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ii. Médina   
 Since the late nineteenth century, the French colonial administration sought to 
remove Africans from the economic and political centre of Dakar in order to establish 
their continued dominance and minimise growing concerns over increased in-
migration to the Cap-Vert (Nelson, 2007, pg. 231). The justifications for the physical 
and residential segregation of the European and African populations were based on 
colonial contentions around the inability of the French colonial administration to 
decontaminate poorly built African housing. The ‘squalor which the African 
tolerated-particularly the co-habitation of people and domestic animals’ and 
differences between African and French way of life, necessitated their segregation 
(Betts, 1971, pg. 143). Simply put, the ‘barbaric collective’ of native inhabitants, in 
the eyes of the colonisers, threatened the health of the European city which justified 
segregationist measures (Bigon, 2016, pg. 98-99). Ribot and Lafon (1908), medical 
practitioners in Dakar at the start of the twentieth century, called for the complete 
segregation of the natives, splitting Dakar into two districts: the European city and 
the indigenous city.  
The ‘Negroes [sic], even the most civilised, cannot submit to 
certain European habits, any more than the Europeans can 
adopt certain indigenous customs’ which necessitated their 
segregation (Ribot & Lafon, 1908, pg.160).  
The Médina was therefore conceived for the indigenous population who did not 
abide by hygiene rules and preferred to ‘live as their fathers have always lived91.’ The 
relocation of the indigenous population outside the city space was also justified by 
what Faye (2001) terms the ‘battle against the hut.’ This battle started in Saint-Louis 
where a decree of 1835 distinguishes between round huts (prohibited) and square 
huts (4 by 4 m and 3.4 m height) (permitted). This decree was based on the 
experience of the French administration in Fort de France when an outbreak of fire 
ravaged the city in 1800. A decree issued in 1902 on building materials and residence 
permits aimed to remove the African element from the city through direct purchase, 
 







expropriation or annexation (Moraze, 1938, pg. 611). By deconstructing the city’s 
infrastructure, down to the building materials, vitalist ontologies (Corrective 
mainstream 2) reveals the inequality created and perpetuated by the components of 
the urban fabric itself. Building materials became an element based on which the 
segregation of the city was justified and enacted92. French colonial authorities, 
however, were never able to advocate or enforce the complete residential 
segregation of Dakar on a legal basis since the local population 
was originaires, making segregation a tenuous issue.  
 
The segregation of Dakar culminated in the creation of the Médina in 1914, following 
an outbreak of bubonic plague, which resulted in the expulsion of the African 
population from the ‘European’ city to the outskirts of the city. The initial response 
to the outbreak of plague was the establishment of two cordons sanitaires as a 
means of placing a large part of the country and the city into quarantine and 
prohibiting the free movement of Africans (Beeckmans & Bigon, 2016, pg. 420). 
These methods, however, were both inefficient and detrimental to the commercial 
life of the city. Throughout colonial French Africa, the cordon sanitaire also 
called zone interdite or zone non aedificandi appeared in a variety of forms, 
including a stadium (Dakar, Senegal), public parks (Rabat, Morocco), a dry creek 
(Niamey, Niger), and lagoons (in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire) (Bigon & Njoh, 2015, pg. 34).  
 
In September and October of 1914, Gouverneur General William Ponty, following the 
example of urban centres in North Africa, issued an order for the relocation of the 
city’s African population to the outskirts of the city. The residences of the relocated 
people were destroyed and only European buildings (construction à l’europèenne) 
were permitted within city limits. The colonial administration provided straw for the 
majority of residences in the Médina, and wooden beams and bricks, for those who 
‘wished and could afford to build permanently[sic]’ (Bigon, 2016, pg. 106). The 
French colonial administration justified the spatial segregation of the city by arguing 
that it allowed for the preservation of an indigenous way of life as African inhabitants 
of the Médina were ‘free to use local building materials, which were forbidden in the 
city’ (Njoh, 2016, pg. 7). This argument stands in direct opposition to the regulation 
 
92 See discussion on ‘assemblage’ on pg. 76 
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on building materials within city limits (1902) which suggests that the Médina was 
not, in fact, considered part of the city of Dakar in the urban lexicon of the French 
colonial administration.  
 
The African population was relocated to a disadvantageous bio-physical 
environment. The perishable building materials that were provided by the colonial 
administration for the African population to rebuild their destroyed homes resulted 
Figure 22: Environs de Dakar, 1906 (Jojot, 1907) 
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in deteriorating living conditions that endure even today93. The 1906 map of Dakar’s 
surroundings (Figure 22) reveals that prior to the establishment of the Médina, the 
north-western part of the peninsula, to which the African populations were 
relocated, was covered in ‘marigots,’ ‘brousse inculte' (uncultivated bush) and 
‘champs de mils’ (millet fields) (prohibited cultivations in the European city). This 
suggests that, up until the displacement of the native population, the area reserved 
for them was, in fact, considered uninhabited(able). The site selected for the 
relocation of the African population was sandy and topographically lower than the 
Plateau, and subject to flooding in the rainy season of hivernage (winter).  
 
Originally named ‘village de segregation’ (village of segregation), the term Médina, 
the Arabic word for ‘fort town’ was borrowed from the French colonial experience in 
North Africa94 (Bigon, 2016, pg. 107). The term ‘Médina’ was adopted as a means of 
appeasing the local population in light of their relocation to unfavourable lands by 
appealing to their Islamic heritage. This name, however, is counterintuitive given 
the orthogonal layout of Dakar’s Médina which did not fit with the ‘intricate texture’ 
of the Islamic Medinas in North Africa (Bigon, 2008, pg. 491). The orthogonal grid 
layout of colonial urban planning was derived from Cartesian geometry that favoured 
parallel streets at right angles. The authoritarian top-down hierarchy imposed on 
precolonial settlements were ‘decidedly non-African and posed several challenges 
in terms of their ‘applicability and adaptability in Africa’ (Amankwah-Ayeh, 1996, pg. 
64). The orthogonal layout also stood in contrast to the Plateau, which was arranged 
along roundabouts, star-like intersections with four to six wide avenues (Figure 23). 
Thus, the model of the Médina drawn from North Africa is no more relevant to Dakar 
than the plan for a ‘garden city’ as both logics were altered to suit colonial doctrine.  
 
 
93 Informal settlements throughout Dakar (Medina and Pikine) experience flooding during 
hivernage season and lack proper stormwater drainage infrastructure. 
94 See discussion on ‘invented tradition’ on pg. 243 
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Bigon & Njoh (2015, pg. 28) note that while the streets of Dakar-ville and Plateau 
were christened and signposted, no ‘commensurate initiatives were undertaken in 
the native district’ as streets were only numbered to facilitate the government 
security apparatus95 (Bigon, 2008 pg. 491). The streets were indicated by numbers, 
from 1 to 71, and did not bear names until much later in the colonial period. The 
practice of toponymic ambiguity continued into the early 1940s and 1950s and was 
only rectified in postcolonial times when African names replaced numbers 
 
95 See discussion on ‘toponymic segregation’ on pg. 145 
Figure 23: Plateau and Medina, 1948 (Betts, 1971) 
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with Avenue El Hadji Malik Sy, connecting the Médina to the north towards the 
village of Hann and avenue Blaise Diagne, connecting the Médina to Dakar-
ville (Bigon, 2016, pg. 89-90). Today, a visitor to the Médina may view this area as 
‘nondescript’, ‘chaotic’ and ‘disorderly,’ lacking both street names and clear 
signage, but residents see names for streets and places in the ‘shared mental 
imageries of their cities’ which constitutes a defining element of ‘cityness’ 
(Bigon & Njoh, 2015, pg. 35).   
 
Grid plans are never a spontaneous urban development and exist only through the 
conscious design objectives of agents shaping the policy and planning of the city. A 
key reason for the orthogonal design of the Médina was the surveillance of the 
African population. In the context of colonial Africa, well-aligned streets 
intersecting at right angles were designed for the organisation and beautification of 
the city but were also necessary to facilitate colonial surveillance of native 
populations (Njoh, 2015, pg. 103). A director of Public Works in the AOF stated that 
‘a single armoured car placed at an intersection [in the Médina] could control the 
entire length of two streets’ (quoted in Bugnicourt, 1982, pg. 30). The layout of the 
Médina also facilitated the capture of deserters from forced labour and military 
service (Bigon, 2016, pg. 107). The first structure, southeast of the Médina were the 
barracks of the Tirailleurs, a ‘rifle company of Senegalese soldiers loyal to the 
Empire, and who were, before 1911, recruited exclusively from rural colonial 
subjects’ (Nelson, 2007, pg. 232-3). The strategic location of the Tirailleurs was 
intended to create a division in the urban space but also limit contact between 
Africans and Europeans, as a ‘swathe of desert land and later a sizeable sporting 
arena bifurcated the Médina from downtown Dakar’ (Nelson, 2007, pg. 233). The 
planning and design of the Médina reflects Haussmann’s ideal in city planning 
which featured straight streets ‘opening onto broad perspectives’ (Benjamin, 1999, 
pg. 24). While contemporaries refer to this practice as ‘strategic embellishment,’ 
Benjamin (1999, pg. 23) points to the underlying goal of Haussmann’s projects which 
was to secure the city against civil war by widening streets in order to make the 
‘erection of barricades in the streets of Paris impossible for all time’ (ibid). The grand 
boulevards of the Paris and Dakar Plateau were meant to ‘connect the barracks in 
straight lines with the workers’ districts’ (ibid) and facilitate ‘troop movement in the 
event of revolution’ (Goonewardena, 2011, pg. 87).  
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The Médina grew rapidly, surpassing 25,000 inhabitants soon after it was established 
in1914. While newly settled African populations were displaced from the city centre, 
the Lebou, the original inhabitants of the peninsula, resisted the transfer to the 
Médina. Having suffered numerous déguerpissements since 1862 and now 
subjected to the demolition of huts and the unwillingness of 
the Conseille d’Hygiene (Hygiene Council) to return the bodies of the infected for 
Muslim burial, the Lebou were brought to the brink of violent struggle. They rallied 
against the colonial administration whom they believed were collaborating with local 
French commerce to benefit from the sale of building materials imposed by the 
colonial decree (Bigon, 2015, pg. 210). In fact, the earliest anti-colonial resistance 
documented in the region was the boycott of Lebou and Wolof vendors in Marché 
Kermel (subject of Chapter Eight) who refused to conduct business with expatriate 
residents in response to the colonial government’s decision to force Dakar’s 
population to build ‘permanent’ housing in the city centre.   
 
As a drastic and hasty response to an outbreak of plague, the Médina was both ‘ill-
conceived and ill-received,’ and was only ever partially completed (Betts, 1971, pg. 
148). Vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2) reveal that ‘in-between’ spaces (or 
‘grey spaces; Yiftachel, 2014) originate in the duality of Dakar as native quarters were 
generally much larger than those of the Europeans, but were ‘disproportionately 
underserved,’ if at all, in terms of basic infrastructure (Bigon & Njoh, 2015, pg. 28). 
These in-between spaces constitute the grey spacing of the urban fabric that 
develop in between the rigid lines of orthogonal design. The area lacked proper 
drainage and access to sewage system, electricity, potable water and other 
amenities such as paved roads which were present early on in the European city. As 
Dakar continued to grow, other populated areas of ‘miserable housing’ surpassed 
the Médina but the latter still remains a ‘monument to hasty colonial decision’ in the 
making of a ‘planned ghetto’ (Betts, 1971, pg. 152).  
  
Bugnicourt (1982, pg. 29) provides a telling, albeit crude, description of ‘dual’ Dakar 
which echoes the passage from Ryszard Kapuscinski (Voices IV), illustrating the 
ways in which the city looks very different ‘depending on whether it is viewed from 
the top or the bottom of the social system’;  
‘The wealthy keep up with the films that are popular with the 
Parisians and in the French press. At parties, the young, 
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wearing rasta hairstyles, play Caribbean or Black American 
music and drink imported beverages. In poorer 
neighbourhoods, people flock to Hindu films which evoke, a 
little abusively, in the people's opinion, a certain Islamic 
culture, or else they go to see traditional wrestling or to hear 
tam-tam…The mimetic environment houses businessmen 
and civil servants, while the infra-urban areas contain the 
unemployed and those working part-time or temporarily. The 
former is home to some Europeans and to well-to-do 
Europeanised Africans, with overseas contacts; the latter 
houses a poorer population, with ties to the Sahel and to rural 
life’ (Bugnicourt, 1982, pg. 28).  
 
Conclusion  
Beginning in 1914, Dakar was divided into three areas; the European city, the African 
village, and the economic centre where European traders conducted business 
alongside Lebanese, Syrians and Africans (Charpy, 2007, pg. 95) (Figure 24). The 
deepening segregation and inequality of Dakar is aptly described by Fanon’s (1961) 
description of the colonial world;  
‘a world divided into compartments, a 
motionless, Manicheistic world, a world of statues: the statue 
of the general who carried out the conquest, the statue of the 
engineer who built the bridge; a world which is sure of itself, 
which crushes with its stones the backs flayed by whips: this 
is the colonial world.’  
As Dakar continued to grow as a commercial centre, rural migrants from all over 
French West Africa converged on the city, often ending up in in informal and 
squatter settlements at the outskirts of the European city. Despite deteriorating 
living conditions in these areas and the dire need for housing, the Office des 
Habitations Economiques, established by Governor General Jules Carde in 1926 only 
built twenty residential units for Africans by 1945 in contrast to the hundreds of villas 
built for French officials. By the 1920s, most of Dakar lived in housing that it 
‘conceived and partly built itself, without help from architects or officials’ and 
without land titles96 (Bugnicourt, 1982, pg. 34).  The following chapter demonstrates 
how the planning and actual growth of Dakar were continuously out of synch as 
masterplans that dictate the urban evolution of the city were baffled by the rate of 
urban growth in Dakar.
 









Négritude is an intellectual tradition founded by Aimé Césaire, Leon Gontran Damas 
and Leopold Sédar Senghor, based on valorising ‘black’ culture to counter the trend 
of continued European (colonial) denigration. Senghor, the first president of 
Senegal after independence in 1960, saw Négritude as a theory of ‘racial belonging’ 
and a ‘cultural rallying point’ for postcolonial affirmation (Harney, 2010, pg. 215). 
Poetry is a hallmark of the Négritude movement and is used as a vehicle to interpret, 
explain and come to terms with a history of colonisation and the ramifications of 
decolonisation. Négritude poetry is relevant to this monograph in its attempts to 
‘give name to the nameless’ and voice to the subaltern (Lorde, 1984, pg. 37).  
‘In the darkness of the great silence, a voice was rising up, with no interpreter, no 
alteration, and no complacency, a violent and staccato voice, and it said for the first 
time: ‘I, Nègre’ 
A voice of revolt  
A voice of resentment  
No doubt  
But also of fidelity, a voice of freedom, and first and foremost, a voice for the 
retrieved identity’ (Thébia-Melsan, 2000, pg. 28). 
The poem below is written by Césaire and expresses the profound disillusionment 
with narratives of modernisation and development as the latter failed to unlock the 
promises by western modernity. Furthermore, it conveys the effect of a newly 
established world order which forces the postcolonial, the southern, the subaltern 
to understand themselves as ‘inferior’ and ‘underdeveloped’ in a global hierarchy. 
The poem relates to Voices VII: Songs from Set/Setal and Sopi which echo the loss 
of hope in the wake of empty promises of modernisation in the postcolonial moment. 
‘Prospero, you are the master of illusion.  
Lying is your trademark.  
And you have lied so much to me  
(Lied about the world, lied about me)  
That you have ended by imposing on me  
An image of myself.  
Underdeveloped, you brand me, inferior,  
That is the way you have forced me to see myself  
I detest that image! What’s more, it’s a lie!  
But now I know you, you old cancer,  
And I know myself as well.’ 





Chapter Six: Layers II (1930s-2000)  
 
Throughout the planning history of Dakar, the phenomenon of urban sprawl has 
baffled the powers that be in their attempts to control and guide the growth of the 
city. As the analysis will demonstrate, the masterplans of Dakar are often playing 
‘catch up’ to urban growth, unable to anticipate or accommodate the influx of people 
and the nascent forms of urbanity. Dakar is therefore characterised by a ‘certain 
boundlessness’ as the limits and borders delineated by maps and masterplans have 
never reflected the real contours of the city both in settlement patterns of new 
arrivals and the urban imaginaries of inhabitants (McLaughlin, 2001, pg. 155). 
Seck (1970, pg. 139) argues that it is ‘inaccurate’ to assume that Dakar has grown ‘at 
random,’ as authorities have never ceased in their efforts to organize the developing 
city (Seck, 1970, pg. 139). These efforts however were fruitless in light of 
‘spontaneous’, ‘deviant’ and ‘uncontrolled’ growth that define the city’s evolution. 
The development of Dakar has (never) been mastered despite repeated attempts by 
the central government (colonial or postcolonial) to bring it under control, resulting 
in a ‘widening gap between the real city and the official city’97 (Tall, 2009, pg. 13-14).  
 
During the 20th century, the colonial administration abandoned the policy of 
assimilation in favour of a doctrine of association that purported to embrace native 
culture and values. In the past, assimilation sought to overcome the obstacle of 
culture, religion and belief systems by teaching native populations the French way 
of life. The policy of association, however, called for greater respect for and 
preservation of ‘distinctive local cultures, even cultural differences among 
indigenous people, including tribal councils and historic monuments’ (Wright, 1991, 
pg. 73-74). The policy of association is best exemplified by the Exposition Coloniale 
(Colonial Expositions) which constitute an important exercise in placemaking 
politics by displaying the ‘barbarity of colonised peoples’ and the ‘modernisation 
brought to them by France’ (Morton, 2000, pg. 13). During the Exposition Coloniale of 
1931 in Paris, the entire region of French West Africa, including Dahomey (Benin), 
Senegal, the Sudan (including Mali), Guinea, Mauritania, Upper Volta, Niger, and 
the Ivory Coast, was grouped in the Afrique Occidentale Francaise (French West 
Africa) pavilion while other French colonies were featured in their own pavilion (e.g. 
 
97 Psychogeographies of the city vs. rationalities of planning 
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Morocco, Indochina). The entire region is put on display as an undifferentiated 
mass;    
‘The French West African section comprised a set of red 
stucco structures modelled after the tata, or fortified palace, 
and Muslim mosques of the Sudan. The work of Germaine 
Olivier and Jacques-Georges Lambert included a main 
pavilion with a tower, a mosque, a rue Djenne of shops, a 
village of huts along the lake, and a restaurant, all bristling 
with wood stakes, buttresses, and primitivist ornament. 
French West Africa was another invented political entity…As 
opposed to the Indochinese quadrant, however, this section 
did not express each colony with its own pavilion. Instead, 
the various countries were lumped into the main building, 
with individual exhibits on French colonial activity and 
indigenous culture for the eight colonies’ (Morton, 2000, pg. 
42).  
The expositions revealed the social Darwinian hierarchies of the French empire in 
the amalgamation and juxtaposition of indigenous culture that differentiated 
between the ‘higher’ achievements of some regions (e.g. Indochina), and the 
‘primitive’ productions of others. In this western laboratory, the colonial state sought 
to represent a ‘human landscape of perfect visibility’ through the classification of 
cultures presented in neatly bounded and coherent exposés (Anderson, 1991, pg. 
185). The relevance of these expositions to the broader framework of planning in 
Dakar and Senegal is based on the shift in colonial doctrine which influences the 
transformation of the urban fabric. The goal of urban development was, and 
continued to be, to persuade the African population to ‘adopt our [French] 
civilisation, the highest and the best of all civilisations’ (Labouret, 1940, pg. 25). 
Associationist discourse was a calculated attempt to facilitate the exploitation of 
natural resources while appeasing the natives through the articulation of continuity 
between precolonial African societies and the colonial empire in the built 
environment. It is therefore an ironic turn of events that the practice of 
déguerpissements was further intensified during the 20th century, even becoming 
a necessary step in the implementation of masterplans. 
   
The first masterplan of the 20th century was conceived by French architect 
H.L. Hoyez in 1938, followed by the 1946 masterplan designed by the French 
architectural firm Gutton, Lambert and Lopez. Michel Ecochard was the author of 
Dakar’s first (post)colonial masterplan following the independence of Senegal in 
1960. This masterplan, like its predecessors, tackled Dakar’s main problem, ‘a 
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problem of the greatest number,’ brought on by the rapid and uncontrolled urban 
growth and a worsening housing crisis (Beeckmans, 2014, pg. 852).  Throughout this 
chapter, the corrective mainstreams reveal the defining characteristics of Dakar’s 
urban development that contribute to our understanding of ‘cityness.’ Specifically, 
southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1) exposes the implicitly racist 
undertones of Dakar’s urban planning and looks at how they are translated in the 
modern segregation of the urban landscape. Vitalist ontologies (Corrective 
mainstream 2) attends to the infrastructural deficit in Dakar and the stark differences 
between areas defined by uniform infrastructure and those with fragmented 
infrastructure. Everyday urbanism (Corrective mainstream 3) focuses on the effects 
of the masterplans on the urban majority and the creative adaptations of, or the push 
back against, urban policy.  
 
Plan Directeur d’Urbanisme (H. L. Hoyez, 1938) 
In 1938, a federal council of the Afrique Occidentale Française (AOF) established 
a Commission d’Urbanisme (Commission of Urbanism) to oversee the long-term 
development of Dakar. The architect Hoyez, employed by the Ministry of Colonies 
since 1936, was charged with designing a masterplan for the city. Hoyez presented 
his masterplan (Plan Directeur d’Urbanisme) in 1938 which called for the extension 
and expansion of Dakar. Much like Pinet-Laprade, Hoyez showcased the Beaux 
Arts tradition in his plan which translated into an emphasis on the grandeur of the 
city through monumental boulevards and squares. In an opus titled 'Regards sur 
Dakar' (1938), Hoyez advocated rational spatial planning and the urban practice of 
zoning to address uncontrolled urbanisation and provide a long-term outlook for the 
development of the city. Although the masterplan was never implemented, it reveals 
the core tenets of urban planning in 20th century Dakar. Among other things, the 
need to restructure the ‘old’ city, Dakar-ville, the embellishment of the city through 
total segregation (social and spatial segregation and functional specialization) and 
the development of indigenous villages to the north of the peninsula, separated from 
the rest of the city by zones of food crops (Chenal et al., 2009, pg. 72). 
 
i. Zoning  
In Hoyez’s masterplan, the practice of ‘zoning’ meant the division and development 
of three distinct ‘zones,’ namely the indigenous, European, and industrial zones, in 
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such a way that they may grow without ‘colliding’ or confronting natural obstacles 
(ANS 4P 48, Un projet d’urbanisme en cours d’elaboration; note de Hoyez, Revue 
Nord Sud, January 1939).  Hoyez proposed the masterplan as a prospective look at 
the development and expansion of the suburban space and the enhanced 
circulation in and out of the ‘old city.’ In his accompanying notes, Hoyez was explicit 
about the need for delimiting the borders between the European and native city, and 
so-called neutral zones that would separate ethnic populations (A.N.S, 4P 64, Note 
de Hoyez sur la Circulation générale. Extensions suburbaines - Etablissements 
militaires - Etablissements hospitaliers -Abattoir). 
  
Hoyez designated the eastern coastline as the industrial zone, the western and 
southern coastlines as the European zone, and the swampy central zone of the 
peninsula as the indigenous zone. Hoyez also introduced a ‘zone mixte’ (mixed 
zone) in his plan, located between the European and indigenous zones, which was 
intended for the ‘évolués’ as a transition zone for Africans who opted for a European 
lifestyle, as implied by the designation 'zone mixte de transition' (mixed transition 
zone). The ‘zone mixte’ was intended as a buffer, allowing a gradual transition from 
African to European zones and providing a space for Africans ‘transitioning’ from 
an indigenous lifestyle towards an ‘evolved’ European way of life.  
M. Hoyez intended this zone for the modest dwellings of 
Europeans and those of the natives who have the desire and 
the possibility of living in the European way to varying 
degrees. M. Hoyez believes that this zone will constitute a 
transition zone between the indigenous village which will 
remain in Médina and the European city (ANS 4P 46, report 
of the meeting of the Urbanism Commission, February 2, 
1938).  
This division was recreated in the ‘suburban’ periphery of the city with an industrial 
zone in the north, European zone along the western coast, an African/indigenous 
zone in the new Médina, and between these, a zone for the évolués. Hoyez sought to 
mask the racial division created by ‘zoning’ by changing the names and 
designations of the residential areas. Residential areas intended for Europeans were 
referred to as 'zone de résidence de première catégorie,' (zone of residences of first 
category). These zones represented the ‘neighbourhood par excellence,’ typified by 
the ‘district of villas with gardens; the quiet neighbourhood where traffic is less 
intense, where the noise is excluded, where we rest and where life is good’ (A.N.S, 
extrait du Guide pratique de l’Urbaniste/  
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extract from the practical guide of the urbanist). The zones located in the former 
‘cordon sanitaire’ were designated for less wealthy Europeans and 
African évolués and made up the 'zone de résidence de deuxième catégorie’ (zones 
of residence of second category), while the indigenous zones were referred to as 
‘zone de residence de troisieme catégorie’ (zones of residence of third category). 
The racial segregation was also repeated in the ‘zone mixte’ with Europeans settled 
closer to the plateau and Africans closer to the Médina to allow for a ‘smooth visual 
[racial] transition’ (Beeckmans, 2013, pg. 123). Beeckmans (2013, pg. 123) notes that 
the ‘zone mixte’ located in the former cordon sanitaire was already occupied by 
Lebanese and Syrians which fell in line with the ‘racially-honoured character 
that Hoyez had in mind’ since it respected the ‘colour line’ imposed by zoning. By 
1939, new building regulation meant that ‘zoning’ was now legally enforceable 
throughout the city. These regulations, based on previous French and Moroccan 
experiences, outlined specific and separate building and construction rules for each 
zone. Much like the regulations on building materials implemented in 1902, these 
rules further exacerbated the socioeconomic and racial segregation of the city. 
Despite having been purged the plan from racial terms, the reappearance of terms 
such as ‘ville indigène’ and ‘zone mixte’ are indicative of the underlying 
segregationist motives of urban planning. 
  
The strong push towards actively controlling and planning Dakar’s urban growth 
was met with little consensus at the government level as both the municipal and 
federal governments pushed forward with their own plans to no avail. Just 
as Hoyez was making headway in planning the urban development of the city, World 
War II98 erupted and plans fell into disarray as France and its colonies were swept up 
in the conflict. World War II diverted the aims of the French colonial administration 
towards the protecting French territory and colonies which ‘reduced the efforts on 
progressive planning for the city of Dakar and caused a housing crisis in the city’ 
(Mboup et al., 2015, pg. 8). The Hoyez plan has seldom been analysed in 
examinations of Dakar’s urban evolution, primarily because it was never 
implemented. However, the masterplan is the foundation for the subsequent 
 
98 During World War II, Dakar, as the capital of French West Africa, was a strategic military 
post for warring nations as the allies sought to capture the port of Dakar in the Battle of Dakar 
(Diop, 2012, pg. 33). 
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masterplan designed by Lambert, Gutton and Lopez in 1946 and provides the 
blueprint for urban policies on ‘zoning’ that determined the racialised urban 
development of Dakar in the 20th century. 
 
ii. Déguerpissements: Phase two  
The Hoyez plan was founded on the displacement of native populations as an 
integral part of the urban development of Dakar. The first phase of 
déguerpissements dates to the initial annexation of Dakar with the implementation 
of the Pinet-Laprade plan and the relocation of the native population to the outskirts 
of the European city. The next phase took place during and after the establishment 
of the Médina and is referred to, in official terms, as the ‘voluntary exodus’ of the 
native population, continuing well into the 1930s (Faye, 2000, pg. 162). Everyday 
urbanism (Corrective mainstream 3) suggests that the ‘voluntary’ nature of these 
displacements is highly debatable. The displacement of residents was engineered 
by putting increasing pressure on urban inhabitants who did not possess the 
financial means to build ‘en dur’ and therefore the capacity to comply with building 
regulations99 (Faye, 2000, pg. 164). The Hoyez plan once again harnessed the 
imperatives of sanitation in the eradication of the threat to the ‘European city.’ In 
order to ‘modernise’ Dakar, the ‘urgent evacuation of the demographic surplus of 
natives’ in the centre of the city was explicitly recommended by Hoyez at the 
Commission of Urban Planning during a meeting on August 12, 1938. ‘Old Dakar,’ 
however continued to ‘defend itself; nestled in the shadow of massive constructions, 
around even from the Government Palace, it survives sneakily in primitive huts 
where is teeming with a brown undressed population’100 (Proust quoted in Goerg, 
2006, pg. 15-45). Consequently, although the Hoyez plan was never implemented in 
the city, it reveals the integration of segregation into the planning jargon and 
mechanisms of modern urban planning deployed in subsequent masterplans of 
Dakar.
 
99 See discussion on ‘criminalization of survival’ on pg. 47 
100 See discussion on ‘grey spacing’ on pg. 85 
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Figure 25: Plan Directeur de la presqu’île du Cap Vert (Lambert, Gutton and Lopez, 1946; Seck, 1970) 
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Plan Directeur de la presqu’ile du Cap Vert (Lambert, Gutton and Lopez, 1946) 
In 1946, the architectural firm of Lambert, Gutton and Lopez was tasked with 
designing a masterplan for the Cap-Vert peninsula and its extension to 
Thiès, Popenguine and Mbour. This plan envisaged the extension of the city to the 
villages of Fann in the west and Hann in the east to create the subdivision of ‘Grand 
Dakar’ (Greater Dakar). The 'Plan Directeur de la presqu’ile du Cap Vert' 
(masterplan of the Cap Vert peninsula) altered the city’s boundaries which were now 
determined by the entire Cap Vert Peninsula and projected a demographic growth 
of 1 million inhabitants by the end of the century (Figure 25). The population was, in 
fact, closer to 2.3 million by 2000. The city was divided into three zones 
(Dakar ville and annexes, Médina, and Grand Dakar – Figure 26). The city developed 
along three axes, each evolving according to the rationalities of its inhabitants.  
‘The plateau and the Corniche Ouest were to get some high-
class buildings and living facilities, actually assigned to the 
expatriate colonial community. Greater Dakar was equipped 
with some middle-class and lower-class buildings (SICAP 
and HLM). These buildings were for the use of a group of 
Africans whose purchasing power justified such property 
(civil servants, executives, etc.). Then those at the low end of 
the social spectrum, long-time city dwellers or recent 
immigrants, shunted aside by the urbanisation process, 
slipped into all of the temporarily vacant pockets. This 
explains the proliferation of poor districts and slums, 
amplified by the population growth of Cape Verde’ (Sow, 
1983, pg. 48). 
Grand Dakar experienced the fastest urbanisation, accounting for over half of the 
population of the city and included both modern areas with a ‘particularly successful 
urbanisation’ as well as the city’s ‘largest islands of slums'101 (Seck, 1970, pg. 167). 
The 1946 masterplan was funded by the large-scale investment program Fonds 
d’Investissement pour le Developpement Economique et Sociale (FIDES) 
(Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development) for nearly ten billion francs 
CFA and executed by the Service Temporaire d'Aménagement du Grand 
Dakar (STAGD), established in 1945 under the leadership of 
Roger Lantenois, directeur général des Travaux publics 
de l'Afrique Occidentale Française (Director General of Public Works of French 
West Africa). 
 




Lambert, Gutton and Lopez were also assigned the task of setting up a permanent 
urban planning service and drafting legislation that would facilitate the 
implementation of the plan. In 1957, the plan was amended by architects Cerruti and 
Marie-Appoline to integrate rural areas into the urban perimeter to account for the 
unanticipated speed of urban sprawl. Despite these amendments, the population 
projections on which both the initial and amended plans were elaborated were 
exceeded as the influx of migrants from rural areas continued to increase due to the 
industrial and commercial development of Dakar. Urban growth in the periphery of 
the city was so rapid, especially in the Médina, and later in Grand Dakar, that it was 
necessary to find an outlet in the east. It was under these conditions that 
the Dagoudane-Pikine (Pikine) district was created in 1952 to receive the 
‘déguerpis’ of the Médina, Grand Dakar and outlying districts (Seck, 1970, pg. 146).  
 
Figure 26: Three zones of Dakar (Adapted from Seck, 1970) 
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iii. Segregation  
Once again, the western coastline was intended for Europeans, the eastern coast for 
the port, industry, and the swampy interior for the African population. The key 
difference with the Hoyez plan was the inclusion of a satellite district along the 
eastern highways near the cities of Thiès and Rufisque. The Lambert, Gutton and 
Lopez masterplan utilised the same zoning rationale as the Hoyez plan, further 
entrenching racial and socioeconomic classifications and divisions. Much 
like Hoyez, Lambert, Gutton and Lopez designated this segregation as ‘technical’ 
rather than racial. Their rationale for segregation, however, was based entirely on 
the perceived cultural hierarchies of African and European populations of the city.    
Segregation is null, and we believe it is a mistake for both 
races who are in contact, the indigenous people 
who cannot develop their mode of existence, and the 
European who is constantly embarrassed by an embryonic 
mode of existence that is very different from that which he 
desires. [...] We have therefore imagined a segregation - but 
I insist immediately: a segregation that is not racial - a 
segregation that I will call technical (Raymond Lopez cited 
by Dulucq (1997); Dulucq quotes from the Committee on 
Urban Planning and Housing in the Colonies, Plan Director 
of the Peninsula of Cape Verde, Processional of the 3rd 
Sitting, 18 July 1946).  
Southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1) reveals that there was, once again, an 
effort to mask the racial categorisations of urban planning using ambiguous 
designations. Pseudo assimilationist motives were etched onto the design of the 
city, ensuring a legacy of socio-spatial segregation.  The plan designated zones 
based on house ‘types’; linked houses (A), single houses (Small: B, medium size: C 
and large: D) and apartments (high-rise: E and low-rise: F). These labels were 
directly linked to the population living within the types of dwellings based on 
traditional family sizes and structures (i.e. housing for Africans (A), housing 
for évolués (B) and housing for Europeans (C-F).   
Areas A, reserved for closed habitat, respect the ancestral 
lifestyle of the majority of the indigenous population. Sectors 
B, located close to the previous ones, are open to the part of 
the indigenous population that seeks a habitat that conforms 
to desires for development Sectors C, D and E are intended 
for the European population. The sector F, unique in Dakar, 
[...], is reserved for the construction of collective buildings, 
isolated in the middle of gardens (Plan Directeur de 
la presqu’ile du Cap Vert, 1946).  
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The terminology appears to uphold the motives of association of the colonial 
administration but only disguises the abandonment of assimilation in favour of 
segregation. Zones A, for Africans, were located in the interior of the peninsula 
while Zones B, for the évolués were once again a buffer between the African and 
European zones. Zones C and D were situated in prime locations including 
Ngor, Mermoz and Almadies, parts of the city which continue to house the elites 
even today. Zones E and F, denoting apartments, were located on the Plateau and 
intended for Europeans who required additional living space in the increasingly 
densely populated inner city. In a communiqué addressed to the AOF Public Works 
Agency regarding the urbanisation of Zone A, Lambert refers to this area as ‘rural’ 
and also indicates that this zone was not subject to the same building and planning 
regulations and policies as other parts of the city.   
‘The 'A' zones of the Masterplan are rural areas, not urban 
areas. If the rural character of zone ‘A’ were to be abandoned, 
it would only be in violation of the Masterplan ... We would 
see these territories, primitively reserved for the detente of 
the African populations, invaded by heterogeneous 
constructions disseminated at random, and much more 
unfortunate than the simple indigenous huts, which are not 
prohibited in zone A of the Masterplan and which, in their 
simplicity, are aesthetically preferable to the proliferation of 
mediocre barracks.’(ANS 4P 31; Letter from Lambert to the 
head of the AOF Public Works Office, Bigorgne, July 10, 
1948).  
The STAGD worked within the boundaries of the Lambert, Gutton and Lopez plan 
but made its own alterations. For example, the area designated as Zone A, reserved 
for Africans, and located in the Grand Dakar region was reduced in size while Zone 
B, intended for the évolués, was expanded in order to accommodate the AOF officers 
following the expansion of the federal parliament. Government officials of the 
highest rank (e.g. civil servants) were housed in the western part of Grand Dakar 
near the western coastline for Europeans. Lower ranking officials (e.g. police 
officers) were housed in the eastern part, indicating how the ‘layered French society 
model was spatially translated’ (Beeckmans, 2013, pg. 136). The STAGD was also 
responsible for developing the infrastructure of the Grand Dakar region including 
paved roads, sanitation, drinking water and electricity between 1951 and 1955. 
However, the STAGD was primarily concerned with developing the European zone, 
along the western coastline, and much less with the African/indigenous zone in the 
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inner part of the peninsula102. As the city continued to grow, the colonial 
administration established Pikine-Dagoudane, 13 km from the city centre to control 
the overflow of population. 
 
iv. Pikine 
Unlike Dakar, Pikine was arguably created ex nihlio, and constitutes the first district 
of the suburban area of Dakar (Sow, 1983, pg. 48). The area, which was part of the 
public domain, was cleared and ‘equipped in very summary fashion… there was no 
road, no electricity, no market, no dispensary, no school’ (Sow, 1983, pg. 49). Pikine 
grew to be one of the most populous areas of Dakar – beginning with 20,000 
inhabitants in 1959, 292,601 in 1976 and today counting more than 1,200,000 
inhabitants (Zeliche, 2005, pg.124). By 1960, 80,000 Africans were moved from the 
Médina and Grand Dakar and relocated to the periphery which no longer served as 
an outlet for Dakar residents but rather as an entry point for new migrants 
converging on Dakar. Pikine ‘irregulier,’ the part of Pikine that developed 
‘spontaneously’ on the initiative of social actors, grew much faster 
than Pikine ‘regulier’, demonstrating the ‘pre-eminence of irregularity’ (informality) 
as a mechanism of spatial growth (Tall, 2009, pg. 15). The irregular city evolved 
‘outside the reach of any government intervention’ (Sow, 1983, pg. 53).  
 
The large investments that fuelled the growth of Dakar were not matched with equal 
investments in Pikine, thus preventing the periphery from developing into a fully-
fledged district of Dakar. The area lacked nearly all basic infrastructure and was 
poorly connected to the city centre and the déguerpis who had already ‘broken ties’ 
with their rural lifestyles were relocated to an area where they were, once again, 
living in rural conditions (Seck, 1970). Furthermore, given that Pikine and Dakar 
were poorly connected, displaced Africans lost their homes as well as access to jobs, 
hospitals and schools103. The problems afflicting Dakar were simply moved to Pikine. 
The already strained housing market was unable to accommodate new migrants 
from inland Senegal, forcing the latter to settle in bidonvilles (slums). The 
development of Pikine reveals the expansion of infrastructural archipelagos (Vitalist 
ontologies) as access to infrastructure (or lack thereof) was synonymous with the 
 
 
103 See disruption of socio-cultural infrastructures on pg. 76 
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limits of social citizenship in Dakar. As Star (1999, pg. 379) remarked: ‘study a city 
and neglect its sewers and power supplies (as many have), and you miss essential 
aspects of distributional justice and planning power.’ The presence and absence of 
infrastructure in Dakar and later in Pikine, are a testament to the inequality and 
spatial segregation of the city that stem directly from the urban plans of the city. 
 
By 2001, three types of ‘habitats’ emerged in Pikine and represent the infrastructural 
archipelagos of uneven development;  
1. The village-type habitat on the former sites of 
traditional villages such as Keur Massar 
and Yeumbeul. As old neighbourhoods became 
overpopulated, these villages were an extension of 
the city of Pikine. Agricultural activity is a primary 
means of subsistence in these types of areas with 80% 
of the active population in the district of Boune-
village engaged in agriculture (Zeliche, 2005, pg. 
128).  
2. The ‘irregular’ habitat is defined primarily by the 
'illegal' occupation of the land. Habitats are often 
installed in areas considered unfit for construction 
(lowlands, swamps, etc.) and afflicted by serious 
sanitation problems, particularly the evacuation of 
water during the rainy season (hivernage).  
3. The last type of habitation is the planned and regular 
habitat. This type of habitation benefited from 
networks (roads, electricity, water) established by the 
state. These areas are subject to urban planning rules 
such as the formal prohibition to build with 
perishable materials and the strict enforcement of 
planning rules (Zeliche, 2005, page 129).  
Article I of the Senegalese law on urban planning stipulates that the modernisation 
of Dakar must include all neighbourhoods including the ‘semi-traditional’ African 
neighbourhoods in the Médina and Pikine (Seck, 1970, pg. 147); 
‘The aim of the urban planning policy of Senegal is to 
integrate, in a general policy of economic development and 
social progress, the progressive and forecasting of the 
agglomerations. In particular, it aims at the rational use of 
land, the creation of a harmonious, physical, economic, 
cultural and social development for the population as a 
whole’ [emphasis added] (Loi n° 
6460 portant code d’urbanisme du Senegal 15 aout 1964; Law 
n° 6460 of the urban code of Senegal).  
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The 1946 masterplan engineered the ‘modernisation’ of Dakar by simply removing 
impediments to development and deviant neighbourhoods from the city centre and 
relocating them to the suburbs.  A law passed on June 17th, 1964 granted the state 
ownership of the ‘vacant’ lands of the Lebou, resulting in continued land conflicts 
and the legalization of the practice of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 
2003). The Lebou, the original inhabitants of the peninsula, fiercely protested the 
removals and expropriations and demanded compensation in the event of being 
moved from their ancestral homes. For many, leaving the ‘heart of the city meant 
losing the slim chances for survival that had been acquired at great cost’ (Sow, 1983, 
pg. 54). New arrivals to the city could not make similar claims, however, and were 
pushed to the periphery as Pikine today represents the largest département of Dakar 
region. The evolution of Pikine is therefore characterised by a ‘vicious dialectic of 
dispossession’ which draws people into the city ‘while spitting others out of the 
gentrifying centre, forcing poor old-timers and vulnerable newcomers to embrace 
each other out on the periphery’ (Merrifield, 2013, pg. 15) 
 
Pikine provides an interesting restatement of the phenomenon of suburbanisation. 
Research on processes of suburbanisation have often focused on North American 
cities, but evidence suggests that the process must be evaluated and ‘understood 
outside the conceptual boxes in which urban studies have conventionally filed the 
process’ (Keil, 2018, pg. 497).  Africa is witnessing the ‘most pervasive forms of 
suburbanisation in the world at this conjuncture’ (Bloch, 2015; De Boeck and Baloji, 2016; 
Mabin et al., 2013).  The African context demonstrates the two drivers of 
suburbanisation; the ‘wealthy’ flight to enclaved spaces and the peripheralization of 
poor urban dwellers104. The first driver of suburbanisation leads to the development 
of ‘new economic activities, zones of middle- and upper-income residence (some of 
them ‘gated’)’ (Keil, 2018, pg. 504). Chapter Seven examines this process in Dakar 
with the development of Diamniadio, a satellite city meant to decongest the city 
centre and offer the possibility of elite lifestyle. Pikine, however, is an example of the 
second driver of suburbanisation, as an outlet for poorer city dwellers. Pikine 
challenges notions of centre and periphery in the examination of African 
urbanisation. The debate is no longer about the ‘intrusion of the countryside into the 
 




city, or of the city into the countryside’ (Sow, 1983, pg. 59) but rather on the very 
definitions and understandings of what constitutes the urban; 
‘If ruralness today means walking along sandy streets, 
breeding chickens or a fetishist sheep that protects the line, 
consulting a healer to overcome sterility, sexual impotence, 
anxiety or insanity, or to get a promotion, then the Pikinois 
are still rural people. But this same ruralness is reflected in 
the fine residences of the top of the Plateau and of Fann, 
which house a certain bureaucratic and political elite of 
Senegal. Here, despite the barriers of money, the social splits 
and the possible alienation, the rites and the values are often 
identical. At this level, when it comes to Westerness, 
wrongfully synonymous with urbanity, people say ‘never 
heard of it’ (Sow, 1983, pg. 58). 
Pikine is home to 1.6 million inhabitants in an area of 99.6 square km, compared to the 
1.2 million of Dakar city (an area of 79.7 square km) (Mboup et al., 2015, pg. 8-9). The 
suburb reveals how definitions of density and urban sprawl are not only ‘sterile or 
semantic, but also increasingly irrelevant, for the majority urban experience’ (Keil, 
2017; Tonkiss, 2013, pg. 43). An understanding of this urban phenomenon necessitates a 
shift from an ‘unfounded duality’ between the rural and urban, modern and tradition, 
western and non-western towards an understanding of the ‘relationships of a 
dominant production system with a dominated production system’ (Sow, 1983, pg. 
55). The peripheral is therefore not understood as marginal to the centre as the 
relationship is recast in the ‘exploded centralities’ and ‘reconfigured peripheries’ that 
develop a ‘life of their own in a world of complete urbanisation’105 (Keil, 2018, pg. 504).  
 
v. Housing 
Throughout the 20th century, the housing crisis in Dakar worsened as the colonial 
administration subjected the housing industry to colonial doctrine through spatial 
manipulations and population redistribution. The Société Immobilière du Cap 
Vert/Cap Vert real estate company (SICAP), founded by the Ministry of Overseas 
France in 1950, and funded by long-term loans from the Caisse Centrale de la 
France d'Outre-Mer (CCFOM), was responsible for the construction of housing in 
the Grand Dakar region. Given the gravity of the housing crisis in Dakar, it was 
evident that the Office des Habitations Economique (OHE), founded in 1926 by the 
AOF was unable to cope with the increasing demand for housing in the city. Despite 
 
105 See discussion on planetary urbanisation on pg. 81 
186 
 
the presence of private real estate organizations, including Crédit 
Foncier d'Afrique (CFA) and Crédit Foncier de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CFAO), and 
private real estate developers, particularly Lebanese, in the housing market, the city 
continued to suffer from a strong penury of housing. SICAP operated alongside 
STAGD within the limits of the Lambert, Gutton, Lopez plan - STAGD built the 
infrastructural framework while SICAP provided the housing. Between 1951 and 
1960, SICAP built 3,602 homes for 30,000 inhabitants as well as open spaces, parks 
and public buildings. SICAP worked primarily with French companies including 
SOGRETA, COTRA and SODECO and obtained construction materials from France 
in order to keep the entire process under French control. During this time, OHLM 
and SICAP were interested in ‘experimenting [emphasis added] with styles of 
community-making that broke with the French grid system, drawing on 
Scandinavian notions of the modern suburb’106 (Melly, 2010, pg. 45).  
 
SICAP held a monopoly over public housing in Dakar (and the AOF), using it for the 
forcible redistribution of African populations across the peninsula. SICAP built 
villas and buildings in Grand Dakar but the cost of this housing was often prohibitive, 
as only a minority of civil servants benefited from a regular income. SICAP provided 
‘permanent housing’ for a select group of Africans by controlling building 
regulation, the allocation of housing and the location of socioeconomic groups in the 
city. For example, Dakarois earning less than 15,000 CFA were excluded from SICAP 
rental which was destined for inhabitants with a monthly salary of approximately 
28,000 CFA (location simple/simple rental) or 52,000 CFA (location vente/rent to buy) 
(Odinet, 1962, pg. 7). SICAP policies soon became the subject of public debate and 
discontentment;  
‘[SICAP] does not do anything for a whole mass of Africans 
whose monthly salary is between 6 and 12,000 francs 
(CFA): drivers, typists, small staff who do not have sufficient 
financial means to amortize the construction of a house at 
4,000 francs. per month (ANS, Internal Note, Meeting of the 
Board of Directors, 1951)  
‘[SICAP] helps especially those who are already a 
little favoured: by their income or by the stability of 
their employment' (Odinet, 1962, pg. 60).  
 
106 See discussion on city laboratories on pg. 134 
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The Senegalese socialist party newspaper, L’Action, issued an editorial that 
captures the building practices of SICAP and the hollowness of the association 
doctrine that allegedly underpinned the urban development of Dakar during this 
time period; 
   
‘…we note that everywhere buildings and squares are 
erected, it is for the use and the satisfaction of the European 
populations that grow rapidly and a minority of privileged 
Africans of the colonial system.’  
The colonial administration used the housing industry as a strategic tactic for 
‘muzzling possible dismay’ as the ‘offer of a modern house’ was alluring to an 
emerging group of privileged elites who saw settled dwelling as a symbol modernity 
(Beeckmans, 2018, pg. 11). By harnessing social initiatives as a political tool, the 
colonial administration ensured the compliance of the native population in a loosely 
knit ‘social contract.’  The effect of housing policies resulted in visible changes to 
the urban landscape of the city;  
‘…the living quarters of Dakar Plateau were taken over by the 
nouveaux-riches and prominent bureaucrats of the new 
regime; black officials and soldiers have taken the places of 
their white predecessors in the Médina administration 
buildings and barracks; in the areas once occupied by the 
retrained colonial agencies have sprung up the 
presumptuous offices of the neo-colonial economic powers; 
into the areas which had been left free, as poured an 
enormous mass of emigrants from villages, in search of an 
illusory wellbeing’ (de Carlo, 1983, pg. 73).  
In addition, the housing model prioritised by urban policy and codes corresponded 
to the western vision of a family dwelling which was poorly suited to the needs of 
African households which were typically larger than their European counterparts107 
(Chenal et al., 2009, pg. 72). The houses built by SICAP during this time, much like 
those of the Belgian Office de Cités Africaines (OCA) in Congo, were based on 
the average middle-class European family composed of four members rather than 
the larger African family. Thus, as argued by Castells (1977, pg. 295), in the 
‘arrangement of space [housing, hospitals, schools, transportation, etc.], the state, 
 





through SICAP and STAGD, becomes the ‘real manager of everyday life.’ 
Architects, planners and engineers script a simplified understanding of society in 
order to incorporate new built forms into the world108. In turn, technocrats fabricate 
new social worlds, which cannot be inhabited by the majority of urban dwellers. The 
tendency of SICAP to prioritize class-based housing over ‘culture-specific’ or 
‘context-specific’ housing meant that public facilities in 
SICAP neighbourhoods were often absent or poorly maintained. Everyday urbanism 
(Corrective mainstream 3) reveals the ways in which African inhabitants of poorly 
serviced neighbourhoods dealt with the intentional oversights of housing 
programmes;  
‘…small traders, Moors or Foulahs [were] forced to infiltrate 
daily, like guerrillas, to supply consumers with tea, tomato 
paste, matches and the like. The lack of commercial facilities 
and the related influx of small-scale traders 
therefore resulted in new and unanticipated patterns of use 
of the public squares and parks in the SICAP 
neighbourhoods, as well as in the transformation of SICAP 
houses, public toilets, and garages into shops and stores’ 
(Bugnicourt, 1982, pg. 33; Beeckmans, 2018, pg. 19).  
The implementation of housing programmes in Dakar once again necessitated the 
segregation of populations. Racial segregation morphed into socio-economic 
differentiation. The forcible removal of Africans enabled SICAP and the Office des 
Habitations a Loyer Modéré (OHLM) to implement their housing program destined 
for the slowly growing middle class rather than the rapidly expanding urban poor 
population.   
‘To date, the policy of the Office des HLM has been, in 
general, the replacement of slums by modern housing 
intended not for the former inhabitants of displaced slums 
but for higher social categories, as modern housing is 
transforming rather quickly into this same middle class of 
employees already encountered in the SICAP 
neighbourhoods’ (Seck, 1970, pg. 109).  
Indeed, the implementation of a real estate program was only possible through the 
destruction of precarious housing, highlighting the claim that the ‘history of cities is 
only a succession of phases of construction-destruction, interspersed with 
unfinished models’ (Haeringer, 1996, pg. 8). Through the scope of southern 
 
108 See discussion on ‘perceived space’ on pg. 115 
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urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1) and vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 
2), the analysis suggests that the superimposition of subsequent masterplans has 
resulted in a process of ‘creative destruction’ (Schumpeter, 1942) in the realm of 
urban planning. Creative destruction is the ‘incessant product and process 
innovation mechanism by which new production units replace outdated ones’ 
(Caballero, 2010, pg. 24). In Paris, for example, Haussmann’s ‘urban improvements’ 
reflect an instance of creative destruction when the newly conceived urban 
boulevards were destined to break through the ‘medieval street plan’ and open the 
city further to capitalist spatiality through the increased ‘circulation of goods, people 
and money’ (Hubbard, 2017). While the theory is used to explain macroeconomic 
performances – growth, economic fluctuations and structural adjustments – it also 
explains the ways in which capital and profit-making increasingly shapes the city 
(ibid, pg. 24). Cities are increasingly moulded by the ‘workings of the market’ and 
property industry that align with ‘modernist visions’ but have ‘little to benefit’ from 
including the poor (Watson, 2009, pg. 2260). These early processes and continued 
transformation over the years reveal a shift in rhetoric from ‘land as commons or land 
as livelihoods’ into ‘land as commodity’ which disguises local struggles of 
‘dispossession and fast city aspirations’ (Datta, 2017, pg. 20). Therefore, the profit-
driven housing industry of Dakar prioritised a view of ‘land as commodity,’ explicitly 
and perhaps intentionally undermining the ‘land as livelihoods’ that enabled the 
poorer African population to maintain a foothold in the city. In the process, the 
driving rhetoric behind urban growth and expansion legitimised residential 
segregation which was ‘no longer traced exclusively along racial lines, but now also 
along socio-economic ones’ (Beeckmans, 2018, pg. 3).   
 
vi. Independence and welfare colonialism  
As African nations (allegedly) shed their colonial yoke, southern urbanism 
(Corrective mainstream 1) traces the mutation of colonial policy and rhetoric into 
present-day development discourse. During General de Gaulle’s visit in 1958 a vote 
for independence saw Senegal opt to remain under French rule in the ‘context of a 
legal framework that granted the country a substantial measure of decision-making 
autonomy’ (Diop, 2012, pg. 33).  However, soon after the dissolution of the short-lived 
Mali Federation (which sought to create a union of Mali and Senegal with Dakar as 




Political leaders of newly independent countries viewed urban planning as a way of 
‘representing, consolidating and dominating their power in space’ (Beeckmans, 
2013, pg. 161). While this discourse signalled a move away from segregationist 
planning, it would do nothing to improve the living conditions of the majority 
of inhabitants of Dakar and only deepened the socioeconomic polarization of the 
city. Development discourse, as it appeared on the African continent shortly before 
and after independence, is denounced as ‘welfare colonialism’ (Young, 1994), 
‘development colonialism’ (Cooper, 2002) and the ‘second colonial occupation of 
Africa’ (Low & Lonsdale, 1976). Cooper (2002, pg. 16) traces the development idea 
from ‘colonial project to national project’ and asks whether the national project 
‘reproduced certain aspects of the colonial one – such as the belief that ‘experts’ 
should make decisions for others.’  
 
As in many other newly independent countries, the development of Senegal and 
Dakar, in particular, was characterized by both continuity and change as new 
multilateral development agencies emerged while other bilateral development 
agencies maintained their colonial functions (Beeckmans, 2014, pg. 849). This trend 
was also noted in Anglophone colonies where British colonial officials reappeared 
as development experts in the 1960s and 1970s (Craggs, 2014). Development 
organisations and donor countries offered their expertise to African nations and 
provided new opportunities for architects and urban planners to extend their 
professional practice throughout African countries as the latter once again became 
the ‘experimental terrains’ or laboratories of urban planning.   
 
The French Fonds d’Investissement pour le Développement Economique et 
Sociale (Investment Fund for Economic and Social Development) (FIDES), 
renamed Fonds d’Aide et de Cooperation (Aid and Cooperation Fund) (FAC) after 
independence was run by former colonial officers, the United Nations and the World 
Bank. Through the scope of southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1), the 
evolution of the former colonial finance structure into modern-day development 
agencies such as the Agence Francaise de Developpement reveals that the 
mechanisms and rationales guiding the urban development of Dakar are still at work 
and have simply been renamed and reconstituted (Figure 27). Governing bodies and 
financial institutions that guided the development of Dakar during colonial times 
merely changed names and adopted a new status but resumed their activities, 
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unfettered by the ramifications of the ‘post’colonial moment. The instruments of 
development that govern the urban evolution of Dakar will be discussed in detail in 
the following section with the implementation of the first postcolonial masterplan.   
 
  
Plan Directeur du Cap Vert (M. Ecochard, 1967) 
 
i. Urbanisme evolutif  
In 1950, Jean Dresch described Dakar as a ‘monstrous metropole whose accelerated 
growth brought despair to urbanists’ (quoted in Zeliche, 2005, pg. 124). After Senegal 
gained its independence in 1960, French architect Michel Ecochard was tasked with 
designing the first masterplan of the postcolonial era. In 1967, Ecochard presented a 
plan for the Cap Vert Peninsula and proposed a ‘two-pole’ development of Dakar 
and Pikine, which were projected to expand over a period of 15 years and eventually 
form a single urban agglomeration (Figure 28). During his time as head of the Urban 
Planning Department of Morocco (1946-1952), Ecochard elaborated the concept of 
‘urbanisme evolutif’ (evolutionary urbanism) – known as Trame Ecochard – based 
on the assumption that urbanites who improved their living conditions could 
simultaneously improve the quality of their homes. This notion is underpinned by a 
development-as-modernisation discourse which suggests that ‘an improvement in 
infrastructure can create incentives for increased investment in housing 
construction’ (Gulyani et al., 2014, pg. 102). Ecochard drew a great deal from his 
experiences in North Africa. His plans for Dakar were much more aligned with the 
existing spatial and social conditions of the city than previous plans based entirely 
on metropole experience and expertise. However, in recycling plans designed for 
Casablanca and Rabat, he also revealed a fairly generalizing idea of  African society, 
Caisse centrale de la France libre (CCFL) established in 
1941
Renamed Caisse centrale de la France d’outre-mer 
(CCFOM) in 1944
Established as Caisse centrale de coopération 
économique (CCCE) in 1958
Renamed in 1992; Caisse française de développement 
(CFD)
Renamed Agence française de développement (AFD) 
in 1998
Figure 27: Evolution of colonial and development banks (Author’s own figure; Le portail 
de l'Économie, des Finances, de l’Action et des Comptes publics) 
192 
 
assuming that planning concepts could be seamlessly carried over from one context 
to the other. This reiterates the colonial inclination to view northern African cities as 
a more valid examples of ‘modernisation’ and ‘urbanism,’ thereby justifying their 
replication in sub-Saharan Africa.  Ecochard also subscribed to the modernist 
separation of functions such as inhabiting and working and emphasised the 
importance of including public facilities in new and existing neighbourhoods. He 
was inspired by the ‘neighbourhood unit,’ drawing inspiration from New York City. 
Ecochard quite literally called his neighbourhoods in Dakar 
‘unitées de voisinage’ (neighbourhood units) (Beeckmans, 2014, pg. 857).    
  
Ecochard, a self-professed ‘urbaniste tiers-mondiste’ (third world urbanist), began 
his work in Dakar in 1963, following his appointment as urban planning consultant 
by President Leopold Sédar Senghor and funded by the Secretariat des 
Missions d’Urbanisme et d’Habitat (SMUH) (depends on funding from 
Figure 28: Plan Directeur de Dakar et du Cap Vert (Ecochard, 1967; Archnet) 
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FAC; Fonds d’Aide et de Cooperation). Ecochard conducted extensive surveys of 
Dakar for three years following his appointment alongside the Senegalese 
authorities to collect socioeconomic, demographic and geographical data on the 
city. He was also tasked with developing plans for other Senegalese cities 
including Kaolak, Saint Louis, Diourbel, Louga and Thiès as a means of slowing 
emigration towards the capital city. From the very beginning, Ecochard opposed the 
existing housing policy of the Senegalese government, which he viewed as biased 
in favour of higher classes of society while ignoring the urban majority. He also 
criticized the policy of déguerpissements, a colonial legacy repackaged and 
rebranded as ‘recasement’ in the 20th century (Beeckmans, 2014, pg. 853). 
‘Recasement’ involved the removal of slumdwellers from the centre of Dakar to the 
periphery, Pikine, in order to develop modern neighbourhoods for public officials 
who could afford to live in the city centre. Between 1965 and 1975, nearly 
130,000 déguerpis were displaced from 1,000 shanty towns and relocated to the 
periphery in Pikine and Guédiwaye. Governmental regulations that rendered these 
settlements ‘unlawful’ simultaneously produced ‘specific images of modernity’ that 
legitimised the displacement of those ‘polluting’ the landscape and deemed ‘unfit 
to belong to the city’ (Fredericks, 2014, pg. 535).   
Ecochard was highly critical of the complacent attitude of the 
Senegalese government towards the development of Pikine, 
as Vernière (1977, pg. 229) warned against repeating the 
mistakes made in Dakar, in Pikine;   
‘For independent Senegal, it might be desirable not to 
reproduce models and errors of European origin, not to 
continue an experiment inaugurated in 1952 by the colonial 
powers. Without going so far as to glorify the ‘irregular’ a 
certain policy of ‘laissez-faire’ towards them (actually 
in recent years).’  
Ecochard also condemned the neglect of public facilities and open spaces in the 
SICAP and OHLM neighbourhoods in Dakar. In her analysis 
of Ecochard’s work, Beeckmans (2014, pg. 857) notes that his masterplan and its 
proposal often appeared more as a ‘political manifesto than an urban planning 
report’ with a ‘very moralistic’ tone. Ecochard proposed educative television 
programs that would teach the African population the ‘modalities of urban life’ and 
also suggested ‘cultivating a sense of public responsibility and civil awareness 
among the inhabitants of Dakar’ (ibid). He was increasingly frustrated by 
modifications to his plans, made without his consent, and incompatible with his 
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vision of urban development in sub-Saharan Africa. The continued lack of public 
facilities in Pikine indicate that the work of semi-public housing institutions was 
defined by the Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique (CCCE), making the 
cost-effectiveness of any housing programme a top priority over the pressing needs 
of urban inhabitants. 
  
In order to cut costs in the implementation of the Ecochard plan, SICAP removed all 
‘non-profitable’ elements from the plans and encouraged rented houses rather than 
private properties as the former were more lucrative. Ecochard denounced these 
practices as a colonial vestige that dictated a kind of urbanism based on profitability 
rather than social development;   
‘Although on a previous occasion he had already accused 
OHLM of hijacking his proposal for public housing in the 
former cordon sanitaire, the problem escalated when SICAP 
decided, without informing Ecochard in advance, to omit a 
major core of public facilities in Quartier B, a zone roughly 
corresponding with the area of Grand Dakar in the centre of 
Dakar. In Quartier B SICAP built almost all its 
neighbourhoods, most of them organised around the central 
‘Rond Point de Libérté’ and usually containing the prefix 
‘SICAP’ in their name. Instead of a public centre aimed at 
servicing more than 50,000 inhabitants, SICAP’s ambitions 
were to develop the site as an (exclusive) residential 
neighbourhood, which would later be known under the name 
SICAP Libérté V’ (Beeckmans, 2014, pg. 860).  
The French investment bank CCCE (Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique), 
central fund for economic cooperation, threatened to withdraw from SICAP if the 
SICAP-Libérté V neighbourhood was not built according to its plans. Thus, the 
postcolonial evolution of Dakar was increasingly determined by investment policy109. 
Despite numerous protests, Ecochard’s plans were repeatedly modified in order to 
fit the agenda of key players in the housing industry and urban planning which 
ultimately lead to his resignation as urban planning consultant in 1967 soon after the 
approval of his plan. Consequently, and perhaps inadvertently, Ecochard's 'Plan 
Directeur du Cap-Vert' fuelled the tradition of exclusion and segregation 
perpetrated by its predecessors, rather than fostering the development and 
prosperity Ecochard intended. Furthermore, given that subsequent masterplans of 
 
109 Increasingly, the urbanisation of Dakar is driven by investment policy as the agenda of 
market-driven competitive cities governs the spatial regime of urban growth. 
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Dakar continue to base themselves on Ecochard’s 1967 plan, this mechanism is still 
active today and determines the contours of Dakar’s ‘cityness.’   
  
Conclusion 
Despite gaining independence in 1960, the first masterplan of Senegal’s capital city 
was, once again, devised by French urban planners and entrusted to French 
expertise (Ecochard, 1967). Planning ideas therefore continued to travel in one 
direction and recycled colonial policies and plans that were ultimately imposed on 
the urban fabric of the city. This time period was marked by the ‘radical importation 
of techniques, of formal aesthetics’ and an ignorance or rejection of local traditions 
and ‘popular imagination’ (Depret, 1983, pg. 70).  
 
An analysis of 21st century urban planning reveals that masterplans of Dakar did not 
capitalise on the seemingly egalitarian hopes brought by independence. In the early 
1970s, rural-urban migration increased in response to the effects of environmental 
degradation in the Sahel (Zeliche, 2005, pg. 122). During the 1980s, under the 
pressure of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), the state struggled to 
provide basic urban services to a large portion of the city’s population and 
disengaged from the sectors of real estate and housing (ibid). Since then, nearly 90% 
of the demands for housing each year are fulfilled by promoters and real estate 
partners or through ‘self-help housing.’ The dynamics of the housing crisis in Dakar 
meant that the limited means of vulnerable groups precluded them from accessing 
housing due to the scarcity of long-term resources and the difficulties in mobilizing 
personal contributions for leasing programs. As a result, official sources estimate 
that between 25 and 45% of the urban area of Dakar has been occupied outside the 
legal norms as the built environment of the ‘official city’ lags behind the production 
of the city by popular initiative which continues to evolve outside of state supervision 
and control (Tall, 2009, pg. 82).  In their efforts to address the problems of 
urbanisation, the implementation of plans and urban development reforms often 
resulted in worsening socio-economic segregation and the deepening polarization 
of cities. As the borders of the city were expanded to include Pikine, Thiès, 
and Rufisque, these towns were not developed with the same zeal as Dakar and only 
benefited from rudimentary design and infrastructure while remaining poorly 




The masterplans of the 20th century reflect the extent to which development 
discourse has permeated the urban plans of cities, ‘charged with hopes for redress 
and self-affirmation’ (Sachs, 2001). Southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1) 
reveals that despite the pitfalls of development, this discourse is firmly rooted at the 
heart of Dakar’s urban development. Vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2) 
demonstrates how this continued emphasis on the development narrative is 
epitomised in the ‘service delivery myth’ (Pithouse, 2011), which is an apt 
characterisation of the worsening infrastructural and service deficit in Dakar and 
the public responses to fragmented and/or absent urban infrastructure. As it took 
hold in Dakar and across the African cities more broadly, the articulations of the 
development discourse meant that service delivery was ‘assumed to be the natural 
metric for measuring the performance of the state’ (Pithouse, 2011). Masterplans 
delineate a future for urban inhabitants who are now viewed (and planned for) as 
‘consumers or beneficiaries who just need to be plugged into the grid of serviced 
life by a benevolent state’ (ibid). The masterplans, however, do not only ignore the 
difficulties of access, but they also deny the ‘rebellion against service delivery’ and 
ongoing creative adaptations of existing infrastructure; 
‘When delivery means an eviction from a shack in a 
community of which you are a valued member, and which is 
near to your work and your children's schools to a transit 
camp filled with strangers in the middle of nowhere it can be 
a catastrophe. When delivery means the installation of a 
water or electricity meter to someone who previously, legally 
or illegally, had non-commodified access to water or 
electricity it can also be more of a curse than a blessing. 
Delivery, in the form that the state currently offers it to 
people, is fairly frequently refused and it’s not unusual for it 
to have to be implemented at gunpoint’ (Pithouse, 2011). 
‘Cityness’ can therefore be translated into a language of delivery and access – the 
right to incorporate oneself as an active participant rather than passive consumer. 
As a result, urban spaces become more fragmented along socioeconomic lines, and 
planning is responsible for not only recasting ‘notions of citizenship in the terrain of 
racial difference’ but also for delineating different city spaces ‘separated by 
boundaries of class’ (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004, pg. 356).
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Voices: Mon Super Kilomètre 
 Dakar is a city defined by its architecture and art. Bolstered by the Négritude movement, Dakar positions itself as the heart of 
Black African culture. The city hosts Dakar Biennale, or Dak'Art, a major exhibition of African art, since 1996. The photographs 
presented here are part of an art installation from Dak’Art Biennale 2018. The installation was located at a critical juncture in the 
city between Gueule Tapée and the Médina as a metaphor positioning art at the heart of the city and the city at the heart of art. 
The artwork does not only depict the urban fabric but becomes a part of it, simultaneously representing and becoming a part of 
Dakar’s ‘cityness.’ 
 




 ‘Mon Super Kilomètre is an open-air gallery which responds to the rhythm of the city. That city is Dakar and this gallery aims to 
break its social and aesthetic barriers. The painter appears alongside the fishmonger and the car mechanic. The photographer 
contends with the tea vendor and the tinker. The artist, whether recognized by academic institutions or not, takes up, on a daily 
basis, with both the handyman and the Fine Arts school alumnus. Opposites, or at least what we could have defined as such, get 
closer and discover each other and contradict themselves, in a wise and civilized atmosphere of the palaver tree. Here is the city. 
The omnipresence of the city that gives it its vitality. A simple pleasure to be together for a moment that hopefully could last 




Chapter Seven: Layers III (2001-2035) 
 
The Plan Directeur d’Urbanisme de Dakar Horizon 2025 (PDU Horizon 2025) is the 
first masterplan of the city in the 21st century and was elaborated by the Ministère du 
Renouveau Urbain, de l’Habitat et du Cadre de Vie (Ministry of Urban Renewal, 
Habitat and Urban life) of Senegal with the help of Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA). PDU Horizon 2025 was never implemented due to a series of 
problems and shortcomings that rendered it ineffective as a planning tool. The 
masterplan was never developed with a clear understanding of local conditions and 
suffered from inefficient communication with grassroots actors. The lack of 
participation of local communities throughout the plan drafting process hindered 
the elaboration of grounded knowledge and limited its relevance and acceptability 
to the actors in charge of its implementation. The masterplan was disconnected from 
a reality in which the continued, and often necessary, encroachment on public 
infrastructure resulted in the transformation of railroads into garbage dumps, four-
lane highways into two by the ‘invasion of informal activities,’ the destruction of 
natural reserves by the expansion and construction of real estate (niayes), and the 
sprawl of slums built on treacherous terrain regularly submerged by rain (Zeliche, 
2005, pg. 125).  
 
The involvement of Japan in the design of the masterplan for Dakar originates in the 
Tokyo International Conference of African Development (TICAD), first held in 1993. 
The conference laid out the terms of involvement between Japan, African nations 
and international organisations for the betterment of economic, social and 
environmental conditions of the African continent (Kato, Director General of the 
African Department, JICA). JICA positions itself as a strategic development partner 
in Senegal, and across Africa, by emphasising the fact that the most pressing 
problems plaguing African cities, namely rapid and uncontrolled population growth, 
are relevant to Asian cities as well. Despite the involvement of new development 
partners, the masterplans of 21st century Dakar reveal the unchanged modernist 
underpinnings of the city’s urban development. The ‘modernist persuasion’ of 
planners, architects and urbanists is evident in the recycling of traditional urban 
planning tools in the masterplans including the ‘zone’(zoning) that distinguishes 
areas with ‘ambiguous boundaries’; the ‘census’ for calculations ‘on which to base 
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interventions’; and the ‘plan’ which offers an ‘authoritative promise of the city to 
come’ (Zeiderman et al., 2015, pg. 282). 
 
Throughout this chapter, southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1) identifies 
the silences of the masterplans on the issues of poverty and informality. It also 
problematises the sanitised render of the satellite city as an extreme form of mimesis 
in the making of ‘hyper modern’ enclaves in the image of Dubai (which itself is 
arguably based on the Euro-American model). Vitalist ontologies (Corrective 
mainstream 2) addresses the continued fragmentation of the urban infrastructure as 
the infrastructural deficit of the city is increasingly determined along socioeconomic 
lines. Conversely, this corrective mainstream also addresses the making of 
Diamniadio, a fully equipped, serviced, and ‘green’ satellite city located on the 
outskirts of Dakar. Everyday urbanism (Corrective mainstream 3) engages with the 
disconnect between the masterplans and the reality on the ground as the definitions, 
descriptions, data and imagery110 incorporated in the masterplans are not only 
misleading but also irrelevant to the lived realities of the urban majority in Dakar.
 
110 See ‘defining the urban’ and ‘delimiting the urban’ on pg. 57-62 
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Figure 30: Plan Directeur d’Urbanisme de Dakar et ses Environs Horizon 2025 (Ministry of Urban Renewal, Housing and Living 
Environnement, 2001; Republic of Senegal and JICA) 
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Plan Directeur d’Urbanisme de Dakar Horizon 2025 (Republic of Senegal 
and Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2001) 
 
PDU Horizon 2025 was never implemented but represents an important example of 
the power of a master narrative to dictate the direction of Dakar’s urbanisation in the 
21st century (Figure 30). A number of projects currently underway in Dakar were 
developed on the basis of the 2025 masterplan. Among these projects are the Blaise 
Diagne International Airport, the extension of the Dakar-Diamniadio motorway, the 
extension of the VDN (Voie de dégagement Nord; northern clearance road), the 
development of the urban hub of Diamniadio, the development of a special 
economic zone (SEZ), and the construction of the new port of Sendou. 
 
The fate of PDU Horizon 2025 was similar to that of previous masterplans of Dakar 
which were founded on ‘well-established colonial logic,’ but baffled by the reality of 
a city that has developed ‘anarchically’ in the years since its creation (Cities 
Alliance, 2010, pg. 7). The city is typified by an extreme spatial imbalance and 
incoherent territorial divisions worsened by a lack of strategic and concerted 
planning at the local, departmental and regional levels. PDU Horizon 2025 is the first 
masterplan for Dakar since the Ecochard plan of 1967 which was revised in the 1980s 
to account for urban growth and sprawl. Despite the deployment of longer-term 
planning mechanisms from previous plans, this gap in the timeline of Dakar’s 
growth suggests a growing disconnect between the narratives and imaginaries of 
the ‘dream city’ of masterplans and the actual development of the ‘real’ city.  
Masterplans are, to different extents, insufficiently applied to determine the spatial 
evolution of the region, leading to ‘une urbanisation sous-integrée’ (under-
integrated urbanisation). This expression, borrowed from the Moroccan geographer 
Mohamed Naciri, explains the uneven planning and organization of cities in the 
developing world. Under-integrated urbanisation has resulted in the development 
of areas that are located within the cartographic borders (delineated by the 
masterplan) of the city but are still poorly connected to ‘the city,’ due to derisory or 
non-existent basic services and economic and social marginalisation111 (Sané, 2013, 
pg. 315).  
 
 
111 See urban fragmentation on pg. 77 
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The ‘dream’ city 
PDU Horizon 2025, approved in 2009, sought to create a new urban structure for the 
city by increasing the size of the region to cover the full extent of the peninsula and 
form what is now called Dakar region. The anticipated annual population growth of 
the region was projected at 3.0% beginning in 2001 and amounting to 5,020,000 urban 
inhabitants by 2025 (Ministry of Urban Renewal, Habitat and Urban life, 2001). 
The PDU Horizon 2025 outlines the key goals for the urban development of Dakar as 
follows:  
1. To develop a balanced spatial plan for the three 
départements of the region, Guédiwaye, Pikine and 
Rufisque, while maintaining the centrality of the 
département of Dakar;  
2. To improve the transportation links between the 
different territorial entities (Dakar-Pikine-Diamniadio 
motorway, VDN (Northern Clearance Road), north-
south road axes, and maritime transport network, 
etc.); 
3. To meet communities’ expressed needs through 
planning by taking into consideration the socio-
economic and spatial characteristics of various 
groups;  
specifically, to guarantee people access within 30 
minutes (reasonable access time) to better basic 
urban services (water, electricity, education, health 
care, markets, etc.); 
4. To manage population growth through effective and 
efficient decentralization, combined with intensified 
education and awareness;  
5. To preserve and improve the urban environment and 
natural sites through stakeholder involvement 
(Ministry of Urban Renewal, Habitat and Urban life, 
2001). 
The emphasis on spatial balance throughout the urban agglomeration stems from 
the primacy of the département of Dakar over the territory which translates into the 
concentration of infrastructure in Dakar (département) and Dakar Plateau at the 
expense of the remaining départements of the region, and communes 
d’arrondissements in Dakar. Urban bias in Senegal has resulted in a 
‘disproportionate allocation of resources’ to the capital city (O’Brien, 2008, pg. 8). 
The Plateau district contains, governmental, national, regional and administrative 
services, as well as commerce, higher education institutions, medical facilities, and 
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financial, cultural, manufacturing and logistics institutions. Urban services are 
concentrated in an area which makes up only 0.3 per cent of the map presented by 
PDU Horizon 2025. This imbalance is such that the region’s entire population is 
forced to travel to the southern tip of the peninsula for certain urban services 
(Chenal, 2014, pg. 104).  
 
Originating in urban-industrial models (Lipton, 1977), the concept of urban bias 
points to a marked bias in favour of the urban sector, at the expense of the rural 
sector, leading to an inefficient allocation of resources, government expenditure, 
and development spending in favour of urban areas. In Dakar, however, this 
phenomenon appears as an ‘overdeveloped town set against the impoverished 
countryside’ as Dakar region contains non-urbanised areas that create a stark 
division within the urban ‘built up’ landscape (Figure 31) (O’Brien, 2008, pg. 8). Thus, 
while the colonial administration had to contend with remnants of the African 
settlement in the European city (in the battle against the hut); today, the 
administration must contend with this legacy of disjointed urbanisation as the 
landscape of Dakar, from one place to another, challenges definitions of ‘the 
urban’112   
 
The situation in Senegal also points to ‘dispositional urban bias’ (Jones & Corbridge, 
2007) as urban life, concentrated in the networked and serviced parts of the city, is 
likened with ‘modern’ and ‘developed’ visions of city living, despite a reality in which 
the majority of the city’s population lives in informal settlements and shantytowns, 
‘scraping a living as best they can’ (O’Brien, 2008, pg. 8). This explains both the 
continued allure of the city for rural-urban migrants but also provides a Senegalese 
example of Ferguson’s (1999) ‘expectations of modernity.’ People’s ‘desire for 
development’ appears to be caught up in their desire to be in and of the city 
(Matthews, 2017). Dakar, the ‘dream city’ of Kapuscinski’s description (Voices IV) 
and the ‘illusion’ of Césaire’s poem (Voices V) paid the price for its ‘astonishing 
attraction’ in the ‘extreme concentrations of people for whom it constituted the 
mirage’ (Vernière, 1977, pg. 8). The advantages of living in Dakar, even the periphery, 
 
112 See discussion on planetary urbanisation on pg. 81 
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underpin the never-ending struggle of urban inhabitants to stake their claim in the 
city and their right to ‘cityness.’  
 
Figure 31: Spatial evolution of Dakar region (Adapted from N’diaye, 2011) 
The ‘real’ city 
The issue of access to basic urban services, particularly in Pikine, continues to be a 
key preoccupation of city plans. ‘Auto-construction’ (informal) is difficult to 
quantify, but estimates suggest it satisfies an estimated 84.75% of the demands for 
housing (PDU Horizon 2025, 2001, pg. 148). Since auto construction does not respect 
building regulations in the city, it is difficult to collect reliable statistics on the size 
of this phenomenon. To significantly increase the supply of housing and land 
purposed for building, the plan proposes to do the following: i) develop large 
extension areas; ii) facilitate access to credit; iii) provide adapted housing (based on 
family size and dwelling preferences) (PDU Horizon 2025, 2001, pg. 148). The PDU 
also aims to enable greater access to water and electricity as well as to education 
and health services. The issue is complicated by the massive population growth 
taking place in the city which the PDU proposes to address through a strengthening 
of population policy at the state level and through decentralization policy at the local 
level. By promoting poles of economic development at the national level, the PDU 
proposes to reverse rural-urban migration and ease the pressure of population 




Previous studies conducted on the postcolonial development projects across sub-
Saharan Africa ‘almost unanimously highlight their failure’ in the domain of 
architecture and urban planning but also in rural development, education, road and 
rail infrastructure (Beeckmans, 2014, pg. 865). PDU Horizon 2025 is one of these 
notable failures. Delays in the elaboration of the plan (initiated in 2001, approved in 
2009) meant that many of the borders and guidelines drawn out by the map were 
exceeded by the spatial growth of the city by the time the plan was finally approved. 
This echoes Brenner & Schmid’s (2015) point on the falsity of urban borders and 
delimitations within the scope of ‘planetary urbanisation’ and the need to reimagine 
our understanding of the urban. Furthermore, the plan bases itself on the 
assumption that the city will densify rather than sprawl. However, urban sprawl has 
defined the spatial evolution of Dakar since the first masterplan in 1862. The PDU 
does not propose a plan or mechanism for dealing with urban sprawl and bases its 
population projections on calculations that validate the current situation for the next 
25 years (surface required per family multiplied by the number of new residents). 
Vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2) reveals that the ‘detailed urban 
diagnostic’ of PDU Horizon 2025 for the appraisal of key urban issues, including 
infrastructure, environment, housing, and basic amenities, fails to understand and 
attend to the fundamental issue of land as ‘we ultimately learn very little about the 
market mechanisms of parcels in Dakar’ (Chenal, 2009, pg. 104). The PDU draws 
from multiple sources and does not use the same points of reference or 
administrative divisions (e.g. the divisions are either by département or by region) 
which makes it difficult to understand the situation on the ground.  
 
Perhaps most importantly, southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 3) 
demonstrates that the PDU ignores or glosses over issues of poverty, presenting 
Dakar as a city like any other (Chenal, 2014, pg. 107). The masterplan falls in line with 
President Abdoulaye Wade’s vision of transforming Dakar into a ‘world-class city’ 
with ‘five-star hotels and modernized highways’ during his presidency (Melly, 2010). 
Through large scale and often controversial infrastructural projects, Wade 
positioned himself as the ‘builder of modern Senegal’ by attracting funding from a 
range of sources to finance projects that ‘sold the dream of a modern city […] to the 
Dakar people’ (Sarr, 2013, pg. 417-418). Similarly, Khalifa A. Sall, former mayor of 
Dakar (2009-2018) emphasized urban planning as priority for Senegalese 
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development, focusing on PDU Horizon 2025 as a tool for creating a ‘modern capital’ 
by influencing Dakarois way of life and modernising employment and trade 
(Marfaing, 2019, pg.5). The reality of Dakar, however, is that;  
‘Sections of the city where rents were more affordable grew 
crowded, and seven or eight young male migrants from rural 
Senegal might share a single room. Constant price increases 
in fuel, water, food staples, and imports wreaked havoc on 
household budgets...New arrivals and long-time residents 
alike worried aloud that their stay in Dakar was always 
provisional; if the cost of living continued to rise, they would 
be forced to return to their village or move in with family’ 
(Melly, 2010, pg. 54).  
Much like its predecessors, PDU Horizon 2025 manipulates terms, definitions and 
housing classifications to create ambiguity surrounding the living standards of the 
urban population (i.e. ‘village’, and ‘spontaneous,’ correspond to the self-help 
housing of the poor). There is no examination of the living conditions of the 
‘spontaneous’ or ‘village’ housing or an acknowledgement of the slums located in 
‘formal’ areas. Throughout Dakar, slums may be characterised as ‘extremely diverse 
places characterized by great differences in housing quality, access to 
infrastructure and urban services, levels of crime, etc.’ (Gulyani et al., 2014, pg. 102). 
Vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2) and everyday urbanism (Corrective 
mainstream 3) reveals that PDU Horizon 2025 does not adequately address the fact 
that 74 per cent of Dakar’s ‘slum’ households ‘have access to piped water and 
electricity and live in houses with permanent walls’ (Gulyani et al., 2014, pg. 101).  
 
PDU Horizon 2025 is nestled within a broader decentralisation initiative that was 
launched to better coordinate and control the growth of Dakar. The decentralization 
initiative launched in 1996 and supported by the Ministère de l’Urbanisme et 
de l’Amenagement du Territoire (Ministry of Urban Planning and Development), 
transferred some jurisdiction to local authorities, including urban planning (in the 
form urbanisation plans for administrative subregions). Act III of the 
decentralisation initiative approved in 2013 is an administrative reform that divided 
the country into 14 regions, 45 départements and over 500 municipalities 
(communes). Dakar is one of the 14 regions that was subdivided into 
four départements: Dakar, Pikine, Guédiwaye, Rufisque. 
Individual départements were then subdivided into municipalities with mayors who 
represent the local community and administer the properties and assets of the 
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municipality. With Act III of the decentralization act, the département was 
established as a local authority and borough communes and rural communities 
received the status of full-function municipalities. Article 193 of the Act III dictates 
guidelines for municipal finance, a key element in the implementation and 
deployment of urban programmes (Mboup et al., 2014, pg. 13). Article 170 of Act III 
also set up a framework for the decentralization of municipal services including 
waste management and hygiene, protection and conservation of historic sites and 
monuments, promotion of national and local cultures, preparation and 
implementation of various kinds of plans (including masterplans) and management 
of health and education programs. The new decentralised system is maintained by 
three supervisory authorities: the governor (region), the prefect (départment) and 
the sub-prefect (district). However, the central government retained the power to 
supervise the activities of local authorities under the new decentralised system for 
the effective management of urban planning in light of the limited funding and 
capacity of these communities to implement urban development projects.  
 
Under the decentralisation initiatives, a series of PUD (Plan d’Urbanisme de 
Details), detailed urban plans, were also approved and introduced into the planning 
framework of the city (Figure 32). The table below demonstrates that, rather than 
streamlining the urban planning process, the new administrative divisions resulted 
in conflicts over funding, precedence, competence and power as the coordination 
of various plans became increasingly difficult. The plans of different administrative 
bodies often lacked coherence and synchronisation in both their development and 
implementation (Mboup et al., 2015, pg. 14). Thus, the increasingly technocratic and 
bureaucratic jargon of planning tools of the 21st century plans only further reinforced 
their inaccessibility and incoherence. 
 
 















































(Framework for planning and urban 
planning) 
- Covers the planning period for the next 
20 years 
- Provides a planning guide for the 
formulation of a PDU to meet the 
requirements stipulated in the national 
spatial plan 






























) (Urban masterplan) 
- Covers the planning period over the 
next 20 years  
- Defines land-use plans including public 
spaces, public facilities, green spaces, 
the road network, environmental 
preservation areas and cultural 
conservation areas 
- Part of the program for the 
Development of Public Facilities and 
Infrastructure 
- Designates planning areas for specific 
plans such as PUDs, urban renewal 
areas, etc. 






of other plans 
























- Detailed urban plan for the development 
of départements  
- Land Development Plan 
for the implementation of the Program for 
the Development of Public Facilities and 
Infrastructure 
- Determines regulation of regional 
planning 
- Designates planning areas for specific 
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(Lotissement (allotment) plan) 
- Planning guidelines for spaces in 
preparation for and to meet the 
requirements of the PDU  
Planning for allotments, whether 
residential, industrial or logistic with the 
















































(Urban renovation zone) 
- Plan for land acquisition, infrastructure 
development, land restructuring and 






































)  (Structural reinforcement urban zone) 
- Plan for restructuring and regrouping 
parcels in unoccupied and degraded 
urban areas, in order to meet the 





















- Plan for the redistribution of isolated 
parcels including in a Special 
Management Zone Plan, applicable in the 
event of a restructuring of the zones for 
the construction of a subdivision, or a 
























(Cooperative development zone) 
- Provides incentives to promote private 
investment for mixed-use, residential, 
commercial and business urban centres 
- Provides guidelines for the 
management of funds in the development 
of projects  
Figure 32: Code of Urban Planning and Regulatory Framework of the Urban Planning Code (Republic 
of Senegal, 2009) 
 
Despite the limitations and failings of PDU Horizon 2025, the following masterplan 
for Dakar (Plan Directeur d’Urbanisme de Dakar et ses Environs Horizon 2035) is 
essentially an adaptation of PDU Horizon 2025, recycling the same ideas and often 
the same shortcomings in planning Dakar’s urban future. A policy brief dated May 
5th, 2014, titled ‘Project for Updating Dakar Urbanisation Masterplan by the Horizon 
2025,’ published by the Ministry of Urbanisation and Housing of Senegal and Japan 
International Cooperation Agency, identifies the necessary revisions of PDU 
Horizon 2025 in the elaboration of PDU Horizon 2035. The policy document states 
that the PDU Horizon 2025 lacked in ‘vision’ for development, which should have 
been ‘formed in a participative way.’ The document stipulates that ‘spatial planning 
as well as demand forecast or integrity with social and economic policies, are not 
sufficient’ for the planning of Dakar. Regarding the PDU Horizon 2035, the policy 
brief states that the urban development of Dakar region should be based on the 
creation of a ‘favourable urban environment,’ based on social and economic 
development, environmental conservation, and disaster prevention (DUA & JICA, 
2014). The following sections outlines and assesses the parameters of PDU Horizon 





















Figure 33: Plan Directeur d’Urbanisme de Dakar et ses environs Horizon 2035 (Ministry of Urban Renewal, Housing and Living Environnement, 2015; 
Republic of Senegal and JICA) 
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Plan Directeur d’Urbanisme de Dakar et ses environs Horizon 2035 
(Republic of Senegal and Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2015) 
Based on the failures of the PDU Horizon 2025, the Senegalese government formally 
requested JICA to extend its technical cooperation and expertise in the revision of 
PDU Horizon 2025 and elaboration of PDU Horizon 2035. In 2015, JICA and the 
Ministry of Urban Renewal, Housing and Living Environment presented the ‘Urban 
Master Plan of Dakar and its Surroundings Horizon 2035’ (PDU Horizon 2035) within 
the framework of the National Plan for Territorial Development in order to control 
internal urban growth, reduce the spread of slums, encourage balanced urban 
development and respond to the needs for housing (Mboup et al., 2015, pg. 15) 
(Figure 33). The new plan was elaborated in line with the implementation of the Plan 
Senegal Emergent (PSE). Plan Senegal Emergent (Emerging Senegal Plan) (PSE), 
approved in 2014, provides a holistic framework for the sustainable development and 
economic growth of Senegal. Based on the PSE, the region of Dakar and 
surrounding areas are poised to play a leading role in the PSE as the national capital, 
international gateway and centre of economic activities in Senegal (Plan Directeur 
d'Urbanisme de Dakar et ses Environs Horizon 2035 Rapport Final: Volume I). In a 
traditional ‘policy fix’ approach, the PSE is structured around three main axes: 
1. structural economic growth and transformation;  
2. human capital, social protection and sustainable 
development; and  
3. governance, institutions, peace and security 
(Mboup et al., 2015, pg. 13).  
The ‘flagship projects’ developed under the PSE aim to position Dakar as a logistics 
hub in West Africa for the production and distribution of products and services; a 
touristic hub; a regional educational hub with world-class international schools; a 
business parks-hosting centre; and an ‘international medical city’ (Mboup et al., 
2015, pg. 14). Guided by the framework of the PSE, the key aims of the revised PDU 
Horizon 2035 are: sustainable urban development, the development of a compact city 
connected by efficient transportation networks, environmental resilience, and 
coherent spatial planning. While the PSE addresses matters of national scale and 
importance, the discourse surrounding the role of Dakar as a locomotive for growth 
and the plans for Diamniadio, a new satellite city currently under construction in 
Dakar region, reveal a great deal about the forces guiding Dakar’s development and 




Published in 2015, the PDU Horizon 2035 presents Dakar as a 
‘ville hospitalité’ (hospitality city), discussing the country’s world-famous culture of 
‘teranga’ (hospitality). The PDU lists the elements necessary for the transformation 
and growth of a hospitality city, namely;   
1. A comfortable living environment; through the 
implementation of the masterplan, Dakar is poised to 
become a city where people will live comfortably 
‘without worrying about basic needs,’ disaster risks, 
financial and security issues. The plan presents the 
image of a city characterised by a ‘relaxing 
environment with lots of green space and parks’ (PDU 
Horizon 2035, 2015, pg. 1).  
2. Easy communication; Dakar will be a ‘viable’ city with 
improved communication and mobility. Urbanites will 
be able to ‘move around the city and travel easily to 
other areas’ and foreigners can enter Senegal via 
Dakar. Additionally, goods will be ‘transported 
efficiently both inside and outside the city.’ 
Communication with other regions and countries will 
be facilitated through ‘advanced telecommunication 
technologies’ (PDU Horizon 2035, 2015, pg. 1).  
3. Innovative creation; Dakar will be ‘an innovative city 
of creation’ where people will benefit from ‘local 
products manufactured and agro-food of quality.’ 
The Senegalese people as well as foreigners will 
benefit from a ‘unique touristic offer in the region and 
original artistic works’ (PDU Horizon 2035, 2015, pg. 
1).   
The PDU Horizon 2035 states that people of ‘all social classes [emphasis added] can 
benefit from these (inclusive benefits)’ and generations to come will continue to 
profit from these (sustainable) benefits provided by the efficient organisation and 
planning of the city113. Under the guidance of the PSE and through the 
implementation of the PDU Horizon 2035, Dakar and surrounding areas will play a 
‘leading role in West Africa (competitive) while supporting and stimulating the 
development of all the populations of Senegal and other countries across West 
Africa (solidarity)’ (PDU Horizon 2035, pg. 2).  
 
 
113 See Article I of urban planning code on pg. 185 
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Firstly, the analysis of previous masterplans suggests that the aim of making Dakar, 
with its never-ending urban sprawl, a ‘compact’ city seems unrealistic given the 
patterns of human settlement. Secondly, the goal of ‘inclusivity’ has often been 
touted in masterplans as a key principle but has rarely seen any follow-through. The 
emphasis on ‘inclusivity’ and ‘capacity building’ in the postcolonial masterplans 
ring as hollow as the rhetoric of association during colonial times. Since its inception 
as a colonial project, Dakar has always been a profoundly segregated city, whether 
in the form of  ‘déguerpissements’ or ‘recasement,’ the goal remains the same - to 
banish the African population (colonial) or the urban poor (postcolonial) to the 
periphery of the city in order to make the scenic and serviced parts of the city the 
exclusive playing field of the wealthier urbanites. Thus, the city is planned as an elite 
enclave with large ‘pockets’ of poverty or ‘incomplete archipelagos’ of urban 
infrastructure (Bakker, 2003, pg. 62).  
 
Much like its predecessors, this PDU seeks to mollify the reality of poverty in Dakar 
and its physical manifestations. There is no mention of ‘bidonvilles’ (slums) despite 
the ubiquitous presence of informal settlements throughout the city. The term is, 
once again, replaced by the term ‘spontaneous’ in reference to patterns of urban 
growth and settlement. Once again, the PDU also fails to acknowledge the presence, 
let alone the disparity, of slums across the city. Slum conditions and informality in 
Dakar challenges the modernist notion that poor citizens must have ‘education and 
employment before they can have access to decent living conditions and basic 
infrastructure’114 (Gulyani et al., 2014, pg. 101). The PDU Horizon 2035 is concerned 
with pursuing the ‘modernist ideal’ of the ‘uniform, integrated, equally serviced city’ 
which vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2) has revealed as a mere spectre 
in light of the increased fragmentation of urban services caused by 
‘deindustrialisation, privatisation and reduced state spending’ (McFarlane & 
Rutherford, 2008, pg. 354). Consequently, the plans of the 21st century perpetuate an 
image of urbanisation rooted in the modernist (western) ideal that ‘subconsciously 
insists that all cities, wherever they are, be interpreted in that image’ and 
‘systematically find wanting any urban form that does not conform’ (Koolhaas 
in Enwezor Ed., 2003, pg. 175). Everyday urbanism (Corrective mainstream 3) reveals 
the disconnect between a state that continues to base its development on modernist 
 
114 See ‘urbanisme evolutif’ on pg. 193 
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ideals and the survival strategies of the majority of urban dwellers in Dakar who 
‘remap the shape of the city, redesigning desires and aspirations outside the order 
of the colonial city and outside the nation-state, which given its colonial attachment 
is nothing but a ‘hollow’ pretence’ (Okome in Enwezor Ed., 2003, pg. 319-200). Since 
colonial times, official masterplans of Dakar have rarely ever been in tune with the 
urbanisation articulated through the modifications of urban dwellers on-the-ground.  
 
Diamniadio Lake City 
A key element of the PDU Horizon 2035 is the plan for the development of Diamniadio 
Lake City, a satellite city located 30 km from Dakar city. The plans for Diamniadio are 
deployed under the PSE which seek to enhance the ‘attractiveness and 
competitiveness of Dakar, and the Special Economic zone Diamniadio.’ (Mboup et 
al., 2015, pg. 14). The PDU Horizon 2035 specifies the plans for Diamniadio within the 
broader framework of the urban development of Dakar;  
1. ‘the creation of a secondary capital city 
(Diamniadio) with additional functions to that of the 
capital and a new economic centre at the crossroads 
of the regional corridor;  
2. the formation of ‘Green Growth Centre’ as an area 
with stronger potential for agricultural development 
and focal point of green tourism;  
3. the formation of secondary cities to support the urban 
pole and its surroundings' (PDU Horizon 2035, 
pg.43).  
The renders of this futuristic city (Figure 34) reflect the ‘familiar blend of 
programmatic ingredients, including securitised office parks, upscale shopping 
malls, exclusive residential accommodation, and a wide range of entertainment-
leisure activities’ (Murray, 2017, pg. 32). In terms of urban planning, Diamniadio is 
based on a ‘holistic response’ to the urban issues of Dakar, namely infrastructural 
deficit, housing crisis, restricted mobility, and environmental conservation. 
Furthermore, Diamniadio is intended as a ‘smart city’ with the installation of 
data centres, cloud servers, e-commerce, training and software 
development centres, business incubators, audio-visual and multimedia production 
units. The city is also touted as an environmentally responsible and eco-friendly 
development, drawing interest from Belgian, and Luxembourgian companies 
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specialized in renewable energies, and from the German KFW for the installation of 
a solar plant near the city.  
 
Across Africa, the construction of satellite cities is often ‘deployed in tandem’ with 
large-scale transportation projects and land use plans that aim to decongest the city 
centre (Lane, 2017, pg. 171). Indeed, Diamniadio is connected to Dakar via a new toll 
highway, opened in 2013, which is the first public-private partnership project in the 
road sector in Senegal. The project was financed in part by the Senegalese 
government (for nearly 35 per cent of the project), with private sources contributing 
22 per cent of the funding, and the World Bank’s International 
Development Association (IDA), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the 
French Development Agency (Agence Francaise de Developpement, AFD) 
providing the remaining 43 per cent in the amount of 178.8m Euros (The Report, 
Senegal, 2011). The city is connected to the new Blaise Diagne airport completed in 
2018 and serviced by the new Regional Express Train due to be completed in 2019.  
 
The project has drawn interest from several investment consortiums who have been 
allocated land by the Senegalese state to develop diverse urban projects at a variety 
Figure 34: Diamniadio Lake City (Semer Investment, 2018) 
217 
 
of different scales. In 2014, SénégIndia, a partnership between the Senegalese 
company Générale des Travaux Publics et de Négoce (Getran) and two Indian 
companies (Swaminarayan Vijay Carry Trade and Garasiya Farm), was the first 
consortium to launch work in Diamniadio Lake City. By the end of 2019, they aim to 
deliver 2,500 apartments and houses of low, middle and high standing as well as 
sports and health facilities, a five-star hotel and 10,000 sqm of green spaces and 
shopping centres that will form the ‘SD city’ within Diamniadio. Other companies 
involved in the urban project include Teyliom, Alliances (Morocco) and Médina 
Invest (Morocco), Doozy Gulf Group (UAE), and CGC Overseas Construction (China) 
which has been tasked with building an industrial park. Semer Investment, an 
Emirati firm, is responsible for the plans and development of the city while the 
design and architecture of the city were assigned to FSS Consult, another Emirati 
firm.  
 
The Diamniadio project falls in line with a trend seen across the continent involving 
the construction of large-scale futuristic satellite cities; 
‘a massive shoreline reclamation project called Eko-Atlantic 
in Lagos; New Cairo City outside Cairo; high tech business 
incubators like the USD 14.5bn Konza City technopolis, 
south of Nairobi; Machakos City, a satellite city south of 
Nairobi; King City, an exclusive mixed-use development near 
the rebuilt port of Takoradi (Ghana); Luano City, a satellite 
city built on the outskirts of Lubumbashi in copper-rich 
Katanga Province (Democratic Republic of Congo); La Cité 
du Fleuve, a master-planned ‘oasis of tranquillity’ 
constructed on two islands reclaimed from sandbanks and 
swamp in the Congo River, adjacent to Kinshasa’ (Murray, 
2017, pg. 33).   
These cities are often located outside the official boundaries of metropolises in the 
larger urban regions and aim to deliver high quality infrastructure and ‘first-world’ 
lifestyles in carefully planned and regulated environments115. The renders of 
Diamniadio present a ‘hopeful future of a fully modernised and up-to-date 
metropolis’ (De Boeck, 2011). However, the long history of urban planning and socio-
spatial segregation in Dakar is better characterised as a ‘future slow-motion 
apocalypse,’ in which the plans for the satellite city result in the abandonment of the 
 
115 See suburbanisation on pg. 186 
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urban majority ‘to make way for a partitioned city in which the elite retreat into 
fortified enclaves’ (Shatkin, 2014, pg. 11).   
 
These satellite cities are revealed as templates rather than tailored solutions to 
urban problems since they are based on a singular notion of modern urbanism. 
While these projects lay claim to ‘novelty’ in their inception and planning, the 
analysis reveals that they often ‘borrow, mimic, or steal ideas about building 
typologies, design aesthetics, and regulatory regimes at work elsewhere in the world 
economy’ (Murray, 2017, pg. 35). The plans for Diamniadio fall neatly within the 
scope of the ‘neoliberal thrust of the creative-smart-sustainable triumvirate in urban 
discourse’ (Goonewardena, 2018, pg. 458). A closer examination of future plans of 
Diamniadio reveals the functional specialisations of these emerging satellite cities 
as outlined by Murray (2017, pg. 40);  
‘The first type consists of large-scale mixed-use satellite 
cities that are typically constructed at the edge of existing 
urban landscapes and that operate under the mantra of ‘live, 
work, and play.’  
The second type can be called ‘terminal cities’; that is, new 
urban landscapes constructed around major international 
transportation hubs like ports, railroad lines, and airports.  
The third type can be labelled ‘leisure-entertainment cities’ 
which offer the amenities of a resort vacation in relaxed 
outdoor settings.  
Finally, the fourth type consists of new ‘information 
technology’ hubs that function as business incubators.’ 
The plans for Diamniadio encapsulate all four functional specialisations, as the city 
is divided into three ‘zones’: financial, residential and entertainment districts. This 
division brings to mind Ecochard’s modernist separation of function, inspired by the 
‘neighbourhood unit’ model of New York City and envisioned for SICAP 
neighbourhoods in the 1967 masterplan in the separation between ‘live, work, and 
play.’  Conversely, Diamniadio features three districts:  
1. Financial district; stock market, office space with 
services, and business hotels  
2. Residential district; private homes, retail and coffee 
shops on main streets  
3. Entertainment district; shopping mall, national 




Plans for Diamniadio were unveiled during the Salon International de l’Immobilier à 
Cannes in 2017 (International property market salon in Cannes) which recalls the 
Exposition Coloniale (Colonial Expositions) that put the colonial world on display 
during expositions held in France. It is important to highlight the discourse 
around Diamniadio as it reveals much about who the city is intended for. Diene 
Marcel Diagne, the CEO of the Semer Investment group, describes Diamniadio Lake 
City as a project designed in accordance with the vision of the ‘new aspirations of a 
Senegalese population that embraces its modernity, its high-class lifestyle and its 
pronounced taste for elegance’ (Le Figaro, 2017). Thus, the discourse around 
Diamniadio is structured to leverage the geopolitical positioning of the country but 
to attract a ‘new generation of foreign travellers’ - foreign direct investors - in some 
ways despite rather than because of ‘its African-ness’ by offering the ‘sort of generic 
comforts that they would expect to find at ‘home’’ (Melly, 2013, pg. 386). Diagne also 
highlights Senegal’s favourable position within the international political economy;  
‘…some of the money comes in from France to pay for an 
important member of la francophonie…Senegal also attracts 
financial support from the US and the EU to support an 
African democracy with a commitment to the free market; 
from the Muslim world to support an African Muslim state; 
and then the funds from other sources to support a 
respectable African country which remains open and 
welcoming to the outside world’ (O’Brien, 2008, pg. 10).   
To model the ‘meteoric rise of global cities like Dubai,’ the discourse around 
Diamniadio is designed to ‘lure international attention’ and reposition Dakar as both 
‘the most beautiful city in Africa’ but also a destination for foreign investment and 
tourism (Melly, 2013 pg. 386). Through Diamniadio, Dakar is sold as a ‘modern’ city 
in the image of Dubai, looking to position itself as a ‘world city, reference, a 
crossroads city for a country, a region’ (Chenal et al., 2009, pg. 80). The agenda of 
these mega-projects is justified through the promise of job creation, a sequestered 
and wealthy lifestyle, and eco-friendly sustainability. Indeed, Diamniadio promises 
to generate 35,000 direct jobs, as well as 105,000 indirect jobs by 2025, in an 
environment aimed at sustainability and upscale modern living.   
 
The ‘futuristic fictions’ sold by these projects reveal the logics of ‘global capital 
accumulation, economic partnership and neo-liberal governance’ that shape the 
urban landscape of the southern city today (Melly, 2013, pg. 387). These projects are 
the ‘mirror (and yet polar) opposites of existing urban landscapes in Africa,’ aiming 
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to do away with the chaotic, congested and overcrowding of African metropolises 
(Murray, 2017, pg. 32). They represent a new geography of segregation. For many 
urban researchers, these cities are a drastic shift from the traditional approach 
aimed at rebuilding and regenerating the urban fabric. Satellite cities bypass the 
crumbling infrastructures, congested thoroughfares, and impractical regulatory 
regimes of existing metropolises. The sheer size and cost of Diamniadio Lake City, 
which requires a budget of 2bn USD to complete, provokes several important 
questions regarding the development goals of this satellite city;    
‘where are the street traders, the informal transport 
operators, and the shack-dwellers in these new fantasy 
plans? Would traders ever be allowed to set up business on 
these pristine boulevards? Could the poor (or even the 
middle class) ever afford the glass box apartments, or even 
have the kinds of jobs that would get them access to the 
towering office blocks? How do people move around on foot, 
as most city dwellers do, through these wide-open spaces 
and care-oriented movement route?’ (Watson, 2017, pg. 63).  
By doing away with overcrowding, chaos and congestion, satellite cities are an 
alternative to deviant urbanism of the continent; they represent the 21st century 
version of the tabula rasa approach to urban development as existing urban 
landscapes are abandoned in favour of ex nihlio urban projects. The ‘urban 
fantasies’ and narratives of ‘Africa rising’ are created and promoted by politicians 
and global investors who envision a city in sharp contrast to the reality in which the 
bulk of the population is ‘extremely poor and living in informal settlements’ (Watson, 
2014, pg. 216). Within this discourse, however, hundreds of thousands of people who 
make up the urban fabric of Dakar are ignored and left to ‘live and die on sidewalks 
of development’ (Chenal et al., 2009, pg. 80).  
 
Conclusion  
The plans of the 21st century employ the familiar pillars of policy and reform to 
increase investment in the sectors of rail, road, and energy networks as the key 
development interventions based on which to unlock the benefits of urbanisation. 
Despite the involvement of new actors in the urban planning process and new tools 
of urban development, these plans are indicative of continuity rather than change in 
the emphasis on technocratic knowledge steeped in the modernisation as 
development rhetoric. The development argument, as articulated through these 
masterplans, emphasizes the need for African urban systems to ‘reform themselves 
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into new vectors of political and mercantile liberalism’ just as the modernisation 
discourse underlines the importance of ‘retooling outdated and neglected 
infrastructure and policy’ to allow for more efficient urban economies (Enwezor et 
al., 2003, pg. 13).   
 
PDU Horizon 2025 and 2035 and the plans for Diamniadio betray a concern with 
‘what ought to be’ rather than ‘what is’ (Venturi et al. 1972, pg. 21). Everyday 
urbanism (Corrective mainstream 3) suggests that the 21st century aspirations for the 
‘modern’ city means that the majority have been ‘swept out of sight’ in these 
futuristic visions as the latter will likely be ‘chased out of town, removed to land on 
the city edge and out of sight, or perhaps - as the politicians so often wish - they have 
gone to smaller towns and rural areas’ (Watson, 2017, pg. 63). Vitalist ontologies 
(Corrective mainstream 2) suggests that in satellite cities outside the metropolitan 
area, it is the wealthy that will flee beyond the city border, away from ‘what is 
perceived as the crime, grime and chaos of the major cities’, in what is increasingly 
a ‘wealthy’ flight to elite enclaves (Watson, 2017, pg. 63). Finally, southern urbanism 
(Corrective mainstream 1) reveals that for all that has changed, everything is status 
quo in the urban development of Dakar as policies and plans originating in colonial 
times are given second life in the form of modernist and unilinear visions of growth 
that culminate in the satellite city.  
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Voices: Songs from Set/Setal and Sopi 
 
Set/Setal (Clean-up/Make clean) was a youth movement launched in the 1980s to 
clean the streets of Dakar following state disinvestment from basic urban services 
such as waste management, security and sanitation. Sopi (Change) was the rallying 
cry of a politically engaged urban youth group who demanded changes to the 
country’s leadership, playing an important role in the election of Abdoulaye Wade 
to the presidency of Senegal.  
 
These songs contribute to our understanding of ‘cityness’ as they shed light on the 
popular response to narratives underpinning the development of the city (e.g. 
development, modernisation, etc.). While ‘Set’ captures the dichotomy of 
First/Second world narratives and the ambivalent positioning of Africa (and 
postcolonial youth) within this global framework, ‘The executioner is black’ reflects 
the postcolonial disillusionment of young Africans, marginalised and maligned by 




Have a clear mind 
Be pure in your heart 
Be sure in your actions 
One day all the world's musicians will 
meet 
Music has no frontiers 
One day the Americans 
Will find a new vision 
And the Russians too 
Will see life in a different way 
For there are too many weapons 
And war is terrible 
I have a vision of all Africa 
Being united one day 
Give me your hand 
Give me one chance to know 
What do you think 
For the future? 
The young people are crying 
Because the older ones are 
frightening them 
That's what makes me sad 
They are crying because 
They have no hope … 
 
Youssou N’Dour, 1990 
 
‘The executioner is black’  
Some time ago you talked about illicit 
enrichment 
It's been years but tell me where the 
follow-through is 
I was proud of you at that time, I saw 
justice 
But unfortunately, we stopped 
everything and scrambled tracks 
You are utopian but you stand by 
millions 
Corruption, religion 
Many people have understood this 
But they avoid the solution 
You see, it's unfortunate 
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Democracy, democracy what a nice 
bullshit 
In Africa we always live in the hour of 
irony 
The same dominant, the same 
dominated; the dominated, the sons 
of dominants dominate the 
dominated 
The dominated being born is damned 
The sons of the dominated have 
become damned 
That we throw away 
I just show you a youth condemned 
In truth, in truth this bullshit is for the 
money and I'm bitter every time I talk 
about Africa 
We are black sheep 
That we head to the slaughterhouse 
and I am so ashamed 
The executioner is black 
 
Positive Black Soul (PBS), 1995 
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Chapter Eight: the paradigmatic and the critical 
case 
 
This chapter focuses on the ‘contingent universals’ (Healey, 2012) of southern cities 
by investigating themes and topics that resonate across African cities and the 
‘global south’ more broadly. In order to tease out these themes, the research project 
uses two units of analysis based on the parameters of the paradigmatic and critical 
case study. The paradigmatic case is an exemplar or prototype that acts a reference 
point and key paradigm for theoretical frameworks or schools of thought. The critical 
case has strategic importance relative to a general issue, problem or 
phenomenon. In this context, Sandaga is a strategic location within the urban fabric 
given its historical role and its continued importance as a battlefield between the 
state, the youth and informal vendors. Place Kermel (Kermel Plaza) is a microcosm 
of larger processes at work in Dakar and therefore provides a paradigm to 
understand the forces driving Dakar’s urban transformation. The key difference 
between the critical and paradigmatic approach is in the literal and theoretical 
locatedness of the field sites under observation. In theoretical terms, Place Kermel 
is relevant as a paradigm for understanding urbanisation processes unfolding in 
Dakar. Geographically speaking, Marché Sandaga is a strategic location (and object 
of study) given its status as one of the most popular markets in Dakar located at the 
heart of the urban agglomeration of Dakar (in Dakar Plateau). 
 
It is neither within the scope of this doctoral project nor the aim of this study to 
theorise southern urbanisation based on a single case study or make generalising 
statements concerning the large and ‘boundless’ expanse of the urban 
agglomeration of Dakar based on two urban spaces. Rather, the aim of this 
chapter is to finetune the picture of urbanity in the ‘global south’ that is slowly, but 
surely, coming into focus as a new research agenda comes to the fore. The narrative 
weaves between historical sources and first-hand observations, and continually 
engages with relevant literature to situate the findings of the research interventions 
within the broader context of an urban theory of the ‘global south.’  The chapter 
begins with an overview of Place Kermel and Marché Sandaga, reporting 
observations and identifying the salient elements of these spaces that are relevant 
to the study of urbanisation. The following sections look at the contingent universals 
of these sites and considers their broader implication for the urban development of 
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Dakar. The analysis of the built environment of these two field-sites reveals the 
importance of architecture in situating the historical development and modern-day 
configurations of space. In the context of Kermel plaza, the contingent universals 
are established based on the presence of a Chinese supermarket, a Moroccan bank, 
a 5-star hotel and a newly established market in the field-site. In Sandaga, the 
‘contingent universals’ are centred on processes unfolding in the city in which the 
market plays a pivotal role, including the informalisation of space and the 
development of a plebeian public sphere. Given the demographic structure of Dakar 
and the nature of income generating activities, youth and informality play important 
roles in the analysis. 
 
Throughout the chapter, southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1) examines 
the continued influence of colonial history on the physical structure and social fabric 
of the city and the enduring effect of these longue-durée processes. 
Vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2) and everyday urbanism (Corrective 
mainstream 3) are used in tandem throughout this analysis to understand the socio-
spatial evolution of the spaces under scrutiny. Specifically, they are used to analyse 
the ‘unplanned’ developments in the field sites that reflect the processes of ‘grey 
spacing’ and densifying social networks in the making of ‘people as infrastructure.’  
 
Paradigmatic case: Place Kermel  
The paradigmatic case (unit of analysis) selected for this chapter reflects the multi-
layeredness of urbanisation in Dakar and allows for the extrapolation of key themes 
and narratives revealed in the masterplans. The study of physical spaces reveals 
urbanisation as a complex transformative process that shapes multifaceted 
relationships between class, race, occupation, religion, and generation (Falola & 
Salm, 2005). The analysis of the paradigmatic case builds on the work 
by Bigon, Beeckmans, & Sinou (2016) on the façade of Marché Kermel which 
examines the architectural evolution of the market by dissecting the various 
narratives at work in the making of the market. The following study broadens the 
scope of the analysis not only in terms of the space but also the range of 
phenomenon under observation. The case covers the entirety of Place 
Kermel (Kermel plaza), using it as a model for understanding the urban 




A snapshot of present-day Place Kermel reveals the successive waves of influence 
and infrastructural changes that shape the urbanisation of Dakar. The space is 
therefore used as a prototype for understanding urbanisation in Dakar and the 
dominant metanarratives that dictate the built environment of the city. Interestingly, 
Place Kermel reflects the fact that no city presents a ‘uniform aspect, even in the 
most developed countries,’ as these contradictions are nowhere more brutal than in 
Dakar, showcasing both ‘very modern ensembles and shanty towns’ (Seck, 1970, pg. 
121). Kermel Plaza demonstrates a phenomenon observed throughout Dakar where 
the integration of some elements has remained incomplete and competing logics 
are played out in an urban setting116. The urban fabric appears disjointed with the 
amalgamation of different waves of past and continuing influence, many of which 
are observed in Kermel (e.g. globalisation, informalisation, neoliberalisation, 
colonisation, etc.).  
  
During an initial visit in April 2017, the area around Kermel was undergoing 
infrastructural change with the ongoing construction of Centre 
Felix Eboué, initiated by Mayor Khalifa Sall, and the Projet Lacoste, undertaken by a 
French architectural firm Lacaton & Vassal. Observations carried out during 
fieldwork in Place Kermel revealed the stark unevenness of the urban landscape. 
One can go so far as to stretch the metaphor to describe the state of the pavement 
and sidewalks which are an obstacle course of debris from nearby construction 
sites, piles of garbage and improvised stalls laid out on sidewalks. The initial visit to 
the renown Marché Kermel, a colonial artefact, revealed that the infrastructural 
changes taking place around the market were important to understanding the 
process of urban transformation in the city, prompting the decision to expand the 
zone of inquiry to include the entire plaza.  
 
In the plaza, Marché Kermel operates as a market for fresh produce with an 
abundance of fruits, vegetables, fish, meat, grains, etc. The sheer amount of 
produce available in the market makes it hard to move around the windy passages 
arranged in concentric circles and mapped out by crates of fruits and vegetables. 
 
116 The ‘history of cities is only a succession of phases of construction-destruction, 
interspersed with unfinished models’ (Haeringer, 1996, pg. 8). 
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The fishmongers are located at the centre of the market, along with the butchers 
while the vegetable and fruit sellers stack their crates along the edges of the 
hexagonal market. The market is organised based on the type of produce on offer, 
with sellers standing in each section of the market waiting for customers to walk by 
their merchandise. Some of the sellers recline on makeshift chairs towards the back 
of the market, huddled in groups of 3-4 men and women sharing tea or coffee, 
delivering their sales pitch, offering deals and guiding customers to other vendors 
when necessary. These observations recall the study conducted by Ralph (2008, pg. 
24) who documented the daily tea-making rituals of young Senegalese men in public 
spaces (depicted in Voices VIII: Dakar Arty). To the untrained eye, they appear to be 
loitering in the public sphere, but Ralph found they were actively involved in 
building solidarity networks by relaying information, tips and experiences while 
sharing a cup of tea. Furthermore, the patterns of buying and selling taking place 
within and beyond the market structure, particularly the tendency for several sellers 
to offer the same merchandise to one buyer, recalls the phenomenon of ‘collateral 
realities’ (Law, 2011). By pursuing their ‘own economic interests’ within a context of 
‘collective entanglement,’ the sellers are ‘silently and incrementally’ creating the 




There are a number of cars and taxis parked right outside the marketplace making it 
difficult to manoeuvre in between stalls, people, cars and rubbish (Figure 
35). Directly outside of Kermel, numerous stalls have been erected and offer the 
traditional ‘boubous’ (garment worn in West Africa), African masks, artisanal 
jewellery, art, and other such tourist-friendly knick-knacks (Figure 36). Others offer 
even more produce stacked on rickshaw stalls that are shifted around the market 
area for better visibility and out of direct sunlight throughout the day. The stalls 
outside of Kermel are propped up by wooden beams and covered in scrap metal or 
large parasols to extend the shade of the market. In between the stalls and the street, 
there are large piles of garbage from overflowing dumpsters and trashcans.  
 
Figure 35: Façade of Marché Kermel (Author's own photograph, 2017) 
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Critical case: Marché Sandaga  
While the paradigmatic case is used as a prototype exemplifying a range of 
phenomena unfolding in the space relevant to the broader topic, the critical case 
broadens the scope of the theoretical work further given its strategic importance 
relative to the phenomena under observation. The analysis of Sandaga, as a 
strategic location in the city, allows for the appraisal of key themes that are relevant 
to ‘cityness’ including informality, resistance, and entrepreneurship which have 
arguably become defining features of the city in the ‘global south.’ Observations 
undertaken in Sandaga reveal the importance of the changing physical structure of 
the market, the presence of informal vendors in proximity to the market and the 
market activity itself. Unlike other markets of Dakar, Sandaga is one of the most 
Figure 36: Entrance to Marché Kermel facing Centre Felix Eboué (Author’s 
own photograph, 2017) 
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important meeting places for locals and toubabs117 given its location and allure as a 
colonial artefact. During the colonial era, Dakar-ville was home to the European 
population and evolués. Today, these buildings are occupied by African businesses 
– many of which pay tribute to the holy city of Touba118 – when once they were the 
exclusive playing field of the European and Libano-Syrian population of Dakar. The 
postcolonial era saw the area become the hub for new government buildings as well 
as museums and monuments in accordance with President 
Léopold Sédar Senghor’s Négritude movement of postcolonial nationalism. 
Today, Sandaga is surrounded by five-star hotels and shopping plazas which stand 
in stark contrast to the colonial style both in physical form but also in the types of 
consumerism taking place in these spaces.  
  
The commercial activity of Sandaga has spilled over into the streets, making it 
difficult for cars to weave through pedestrians and vendors who now occupy the 
space. Although impressive in its distinctive stature and style, Sandaga is visibly 
crumbling with evidence of the fire that ravaged the market in 2013 and resulted in 
the closing of the central building. The story goes that the authorities closed the 
market due to the physical degradation of the building, and then a fire broke out a 
week later (Barblan & Hernach, 2014, pg. 100). While the origins of the flames remain 
unknown, many traders considered the possibility of arson sponsored by the public 
authorities. This stems from the strange coincidence between the timing of the 
forcible evacuation of the building during the week of the Tabaski festival (Eid-el 
Adha or the festival of sacrifice) when many Dakarois leave the city to join their 
families in the countryside, and the accidental fire that occurred a week later. 
According to some traders, this was a strategic move to relocate them permanently 
from Sandaga and compromise their foothold in the city. Sandaga is known as a 
‘gateway’ to the country’s informal economy and economic activity unfolding in the 
market blurs the line between formal and informal (Melly, 2013, pg. 392).  This is 
perhaps why governments often perceive markets as ‘dangerous places’ since they 
are unable to impose ‘one story about what the market is and should do’ (Simone, 
2018, pg. 35) 
 
 
117 Local term for people of European heritage 
118 See Mourides example on pg. 258-259 
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Yet, the strategic importance of Sandaga has meant that it continues to be one of 
the most popular markets of Dakar for locals, tourists, and informal traders who 
continue to flock to the market area. Today, the core of commercial activity takes 
place outside of the market structure itself. Despite repeated attempts to remove the 
vendors from the market and surrounding area due to the fire damage and risk of 
collapse, market activity has not slowed. Recently, the Minister of 
Commerce, Alioune Sarr, has announced the establishment of a steering committee 
will devise a plan for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Sandaga due to be 
inaugurated by the end of 2019 (Agence de Presse Sénégalaise, 2018). The decisions 
surrounding the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Sandaga are important. 
Colonial heritage is a ‘socio-political construct’ and the preservation and/or 
rehabilitation of built heritage, as with Kermel, is intrinsically linked to national 
identity. Southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1) suggests that when the 
‘critical filter’ between postcolonial memory and colonial past is removed, issues of 
‘whose heritage’ (Hall, 2002) is destroyed/built/reconstructed are dehistoricised and 
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An urban theory of the ‘global south’ emphasizes context-specific and embedded 
knowledge as a means of challenging universal theory. However, generalisation is a 
key means for developing theory and is required in research ‘if we are not to treat 
each city or place as entirely unique’ (Watson, 2016, pg. 38). The crucial nuance in 
the elaboration of southern theory is to understand and be explicit about the limits 
of theory to avoid repeating the mistakes of northern theory with regards to the 
‘global south.’ To that end, the methodology proposes the analysis of ‘contingent 
universals’ (Healey, 2012) as a way of speaking ‘beyond the single case’ and 
elaborating a ‘criteria for comparisons and the terms of a diagnosis’ (Connell, 2007, 
pg. 225). Contingent universals allow for ‘meso-level theorising’ whereby the 
findings and ideas generated from this case are assessed in terms of their relevance 
and usefulness to other parts of the ‘global south,’ and the world. In so doing, it is 
possible to avoid the trap of what Connell (2015, pg. 59) calls ‘mosaic epistemologies’ 
in the elaboration of knowledge systems based on ‘specific culture or historical 
experience, and each having its own claims to validity.’ The contingent universals 
outlined in this chapter are specific to Dakar, but their relevance extends beyond the 
case study city. Firstly, the themes analysed in this chapter reveal the 
interconnectedness of cities which suggest that the urban development of a 
singular study is intrinsically linked to larger urban processes driven by 
globalisation, neoliberalisation, migration, etc. Secondly, the importance of these 
themes as starting points for theory-building is relevant to the broader agenda of 
informing an urban theory of the ‘global south.’ 
 
Consequently, southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1) engages with 
architecture and the evolving physical structure of the field sites to demonstrate how 
power is inscribed on the built environment from the colonial era to modern 
times. Vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2) demonstrate that built form, 
public spaces and the ‘everyday’ are political – both static infrastructure and 
quotidian acts of subversion that transform the urban landscape. Everyday urbanism 
(Corrective mainstream 3) focuses on the everyday activities that unfold in the 
spaces under observation and engages with the ways in which people arrange 
themselves as ‘conduits’ and ‘connectors’ to create ‘unanticipated by-products and 




i. Hauntology119  
The ‘spectre of colonialism' remains ever present and 'haunts' urban landscapes of 
the south in a ‘psychology of fear that links the past into the present’ (Derrida, 2006). 
Architecture and built form are strategic objects of study because they are not ‘static 
embodiments of culture’ and should be analysed as mediums through which 
‘identity, power and society are produced and reproduced’ (Avrami & Mason, 2000, pg. 
6). The city is not a ‘neutral realm’ as construction and infrastructure cannot be 
understood only in terms of ‘concrete and stabilised earth’ (Sow, 1983, pg. 45). 
Consequently, the analysis of the built environment reveals the complex relationships 
between ‘built fabric, history and memory’ and situates buildings within process of 
urban transformation and ‘broader political-cultural contexts’ (Lagae, 2018, pg. 19).  
 
Marché Kermel was completed in 1910 and stands as a unique colonial structure in 
the city of Dakar. Located in the heart of the plaza, Marché Kermel evokes similarities 
to the ‘great metal markets’ in France and other European countries, featuring a 
prefabricated metal frame that was made in France and shipped to Dakar 
(Bigon & Sinou, 2013, pg. 714-718). The construction and reconstruction 
of Kermel market following an outbreak of fire in 1993, as well as the infrastructural 
changes taking place around the market area are indicators that built form and 
space are not static artefacts as infrastructural changes do not constitute neutral 
adaptations of the landscape.  Chapter Six outlined the doctrine of assimilation in 
French colonial policy which was based on the apparent ‘respect for and 
preservation of distinctive local cultures, even cultural differences among 
indigenous people, including tribal councils and historic monuments’ (Wright, 1991, 
pg. 73-74).  The ‘visual language’ of Marché Kermel reflects a period of ‘stylistic 
hesitation’ during which the French borrowed architectural motifs from North Africa 
in accordance with the doctrine of association (Bigon & Sinou, 2013, pg. 714-718). 
The architecture of Kermel consists of the appropriation of North African (Morocco, 
Algeria) vernacular elements in the making of the neo-Moorish architectural 
tradition. For the French, this region (Northern Africa) demonstrated a 
‘certain degree of civilisation’ and became the subject of ‘considerable 
anthropological and scientific interest’ (Bigon & Sinou, 2013, pg. 714). The neo-
 
119 Derrida, 2006 
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Moorish style (known as Arabisances) is visible on the façade of Kermel in the horse-
shoe entrances adapted from Islamic architecture in a ‘decorative synthesis’ 
between two aesthetic traditions - that of the indigenous, colonised societies, and 
that of the modern metropole (Bigon & Sinou, 2013, pg. 714). In the colonial mindset, 
the prevalence of Islam in both regional colonies justified the use of North African 
design motifs in a sub-Saharan context. The apparent ‘respect for Islamic culture’ 
was evidenced in the use of indigenous Moroccan motifs in official buildings in 
Rabat as a ‘formal homage’ to Moroccan culture and a strategy for subduing hostility 
towards the colonial administration (Wright, 1991, pg. 1).  
 
Another iterance of the colonial past that continues to haunt the landscape of Dakar 
is the development of the neo-Sudanese architectural style in the 1930s. In Dakar, 
the buildings designed in this style include Marché Sandaga, the Cathedral of 
African Memory, the Maternity Hospital, IFAN (Museum of 
the Institut Francais d’Afrique Noire) and the Polyclinic in the Médina (Figure 39). 
Colonial administrators struggled to draw inspiration from the ‘vernacular mud (also 
called adobe or banco) straw structures’ of the Senegalese landscape 
that were dismissed as ‘primitive’ (Weithas, 1932, 114; Prussin, 1985). 
 
Figure 39: Musée de l'Institut Fondamental d'Afrique Noire (Author's own photograph, 2017) 
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The origins of the neo-Sudanic style are not from the local context and can be traced 
to the mud mosques in Mali (Western Sudan) and neighbouring countries. The 
mosque of Djenne, located in one of the oldest cities and major centres of commerce 
in SSA, provides the best example of the design motifs of this building style.  Key 
elements of this architectural tradition include ‘monumentality, massing which 
conveys the sense of being solidly built,’ and the use of mud as the primary building 
material along with an infrastructure of wood (Shaw, 2006, pg. 64). Developed in the 
l920s/30s, the neo-Sudanese/neo-Sudanic style reflects a brief period in history 
when colonial authorities sought to legitimise their presence by exhibiting, in a 
concrete manner, continuity between precolonial African societies and the colonial 
empire120. Much like previous experiments with the neo-Moorish architectural style, 
the neo-Sudanese architectural tradition was invented to pay tribute to local culture 
under the new doctrine of association. Components of this architectural style were 
repackaged in order to suit the needs of the colonial administration. The neo-
Sudanese architectural style never developed beyond an ‘embryonic and hesitant 
enterprise, sometimes vague in terms of stylistic coherence’ (Bigon & Sinou, 2013, 
pg. 721).  
 
The resulting architectural hybrids of these stylistic experiments were not based on 
an accurate ‘historicism’ but instead represented an amalgamation of various visual 
sources subjected to western logics. This trend was seen throughout the colonial 
world and remains visible in many postcolonial countries. In British India, this took 
the form of Indo-Saracenic architecture (Davies, 1985), while in Mandate Palestine, 
the Moorish style was blended with ‘romantic Semitism’ by Jewish architects 
(Kalmar, 2001).  Under the guise of conserving indigenous customs, the doctrine of 
association ‘mummified’ indigenous culture by shielding it from European 
influences that included ‘dangerous political ideas such as democratic 
representation and self-determination’ (Morton, 2000, pg. 190). Sandaga and Kermel 
therefore stand as self-congratulatory exercises for the French colonial 
administration in their clin d’oeil to indigenous culture, or as Hobsbawm calls this 
form of architecture - the ‘great new rituals of self-congratulation’. The use of 
architecture as an ‘ideological transmitter’ (Wright, 1991) recalls the underlying 
 
120 Engineering acquiescence through architecture is reminiscent of the ‘social contract’ of 
housing example on pg. 189 
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motives of the 1862 masterplan in which the grandeur and design of buildings 
imparted European ‘models of command’ and dictated ‘modern’ behaviour to an 
awestruck African population. Architecture thus becomes a form of governance to 
the African psyche and, in so doing, ‘modernises’ African ‘thought and conduct’ 
(Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983, pg. 220).   
 
The examination of these architectural styles and hybrids is relevant to the analysis 
of urban planning because it reveals that the ‘studied neglect or denial of a discrete, 
variable architecture in Africa’ permeates plans of the modern era (Prussin, 1974, 
pg. 183). Africa, south of the Sahara, was viewed as an architectural ‘terre vierge’ 
(virgin land) during colonial times as ‘traditional’ African built form could not be 
‘described, let alone valued’ (Lagae, 2008, pg. 18). Today, the designers of the 
Diamniadio masterplan claim to draw inspiration from African culture, architecture 
and built form in the design of the futuristic satellite city. For example, the ‘sharp 
curves and sloping lines’ of the buildings in Diamniadio supposedly ‘mimic the 
amorphous patterns of algae in a nearby lake, as well as the silhouettes of traditional 
female sculptures’ (Bakri, Semer Group, 2018). The building materials include 
copper, ‘an element found in the earth’s crust’ as a way of recalling the natural 
landscape121 (ibid) (Figure 40). The majority of the structures, however, are made up 
of the materials of vernacular western modernity: steel, glass and concrete. 
Interestingly, Prussin (1974, pg. 192) argues that African built form is remarkable 
because of the ‘absence [emphasis added] of any need for concrete permanence’ 
(Prussin, 1974, pg. 192). Aside from stone ruins of some medieval cities, there is ‘little 
evidence for architecture in permanent materials’ as permanence exists ‘perhaps 
only insofar as it marks the ‘place’ made sacred by ancestral habitation’ (Prussin, 
1974, pg. 204). Thus, the architectural styles observed in the city and in the renders 
of the future city only hint at African forms without being ‘wholly African’ (Shaw, 
2006, pg. 87). So, ‘whose ‘Africa’ was[is] this meant to be?’ and ‘what were[are] the 
political purposes of this synthesizing aesthetic?’ (Roberts, 2004, pg. iii).  
 
Today, African cities are, to an extent, defined by the absence of permanence, a 
prerequisite for Mumford who identified ‘permanent settlement’ as a defining 
 
121 See discussion on assemblage and building materials on pg. 78 
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feature of the city. The lives of many city dwellers are built on impermanent 
settlements and their way of life is often characterised by the ‘temporariness’ of 
social arrangements (Appadurai, 2003). While this impermanence may have 
preceded the colonial moment, it was engineered by the colonial administration who 
prevented the African populations from settling permanently within the borders of 
the city. Today, the displacement of people and destruction of slums extends this 
practice of enforced impermanence122. However, the analysis demonstrates that the 
‘absence of a stable system of places’ does not prevent urbanisation but instead 
demonstrates that the processes of ‘renewal, rejuvenation, and rebirth’ are integral 
to ‘cityness’ (Prussin, 1974, pg. 205).  
 
 
Figure 40: Diamniadio Lake City (BAD Consultants, 2018) 
 
122 See Wirth and Mumford definition of a city on pg. 58 
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These architectural forms are a testimony to the history of experimentation and 
cultural appropriation which culminate in the hybridisation of urban form and 
function. These cultural hybrids, of which there are many in Dakar, represent what 
Hobsbawm (1983, pg. 1) calls ‘invented tradition’;   
‘…a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly 
accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek 
to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by 
repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the 
past.’   
Hybridisation is an important metaphor for understanding the urban 
transformations underway in Dakar and Diamniadio. Observations during fieldwork 
suggest that the neo-Sudanese heritage of Dakar is not a thing of the past. Alongside 
historical buildings, recently built or rehabilitated buildings such as Hôpital Dantec, 
renovated in 2017/18, feature neo-Sudanese architectural motifs (Figure 
41). Furthermore, present-day Sandaga market has also been further ‘hybridized’ 
both in terms of its physical appearance and the nature of the activities unfolding 
within and around this space. While the building retains its monumentality, smalls 
stalls set up around the structure accommodate the ‘legions of shopkeepers who 
want or need to be located in such an important place’ (Shaw, 2006, pg. 106). In many 
instances, the vendors who have installed themselves around the periphery 
of Sandaga have ‘cemented’ their presence – both figuratively and materially - 
through the construction of informal concrete shops that sell textiles, cassettes, 
DVDs, fresh produce, meat, and spices. A space that was once highly regulated as 
a rare meeting space between Africans and Europeans has arguably been re-
appropriated and subjected to the needs of Africans – in a ‘wholly African’ 
way.  Therefore, the colonial built legacy ‘no longer belongs to those who built it, but 
rather to those who inhabit it’ (Lagae, 2008, pg. 15).  
 
The physical evolution of spaces therefore provides an interesting restatement of 
‘grey spacing’ given the blend of ‘white’ (colonial) and ‘black’ (African) memories 
that ‘cannot be reduced to a simple juxtaposition, just as colonial history cannot be 
written simply in ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ terms’ (Lagae, 2008, pg. 14). Sandaga and 
Kermel arguably represent a space for competing modernities or an arena in which 
the historical allure of modernity is confronted with the realities of the city. The 
colonial layers are now arguably ‘subjected to the corrosive uniformity brought 
about by the neo-colonial one’ – a process that will be examined as we continue to 
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explore the evolution of Place Kermel and Marché Sandaga (de Carlo, 1983, pg. 74). 
These invented traditions represent strategic manipulations of the built 
environment, evoking at once both the monumentality of the colonial administration 
but also paying tribute to the ‘local’ indigenous cultures. The ongoing physical 
transformations of the landscape, including the rehabilitation of colonial structures 
and the future designs and renders of Diamniadio, demonstrate that these 
manipulations of the built environment are at work in present-day Dakar. 
 
ii. Global linkages  
Any amount of time spent in Dakar, and in the spaces examined in this research 
project, reveals the continued involvement of foreign elements in the socio-spatial 
structures and infrastructures of the city. While colonialism represents a clear and 
easily identifiable example in which narratives of development and growth were 
imposed on the urban fabric of the city, recent trends in global linkages point to the 
influence of new global actors in shaping the urban development of the city. 
 
A Chinese supermarket  
Around Place Kermel, the ground floors of most buildings have small stores offering 
day-to-day necessities (i.e. milk, water, bread, etc.), a travel agency, and an Orange 
Figure 41: Hôpital Dantec (Author's own photograph, 2017) 
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tele-boutique which offers prepaid telephone cards and key cutting services. One of 
the storefronts located opposite Marché Kermel is displayed entirely in simplified 
Chinese which, upon consultation with native speakers, was translated to ‘China’ on 
the left, ‘market’ on the right and ‘supermarket’ across the top (Figure 42). The fact 
that the storefront is written entirely in simplified Chinese begs the question of who 
exactly the signage is meant for or if, perhaps, the presence of a Chinese 
supermarket in such a prime location is so common an occurrence that it doesn’t 
necessitate an explanation for anyone other than the researcher. The store offers a 
vast array of Chinese groceries and household goods (food and household products, 
many of which don’t have any French or English translation on the packaging) and 
appears to be managed by three attendants – one Senegalese and two Chinese.   
 
The presence of a Chinese business in this central location reflects the increasing 
importance of China as a development partner in Senegal but also demonstrates the 
effect of an influx of Chinese merchants as competitors to African businesses in 
Figure 42: Chinese supermarket (Author's own photograph, 2017) 
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Dakar. Through the scope of southern urbanism (Corrective mainstream 1) and 
everyday urbanism (Corrective mainstream 2), the analysis considers the 
implications of the Chinese supermarket in Place Kermel as a starting point for 
understanding the involvement of new actors in the development of Dakar.   
 
At the local level, the advent of Chinese traders in Dakar has contributed to 
considerable changes in the city’s informal economy in the development of new 
relationships of ‘competition, complementarity and cooperation’ (Haugen, 2011, pg. 
173). The increased presence of Chinese merchants in Dakar markets has arguably 
changed the rules of the traditional ‘bazaar’ or ‘souk’ economy. In some instances, 
Chinese traders have all but replaced African merchants such as in Gare Petersen 
where they operate nearly 90 per cent of shops in a commercial centre arranged for 
Senegalese vendors relocated from the city centre (Scheld, 2010, pg. 153). The main 
base of operations for Chinese merchants is the Boulevard de General de Gaulle 
(Allée des Centenaires); a central location connecting the city centre to the 
residential areas of Grand Dakar, including HLM and SICAP, and located close to 
Dakar’s major markets and supplies Sandaga, Colobane and other markets with 
cheap goods. Interestingly, the patterns of occupation of urban space observed 
throughout Dakar and, particularly, in Kermel and Sandaga suggest that Chinese 
businesses are replicating existing patterns of ‘secondary production’123 
(DeCerteau, 1984). Secondary production is articulated through the use of space and 
objects in a manner different to their ‘original intended use’ (ibid). For example, the 
transformation of garages into Chinese-owned sewing workshops, hair salons, 
restaurants or shops that replicate the existing Senegalese ‘economies of piracy’ 
(Simone, 2006) by subverting urban space to the logics of informality.  
 
The advent of the Chinese traders in Dakar has been a double-edged sword, 
particularly for young people who operate in increasingly competitive markets. On 
the one hand, goods and business from China are ‘particularly appropriate for small-
scale African entrepreneurs’ including ‘low-cost motorcycles and solar chargers, 
cheap and easily repairable tractors and other types of mechanised farming 
equipment, machinery for packaging, metalworking and woodworking’ (Mbembe, 
 
123 See ‘economies of piracy’ on pg. 88 
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Cityscapes, 2015, pg. 9-10). The low cost of Chinese commodities has enabled new 
urban actors to ‘take up trade with a decisively lower entry barrier’ by opening up 
new spaces for ‘emerging social actors,’ and by hiring local youth who gain access 
to commodities for ‘their own independent business endeavours’124 (Marfaing & 
Thiel, 2013, pg. 655). Thus, the city has seen the growth of a new merchant class 
consisting of Chinese traders and merchants and their Senegalese employees (as 
observed during the fieldwork visit to the Chinese supermarket in Kermel).   
 
On the other hand, the presence of cheap Chinese goods has meant that the local 
artisanal industry in Dakar has suffered. The National Union of Traders and 
Industrialists of Senegal (UNACOIS) denounces the negative effect of Chinese 
businesses and goods on the local economy and the environment. The prices 
charged by the Chinese traders are in direct competition with those of the 
Senegalese merchants of Sandaga, Tilène and HLM markets. Marfaing (2019, pg. 10) 
provides an interesting restatement of this phenomenon. While craftsmen have 
undoubtedly suffered the effects of increasing competition from cheap Chinese 
imports, she argues that competitivity has encouraged Dakarois artisans to renew 
their artistic styles by modernising local know-how and adapting it to the needs of a 
‘globalised population.’ This is evident in the ways Senegalese youth harness the 
consumption ideologies of modernity rooted in the imaginaries of the western 
middle class and subvert them to the needs of Senegalese identity – e.g. the 
purchase of boubous that follow the latest trends for cultural and religious 
occasions. The involvement of Chinese merchants in traditional markets has, 
therefore, allowed for the Dakarois to negotiate access to the materiality of a 
globalised modernity and enabled many whose incomes are limited to meet their 
household needs. Chinese involvement in African economies may therefore be 
thought of as a gateway to a globalised modernity. 
 
On a national and regional scale, state-owned and private Chinese corporations 
constitute a ‘second form of Chinese presence in African cities’ which suggests an 
‘expansion of the geography of transnational capitalism in Africa’ (Harrison & Yang, 
Cityscapes, 2015). However, the influence of Chinese involvement in African 
 
124 The neoliberal rhetoric of self-entrepreneurship circulated by the World Bank (see pg. 89) 
is made possible by the increasing involvement of Chinese actors in African economies. 
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economies extends beyond the usual effects of bilateral trade and has, for example, 
enabled African countries to ‘foist tougher terms on Western rrms’ (Wallis 
and Burgis, 2010; Haugen, 2011, pg. 163). The increased involvement of China in sub-
Saharan African countries, like Senegal, falls within the scope of South-South 
Cooperation. The United Nations defines South-South cooperation (SSC) as 
‘a process whereby two or more developing countries pursue 
their individual and/or shared national capacity development 
objectives through exchanges of knowledge, skills, 
resources and technical know-how, and through regional 
and interregional collective actions, including partnerships 
involving governments, regional organizations, civil society, 
academia and the private sector, for their individual and/or 
mutual benefit within and across regions. South-South 
cooperation is not a substitute for, but rather a complement 
to, North-South cooperation’ (Nairobi Outcome Document, 
2009).  
Academic literature on SSC suggests that it is unique development in the 
geopolitics of ‘postcolonial solidarity’ between southern nations that leverage their 
difference from the north in the negotiation of economic treaties (Mawdsley, 2012, 
pg. 257).  Chinese policy couches its involvement in African economies under the 
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence125. A key element of Chinese involvement 
with African countries is the emphasis on China’s status as a ‘developing’ and 
‘emerging’ nation in which ‘domestic modernisation remains incomplete’ (Dehart, 
2012, pg. 1366). Partnerships between China and African countries are based on 
shared histories and experiences, ‘structural positioning and values among 
developing nations, especially in terms of the desire for sovereignty and equality’ 
(ibid, pg. 1367). The ‘south’ of SSC is therefore harnessed not as a geographical 
designation but rather as a shared concept speaking to the global dichotomy 
between the developed and developing world.126  
 
 
125 (1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty (2) Mutual non-
aggression. (3) Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs. (4) Equality and 
cooperation for mutual benefit. (5) Peaceful co-existence (UN Treaty Series, 1958). 






On a national level, China127 explains the development cooperation between 
southern nations as a mutually beneficial arrangement that enables countries like 
Ghana, Senegal and Zambia to ‘redeem their honour and status by providing 
resources, investment opportunities and markets’ (Mawdsley, 2012, pg. 264). Some 
claim that China’s ‘scramble [emphasis added] for unfettered access to Africa’s 
resources as well as her markets’ (Lee, 2006, pg. 303) is reminiscent of Europe’s 
mercantilist and exploitative patterns of expansion in its colonial relations with 
Africa. Others argue that China ‘with its impressive national development record, is 
more capable than any Western country of leading Africa out of poverty’ (Haugen, 
2011, pg. 164). China and Africa’s shared experiences as developing countries lends 
China credibility as a development partner for African countries. For example, 
Chinese urbanisation has been marked by the trend of ‘urbanisation without 
citizenship,’ as newcomers to the city are ‘integrated into the city as workers but 
denied entry as political bodies’ (Short, 2017, pg. 3). This description recalls the 
experience of the déguerpis of Dakar and the establishment of Pikine which saw 
displaced or newly-settled urban inhabitants negotiate their insertion into ‘the city’ 
despite living within ‘city’ limits. A third camp argues that China’s aim is simply to 
maintain the status quo and therefore engage with the African continent in the way 
of western countries (i.e. exploitative and patronising) (Haugen, 2011, pg. 164). As 
the relationship between China and African continues to evolve, an undeniable 
effect of these emerging partnerships is the reinsertion of ‘Africa’ into the heart of 
discussions from which it has been historically excluded as the purveyor of 
discordant globalisation and divergent urbanism. 
 
Whether the involvement of China in African development represents a shift from 
the status quo or simply a new form of the same exploitation is not yet clear. 
Historically, aid has been given ‘exclusively by the richer, industrialised countries of 
the North to the poor, needy, backward countries of the south’ (Mawdsley, 2012, pg. 
261). Northern agents are therefore constructed as ‘carers who are active 
and generous’ while southern actors are ‘cared for, passive and grateful’ (Silk, 2004, 
pg. 230). Recently, however, non-DAC (Development Assistance Committee) 
 
127 China has set out its foreign policy principles in the Beijing Declaration of the China-
Africa Cooperation Forum in 2000, and the People's Republic of China's (PRC) white paper 
on Foreign Aid  
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countries such as China, India, Taiwan, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Brazil have been 
supplying aid to other southern countries which appears to be changing the rules of 
the (development) game (Kharas, 2007, pg. 7). Edemariam (2008, pg. 31) suggests 
that when combined with the lasting effects of the 2008 economic recession, the 
emerging status quo undermines the development model set up in Truman’s 1948 
speech;  
‘[Moreover] all that wealth that has accumulated in China, in 
the Middle East and Russia—that shifts the balance of 
rnancial power massively in their direction. ... If the Chinese 
got their act together, and they wanted to, they could, at this 
moment, buy the entire US banking system. ...Which is an 
extraordinary thing—it’s something that none of us could 
have predicted a few years ago.’  
China’s increasing involvement in southern countries such as Senegal has arguably 
contributed to the narrative that ‘the west has lost power to shape the world in its 
own image’ (Mishra, 2014). China’s economic growth in the last few decades has 
‘ostensibly validated’ the effectiveness of its development strategy as an example for 
other nations to follow; the model rejects the ‘standard package’ of policies 
promulgated by bilateral and multilateral development institutions, making it a 
‘serious ideological threat to the West in particular’ (Dehart, 2012, pg. 1364). Thus, a 
new paradigm begins to emerge – one that suggests that southern countries, 
formerly dependent on and subject to the conditionalities of northern aid, are 
turning towards increased SSC as a cornerstone of their development.  
 
Today, China is Senegal’s most important foreign investor, with nearly USD 1.6 bn 
invested in the country (Haque, 2018). Aside from the unmistakable presence of 
Chinese businesses throughout Dakar, Chinese investment is visible in their 
publicised involvement in the construction of large-scale projects such as the 
Léopold Sédar Senghor Stadium, the National Theatre and the Black Civilization 
Museum. Chinese influence in the transformation of the landscape of Dakar 
(evidenced in the example of Place Kermel) reflects China’s role in challenging the 
development binary that has hitherto determined the status quo; ‘just as 
globalisation is shrinking the world, China is shrinking the West. China is quietly 
helping to remake the landscape of international development’ (Halper, 2010, pg. 26). 
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Throughout different levels of society128, we see the influence of China on the 
narratives and outcomes of development;  
‘The young street vendor who gravitates around the urban 
markets, taking advantage of the presence of small Chinese 
merchants, the merchant who imports his containers of 
goods made in China, through the big entrepreneur who 
invests in solar energy or construction, or the States that 
entrust the construction of their infrastructure and the 
extraction of their raw materials to Chinese companies, all 
look increasingly (also) to China, which has become a 
benchmark or an alternative to Europe. Thus, these 
entrepreneurs allow another perception than that conveyed 
by the West’ (Marfaing, 2019, pg.6). 
Consequently, the Chinese arguably position themselves as the purveyors of a ‘new’ 
modernity, made in China, which undermines the western model that has hitherto 
determined the evolution of southern cities (Bridet et al., 2018, pg. 8). 
 
 
128 See example of global and local mediated by ‘the urban’ on pg. 285 
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A Moroccan bank  
 
The CBAO (Compagnie Bancaire de l’Afrique Occidentale) agency, located in 
Place Kermel, was rehabilitated in 2006 and retained much of its original colonial 
architecture, updated only to suit the needs of a modern bank (i.e. reinforced 
windows, gated entrance, etc.) (Figure 43). Founded by Napoleon III in 1853, before 
the official colonisation of Dakar, the CBAO was originally named Banque du 
Senegal (Bank of Senegal) and backed by Louis Faidherbe as the first local credit 
institution that lifted the dependence of Senegalese traders on French financiers. 
An agency was opened in Gorée in 1867, in Rufisque in 1899 and the headquarters 
were transferred from Saint-Louis to Dakar in 1884 as the latter gained increasing 
prominence. Following independence in the 1960s, the Bank continued to gain 
influence and merged with the First National City Bank of New York to create 
the International Bank of West Africa (Banque Internationale 
pour l’Afrique Occidentale) in 1965. Changing its name once again in 1993, the Bank 
Figure 43: Compagnie Bancaire de l'Afrique Occidentale (Archnet, 2006) 
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became the Compagnie Bancaire de l’Afrique Occidentale. In 2006, the Bank 
merged with the Moroccan Attijariwafa Bank to form ‘Attijari Bank 
Senegal.’ Attijariwafa Bank is a Moroccan bank, headquartered in Casablanca and 
one of the largest banks in Africa (Media24, 2016). The prominent presence of the 
CBAO Attijariwafa Bank in the heart of the city along with other Moroccan-funded 
infrastructural projects across the city (e.g. port de Soumbedioune) reflect the 
continued influence of Morocco in the urban development of Dakar and points to 
another instance of south-south cooperation in the city.  
 
Previous chapters examined the ways in which the French colonial administration 
replicated much of their North African experience (in Rabat and Casablanca, 
specifically) in the development of Dakar. However, the intermingled histories of 
Morocco and Senegal predate colonial amalgamations of the regions. The historical 
presence of Moroccans/moors in Dakar prior to the arrival of the French, the parallels 
between Dakar and Rabat, and the increasing involvement of the Moroccan 
Kingdom in present-day Senegal suggests a continuity both in physical form and 
cultural and political ties in the postcolonial period. Southern urbanism (Corrective 
mainstream 1) argues that the trade and investment relations between Morocco and 
Senegal are more pertinent examples of SSC to the Chinese model given their 
intermingled histories. Firstly, Mawdsley (2012) suggests that south-south 
development cooperation can be ‘discursively constructed and performatively 
embodied’ through shared experience of ‘colonial exploitation, postcolonial 
inequality and present vulnerability to uneven neoliberal globalisation.’ The colonial 
and postcolonial experiences of Morocco and Senegal are two sides of the same 
coin, as the history of one has directly impacted the history, present and future of 
the other.  Morocco re-joined the African Union in 2017 after 33 years of absence and 
joined the Pan-African Parliament in South Africa in 2018. King Mohammed VI’s 
speech upon Morocco’s admission into the African Union in 2017 lays out the 
Kingdom’s approach towards increased cooperation between African countries;   
‘Africa no longer needs ideological slogans. It needs 
concrete, resolute action in peacebuilding, security and 
human development.  
  
 Morocco has faith in Africa's ability to reinvent itself and to 
unleash a momentum of its own. Given the obvious 
limitations of classic North-South co-operation in the bid to 
rise to the challenge of an emerging Africa, our continent 
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should make greater use of inter-African cooperation and of 
strategic, solidarity-based partnerships between sister 
nations’ (King Mohammed VI’s Speech to 29th AU Heads of 
State and Government Summit, 2017). 
Morocco’s official policy towards increased African cooperation reflects the 
fundamentals of SSC which are partly based on the rejection of hierarchies and an 
‘an insistence on win-win outcomes of South-South development cooperation and 
mutual opportunity’ (Mawdsley, 2012, pg. 263). As southern partners increasingly 
bring their own histories, identities and discourses to the table, the status quo is 
arguably shifting. Thus, the evolving patterns of foreign influence suggest that the 
‘old spell of universal progress’ based on western ideologies has been ‘decisively 
broken’ (which recalls the poem by Césaire in Voices V); 
 …we have been living – in the east and south as well as west 
and north – with vanities and illusions: that Asian and 
African societies would become, like Europe, more secular 
and instrumentally rational as economic growth accelerated; 
that with socialism dead and buried, free markets would 
guarantee rapid economic growth and worldwide prosperity. 
What these fantasies of inverted Hegelianism always 
disguised was a sobering fact: that the dynamics and 
specific features of western ‘progress’ were not and could 
not be replicated or correctly sequenced in the non-west 
(Mishra, 2014). 
It is important, however, not to overstate the scale of the phenomenon as the 
importance of north-south linkages will likely remain the global status quo. Whether 
these new south-south agreements are evidence of an evolving pan-Africanism or a 
strategic move for the Kingdom to gain allies in the stalemate over the perpetually 
contested Western Sahara territory is yet to be determined. These new and 
emerging insights from postcolonial geography are fundamental to developing an 
understanding of the ‘hybridised landscapes’ of economic and political power 
associated with emerging economies, including - and indeed ‘especially in terms of 
their implications for the rest of the global south’ (Mawdsley, 2012, pg. 269).  
 
iii. The (in)formalisation of space  
Whether in the shaky stalls temporarily set up along sidewalks or public parks, the 
bootleg DVDs and imitation designer clothes and accessories, or the freedom to 
haggle and bargain the cost of almost anything, informality dictates the comings 
and goings of the spaces under observation. On the ground, informality is an 
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‘accessible’ concept given its near ubiquity in physical form. As a thematic analysis, 
informality is a particularly challenging topic of inquiry as it is simultaneously 
economic, spatial, political and historical. It represents an interesting duality 
between ‘two logics of structuring space’: the ‘normative logic of the state, 
symbolised by the municipal authorities,’ and the ‘so-called informal logic, which is 
animated by the customary authorities’ (Abdoul, 2005, pg. 357).   
  
The experience of informality in the city was an ordinary experience for an urbanite 
raised in a city where taxi fares are negotiable, fresh fruit and vegetables are sold on 
the side of the road, and where the rules for buying/selling are 
improvised. Sandaga market attracts urban residents from all backgrounds, as well 
as tourists who find any number of goods (e.g. second-hand clothes, artisanal crafts, 
bootleg DVDs, fresh produce, etc.). In this space, a familiarity with the way of life is 
not based on who is foreign to Dakar but rather who is foreign to the practices of 
informality in everyday life. Having previously visited Dakar, the city was not entirely 
foreign territory and proved easy enough to navigate for someone originating from 
its North African counterpart – Rabat, Morocco. Owing to the knowledge acquired 
from prior visits, the presence of other Moroccans in the city, and to the fact that the 
urban landscape had, on first impression, proved strikingly similar to that of Rabat, 
the mere exercise of walking through the city and the selected field sites resonated 
with my ‘urban knowledge’ (Mbembe, 1997). The intertwined histories of Morocco 
and Senegal meant that my presence was, for the most part, unnoticed by locals. In 
fact, many interactions involved a measure of incredulity on the part of locals who 
were surprised at my inability to speak Wolof. Most interactions were conducted in 
the conversational French which is spoken throughout the city. Furthermore, in line 
with the Senghorian ‘Négritude’ vision of Dakar as the capital of Black 
Civilisation and the heart of African heritage, all Africans in Dakar are considered 
‘residents’ (a designation which distinguishes us/them from the ‘toubab’ who, 
despite their historical presence in Dakar, are still generally referred to as ‘les 
Français’ – the French). 
  
In the spaces under observation, the concept of ‘market,’ in the traditional sense as 
a designated area of trade and commerce (i.e. store, shop, mall), seems to be a 
restrictive definition as only one version of consumption practices.  ‘Alternate’ 
markets such as sidewalk stalls, boot sales or traffic jam peddling are just as 
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common in Dakar and cities across the continent (Simone, 2010). Places of 
consumption in the ‘global south’ are not static but are formed by the ebb and flow 
of daily life (e.g. in Sandaga, some vendors set up shop in the same part of the market 
day after day while others move around or change the type of product they sell from 
one day to the next). Historically, markets have played a key role in African cities as 
the ‘centre of gravity’ of urban life (Simone, 2008, pg. 81). Consumption, both in the 
spaces in which it unfolds and the physical transactions it involves, grants insight 
into how people construct their identities, particularly with regards to the 
conception of ‘modernity’ and its link to consumption patterns. Scheld (2007, pg. 
233), for example, argues that young people in Dakar are increasingly 
entrepreneurial individuals and base the ‘authenticity of their cosmopolitan identity 
on an ability to buy and sell (trade) in the urban/global informal economy.’ 
Consumption, according to Baudrillard (1970), dictates the ‘organisation totale de 
la quotidiénneté’ (total organization of daily life); so, what does it mean when 
consumption is, more often than not, an informal practice? 
 
Sandaga is best described as a site of ‘incessant performance, for feigned 
connections and insider deals, for dissimulation of all kinds, for launching 
impressions and information, rumours and advice’ (Simone, 2010, pg. 81). A cursory 
glimpse down the side streets, away from the main avenues, tells a story about daily 
acts of subversion such as defying laws on loitering, and selling black market items 
out in the open. Everyday acts are neither innocent or innocuous, as they provide an 
opportunity for resisting conformity through ‘microbe-like strategies’ (DeCerteau, 
1980, pg. 95). In fact, DeCerteau (1984) argues that an ‘urbanistic system’ that seeks 
to administer or suppress these ‘microbe-like’ tactics only reinforces their 
‘proliferating illegitimacy,’ as they find ways to insinuate themselves within existing 
networks through ‘unreadable but stable tactics’ that constitute ‘everyday 
regulations and surreptitious creativities’ (DeCerteau, 1980, pg. 95). A notable 
example observed during fieldwork occurred at the traffic lights at the intersection 
leading to the Institut Français (French Institute) in the proximity to Sandaga market. 
With great ease and facility and under the watchful eye of a traffic police officer, the 
taxi driver purchased a plastic bag of water and a top-up for his cellular phone. Not 
(fully) breaking the laws on loitering or jay-walking, the informal trader was able to 
conduct his business with the taxi driver within the time it took for the light to go 
from red to green. These small examples of ‘secondary production’ (DeCerteau, 
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1984) demonstrate the ways in which subjects develop ‘microbe-like’ strategies and 
appropriate public spaces within the city to suit their needs. During the brief and 
seemingly mundane interaction, urban informality was revealed as an ‘organising 
urban logic’ and the urban actors were clearly privy to the rules of the game 
(AlSayyad & Roy, 2003, pg. 5).  
 
At the masterplan level, these emerging geographies and ‘velocities of circulation, 
shifting circuitries of cross-purposes, collision and complicity, oscillating vectors of 
the political’ are not legible to ‘hegemonic regimes of visibility’ and often overlooked 
or ignored (Simone, 2018, pg. 31). Urban life, ‘far from being dystopic’ is typified by 
an ‘apparent exuberance of the everyday,’ where models of self-organising, produce 
new interpretations of urban cultures and ‘modes of transmitting their efficacy to 
the city polity at large’ (Enwezor, 2003, pg. 18). The local and international linkages 
of urban dwellers and their development of infrastructures beyond the frameworks 
of ‘formality’ and ‘legality’ are not captured by masterplans. In much of SSA, 
postcolonial governments view informality as ‘synonymous with illegality, 
inefficiency or unproductive chaos’ and aspire to the ‘clean Western urban models’ 
as ‘the antidote’ (Watson & Agbola, 2013, pg. 8). This definition, however, is 
reductive and fails to consider the role of informality which was ‘discernible in 
precolonial African cities, perpetuated and consolidated during the colonial period, 
and have developed - and finally exploded - in the postcolonial period, notably within 
the residential, social, and professional dimensions’ (Abdoul, 2005, pg. 339).  
 
The informal, seen solely through an economic lens of regulation, contributes to a 
‘black box’ view of informality which renders invisible the ‘multiple power relations 
and the solidarity principles at work within it’ (Lourenco-Lindell, 2002, pg. 5). 
Informality does not ‘develop in a vacuum’ and originates in the global and local 
forces that have shaped its development (Scheld, 2010, pg. 157). Furthermore, 
informal economies, often viewed on the surface as local or ‘vernacular’ are actually 
‘extensively internationalised’ and embedded within global processes (Lindell, 2002, 
pg. 22). For example, the preponderance of signs mentioning or relating to Touba, 
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holy site of the Mourides brotherhood129 on a variety of storefronts in and around 
Sandaga, points to the ‘transnationalism’ of informal networks. The Mourides are 
important actors in Dakar whose spheres of influence extend beyond the city as local 
Sandaga-based activities are linked to broader global processes. Studies on 
the Mourides trading diaspora in the USA and France reveal that it is a ‘self-
sustaining system of networks linking ties of belonging and trade’ that span over 
several continents. The vendors who display their link with or connection to 
the Mourides brotherhood in Sandaga are signalling their integration into a larger 
network in which Dakar is a hub (like Paris or New York City). In the process of 
developing expansive linkages, the Mourides are demonstrating the ‘plurality of 
cosmopolitanism’ (Werbner, 1999) of which informality is an integral part. On 
the Mourides, Diouf (2000, pg. 702) wrote;    
‘In the Mourides case, there is neither a dissolution of the 
local in the global nor an annexation of the latter by the 
former. Rather, the Mourides experience involves 
constructing original texts and images that establish 
themselves at the heart of the world, and by so doing create 
new forms of cosmopolitanism whose manifestations no 
longer refer necessarily and obligatorily to the acquisition of 
an identity through assimilation but, rather, to the display of 
a unique identity added to global temporality and not simply 
informed by the Western trajectory of modernity alone. The 
Mourides diaspora in the world, precisely because it 
presents itself in the mode of a ritual community, participates 
in this plural representation of the world on the basis 
of unique achievements.’  
By integrating the Mourides brotherhood, urban dwellers insinuate themselves into 
a ‘vast network of patronage and protection that the Mourides have woven into the 
Senegalese economy’ (Guibbert, 1983, pg. 83). Thus, far from ‘behaving in an 
anarchic fashion,’ this example demonstrates how urban agents base their 
behaviour on ‘widely understood and accepted, if informal, rules for social 
interaction’ (Rakodi in Enwezor Ed., 2003, pg. 46). Networks developed within the 
market are maintained through the ‘reproduction of the normative systems of the 
market, as it serves to uphold particular subject positions in relation to other 
networked actors, institutions and practices’ (Marfaing & Thiel, 2013, pg. 650). These 
 
129 The Mourides order was founded in the 1880s by Cheick Amadou Bamba and has its 
capital at Touba, the site of his revelation, where Mourides have constructed the 
largest mosque in sub-Saharan Africa (Riccio, 2004, pg. 934).  
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‘networks of accumulation’ (Meagher, 2006) are distinguishable from ‘networks of 
survival’ (Marfaing & Thiel, 2013, pg. 650). In this example, the notion of ‘informality 
as currency’ reveals that informal activities are ‘composed of relations that extend 
well beyond the ‘local’ and connect places together in ways that are not anticipated 
by urban theory’ (Marx & Kelling, 2019, pg. 16).  
 
Interestingly, the fieldwork conducted in Sandaga and Kermel reflects a drive 
towards a formalisation of informality. After nearly seven years of construction, 
Centre Felix Eboué, a complex dedicated to the street vendors of Dakar was 
inaugurated by the Mayor of Dakar in 2017. Colloquially referred to as 
‘Khadimou Rassoul,’ the centre is designed to accommodate nearly 3,000 vendors. 
In addition, the centre also contains a bank agency, a cafeteria area, a mosque and 
a commercial plateau of 60 m2. The site has modern conveniences, such as video 
surveillance, remote monitoring, and access control. Soham El Wardini, first 
municipal councillor of the city of Dakar, and representative of Mayor Khalifa Sall 
said in an interview in 2017; ‘since 2009, we have toured the markets of Dakar to 
converse with and explain to the traders the need to reorganise them. This [Centre 
Felix Eboué] is one of the achievements and among one of the three centres under 
construction. This modern shopping centre is divided into four three-storey 
blocks, taking into account the diversity of the merchants by making available to 
them canteens and boxes distributed in a manner perfectly aligned with the 
specialisation of activities and functional zoning.’ Yet, despite the attempts of 
‘recasement’ – to situate informal merchants in a designated space within the city, 
the continued presence and effervescence of marchands ambulants in the city is 
palpable. In the formalisation of space, the rationalities of the state, articulated 
through municipalities that impose ‘hierarchies of authority and specific rules and 
procedures about how those practices are going to work with each other,’ ignore 
existing networks rendering them incompatible with socio-spatial infrastructures 
(Simone, 2018, pg. 35). Thus, the processes of formalisation in Dakar fall within the 
scope of Avni and Yiftachel’s (2014) stages of urban policy response discussed in 
the context of vitalist ontologies (Corrective mainstream 2). While the colonial and 
postcolonial state initially ignored, neglected and sought to contain or limit the 
spread of informality throughout the city, the modern-day state has made efforts 
towards selectively ‘whitening’ the grey spaces of informality through 




 iv. The neoliberalisation of space  
The influence of global processes is palpable in the articulation of narratives of 
globalisation and development in the built environment and socio-spatial structures 
of the city. Like many cities across the continent, Dakar has become a hub for new 
modernisation projects and a site for continued and increased real estate 
speculation. The increased involvement of international and ‘economic non-state 
actors in the production of the city’ reaffirms the hegemony of the ‘politico-economic 
elite’ in a new assemblage of urban governance (Choplin & Ciavolella, 2017, pg. 
324).  In the ‘global south,’ the neoliberalisation of urban space translates to the 
‘financialization of everything’ as the ‘the planet as building site’ clashes with the 
‘planet of slums’ (Keil, 2018, pg. 7).  




The neoliberalisation of space in Dakar is evident in Place Kermel in which the 
significance of this space is reimagined through the scope of new and often 
contradictory paradigms. Place Kermel is home to the new Projet Lacoste which 
offers a ‘mixed program of retail, leisure facilities, a hotel (the first Hyatt in ‘black 
Africa’) and events centre superimposed on each other from the ground to the 
fourteenth floor, on top of two basement parking levels’ (Lacaton & Vassal, 
2018).  The project is presented as a ‘high class’ locale in an historical setting for the 
‘discerning’ metropolitan (Figure 44). The glass building stands in stark contrast to 
the neo-Moorish market and even more so in comparison to the informal stalls 
littered around the hexagonal square. Even in its unfinished state, this building 
appears to be grafted on the landscape and does not reflect any of the architectural 
motifs of adjacent buildings. 
 
The promotional pictures for this project feature a sanitised and idealised version of 
Place Kermel without informal stalls, overflowing dumpsters and crumbling colonial 
buildings. Instead, we see a picture of pristine glass and concrete modernity 
effortlessly blended with the ‘history’ of Dakar given its proximity to Kermel. The 
project uses space as an ‘object of cultural consumption for tourists, for 
aestheticism, avid for spectacles and the picturesque’ (Madden, 2011, pg. 782). 
Thus, even the historical importance of Kermel, as a remnant of history, is 
financialised in the process of imbuing the space with an artificial and imagined 
quality that is directly relevant to the monetisation of space. Space is thus taken 
apart, ‘exchanged (sold) in bits and pieces’ (Lefebvre, 1995; Keil, 2018, pg. 
8). Modernity is manifested here at the intersection of the new and the residual 
‘stemming from a different time, histories, and cultural conventions’ (Harootunian, 
2000, pg. 62-3). The implantation of Projet Lacoste reveals that, at the centre of 
everyday life, lies the spectre of uneven development, engendered by capitalism as 
it ‘enters societies at different moments and different rates of intensity’ (ibid, pg. 57). 
Absent from these visions of modernity, for instance, are the thriving street stalls 
and shops whose local networks generate economic activity for urban residents on 
a daily basis. The renders equate modernity with what is commonly identified as 
‘western’ urban aesthetics or the vernacular of western modernity. Therefore, to 
convey ‘modernity,’ the renders remove the informal elements from the visuals 
depicting the ‘modern’ space of Place Kermel. Urban informality in the ‘north’ is 
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discussed in terms of ‘lack of scale of the phenomena’ which is rooted in ‘fixed 
distinctions between what is aesthetically modern and pleasing and what is 
aesthetically unappealing about urban informality’ (Marx & Kelling, 2019, pg. 23). 
Thus, the ‘grey spaces’ of Kermel are conveniently erased from the renders to 
convey the sense of an ‘aesthetically modern’ space which suggests a planned 
disruption to the psychogeographies of the city (as discussed in Voices II: 
Psychogeographies and ‘cityness’) in the juxtaposition of seemingly contradictory 
aesthetics (ibid).  
 
Lefebvre argued that ‘wherever a dominated space is generated and mastered by a 
dominant space – where there is periphery and centre – there is colonisation’ 
(Lefebvre, 1978, pg. 174). The infrastructural development of Place Kermel reveals 
that the colonisation of space extends beyond the colonial history of the market area 
as new forces (globalising and neoliberal) are entering in direct competition with 
existing place-making politics in a new colonisation of space. 
The neoliberalisation of space results in the ‘gradual displacement of politics itself 
from state institutions to marginal, interstitial and informal sites’ 
(Choplin & Ciavolella, 2018, pg. 315). The postcolonial city, in the thickness and 
complexity of its informal linkages in marginal spaces, becomes a ‘laboratory of new 
mobilizations, of informalities producing the ‘city yet to come’ (Simone, 2004)with 
new kinds of ‘insurgent citizenships’ (Brown, 2015); or, to say it in a postcolonial 
Gramscian fashion, of new forms of politically being-in-the-world (Chatterjee, 2004)’ 
(Choplin & Ciavolella, 2018, pg. 315).  
 
 v. Plebeian public sphere  
Harnessing a rhetoric from the ‘global north’ and testing its veracity in the south, 
this analysis questions whether we are witnessing the evolution of an ‘African 
version’ of Habermas’s (1989) ‘plebeian public sphere’ (Ndjio, 2005, pg. 
267).  Traditionally, public spaces are places of open access and interaction 
unrestricted by the state or commercial forces, but subject to a ‘defined purpose and 
behavioural norms that control those who are allowed to enter’ (Mitchell, 1995, pg. 
115). Throughout a city’s history, the nature and use of public space has been 
disputed by groups who hold incompatible views on the purpose of spaces. Urban 
space is understood here as a ‘meeting-place, of jostling, potentially conflicting, 
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trajectories, set within, and internally constituted through, complex geometries of 
differential power’ (Massey, 2016, pg. 89). For example, market(place)s and public 
spaces are often one and the same in sub-Saharan Africa cities (e.g. street corners, 
public parks and sidewalks have been turned into informal and ‘alternate’ markets), 
which reflects a fundamentally different social reality than that of the traditional 
‘public sphere’ theorised in the ‘global north’ in the work of Habermas.  
 
Studies conducted by Ralph (2008), Simone (2006), and Ismail (2009) have engaged 
with the variable ways in which different groups appropriate public space by finding 
ways to negotiate livelihoods and build social networks within the city. Case studies 
documenting acts of subversive resistance in contemporary Africa demonstrate that 
it takes on ‘highly different forms: pillaging, swindling or criminality (Bayart et al. 
1993; Devisch, 1996; Ndjio, 2001); witchcraft practices (Geschiere, 1997); ethnic 
withdrawal (Geschiere and Nyamnjoh 2001); religious awakening (Meyer, 2001); or 
popular derision (Toulabor 1991).’ The city therefore represented a ‘field of 
contention’ or an ‘arena of conflicts of power’ (Sow, 1983, pg. 45). Informality as a 
politics of subversion means that African public spaces may be read as places in 
which ‘subversion took the place of revolution’ (Trentmann, 2012, pg. 528);  
‘From Filip De Boeck’s (2005) work on the appropriation of the 
dead and funerals in Kinshasa as a way to challenge local 
hierarchies, to studies of youth efforts to take over local 
government councils in Nigeria in an attempt to run local 
affairs in new ways (Adebanwi 2005; Watts 2004), scholars 
have been documenting the intensity of the effort to break 
with the past and the different forms devised for doing so’ 
(Simone, 2008, pg. 83).  
In some instances, informality morphs into a political outcry – the right to be informal 
(particularly when the state has failed the people or undermined efforts at survival 
despite being unable to provide basic urban services). Ndjio (2005) documents the 
ways in which Cameroonians have developed different forms of ‘passive resistance, 
including tampering with water and electricity meters, falsification of telephone 
bills, taxes and other dues, slandering the authorities and rumour-mongering about 
the men in power.’  
 
Even in its deteriorated state, informal vendors still fight vehemently for their right 
to be in or near Sandaga. The market is no longer important solely in terms of its 
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functions since the building itself is defunct, but it is important as a place of 
reckoning. In 2007, riots and protests broke out when Wade’s government ordered 
the eviction of thousands of street vendors who set up stalls in city streets, many of 
whom converge on Sandaga. The market was reimagined as a battlefield as the 
‘spaces and objects of urban life are appropriated as a means of making 
highly particularistic claims and solidifying zones of disengagement’ (Simone, 2008, 
pg. 80). People have therefore taken what is ‘significant about a place (industry, 
history, buildings, literature, environment)’ and depleted it, ‘devoured’ or used it 
over time to suit their needs, as the market is in ruins but still holds critical value in 
the shared imaginaries of urban dwellers (Urry, 2006, pg. 1-2). As with Sandaga, 
public space comes to be occupied by ‘active participants in the drama of civilization 
versus barbarism’ (Jacobs, 2002, pg. 45). By its very nature, this requires users to be 
‘actively engaged in the process of civility’ to contend with the ‘perverse 
consequence of the privatization of residential environments’ in the withdrawal of 
‘many law-abiding participants from this role (Bentley, 1999, pg. 163)’ (Carmona, 
2014, pg. 131).  
 
Sandaga has metaphorical value as a battleground. In Sandaga, commercial and 
state forces have clashed with urban dwellers, making it a site of continued contest 
between oppositional groups throughout the years - informal vendors and the 
government, students and the state. The presence of young people and informal 
vendors en masse in the streets of Dakar, and Sandaga in particular, is indicative of 
deep socioeconomic woes. Young people’s integration into society, in terms of both 
civic responsibility and membership, has had enormous economic, cultural, 
political, and social consequences (Diouf, 2003, pg. 2). In demographic terms, ‘youth’ 
are not only the largest cohort in the city but also across the country and have 
become key players in politics and cultural industries. Young people have 
reimagined the traditional roles of music, language, clothing, and even tea-making, 
challenging prevailing approaches to and interpretations of topics such as 
democratisation, informality, and identity.   Linguistic analyses of the language 
politics of the city reveal changing notions of urban identity originating in Dakar that 
move away from conventional identity tropes focused on ethnicity and religion 
towards a collective urban identity based on common language130 (Dakar Wolof). The 
 
130 The emergence of a new cosmopolitan vernacular (see Bhabha on pg. 45). 
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topic of youth is important not only because it deals with the largest demographic in 
most African countries, including Senegal, but also because young people have 
come to symbolise the:  
‘uneven trajectory of an Africa in search of its rhythm and its 
identity in their willingness to combine violence madness, 
and pleasure, sex and the temptations of religious chastity, 
the desire for autochthony and the impulse to rip themselves 
away from the continent and to erase all attachment to 
history and place’ (Diouf, 2003, pg. 10).   
In Senegalese society, state rhetoric has generally recognized two classes of 
youth: encombrements humains (social obstructions) and 
students. Encombrements humains refers to a category of young people seen as 
marginal, whose lives are supposedly characterized by an ‘affinity for loitering, 
sexual deviance, panhandling, and criminal violence’ (Ralph, 2008, pg. 9). These 
young people migrate to Dakar in search of economic opportunities but end up on 
the streets or in prison because of the ‘often illicit strategies they used to secure a 
living’ (Ralph, 2008, pg. 9). The second class of young people, 
unemployed graduates, constitute a substantial cohort since education is no longer 
a guarantee of employment in a postcolonial context of economic crisis. Poverty and 
unemployment as well as worsening conditions in much of Africa due to economic 
crises and ill-fated SAPs resulted in the proliferation of more illegal peddlers on the 
street and illegal emigration towards Europe, as university diplomas 
and professional qualifications no longer guaranteed jobs. 
 
With a median age of 23, Dakar’s population is, for the most part, young (Mboup et 
al., 2015, pg. 12). Student and youth-led protests are a common occurrence in 
Senegal since the 1980s. Everyday urbanism (Corrective mainstream 3) examines the 
ways in which young people strategically position themselves as visible reminders 
of the failure of the ‘neoliberal dream’ in Senegal. Hence, any discussion of 
contemporary urbanisation in Senegal is integrally tied to the role of youth as agents 
of change, particularly in focal places like Sandaga.  The Set/Setal movement, a 
youth lead social endeavour focused on cleaning up the streets of Dakar, has been 
framed within the scope of Bourdieu’s theory of practice, whereby ‘power and its 
legitimation constitute the essence of social practice and social actors struggle to 
enhance their position and to dominate, oppose or transform their social world’ 
(Bourdieu, 1990; Swartz, 1997). Before 1988, waste management in Dakar was 
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regulated by the state. The system fell apart in the wake of the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes and the hollowing out of the state. Thus, the public version of the 
‘disinvestment process’ resulted in the withdrawal of municipal services, including 
street cleaning, hospitals and police protection (Hartman, 2010, pg. 582). The 
accumulation of waste in public spaces became an indicator of state failure, 
corruption, financial insufficiencies, lack of technical capacity, and an inability to 
keep up with the pace of urbanisation (Fredericks, 2014, pg. 533). The state 
had arguably failed to keep up its end of the ‘social contract’ which incited a 
grassroots movement that sought to cleanse the city of its ‘evident corruption and 
evil’ (Ferguson, 2006, pg. 85). The Set/Setal (‘Be Clean/Make Clean’ in Wolof) began 
in Dakar and saw ordinary citizens, youth in particular, take to the streets in order to 
clean the litter following the withdrawal of the state services131 (O’Brien, 2008, pg. 7). 
These urbanites are the Gramscian ‘velites [foot soldiers] of the proletarian army’ 
that ‘take by storm the ancient citta, rotten and unsteady, in order to make rise, from 
its ruins, their own citta’ (1917, ‘il Grido del Popolo’). 
 
As part of the movement, street names were reclaimed and renamed, walls were 
adorned with intricate frescos telling tales of national struggle. Graffiti painted on 
the walls as part of the Set/Setal campaign demonstrated an ‘appreciation of 
Senegal’s past’ and showed ‘solidarity with African heroes like Nelson Mandela and 
enthusiastically supported the values of democracy and freedom’ (Gellar, 2016, pg. 
17). Other cultural icons included the Statue of Liberty, ‘anti-colonial heroes from 
Senegalese history and football players’ (Gellar, 2016, pg. 18). Diouf (1992, pg. 41) 
describes the movement as an ‘assault against the ruling class and its historicity’ 
which redefines public space as it fashions a ‘new historical memory, one which is 
quintessentially urban.’ In an interview conducted with Chimurenga scholar 
Maya Varichon at Raw Academy in Dakar (Interview April 24, 2017), she frames the 
artistic expressions during Set/Setal as a process of ‘appropriation by drawing.’ By 
combining elements of more ‘traditional’ cultural forms of art with the symbolic act 
of painting, the youth of Set/Setal were not only reclaiming their right to the city but 
 





carving out a space in which they could tell a story different to the dominant 
narratives of neoliberalisation and western modernity. In fact, Varichon (2017) 
suggests that Set/Setal was a moment in time when a rural mindset was 
‘reproduced’ in the city, challenging dichotomies between the modern and 
traditional in the ways that people ‘take care’ of the public space132. Village units and 
their concomitant mentalities were harnessed in the city-centre as well as 
in Ouakam, Fass and Fann to appropriate spaces and reject dominant paradigms. 
   
Diouf (2003) describes youth movements in Senegal as a process whereby the 
‘total disillusionment of politics among youth’ led them to ‘claim their own form of 
democracy rather than accepting what is available through party politics’ (Selboe, 
2010, pg. 370). By transforming their social world, cleaning and inscribing the streets 
of Dakar, young people, once dismissed as troublesome elements within society, 
were able to display their power for change and, in the process, expose the 
powerlessness of the state to make good on its promises in their ‘symbolic 
transformation of the city’ (McLaughlin, 2001, pg. 54). In their willingness to embrace 
their power for ‘autogestion’ (Lefebvre, 1970) urban citizens compensated for state 
ineptitude, appropriating both physical spaces and societal roles previously 
monitored and controlled by the state. Thus, the appropriation of space forces us to 
rethink the idea of ‘rightful ownership’ and transform the way we ponder who 
‘rightfully owns the city’ – particularly in contexts where the use and control of space 
is so contested (Purcell, 2013, pg. 149).  Autogestion is only possible in a historical 
moment when the state withers away (Lefebvre, 1966/2009:150) since ‘autogestion 
cannot avoid a collision with that stato-political system’ (ibid., pg.147). In The Urban 
Revolution, Lefebvre (1970/2003, pg. 180) argues that the ‘state and the urban’ are 
‘incompatible.’ The example of Set/Setal demonstrates how the urban only comes to 
be defined in opposition to the state and in the spaces and roles abandoned by the 
state. Thus, Brenner and Elden (2009, pg. 38) suggest that Lefebvre’s concept of 
autogestion provides an ‘important normative reference point for the rejuvenation of 
political struggle’ and allows us to reframe our understanding of youth movements 
in the city, especially when considering how they shape ‘cityness’ and ‘the urban.’ 
Butler (2012, pg. 158) argues that Lefebvre’s right to the city has the potential for 
‘destabilizing and challenging the dominance of capitalist social relations’ if 
 
132 See discussion of ‘ruralness’ in Pikine on pg. 187 
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pursued simultaneously with ‘the right to difference as part of a generalized spatial 
politics of autogestion.’  Set/Setal is an example of the ‘urban’ produced through 
social struggle (Kipfer et al., 2013, pg. 128-9). In Dakar, ‘the urban’ provides a glimpse 
of a future based on autogestion, civic engagement and participation – quite 
possibly in a setting that Lefebvre never foresaw or imagined. 
 
In Dakar, the practices of young people have encouraged ‘democratic, transparent 
and accountable politics and management’ through street manifestations, calls for 
accountability, and sharp criticism of the ‘fraudulent and clientelist practices’ of 
politicians and older generations who ‘agreed to and reproduced these’ (Selboe, 
2010, pg. 380). The spirit of reform and optimism of the Set/Setal devolved into a more 
aggressive social movement in the Bul Faale (Don’t Care) ethos, which was strongly 
represented in Senegalese rap as a rallying cry for disillusioned youth (Figure 45). 
Bul Faale is an urban movement that has a cultural dimension through ‘artistic 
modes of expression’ (i.e. rap) and sports (Senegalese wrestling) and social 
dimension in its conveyance of distinct generational values (Havard, 2001).  It 
represents both a desire to break with tradition and convention, as well as a capacity 
for innovation in the rewriting of identities (Havard, 2001). Young people 
demonstrated their power for creation and destruction, as ‘idealism, nihilism, and 
sometimes even pure, childish naughtiness’ were articulated through the 
positionality of youth in the African city (Diouf, 2003, pg. 9). Diouf (2003) states:   
In the most dangerous neighbourhoods of Dakar, for 
instance, young people have seized control of local space by 
setting up militias for self-defence and the protection of 
property and the tranquillity of peaceable citizens. In 1989, 
the youth of the Médina, seeking to make up for the 
deficiencies of the police, organized raids on thieves and 
drug addicts who hung out in the grottos of the Corniche 
along the seafront. In 1990, in the same neighbourhood, 
groups of young Islamic fundamentalists launched a series 
of reprisals following an early morning attack on a muezzin. 
Several bars and nightclubs selling alcoholic beverages 
were burned down. In September and October 1993, in order 
to fight the noise and accidents caused by express buses, 
young people living in the rues Valmy and Petersen in the 
centre of Dakar blocked the area and forced the governor of 
the region to order the vehicles off the streets (Diouf, 2003, 
pg. 8).  
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These examples demonstrate how young people strategically position themselves in 
the city, leveraging their role within the urban fabric to build the socio-spatial 
infrastructures of the city. Youth opposition to Senegal’s political establishment 
eventually led to the demise of the Diouf regime, helping Abdoulaye Wade and his 
promises for Sopi (change) to power (Gellar, 2016, pg. 17). In Dakar, the new regime’s 
interest in ‘modernising’ the capital through infrastructural transformations was 
often at the expense of the needs of urban residents and failed to address the 
shortage of jobs, affordable housing, poor transportation services, traffic 
congestion, and ‘flooding, erratic waste management, broken sewage pipes and 
frequent power cuts’ that typified the ‘other Dakar’ (Paice, 2016, pg. 1). As popular 
support for Wade and his large-scale and costly infrastructural projects waned, 
young Dakarois who once headed his call for Sopi (change) in his ascension to the 
presidency, were now venting their frustration and demanding a change of regime 
(Gellar, 2016, pg. 16). Wade’s popularity declined due to economic stagnation, 
repeated political scandals, and limits on democratic practice, as young people 
denounced his presidency as ‘increasingly patrimonial, autocratic, and even 
authoritarian’ (Bingol and Vengroff, 2012; Kelly 2012; Mbow, 2008; Fredericks, 2014, 
pg. 131).  
 
In the span of a decade, the challenging socioeconomic context of Dakar, and 
Senegal more broadly, spurred the development of a highly organized, exciting, and 
dreadful social movement, known as Y’en a marre (fed up) – a ‘rallying cry that 
hoarsely shouts the youths’ unprecedented, widespread discontent’ (Ngom, 2016, 
pg. 11). A new identity was formed, the – NTS (New Type Senegalese); 
‘a citizen fully aware of his[sic] rights but who doesn’t shun 
from his duties. This ideal citizen is demanding toward 
their rulers but doesn’t expect everything from the 
latter. Y’en a marre valued entrepreneurship and civic 
Set/Setal (1980-90)
Bul Faale (Don't Care) (1990s)
Sopi! (Change) (2001)
Y'en a Marre (fed up) (2011)
Figure 45: Evolution of youth movements in Dakar, 1980-2010s (Author’s own figure) 
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attitude, which earns the movement growing popularity 
among a population disillusioned by politicians’ (Ngom, 2016, 
pg. 13).  
On election day, youth positioned themselves at polling booths ‘to ensure against 
any foul play in what was turning out to be one of the country’s most dramatic 
electoral test’ (Fredericks, 2014, pg. 131). Abdoulaye Wade lost the election to Macky 
Sall, an outcome which was hailed as a ‘solidification of Senegal’s reputation as one 
of Africa’s strongest democracies’ but also signalled young people’s ability to place 
themselves ‘at the centre of the political stage’ and inspire deeper public reflection 
on citizenship and democratic practice (Fredericks, 2014, pg. 131). To an extent, the 
events unfolding in Dakar mirrored those of the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011. While political 
structures vary greatly between Senegal and countries of the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA), the similitude arises from the ‘dissenting voice of the Arab public’ 
which echoes in the African public sphere in the airing of grievances demonstrated 
by the youth movements in the country (Bayat, 2013, pg. 588).  The events of the ‘Arab 
Spring’ therefore resonate with the revolutionary potential of African cities in the 
culmination of ‘non-movements’ –  
‘the non-deliberate and dispersed but contentious practices 
of individuals and families to enhance their life chances. The 
urban poor made sure to secure shelter, consolidate their 
communities, and earn a living by devising work in the vast 
subsistent and street economy...And youths took every 
opportunity to affirm their autonomy, challenge social control 
and plan for their future, even though many remained 
atomized and dreamed of migrating to the West’ (Bayat, 2013, 
pg. 588-9).  In their ability to work within the confines of 
dominated spaces and subvert everyday routines and 
practices that make up all spheres of life: work, politics, 
leisure, language, etc., the ‘contentious’ practices of non-
movements are actively involved in the making of ‘cityness.’ 
 
Conclusion  
Place Kermel and Marché Sandaga reveal how power is inscribed in the built 
environment of Dakar and how urbanisation is an amalgamation of historical 
processes and evolving metanarratives manifested in built form. The territorial 
relations unfolding in Dakar represent the encounter between a ‘dominated space’ 
that is ‘generated and mastered by a dominant space’ and where the implicit and 
explicit narratives of periphery and centre are at odds in the ongoing ‘colonisation’ 
of space (Lefebvre, 1978, pg. 174). Power is therefore understood as ‘diffuse, residing 
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nowhere but enacted everywhere’ (Lawhon et al., 2014, pg. 508). Urban planning and 
architecture cover up the ‘social antagonisms’ arising from processes of 
urbanisation while informal and grassroots transformations of space are committed 
to the ‘revolutionary vocation’ of radically changing both ‘space and society’ 
(Goonewardena, 2011, pg. 88).  
 
The examination of the structural transformations of the case study city through the 
analysis of field sites allows for a better understanding of the manipulations of space 
and infrastructure and the fundamental redrawing and shaping of the contours of 
‘cityness.’ In Sandaga, we see the transformation of public spaces into political 
arenas – both as contested territories and sites for political protest. Sandaga is a site 
for ‘exegesis, rumour, speculation, conviviality, entertainment, mobilization and 
networking,’ all of which visibly extend beyond the physical (perceived) borders and 
the conceived importance of the market that continues to be a ‘powerful attractor’ 
(Simone & Pieterse, 2017, pg. 93). This example demonstrates that the transformation 
of space occurs through a politicised contest between the imaginaries of the state 
and those of the people. Place Kermel, as a microcosm for urban change, 
demonstrates the various processes and actors at work in the development of the 
city.  The redevelopment of Marché Kermel and the construction of Projet Lacoste 
and Centre Felix Eboué suggest the presence of competing ideologies that fragment 
urban space. ‘Cityness’ is therefore understood in ‘contestatory terms’ (Fraser, 1990) 




Voices: Dakar Arty 
African cities are ‘generators of urban stories worth telling and worth learning from’ (Myers, 2011, pg. 6).  The photograph presented 
here is emblematic of the African ‘bricoleur’ discussed in Chapter Three. The salesman conducting his own business in the backdrop 
of a fish market in Dakar is demonstrating the ‘collateral realities’ that produce urban spatialities of the city (Law, 2011). 
Figure 46: ‘Salesman on the sly in front of Soumbedioune fish market’ (Stefan Gladieu, 2017) 
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African cities are places 'to be modern' and to 'keep tradition alive,' to be ‘a kinsman’ and to be cosmopolitan (Simone & Abouhani, 
2005, pg. 12). This photograph is representative of the networks established through tea-making rituals, the presence en masse of 
young men and the inklings of an Afro-modernity represented in the effortless blend of vernacular elements with globalised symbols 
of modernity.   
Figure 47: ‘Shop on the coastal road between Dakar and Saint Louis’ (Stefan Gladieu, 2017) 
271 
 
Urban dwellers ‘become an infrastructure, a platform providing for and reproducing life in the city’ (Simone, 2004, pg. 407–408). The 
photo below presents an example of the economies of piracy (Simone, 2006) and the increasing presence of women as entrepreneurial 
economic agents in the African city. 






Chapter Nine: Conclusion   
 
The thesis situates itself within the discipline of human geography but 
speaks to broader themes across development studies, urban planning and African 
studies. While these disciplines have called for decolonising urban knowledge, the 
ways in which scholars and students undertake this task still remains a matter of 
debate. Within the framework of human geography, this analysis has utilised a 
variety of lenses and research approaches to analyse key urban processes (e.g. 
colonialism, modernisation, neoliberalism and globalisation) to arrive at a better 
understanding of ‘cityness’ in the case study city. As a geographical contribution, 
this analysis has drawn from and challenged the fields of Development 
Studies, History, and Planning. Furthermore, the importance of reflexivity and 
positionality throughout the research process has leveraged the researcher’s 
identity and experience of the city as part of the discursive work of understanding 
placemaking politics in Dakar. 
 
This analysis is a retroductive study of an urban theory of the ‘global south’ that has 
two key aims: 1) identify and address the gaps in our knowledge concerning cities of 
the ‘global south’; 2) engage with emerging theories on the urban ‘global south’ in 
order to arrive at a better conceptualisation of ‘cityness’ in the case study city. 
Archival research and fieldwork were conducted in tandem in/on the case study city 
to arrive at a better understanding of the ‘contingent universals’ (Healey, 2012) of 
urbanisation in the ‘global south’ through the analysis of the case study city. 
Nevertheless, the study remains conscious of the fact that shared histories of 
colonisation, exploitation, ‘brutal sovereignty and unbridled 
economic liberalisation,’ give rise to ‘specific urban formations and original urban 
residues’ in the making of ‘cityness’ (De Boeck, 2015, pg. 2).  
 
This chapter begins by touching base with urban theory to reassert the position of 
this research project within the broader framework of human geography. The 
following section dissects and evaluates the methodology of this research project. 
The evaluation considers the benefits of a retroductive analysis in the study of 
southern urbanisation against those of traditional urban inquiries (i.e. comparative 






the archival analysis of the methodology. The use of layers/scale to structure 
research interventions is also discussed and assessed. The next section considers 
the benefits of structuring a research project on the ‘global south’ around the 
concept of ‘cityness’ and the opportunities for broadening the scope 
of the methodology. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the role and 
importance of reflexivity and positionality throughout the research process and 
argues in favour of putting African cities at the heart of theory-building in the 
development of an urban theory of the ‘global south.’     
   
Taking stock   
Roy’s (2009, pg. 820) call to ‘blast open theoretical geographies’ and produce new 
concepts in the ‘crucible of a new repertoire of cities’ has incited creativity in 
theorising southern cities. However, this has not been matched by the ‘development 
of rigorous empirical methods to actually research them’ (Schindler, 2017, pg. 48). 
Urban geography continues to ‘tread water’ by recycling old ideas and ‘failing to 
develop new theories to explain the production of urban space’ (Hubbard, 2017, pg. 
3). Thus, the scope of conventional urban theory continues to be limited by its 
theoretical underpinnings and orientations, especially when applied to southern 
contexts. In order to study cities of the south – not as cases of failed modernisation 
or urbanisation gone awry – it is necessary to commit to a ‘mental decolonisation’ 
and recognise that the ‘ideal of the Western city’ was deployed in the colonial era, 
and is now ‘deployed in the neoliberal era to advance a certain paradigm of 
development and capital accumulation’  (Perera, 1999; Miraftab, 2009, pg. 44).  By 
restating the terms and not only the content of this conversation, we are able to 
reframe events unfolding in the urban south to give them their rightful place in 
history and in the framework of global processes underway. At the heart of this 
endeavour is the need to understand ‘what ultimately shapes the city’ in the ‘global 
south’ and ‘what can be done’ to effect urban change (Parnell & Pieterse, 2016, pg. 
237). This requires a ‘parallax view’ of the city that looks beyond conventional 
theorisations that have limited our knowledge of southern urbanism (Simone, 2018). 
 
Oswin (2018, pg. 544) contends that we should ‘keep thinking rather than settling on 
an epistemology’ that tries to capture ‘that which is bound to always elude us’ -the 






revolution’ – the scope and ramifications of which we have only started to 
understand.  An urban theory of the ‘global south’ is a theory in the making which 
allows for a great deal of improvisation, and trial and error in the elaboration of 
methodology. The title of this thesis signals that an urban theory of the ‘global south’ 
is not a totalising discourse on southern urbanisation. Much of what we know about 
southern cities continues to evolve as urban phenomena become ever more complex 
and defy the boundaries within urban theory. Within this framework, African 
urbanity remains an ‘elusive mirage clouded by limited data and inadequate 
theoretical approaches’ (Pieterse, 2011, pg. 20). Through the analysis of African 
urbanisation, this project has proposed that the examination of southern cities 
should be shifted from an appraisal of the city in a ‘state of being’ to a ‘state of 
becoming.’ Thus, African cities should not be seen in terms of ‘what they lack’ but 
rather based on ‘what they are and how they arrived at their contemporary 
configurations’ (Fourchard, 2011, pg. 224). Moving beyond stark binaries of what a 
‘modern’ city should be or look like necessitates the examination of space as a 
chronology which develops and changes ‘as it comes into existence’ (Carmona, 2014, 
pg. 171). Places are not static, they are processes that are always in flux (Massey, 
1994). The analysis of ‘layered’ urbanisation based on the dissection of masterplans 
moves away from the dehistoricising approach to the understanding of southern 
cities towards the examination of longue-durée historical, social and economic 
processes shaping the urban fabric. By identifying patterns of continuity and 
change and the factors ‘driving both,’ the analysis reconstructs the ‘socioeconomic 
and the political past’ of cities over an ‘extended timeframe’ (Reid, 2011, pg. 141). On 
the ground fieldwork is a way to see these processes in action in the physical 
articulations of dominant narratives, whether originating in the statist agenda, from 
above, or the logics of hustling and survival, from below. The empirical and 
theoretical work of this research project supports the idea that urbanity is contested, 
appropriated and reappropriated – both the physical urban landscape and the very 
meaning of what it means to be ‘urban.’   
 
Trial and error  
The tools of urban research in their current configuration are generally ill-suited for 
the study of southern urbanisation. The theoretical framework and literature review 






can broaden and deepen our understanding of southern urbanisation. To answer 
the research questions, this research project proposes and evaluates a method 
centred on the topic of ‘cityness’ in the study of southern urbanisation. The following 
section examines and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed 
methodology. In order to take on this challenge, the analysis has presented a 
research proposal based on scale to tackle the enormity of the urban phenomenon. 
The methodology begins with the examination of masterplans, followed by 
observational work throughout the city within designated spaces to engage 
with themes that are relevant to the socio-spatial infrastructures of the city. The 
methodology is designed to allow for a more grounded image of ‘cityness’ by 
examining the articulation of power politics in built form and the transformation of 
biophysical and sociocultural infrastructures. 
 
Retroduction 
The methodology is based on a retroductive approach to the theoretical and 
empirical work on cities of the ‘global south.’ In the field of urban planning and 
theory, comparative studies have traditionally underpinned the process of theory-
building and allowed for ‘a wealth of empirical findings’ but have been less 
successful in pondering what this means for ‘existing methods and theories’ (Ward, 
2010, pg. 482). More often than not, the comparative approach culminates in the 
development of ‘new ideal-types’ rather than an examination of the differences and 
complexity of cities in the elaboration of theory (Robinson, 2002, pg. 549). 
Comparative approaches are often based on establishing the similarities (and/or 
differences) between places as a means of arriving at a theoretical proposition. As a 
result, comparative approaches run the risk of ‘lump[ing] together the unrelated and 
the inessential’ (Ward, 2010, pg. 476). The methodological choice of working with one 
case study city rather than a comparative approach is arguably both a strength and 
weakness of the proposed methodology. Using only one case study does not prevent 
the analysis of several themes pertinent to southern urbanisation – i.e. colonisation, 
decolonisation, nationalism, structural adjustment, neoliberalisation, and 
globalisation. Furthermore, the methodology was designed to be replicable across 
cities of the ‘south’ by making space for their unique histories and processes of 
change while holding in tension the need for generalisability. Additionally, urban 






extends beyond ‘global south’ and is therefore also relevant to the study of urbanism 
in the north as well. As a result, the methodology is not constrained by the criteria of 
a comparative approach and the uniqueness of place works in tandem with the 
examination of urban transformation to develop a methodology that captures 
‘cityness’ in any city (Massey, 1997). 
 
For the sake of clarity, comparative urban studies often rely on methodological 
territorialism which assumes that ‘all social relations are organized with self-
enclosed, discretely bounded territorial containers’ (Brenner, 2004, pg. 38). This 
premise ignores more open-ended and relational conceptualizations of cities 
(Massey, 2016) that examine the city as ‘both a place (a site or territory) and as a 
series of unbounded, relatively disconnected and dispersed, perhaps sprawling 
activities, made in and through many different kinds of networks stretching far 
beyond the physical extent of the city’ (Ward, 2010, pg. 479-80).  The methodology of 
this research project is based on the premise that ‘boundlessness’ is an important 
feature of southern urbanisation based on the African perspective to planetary 
urbanisation. Furthermore, the analysis highlights the ways in which phenomena 
observed in the selected spaces of fieldwork shed light on larger processes 
unfolding on a city-wide scale with global linkages. By highlighting ‘interconnected 
trajectories - how different cities are implicated in each other’s past, present and 
future’ (e.g. Dakar, Paris, Rabat and Casablanca), the analysis takes a step back from 
looking for similarities and differences between ‘two mutually exclusive contexts’ 
and focuses on ‘relational comparisons that use different cities to pose questions of 
one another’ (Ward, 2010, pg. 480).  
 
This thesis does not engage in the traditional city-to-city comparative approach, 
instead focusing on the analysis of comparators in a relational mode of theorisation. 
For example, the thesis examines ‘urban policy mobilities’ and considers the ways 
in which ‘knowledges, expertise and techniques routinely and quickly move from 
one city to another’ (Jacobs, 2012, pg. 413). Understanding the flow of urban models 
and the often-implicit relational links between the spatialities of cities are important 
components of this research project. The empirical work demonstrates how colonial 
logics of planning and modern-day rationalities of sustainability are circulated 






investigates how the garden city model was exported and implanted across West 
Africa as the ‘cité-jardin’ and how the Medina, a north African urban configuration, 
was transplanted onto the urban fabric of Dakar. Other examples include the use of 
military rationale in urban planning in two colonial regimes (i.e. Bathurst (British) 
and Dakar (French)). This trend is also visible with the sanitation syndrome 
originating in London and Paris which is then recycled in Rabat and Dakar and used 
to justify socio-spatial segregation in these cities. The city of Rabat, in particular, 
reappears throughout the thesis as the prototype for Dakar but Rabat itself was 
modelled after Paris and demonstrates how planning ideas travel through space and 
time and are adopted/imposed in different contexts. More recently, the mobilities of 
urban planning are evident in the model of Diamniadio which is based on new 
planning ideals that fall in line with urbanisation as a profit-driven enterprise.  
 
The analysis also compares different masterplans across space and time alongside 
the comparison of different spaces within the city to explore different themes (e.g. 
Place Kermel, Marché Sandaga, Diamniadio). This type of relational work is 
important for arriving at theoretical propositions that can be shared across contexts. 
Amin (2004, pg. 34) noted that ‘[cities] come with no automatic promise of territorial 
or systemic integrity, since they are made through the spatiality of flow, 
juxtaposition, porosity and relational connectivity.’ These types of ‘connective 
practices’ (Jacobs, 2012, pg. 415) become what Robinson (2004, 2011) calls ‘actually 
existing comparative urbanism.’ This speaks to Healey’s (2012) proposition of 
planning case studies to determine ‘origin narratives’ and how these are carried over 
to other contexts. In so doing, it is possible to determine how planning strategies 
become attached to political projects involving ‘domination of one group by another’ 
(Watson, 2016, pg. 39). Therefore, in this relational approach, a key area of interest is 
to determine how the spatial workings of one city are transplanted onto the other, 
with varying degrees of success, and how this determines the ways in which cities 









The first part of the methodology focuses on masterplans as a way of gaining insight 
into the narratives that shape(d) the urbanisation and urban spatiality of Dakar. The 
task of this research project was to engage with the embedded politics and 
ideological inclinations of masterplans to better understand the rationales driving 
the production of urban space. This study has found that, generally, urban planning 
and design in Dakar consists of a ‘superficial exercise of cut-and-paste graphics 
along with copied text’ that only feigns concern with ‘more than just profit’ (Watson, 
2015, Cityscapes No. 05). This is evident in the plans of Hoyez (1938), 
Lambert, Gutton and Lopez (1946) and Ecochard (1967) in which racist motives and 
an imperative of profit-making and cost-effectiveness led to distortions of the 
plans and entrenched societal stratification and precarity, a hallmark of Dakar’s 
‘cityness.’  
 
The effects of increasingly unequal and segregated cities such as Dakar where the 
poor are marginalised, in spatial and functional terms, will be felt more acutely as 
resources continue to be diverted away from meeting basic needs towards 
supporting the demands of the ‘new enclaves of the elite’ (Watson, 2015). The 
masterplans of 21st century Dakar are highly problematic in the profound disconnect 
between the reality of city life and the implausible development and planning goals 
envisioned as the urban future of the city. The absence of slums, poverty, and 
informality in these masterplans combined with the fact that their implementation 
entails the displacement of thousands, indicates their complete inadequacy in 
guiding the urban development of the city. Planning theory is rarely implemented in 
a way that is pro-poor or inclusive, which points directly to the need for abandoning 
inherited planning systems in favour of context-specific policies. As the masterplans 
of Dakar have indicated, traditional planning often relies on regulatory systems 
of zoning that outline rights, uses, and management of land in order to produce a 
hegemonic idea of the ‘good city,’ developed by urban modernists like Le Corbusier 
(Watson, 2014, pg. 2261). Symbols of the ‘good urban life’ are captured by urban 
forms such as the ‘apartment and single-family dwelling, for example,’ and are 
deployed in the masterplans and infrastructural modifications of Dakar133 (e.g. 
 






SICAP housing under the Lambert, Gutton and Lopez masterplan and Diamniadio 
that prioritise this type of dwelling). Urban inhabitants are interpellated and called 
upon to ‘identify their dreams and desires with regressive, myth-like utopias’ that 
structure urban modernity within the bounds of the ‘nuclear family, private property, 
and segregated community’ (Kipfer, 2018, pg. 201).  Thus, the masterplan as it is 
deployed in the case study city and elsewhere is challenged as a worthwhile tool 
in determining urban futures of southern cities, particularly in the context of 
southern cities where the urban majority (i.e. informal, youth, poor) play a 
fundamental role in reimagining and restructuring the urban fabric of the city134. 
Neuwirth (2015, Cityscapes No. 07) asks;   
‘Are master plans even relevant, given that so many people 
in African cities don’t have access to basic infrastructure, 
like potable water or decent roads or electricity. Given this, 
should Africa be importing fancy development models from 
the rest of the world? Or should African cities instead be 
focusing on providing infrastructure and, as they improve 
themselves neighbourhood-by-neighbourhood, defining 
their own home-grown sense of what it means to be urban?’   
The most recent masterplan for Dakar (PDU Horizon 2035) projects the city into the 
future to 2035 and dictates the rules for planning for the next two decades. The plan 
presents a sanitised version of the city in which fundamental factors such as 
informality and temporary settlements are expected to be formalised and fall in line 
with the modernist aims of the plan. The reality, however, is that any given amount 
of time on the ground reveals that the hidden/ignored/rebranded inconveniences of 
urbanisation in Dakar are alive and well and cannot simply be ignored by a plan that 
currently only exists in the realm of fantasy. The consortium of planners, developers 
and architects that have established these ‘neocapitalist dreamscapes’ therefore 
invalidate the appropriations of everyday spaces ‘by reducing them to industrialized, 
neo-colonial, and patriarchal spaces’ (Kipfer, 2018, pg. 203). Devas (2001) found that 
in a study of nine cities across Asia, Latin America, and Africa, most relied on 
planning standards that were unsuited and perhaps even detrimental to the poor. 
Fernandes (2003) makes a similar point as the urban poor are often forced to ‘step 
outside the law’ to secure housing and basic services due to the outdated and ‘elitist’ 
urban policies in place.  Governments of the postcolonial state continue to opt for 
 






the ‘northern’ way which Fanon explains as the plight of the ‘mentally colonized 
African’ who internalises self-hatred only to have it ‘manifested in a perverse 
attraction for the culture of the colonial master’135 (Ferguson, 2006, pg. 157).  This 
perverse attraction is evident in the recycling of old planning tools and narratives 
that become more and more removed from the reality on-the-ground. Even as the 
models of southern urbanisation appear to have shifted from New York, Paris, and 
Washington to Hong Kong, Dubai, and Singapore, the 
aspirations about somewhere else that is supposedly more ‘modern’ and 
‘more desirable’ remain the same (Watson, 2014, pg. 101). Thus, the liberation of the 
colonies only signalled a new period of a different type of colonisation where the 
vernaculars of the ‘global south’ are still dismissed and subjugated to the 
rationalities of western modernity.  
 
The masterplans of colonial and postcolonial cities such as Dakar, Kigali, Nairobi 
and Addis Ababa have always (and continue) to ‘remake the city in the image of 
somewhere else considered world-class,’ (Watson, 2016, pg. 61). The diffusion of 
hegemonic planning ideas continues to travel north to south, but the increased 
involvement of foreign actors in the development of Dakar has defied 
the north/south binary. Firstly, the dichotomies that segregate the world are 
increasingly irrelevant in the emerging patterns of development of the ‘global south’ 
with the involvement of development actors such as Japan, China and Morocco who 
do not fit neatly within a First/Second/Third World framework or the recently hyped 
‘global north/south’ binary.  Secondly, the analysis suggests that the increased 
involvement of non-western, non-state foreign agents in the development of Dakar is 
evidence of a distorted triangular cooperation136. The distortion arises from the fact 
that despite the partnership between ‘developing’ countries, the involvement of the 
 
135 ‘The curricula of African planning schools draw largely on the colonial past and promote 
ideas and policies transferred from the global North. Most planning text books used in Africa 
are produced for students in the USA, the UK or other developed economies. The 
Association of African Planning Schools (AAPS) was formed to mitigate the dominance of 
unsuitable and irrelevant archetypes in planning education’ (Watson & Agbola, 2013, pg. 6). 
136 The UN's working definition for triangular cooperation. (TrC) is ‘Southern-driven 
partnerships between two or. more developing countries supported by a developed. 
country(ies) or multilateral organization(s), to implement. development cooperation 
programmes and projects’ (Note by the Secretary-General, High-level Committee on South-






‘developed’ country means that the cooperation is implicitly guided by 
the development narratives of the latter, thereby maintaining the status quo. For 
example, while JICA is responsible for Dakar’s masterplan and China and Morocco 
are playing increasingly important roles in the infrastructural transformation of the 
city, the narrative of the masterplans is still very much in line with the demands 
of ‘Big D development’ (Hart, 2001). This suggests that even in the presence of new 
global players, the urban planning bodies of Dakar continue to be ‘occupied with 
the master’s concerns’ (Lorde, 1984). Thus, the advent of satellite cities in Dakar and 
across the continent signals a worrying shift in the same direction. By doing away 
with the congestion, informality and chaos, the ‘parallel’ satellite cities represent 
‘everything existing metropolises in urban African are not’ (Murray, 2017, pg. 
32). Urban development in the ‘south’ requires ‘incremental development, militant 
social activism, smart city management, entrepreneurialism or state-based 
redistribution’ which means that theory and praxis must be linked to the everyday 
and makeshift practices that allow the majority of residents in Africa to ‘come to 
grips with urban life’ (Simone & Pieterse, 2017).  
 
Overall, masterplans are useful tools for identifying competing narratives of 
urbanisation and the elements of continuity and change in urban planning and 
development. The findings reported here shed light on how urban space is caught 
between the ‘workings of the market and the property industry in cities’ and the 
informal incursions and ‘push back’ from the urban (poor) majority who shape 
spaces within the city (Watson, 2009, pg. 2260).  History appears to be repeating itself 
in the urban development of African cities. Modern-day masterplans, inspired from 
their colonial predecessors, once again construct these areas as ‘terra nullis’ 
(Lindqvist, 2015) and the transformation of ‘land as commons or land as livelihoods 
into land as commodity’ is simply a new iteration of a historic cycle (Datta, 2017, pg. 
20). The push back against masterplans, however, is an equally important part of the 
masterplanning process since it documents how planning imaginaries are 
reconciled (or not) with urban transformations on the ground. 
 
Layering 
Throughout the research process, Lefebvre’s (1970) ‘theory of levels (global, urban 






racialised, and stratified socio-spatial processes that form the urban fabric of the 
city (Goonewardena & Kipfer, 2006, pg. 10). For Lefebvre, the urban is a level of 
analysis between the 'general level of the social order’ and the private level of 
everyday life; in this configuration, the urban ‘mediates totality’ (Kipfer, 2008, pg. 
200). The urban is therefore a ‘crucial arena,’ strategically located between ‘global 
flows and national surfaces’ (Short, 2017, pg. 6). Thus, the level of the urban 
‘mediates between the global and the everyday’ (Goonewardena, 2011; Kipfer, 
2009; Goonewardena, 2018, pg. 468).  
 
By working with scale, the methodology begins by looking at masterplans – 
elaborated and implemented on a city-wide scale – and then focuses on zones of 
interest based on the findings from the masterplans. Masterplans are examined as 
‘layers’ of urbanisation, each guided by their own goals, theories and underlying 
objectives. By structuring the analysis in this manner, it becomes possible to 
distinguish where the layers ‘collide’ in a battlefield of competing politics. For 
example, informality is often absent from masterplans and addressed as an 
exogenous phenomenon in the development of a city rather than an integral part of 
the process. The city centre, designed to exclude young informal traders from 
conducting the income-generating activities on which their livelihoods depend, 
have engaged in the ‘illegal’ occupation of land and widespread ‘non-compliance 
with urban regulations regarding the use of public roads and setting up commercial 
businesses’ (Diop, 2012, pg. 41). Street trading was banned despite ‘frequent 
consultations with trader associations’ resulting in opposing relations between the 
city authorities and marchands ambulants (street vendors) (Paice, 2016, pg. 2).   
 
‘Layers’ also structured research interventions in the fieldwork portion of the 
analysis. Lefebvre’s contention that ‘produced space’ has ‘perceived, conceived, 
and lived dimensions’ is key to this analysis (Kipfer, 2008, pg. 200). The examination 
of spaces requires the analysis of perceived (representational) conceived(symbolic) 
and lived aspects (Figure 49). This tripartite approach is helpful for understanding 
the competing narratives on the ground. For example, the table below presents 
a trialectic (Soja, 1996) analysis of Sandaga which can be replicated for any space in 
the city. The example below shows how the perceived space of Sandaga as a 






battleground for the continued struggle of vendors operating within and around 
the market as a lived space.   
 
 
Figure 49: The Sandaga trialectic (Author’s own figure) 
The analysis argues that architects, planners, urban designers are responsible for 
constructing the material aspects of the city such as monuments and renders and 




•Spatiality constructed through individual routines 
(e.g. shopping) which culminate in the systematic 
creation of zones and regions (i.e. consuming health 
services, state consumption of retail)
• The routines in Sandaga are structured mainly
around shopping and retail. The nature of income-
generating activities is characterised by formal
transactions as well as informal business practicies.
Additionally, the space is a popular tourist site and
place of historical relevance. The centrality of the





•Spaces of imagination represented in the visions of 
designers, planners, artists and architects
• Sandaga is typified by its neo-Sudanese
architecture. The ongoing structural transformations
of the market in the physical encroachments to the
market structure are in direct contention with the
visions of planners and designers for the role and
urban transfomration of Dakar-ville. The plans for the
upcoming rehabilitation of Sandaga represent an
interesting case study for the examination of the
evolution of this space.
Lived space
(Lived)
•Spaces of representation exist at the intersection
between spatial practices and representations of
space. These include ‘collective fantasies around
space, the resistance to the dominant practices and
resulting forms of individual and collective
aggression’ (Urry, 2006, pg. 25).
•Sandaga is envisioned as battlefield for informal
vendors despite the fact that the market itself is
defunct following an outbreak of fire in 2013. Their
right to continue operating around the market
is analogous to their right to the city, their right to







example, President Léopold Senghor (1960-1980), first president of the Republic of 
Senegal, encouraged the standardisation of urban planning and architectural 
designs to reflect African sculpture (Diop, 2012, pg. 38). Through Négritude, 
Senghor used the development of the built environment as a ‘tool to exhibit the 
various aspects of the Senegalese way of life’ with the construction 
of Obélisque Square, a 30-metre memorial, the central mosque in 1963, the Demba 
Diop Stadium, and the Daniel Sorano Theatre which hosted important cultural 
events such as the World Black People’s Arts festival in 1966 (Diop, 2012, pg. 
38). Similarly, President Abdoulaye Wade harnessed the perceived and conceived 
aspects of space to establish Dakar as a strategic investment destination and ‘world-
class city’ through large construction programmes, roads, malls, hotels, a new 
international airport, the Monument de la Renaissance Africaine (Paice, 2016, pg. 1), 
the Millennium Gate and a ‘bronze statue of a young football player, which 
immortalises the country’s various victories during the African Cup of Nations and 
the 2002 FIFA World Cup’ (Diop, 2012, pg. 38). Therefore, the ‘specialized, state-
dependent knowledge’ of architects, planners, and urban designers is channelled 
in the reification of space as a ‘thing-like object that imposes itself on the urban 
inhabitants from the outside, as it were’ (Kipfer, 2008, pg. 201). However, the reality 
of places as lived spaces has meant that they are transformed in accordance with 
the ‘cityness’ articulated by urban inhabitants. 
 
Lived space is shaped by the daily interactions of urban dwellers with the 
infrastructural environment (and with each other within the space) which imbues 
the space with its conceived and perceived materialities. Plans and maps represent 
an abstract representation of the city. They give life to the imaginaries of planners 
and development practitioners and fall in line with the growth agendas and 
discourses elaborated at national and international levels. They represent the 
‘aspirational maps’ of planning bodies137. On the ground, however, observations 
have revealed that urbanites are designing their own city in the visible and constant 
 








changes to the landscape138. Therefore, by working with layers and scale, the 
analysis of masterplans allows for a better understanding of the more abstract 
renders of cities and the ‘aspirational maps’ of planners, developers and the state, 
while fieldwork observation is an opportunity to examine whether these aspirations 
are articulated in the development of the city or remain in the realm of fantasy 
(Watson, 2012). While the analysis engages with socio-spatial infrastructures of 
space in a manner that allows for the development of themes, the understanding of 
lived aspects is somewhat limited by the methodology of this research project. While 
the objectives and methods of key agents such as architects, academic, planners 
and developers are taken apart and studied through the masterplans and policy 
literature, the agency of urban dwellers also needs to be considered in all its breadth 
and complexity.  Aside from the insight gained from first-hand observations and 
experiences of the space based on the researcher’s positionality, the proposed 
methodology is limited by the absence of ‘voice’ (interviews). This limitation 
originates in the parameters of the doctoral research project and the theoretical 
imperatives of southern theory that limit or advise against documenting the 
‘manifold narratives of the minority’ (Jazeel, 2018, pg. 17). Rather than draw 
conclusions from fleeting interactions and unstructured interviews, the study has 
opted to focus on the study of plans, structures, landscapes and observations but 
emphasizes the need for in-depth interviews with urban residents who occupy the 
spaces under scrutiny. A key issue in postcolonial and subaltern studies is the issue 
of voice and any attempt to situate the views of the subaltern within the confines of 
a doctoral thesis focused primarily on the evolution of planning and urban forms 
through in-depth archival work that enables an extensive analysis of historical and 
contemporary master plans within the scope of a single thesis. Life stories collected 
through interviews would add a degree of depth to the analysis of urban experience 
in a more humanist analysis to the nature of everyday urbanism. However, the 
current methodology still allows for an understanding of how people operate within 
the confines of planned spaces, often reimagining and redesigning their use and 
purpose. Interviews add a layer of complexity to the analysis of urban lives that have 
 
138 An important example of this trend is in Pikine and the three forms of habitation that 
demonstrate the contest between the aspirational maps of different groups. The ‘official’ 
housing stands in stark contrast to the ‘irregular’ housing and demonstrates how the 






hitherto either been essentialized or ignored. The analysis answers the question of 
how people live within the spaces and their methods of habitation and occupation 
of space. Further research which features interviews and life stories more 
prominently may look more closely at why ordinary urbanites interact with the city in 
the way they do. This research project therefore maintains that in order to expand 
the scope of our understanding of ‘cityness’ further, future research should delve 
further into the lives of those who occupy the spaces under examination. This 
necessitates for the subject to be examined in all its breadth and complexity, as 
geographers must learn to ‘tell the stories that our work yields in non-reductive ways’ 
(Jazeel, 2018, pg. 17). 
 
Scale 
This analysis uses scale as a methodological tool to engage in ‘meso-level’ 
theorising based on which the findings are assessed in terms of their relevance to 
other (southern and northern) contexts139 (Connell, 2007, pg. 225). For example, in 
order to understand the real-life consequences of a macro project such as PDU 
Horizon 2035 or the Plan Senegal Emergent, it is necessary to engage with field-sites 
at the micro level such as Sandaga and Kermel. In the scalar analysis of the case 
study city, the different phases of fieldwork have different aims:  
An archival analysis of masterplans is necessary to arrive at 
a better understanding of the metanarratives guiding urban 
development and explaining the broad contours of 
infrastructural development 
Fieldwork analysis allows for the observation of 
metanarratives ‘at work’ on-the-ground while also 
accounting for the fact that there are elements beyond the 
purview of masterplans that are integral to urban trends (i.e. 
informality) 
On a practical note, the task of studying a ‘city’ in all its breadth and complexity is a 
challenging one for the doctoral researcher, so it was necessary to find a way to get 
a birds-eye view of the city without straying too far from the goal of developing a 
methodology that was replicable in other cities. To do this, the analysis of 
masterplans became an important foundation for understanding the broad contours 
 






of planning and physical development as well as the development of ‘cityness’; 
through the analysis of masterplans, it is possible to discuss the metanarratives 
driving the development of the entire city and to hone in on specific 
topics/ideas/buildings (e.g. architecture as an ideological transmitter). By working 
with scale, it is possible to engage with the constituent elements140 of ‘cityness’ 
without losing analytical rigor and depth of analysis for the purpose of theory 
building. The importance of scale as an analytical tool is demonstrated in the work 
of previous researchers who have conducted their own examination of the case 
study city:  
- Beeckmans (2013) looks at masterplans to trace the 
historical development of three African cities (Dakar, 
Dar es Salaam, Kinshasa) between 1920 and 1980. The 
paper focuses on the development of specific 
neighbourhoods within the case study cities to assess 
the success (in terms of implementation) of the 
masterplans.  
- Bigon (2017) focuses on the historical development of 
French colonial Dakar and looks at a city-wide scale 
but also focuses on specific planning mechanisms as 
well as architectural analyses of specific buildings 
and neighbourhoods.  
- Dione (1992) examines the evolution of Dakar, plan by 
plan, focusing on the bigger picture and broad 
contours of urban development in the city. 
- Seck (1970) examines the 20th century plans of Dakar 
in great detail, including topographical and 
meteorological analyses of Dakar. 
The analysis works across both scale and time to account for the fact that 
infrastructure is always in flux and that space is a chronology. In so doing, the thesis 
takes a ‘more sanguine approach’ to the understanding of ‘underlying conditions’ 
that shape African urbanisation (Berrisford, 2013). The examination of longue-durée 
processes allows for a better understanding of the mechanisms that obstruct 
change and the continuity of ‘deep-seated attitudes’ such as the preponderance of 
the interests of a ‘small minority over those of the majority’ (Berrisford, 2013). 
 
 






Questioning ‘cityness’  
Another key aim of this research project is centred on determining whether 
‘cityness’ is a useful trope for the study of southern urbanism. The research has 
shown that ‘cityness’ is a prism based on which urban research may be broadened 
to develop a better understanding and appreciation of southern urbanisation 
beyond the traditional developmentalist outlook. ‘Cityness’ is located in the 
everyday which is structured by the trivial and repeated occurrences in which a 
single experience acts as a ‘metonym of larger and unarticulated wholes’ 
(Harootunian, 2000, pg. 71).  Wierling (1989, pg. 171), a gender historian, described 
the everyday as the ‘sphere in which people through their actions exercise direct 
influence on their condition.’ Japanese scholars, observing life from banal spaces 
such as street corners, imagined a new discipline called ‘modernologio’ 
(kokengaku) centred on the everyday and the articulations of modernity (ibid). As 
the metanarrative of modernisation was discredited in the failures of development 
policy to unlock growth, new types of exchanges and networks of solidarity and 
resistance were explored (Enwezor et al., 2003, pg. 19). Modernity once held Europe 
as a ‘silent referent’ (Chakrabarty, 2000, pg. 28). Today, the analysis suggests that 
this paradigm was abandoned in favour of ‘revitalised versions of non-modern, 
usually non-Western, philosophies and cultures’ (Peet & Hartwick, 2009, pg. 153). In 
everydayness, we look for ‘the watermark of a history concealed under the smooth 
surface of routine and sameness’ (Harootunian, 2000, pg. 72). The observational work 
conducted in Kermel Plaza, for example, reveals the tension between the etchings 
of history and the routines of modernity that culminate in the ‘cityness’ of 
Dakar.  ‘Cityness’ is therefore posited as the meeting point between the diverse 
processes of city making – the ‘dystonic impositions of planning infrastructure, 
policy and local vernacular practices’ (Simone, 2018, pg. 23). 
 
The academic concern with the everyday arose from a deepening suspicion of ‘big 
structures’ which rejects the idea that politics is a battle over the ‘control of state 
and institutions’ and instead a battle centred on the ways that people ‘appropriate 
their world’ (Trentmann, 2012, pg.525). As the tensions between structure and 
agency are called into question, the everyday and its small acts of resistance become 
an important topic of inquiry. In the study of the everyday, we make note 






knowledge’ and how they are deployed on the ground (Kipfer, 2018, pg. 205). 
Lefebvre makes a distinction between his definition of daily life (la vie quotidienne), 
the everyday (le quotidien), and everydayness (la quotidiénneté). Everyday life is 
where ‘dominated, accumulative sectors (everyday, everydayness) meet 
undominated, non-accumulative sectors (daily life)’ (Kipfer, 2008, pg. 199) (Figure 
50). Therefore, daily life opens up the possibility of radical politics, the ‘locus of 
which is increasingly the city’ (Goonewardena, 2011, pg. 97).  
 
Dakar, alongside other cities of the ‘global south’ showcases examples of the 
‘meeting’ between everyday/ness and daily life, a reality captured by ‘cityness’ as 
the ‘locus where revolutionary breakthrough is achieved’ (Bayat, 2013, pg. 594).  
Through the daily practices of ‘street politics’ of ‘non-movements’ (such as street 
vendors selling their merchandise on the sidewalk or poor households 
‘incorporating public spaces into their private lives’), the urban subaltern wages a 
quiet revolution in a disruption of routines and  the appropriation of public space 
which is a ‘gain itself, rather than a means to achieve a political goal’ (Bayat, 2013, 
pg. 595). As an ‘exercise in placemaking,’ these patterns extend our understanding 
of ‘cityness’ (Vasuvedan, 2015, pg. 349); 
1. as an act or process of ‘collective world-making 
through which an alternative; informal sense of 
‘cityness’ is continuously made and re-made’ 
(Simone, 2010; Vasudevan, 2011); 
2. as an ‘improvised materialism that focuses on the 
everyday materialities’ within informal settlements 
and spaces and the tactics and strategies of residents 
and activists to use and adapt different materials in 
contexts of ‘daily survival, experience, inequality and 
possibility’ (McFarlane, 2011, pg. 163);  
3. as a ‘specific political imaginary characterized by a 
provisional and precarious openness to the 
possibilities of assembling and developing other 
Everyday/Everydayness •dominated, accumulative sectors ; produced by the reproduction of capitalism
Daily life •undominated, non-accumulative; produces 
the possiblity of radical politics






alternative urbanisms out of the very matter and stuff 
of inequality, displacement and dispossession’ 
(Vasuvedan, 2015, pg. 349).   
Drawing from the idea of ‘people as infrastructure’, this analysis has identified the 
social architectures created by urbanites who use their ‘time, bodies, inclinations, 
tools, and all the material stuff that exists around and within them’ to deliver and 
benefit from public services such as water, waste management, income-generating 
opportunities or ‘even to disappear, fade away, fan out into a larger world of 
operations’ (Simone, 2008, pg. 88). In the daily acts of subversion, a Gramscian 
counterhegemonic narrative emerges in the articulation of autogestion (self-
management) that amounts to a transformation of the urban fabric (Kipfer, 2008, pg. 
197). ‘Cityness’ can therefore be used as the masterplan metaphor for this change. 
A map of cityness, in its physical articulations and transformations of the urban 
landscape, placed atop an official masterplan will reconcile the gap between 
planning imaginaries and lived realities. 
  
The everyday therefore becomes a central concern for any radical urban theory that 
isn’t content with simply offering ‘vivid descriptions of cities and capital’ but with 
producing new concepts beyond the ‘exhausted attachments to party, state, and 
parliament, not to mention ‘social capital’, ‘civil society’, or ‘citizenship,’ none of 
which capture the continued battle for the right to the city’ (Goonewardena, 2011, 
pg. 97). The narratives surrounding the everyday in cities of the south are overly 
cautious or blind to their potential to ‘change the world without taking power’ 
(Holloway, 2003). The tendency within some academic work to romanticize 
resistance and read ‘all forms of resistance as signs of ineffectiveness of systems of 
power and of the resilience and creativity of the human spirit in its refusal to be 
dominated’ has, at times, collapsed distinctions between resistance and coping 
strategies (Abu-Lughod, 1990, 42). Studies that elucidate how poor urban 
dwellers survive in ‘uninhabitable’ urban environments are in line with the ‘in-vogue 
parlance of social resilience’ (Simone & Pieterse, 2017, pg. 63). Acknowledging the 
state of poverty, inequality and marginalization of the urban majority in southern 
cities does not preclude us from recognizing the ‘energies and ingenuity’ that the 
urban poor marshal to retain a foothold in the city, despite the odds against them’ 






aspirations,’ Africans are arguably developing new forms of social capital and 
political expression with the potential for creating new societies and ‘running into 
the ground inherited images of what a city should be’ (Simone, 2008, pg. 86);  
‘The notion of capturing positions of power, whether it be 
governmental power or more dispersed positions of power in 
society, misses the point that the aim of the revolution is to 
dissolve relations of power, to create a society based on the 
mutual recognition of people’s dignity. What has failed is the 
notion that revolution means capturing power in order to 
abolish power. What is now on the agenda is the much more 
demanding notion of a direct attack on power relations. The 
only way in which revolution can now be imagined is not as 
the conquest of power but as the dissolution [emphasis 
added] of power’ (Holloway, 2003, pg. 9).  
The examination of these survival strategies – the ability to transform people into 
infrastructure, for example - sheds light on events taking place in the north. For 
example, Jaleel (2012) discusses the neighbourhood distribution centres arising 
from the ‘Occupy Sandy’ movement which established a ‘base for identifying acute 
housing needs’ and enabled the Occupy movement to create and maintain spaces 
for ‘people to care for each other’s needs while challenging the scarcity logics of 
capitalism.’ This phenomenon was arguably happening two decades earlier in 
Dakar during the Set/Setal movement and continues today as residents of informal 
settlements find ways to survive in precarious conditions. Set/Setal was a direct 
response to the effects of capitalism and responded to the needs of urban citizens 
through the mobilisation of people during a time when the state was simply unable 
to fulfil its role.  These social movements do not necessarily have revolution as an 
‘explicit aim’ but often rely on gradual transformation (Kipfer et al., 2008, pg. 15). The 
urban poor are arguably the new proletarian class. Zizek (2005) asks: ‘What if the 
new proletarian position is that of the inhabitants of the slums of the new 
megapolises?’ His answer: ‘While we should of course resist the easy temptation to 
elevate and idealize the slum-dwellers into a new revolutionary class, we should 
nonetheless, in Badiou’s terms, perceive slums as one of the few authentic 
‘evental sites’ in today’s society’.   
 
This type of work therefore has the explicit aim of locating ‘agency, possibility and 
resistance in the habitus of slum dwellers’ (Derickson, 2015, pg. 652). Informal 






consumption or habitation. Neuwirth (2004, pg. 311), for example, argues that the 
‘world’s squatters give some reality to Henri Lefebvre’s concept of ‘the right to the 
city’;  
‘they are excluded so they take,’ he writes, ‘but they are not 
seizing an abstract right, they are taking an actual place: a 
place to lay their heads. This act – to challenge society’s 
denial of place by taking one of your own – is an assertion of 
being in a world that routinely denies people the dignity and 
the validity inherent in a home.’ 
Thus, ‘cityness,’ through the language of rights can be understood as the ‘renewed 
right to urban life’ (Lefebvre, 1996, pg. 158).   
 
Situating ‘cityness’ 
Pieterse’s map of the conceptual landscape of urban theories (2017) is a useful guide 
for understanding the core approaches to the study of African urbanism141. However, 
 
141 In a 2010 paper titled ‘Cityness and African Urban Development,’ Pieterse outlines a 
research agenda based on ‘cityness’ for the analysis of African cities. The agenda is based 
largely on the examination of violence as a defining characteristic of the African city (in 
particular, deprivation as violence). In a previous dissertation titled ‘Youth, Criminality and 
Violence’ completed in 2014, I engaged with this theoretical proposition and research agenda 
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in order to develop and evaluate a research agenda based on ‘cityness,’ the analysis 
has ‘tried on for size’ several theories and frameworks in order to ‘see what sticks’ in 
the process of theory building. The schema (Figure 51) develops a language to speak 
back to urban theory and discuss emerging urban phenomena by operationalising a 
research agenda based on ‘cityness.’ The redrawn schema demonstrates how 
‘cityness’ is disaggregated into its constituent elements and proposes existing or 
emerging theories as mechanisms to redress the oversights of mainstream theory. 
The first disaggregation (urban experience, urban spaces and infrastructures, 
urban experience) breaks down ‘cityness’ into its constituent elements. The schema 
indicates that ‘urban experience’ represents the most concrete engagement with 
the city which requires first-hand observation while the ‘urban plans’ is the most 
abstract representation of the city in the aspirational maps of planning bodies. The 
second disaggregation uses Pieterse’s designations for theoretical landscapes in 
the African urbanism but reimagines their role in the elaboration of theory through 
the selection of several theoretical frameworks.  
Urban plans – The lasting effects of colonial control are 
evident in planning which is why postcolonial theory is used 
as the corrective mechanism to ‘decolonise’ the field of 
urban theory. This thesis does the work of decolonising the 
curriculum and engaging with emerging imperatives. The 
analysis offers a method that can be applied across southern 
contexts and inform both northern and southern theory in a 
postcolonial approach to the study of urbanism.  
Urban spaces and infrastructures – When theorising 
infrastructure, the overly pessimistic outlook (‘journalistic 
Malthusianism’) has meant that African cities are studied in 
terms of what they lack relative to their northern counterparts 
and the focus is on the infrastructure ‘deficit’ and ‘depicting 
African cities as not working—while claiming at the same 
time that urbanisation is a prerequisite for development’ 
(Forster & Ammann, 2018). To move beyond this 
mischaracterisation and acknowledge the various forms of 
urbanity, the analysis proposes to use the language of 
planetary urbanisation which argues that nothing falls 
outside the scope of the urban. Furthermore, ‘grey spacing’ 
 
largest demographic - youth. While the violence agenda opens up the framework of analyses, 
the Pieterse (2017) schema and proposed research agenda expands the scope, allows for 








allows for an engagement with ‘life between buildings’ and 
the importance of socio-cultural infrastructures in shaping 
the case study city. 
Urban experiences - The approach cuts across disciplines to 
avoid ‘normative, preconceived categories’ and better 
understand urbanity as a ‘social practice of urban dwellers 
who, through their interactions, create encounters and 
distanciation in urban social spaces’ (Forster and Ammann, 
2018). Politicians, planners, local entrepreneurs, 
development experts as well as ordinary urbanites have 
different and often contesting visions for their city. By 
engaging with planning documents followed by on-the-
ground observational work, it is possible to observe and 
analyse how the aspirations of planners and development 
experts are articulated and how they are 
accepted/subverted/altered by ordinary urbanites.   
The methodology of this analysis, reflected in the schema, was designed according 
to Simone & Pieterse’s (2017) propositions for a research agenda for the study of 
African cities:  
1. Research on southern urbanisation should involve a 
‘commitment to walking the street and finding 
compelling ways to re-describe the affective 
dynamics of everyday urbanism’; 
2. Theorising the urban south requires a certain degree 
of experimentation to develop new concepts and 
imaginaries that can ‘anchor and accelerate new 
practices, at diverse scales and in numerous 
institutional settings’ – learning through 
experimentation, trial and error; 
3. The study of southern cities must come to grips with 
the ‘changing and creaking institutional formats of 
the state (hierarchy and market), market and civil 
society organisations (networks and hierarchy) with 
an eye toward figuring alternative formats to curate 
organisational designs that are fit for purpose.’ 
In order to attend to these core principles, the theoretical framework works in 
tandem with the methodology to critically incorporate the propositions throughout 
the research process. Firstly, walking is a key method in this research project as it 
allows for an understanding of the psychogeographies of the city and how they 
interact with the rationalities of planning. The principles of flânerie are adopted as 
part of the research process but the aimlessness of the drift was abandoned in order 






much like Simone’s bricoleurs who engage in ‘trial balloons,’ the analysis 
demonstrates how theory building involves a great deal of trial and error. 
Experimentation is at the heart of this methodology which challenges conventional 
models and engage with emerging theory. Finally, to make space for the ‘creaking 
institutional formats of the state,’ the analysis has offered a historical and critical 
analysis of the longue-durée practices that account for the development of the case 
study city. Urban plans and mechanisms are traced back to their colonial and 
precolonial origins and their evolution is analyzed relative to the development of the 
rest of the urban development of the city. 
 
Southern urbanism: Further research   
New methodologies and theoretical propositions for the study of southern urbanism 
will need to find ways of addressing the rapid and ‘unpredictable’ growth of these 
cities, especially in contexts where land and service delivery rely to a much greater 
extent on informal providers than they do on the state (Watson, 2014, pg. 2263).  An 
important question with regards to the study of southern urbanity is - how do we 
grasp as an ’object of analysis’ something that is fleeting and transient? (Simmel). 
Analyses of the urban south should embed themselves within a larger research 
framework that looks at the bigger picture of planning but also privileges the study 
of everyday ‘lived’ urban life. In so doing, this type of research may ‘explicitly or 
implicitly’ disrupt mainstream global urbanism by privileging southern knowledge 
and giving credit to the ‘tactics of survival and subversion resorted to by subaltern 
or subordinated populations’ (Sheppard et al., 2013, pg. 897). 
 
The contribution of this thesis is to consider how ‘cityness’ may be set in motion as 
a research tool to theorise cities of the ‘global south.’ To do so, the thesis engages 
with emerging and longstanding debates in urban geography concerning how 
African cities have been studied and conceptualized and integrating these into a 
theoretical framework that considers how the examination of cities like Dakar 
informs urban theory. By calling on ‘cityness,’ the analysis rejects the northern 
constructs of urbanity and its ruling dichotomies and engages in a longue-durée 
analysis of urbanisation in a southern city, utilising both historical/archival material 
and fieldwork observation to inform an understanding of the process. ‘Cityness’ is 






pathways and trajectories of change and to consider their interlinkages through a 
relational approach. The analysis suggests that ‘cityness’ may be understood and 
studied as the intersection between the psychogeographies of the city and the 
rationalities of planning.  
 
The case study demonstrates that from the very first masterplan, the contours, goals 
and methods of planning have been contested and are embedded within a process 
of othering that turns the city into a battleground for the right to the city. As the 
rationalities of planning and the psychogeographies of the city continue to diverge, 
the ‘cityness’ of Dakar is steeped in contestatory terms as the plans, infrastructures 
and spaces, and (lived) experience are constantly in contest. The ‘cityness’ of Dakar, 
along with that of many southern cities, is arguably ‘off kilter’ as urban plans are 
focused on urbanisation as a profit driven enterprise which compromises the 
viability of urban infrastructure and the lives of the majority of city dwellers. As a 
result, the urban experience becomes one steeped in contest and struggle as 
urbanites are forced to compete with plans and infrastructures in order to maintain 
their foothold in the city. Discordant ‘cityness’ is visible in the fact that the ways a 
city operates is often ‘wholly divorced from the realities of urban life and 
governance,’ particularly with regards to the emphasis on ‘compact, contained city’ 
such as with Diamniadio when the reality of urban sprawl typifies Dakar’s 
urbanisation (Berrisford, 2013). This is also evident in the prominence of large 
infrastructure projects that increasingly use planning law to ‘criminalize informal 
land development’  to clear the way for ‘mega-infrastructure,’ resulting in the 
destruction of ‘homes and businesses of people who are unlucky enough to reside 
on land allocated to a new bypass’ (ibid). 
 
To use the terminology of the colonial administration, the effectiveness of the urban 
experiments (plans) that are deployed in the laboratory of the city (Parks) may be 
measured by ‘cityness.’ ‘Cityness’ is an effective methodological tool because it 
contributes to an understanding of how to harness the strengths of its constituent 
elements (experience, infrastructure and plans) in order to promote efficient and 
equitable development. Therefore, in response to Simmel’s question on how we 
capture something as fleeting as urban development and change, this thesis 






revealed in the moments of contest/symbiosis between the rationalities of planning 













In the opening lines of this thesis, the aim was to harness the ‘liberatory’ potential of 
theory in the development of an urban theory of the ‘global south.’ The academy has 
long come under fire for being dissociated from praxis and too far removed from the 
‘real’ needs of people, constantly shackled by the parameters of the ‘relevance 
reflex.’ However, as the analysis has demonstrated, technical practice is never very 
far removed from social practice which, in turn, is only a step away from the musings 
of urban theorists, flaneurs, and researchers (Baudrillard). Theory informs planning 
but in order for planning to reconcile with the needs of cities of the south, theory 
must liberate itself from dichotomies, conventions and traditional representations. 
 
The premise of this emerging research agenda is to treat the subject matter with 
dignity. Not only the people whose lives are being scrutinised, documented and 
reported, but also the theory which has long been an afterthought in urban studies 
and research. On the topic of southern urbanisation, to speak of an ‘impasse’ (Amin, 
2007) in urban theory is to assume that research has simply reached a cul-de-sac on 
a theoretical road less travelled. Yet, one may argue that this road has seldom been 
travelled at all as there is much left to learn from southern urbanisation. Particularly 
with regards to African urbanisation, this research project has argued that not only 
is it possible, but it is crucial that we ‘move away from the fascination with the 
horrors of a seemingly static world’ in order to better understand its ‘virtue as a 
necessary hallmark of a truly global academic project’ (Mbembe & Nuttall, 2004, pg. 
352). 
 
In the concluding chapter of The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon makes a heartfelt and 
impassioned appeal to newly independent nations to find ‘something different.’ We 
[the postcolonial people] ‘can do everything’ as long as we do not ‘imitate Europe’ or 
become ‘obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe’ (Fanon, 1961, pg. 250). In 
the new geographies of the postcolonial world, we need blueprints, models, and 
masterplans that guide urbanisation; the European model – today’s ‘northern’ city - 
is ‘the most inspiring,’ but has also led to ‘mortifying setbacks’ in the ‘global south’ 






lessons of history and the revolutionary potential of ‘the urban’ to tackle the 
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Safety Committee comments at this stage: Dear Sabrine, Thanks for this. I wondered 
if you could think about risks relating to the experience you are likely to have in 
Senegal, not just the FCO's recommendations. Also, would be good to have the local 
contact's details here too. If you have experience in the region, make that known as 
well. Best, Helen  
 
If you are a student and if your project requires ethical approval you must add your 
approval number to the form when available. 
 
Your assessment is accessed, edited, countersigned or reviewed using this link. 
Each time you submit changes, the form will email you and your 
countersignatory, who will need to review them. 
________________________ 
This assessment is for work carried out by: PhD student 
Student number: K1471873 
 
I confirm that I will/have applied for research ethics approval: Yes 
 
If required, when you have ethical approval log the approval number here:  
 
Provisional project title: Examining 'cityness' to inform an urban theory of the 
global south 
 
Location of the research: Dakar, Senegal 
Estimated date you arrive in this area: 2017-04-18 
Estimated date you leave this area: 2017-04-30 
I/we have pre-existing medical conditions or disabilities that are likely to prevent 
me from undertaking the proposed project safely: No 
Have the FCO advised against travel to this area?: No 
Insignificant or significant risk?: Significant 
My project is:: Social science 
 
Are you planning to work alone? If you are inexperienced in the location or 
techniques, how will your work be supported/supervised in the field.: I will be 
working alone but will have a local contact. 
 
What type of environment(s) are you working in? This initial visit is solely for the 







What are the key techniques you will use? I will be visiting the national archives 
which are open to the public in order to collect data. 
 
Permissions: Although the archives are open to public access, the work may 
require permission to duplicate/scan the files relevant to this research. 
 
Next of kin (full name and email address or telephone number): Soukaina 
Hakam soukainamiyahakam@gmail.com +212 661343384 
 
Identified hazards and precautions that will be taken to minimise risk to you and 
others: Potential hazards (listed on FCO website) There is a high threat from 
terrorism; you should be vigilant after recent attacks in Cote d’Ivoire, Mali and 
Burkina Faso. Attacks could be indiscriminate, including in places visited by 
foreigners. Mitigating actions: Avoid any demonstrations or large gatherings of 
people. Unrest in Casamance regions; you should be vigilant when travelling in the 
Casamance region to the west of Kolda, and where possible you should avoid 
travelling at night, and stick to the main road from Ziguinchor to Cap Skirring and 
the main road north of the Guinea-Bissau/Senegal border from Sao Domingos to 
Ziguinchor. See Local travel Mitigating actions: I am not travelling to the 
Casamance region. Pickpocketing and street crime are common in parts of Dakar, 
particularly around Place de l’Independence, the central area of the Plateau, the 
Western Corniche, and at the airport. Mitigating actions: I will not carry anything 
valuable and avoid public transit.  
 
Are you working far from a hospital?: No 
 
Home country support: who in your home country will you or colleagues contact 
should emergency medical repatriation be required? My family is aware of all my 
insurance details which covers any emergencies that may arise during travel. They 
must be contacted immediately in case of emergency. 
 
Your full name: Sabrine Hakam 
Your KCL email address: Sabrine.hakam@kcl.ac.uk 
Your signature: Sabrine Hakam 
Date of signature: 2017-04-07 
The KCL email address of your countersignatory: Andrew.brooks@kcl.ac.uk 
Countersignature (completed after you submit): Andrew Brooks 
Date of countersignature: 2017-04-11 
KCL email address for safety committee reviewer:  
Safety committee approval:   
Date of Safety Committee approval: 
 
Comments from safety committee and/or approval conditions: Dear Sabrine, Thanks 
for this. I wondered if you could think about risks relating to the experience you are 
likely to have in Senegal, not just the FCO's recommendations. Also, would be good 
to have the local contact's details here too. If you have experience in the region, make 
that known as well.  
 
